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A Management Perspective on the Performance 
of the Irrigation Subsector 
Stellingen 
1. De Wageningse procesbenadeiing blijkt een goed referentiekader voor het verschaf-
fen van een integrale kijk op de besturingsproblemen van de slecht presterende 
irrigatie sector. 
Dit proefscknfi 
2. Het hanteren van het onderhavige besturingsmodel heeft geleid tot het constateren 
dat een deel van de bestuurlijke problematiek van het irrigatie management tot 
dusver niet op zijn waarde wordt geschat. Dit betreft de besturing van de stroomre-
gulering. 
Dit proeftckrifi 
3. Er bestaat een systematische prioriteit in de irrigatie subsector voor het investe-
ringsvolume. Een belangrijk gevolg is een läge gemotiveerdheid tot het leveren van 
goede kwaliteit van capaciteit scheppende besluiten en tot het leveren van goede 
prestaties gedurende de capaciteitsbenutting. 
Dit proefschrift 
4. Verbeteringen in het benutten van irrigatie capaciteit vereisen een relatie 
tussen de financiering van een irrigatiedienst en de kwaliteit van zijn dienst-
verlening. 
DU proeßcfuift 
5. Tot dusver zijn er geen mechanismen in de financiering van de irrigatie subsector 
die op effectieve wijze de verantwoordelijkheid voor het oplossen van de kwaliteits-
problemen decentraliseren naar diegenen die er iets aan zouden kunnen doen. 
Dit proefickrift 
6. Een niet aan prestaties gerelateerde financiering van investeringen in ontwikkelings-
hulp versterkt de bestaande centralistische tendensen van de ontvangende overheden. 
7. Zowel de irrigatietechnische als de economische technieken gebruikt in de irrigatie 
gaan impliciet uit van een mechanistisch, maximaliserend mensbeeld. 
Dit proefcduift 
8. In tegenstelling tot de meeste andere sectoren heeft het in de irrigatie weinig 
status om een manager te zijn. 
Dit proeftchrifi 
9. Een officiele omzetting van de term ontwikkelingssamenwerking in zoiets als 
internationale bijstand —waaronder de opvang van asielzoekers- zal waarschijnlijk 
het bewustzijn van de noodzaak, en dus de politieke haalbaarheid, van een GATT 
overeenkomst doen toenemen. 
10. De investeringen in straalvliegtuigen, automatiseringsprojecten en irrigatie 
Systemen hebben tenminste gemeen dat ze ten opzichte van de schattingen 
ongeveer tweemaal zoveel kosten. GelukMg wordt dit voor de laatste twee 
typen van investeringen "gecompenseerd" door het feit dat het effect meestal 
half zo groot is. 
11. Het beheer van de gemeentefinancien in Den Haag suggereert dat de 
promovendus dezes zieh verder maar beter niet met de ontwikkelingshulp kan 
bezighouden. 
Charles Mjman 
"A management perspective on the performance of the irrigation subsector" 
Bennekom, 2 april 1993 
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"So how is the "Crisis of Irrigation Management" to be avoided? Here the international 
development community has a vital role to play. This community has been an active part of the 
problem through the policy of moving enormous funds into irrigation programs with virtually no 
attention paid to the results. Indeed there can be little doubt that the policy of benign ignorance 
—however well intentioned through reluctance to "interfere in internal affairs" of local 
governments—has been a principal cause of poor management and corruption in irrigation systems. 
The time is now long past due for this policy to be reversed and for the international development 
community to play an active role in helping the many talented, honest and dedicated people in the 
LDCs to resist politidzation and corruption of their management systems. A "hands off" policy, 
confined only to financial disbursements, simply helps the "bad guys" against the "good guys". 
Insistence of effective management, on results, reverses the balance between the two. Here is the 
keystone for international irrigation development policy." 
Seckler 1982:14. 
to Inge and Thijs 
Preface 
THE MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE on the irrigated subsector presented herein is the 
outcome of four years of related efforts that were initiated in 1987 by the then management of 
the International Irrigation Management Institute (IIMI), Dr. T. Wickham and Ir. F.E. Schulze. 
They requested the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs to second a staff member with a 
background in both management science and irrigation engineering. The Ministry reacted kindly 
by sending the undersigned. 
Developing a management perspective on the irrigated subsector required inputs from 
practitioners, researchers and specialists of the most important involved disciplines such as 
engineering, sociology, agronomy and economics. The development of this management 
perspective was therefore initially done through case studies in Sri Lanka, the Philippines, 
Morocco and Sudan. Apart from available data in reports, files, and studies in different 
systems, irrigation agencies and donor organizations, the generalizing picture presented here is 
based to a large extent on interviews with a wide range of actors involved. It is an attempt to 
integrate the following multitude of perspectives: 
of farmers and field staff, their superiors, system managers, engineers, design and other 
support staff of irrigation agencies, as well as most top managers in the involved countries, 
agricultural agency staff, and individuals of the national planning agencies, several secretaries 
and undersecretaries of irrigation ministries, external consultants, many staff members of the 
World Bank and Asian Development Bank, a former Executive Director of the latter, a 
former Member of Parliament, a Minister of Irrigation as well as a former President of the 
World Bank. In addition, interaction with many other irrigation and development 
professionals has contributed to this management perspective. 
Many agency documents, files, reports, management control and information systems, as well 
as loan documents, audit reports and impact evaluation studies were reviewed. The presented 
management perspective was further validated with an extensive survey of the irrigation 
management and development literature. 
The analysis here is based on this multitude of opinions from interviewees and available 
written data. Although supported by an analytical framework, and its "unbiased" management 
perspective, the story represents the author's distillation of the "true" picture of the performance 
of investments in the irrigated subsector. Thus, only the author is responsible for the analyses 
and evolving conclusions and recommendations. The views expressed are his own. 
It is not the objective of this analysis to blame any individual or any specific agency, 
government, consultant firm or funding agency regarding the nature of their involvement in 
irrigation investment. Instead, it is pursued to provide a picture of systematic constraints in 
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irrigation management. Most reviewers of the two initial Sri Lankan case studies have explicitly 
referred to the much wider validity of this systematic pattern. Many findings and 
recommendations are likely to apply to a certain degree to other government agencies and other 
funding agencies involved in investment in irrigation, and in development in general, also in 
other developing countries. As far as individuals can be identified at all here, they should not 
be criticized as this analysis is about the performance of the "system" of irrigation development 
and management in developing countries, and definitely not about individual performance. 
The development of the analytical framework, and its application on case studies to obtain 
a generalized management perspective on the irrigation subsector would not have been possible 
without the extensive and thoughtful professional guidance of Prof. Drs. A.A. Kampfraath in 
our frequent encounters during the past four years. I am extremely grateful to him and to HMI 
for making possible this type of "overseas" professional guidance. Also, I would like to thank 
Dr. P.S. Rao for the support and technical supervision provided in an early stage of this study, 
and Mr. Charles Abernethy and Mr. Khalid Mohtadullah for support and supervision at later 
stages of my assignment with IIMI. 
The majority of data collection and interviews for the two Sri Lankan case studies 
occurred during 1988 and 1989. The comparative studies in the Philippines, Morocco, and 
Sudan, as well as the extensive literature survey were done during 1990 and 1991. 
Given this study's dependence on the interaction with irrigation practitioners and 
researchers, I am very grateful to the many people who allowed me time for interviews, often 
iteratively. I hope that most of these interviewees can find themselves in the presented analysis 
and recommendations. Moreover, I am very grateful for the cooperation and assistance I 
received from the staff of the Sri Lankan Mahaweli Economic Agency, Irrigation Department 
and Ministry of Irrigation, Lands and Land Development, the Moroccan irrigation authorities 
of Gharb and Moulouya, the Philippine National Irrigation Administration, and the Sudanese 
Rahad Corporation and Ministry of Irrigation. I am also grateful to involved staff members of 
several consultant companies, research institutes, the World Bank and Asian Development Bank 
for their cooperation with this research. 
Interaction with IIMI colleagues and some of its visitors was crucial for this study. 
Indeed this study would not have been possible without it. In particular, I would like to thank 
the following for the discussions we had on irrigation management: 
Dr. P.S. Rao, Dr. Hammond Murray-Rust, Dr. Zenete Franca, Dr. Masao Kikuchi, Mr. K. 
Jinapala, Mr. P.G. Somaratne, Dr. Douglas J. Merrey, Dr. D. Vermillion, Mr. J. Verdier, 
Dr. C M . Wijayaratne, Mr. D. Berthery, Dr. H. Sally, Mr. Charles Abernethy, Ir. F.E. 
Schulze, Mr. Khalid Mohtadullah, Dr. R. Saktivadivel, Dr. M.S. Shafique, Prof. Khin 
Maung Kyi, Dr. E. VanderVelde, Dr. Jacob Kijne, Dr. Chris Panabokke, Dr. D. Seckler, 
Dr. D. Constable, Dr. Gil Levine, Dr. M. Svendsen, Dr. Fred Valera, Mr. Jacques Rey, Mr. 
Ranjith Rathnayake, and Ms. Inge Jungeling 
In addition, Prof. Lucas Horst and Dr. Peter Zuurbier of Wageningen University provided 
thoughtful comments on the paper's final draft version. Though I do not want to implicate any 
of them in the author's responsibility for the presented analysis and findings. 
The research was supported by the Research and Technology Department (DPO/OT) of 
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the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, through my secondment to IJMI for more 
than four years. Additional research and publication costs were funded out of HMTs 
unrestricted core funds, for which I am very grateful as well. In addition, I am grateful to the 
Department of Management Studies of the Wageningen Agricultural University for the support 
given to this research, especially during the last months of finalizing this text. 
Special thanks are due to Ms. Charlerie Ludowyke for the preparation of parts of this 
text, and to Ms. Mala Ranawake for assisting in the preparation of most of the figures. 
Reading Advice 
Readers with very limited time who want to grasp the main messages of this management 
perspective, are advised to read the Executive Summary and chapter six, that contains the 
conclusions and recommendations. 
Charles Nyman 
Bennekom, August 1992 

Executive Summary 
INVESTMENT IN IRRIGATION has been immense in the past. Estimated average 
annual investments of US$ 15 billion makes irrigation the largest subsector of the 
agricultural sector, that is itself by far the largest sector of development investment. 
Since the mid-1960s the awareness spread that the performance of irrigation investments 
was far below its potential. The size of this underperformance is well represented by 
Seckler's alarming conclusion that the average irrigation investment costs twice as much, 
and delivers no more than half the benefits specified in the plans. 
THE PROBLEM DEFINITION 
Simultaneously with the increased awareness about underutilization, the awareness 
increased that the level of management of the systems was backward compared to the 
construction efforts and expertise. The underutilization was considered not only a 
technical, but also a managerial problem. Essentially three pilot studies in the late 1970s 
in the Philippines, Sri Lanka and India have provided the few available data to proof such 
potential for performance improvement through improved management. Yet, this 
potential for a sustainable "water revolution" remains to date largely as it was, because 
the evidence of these three experiments was not repeated nor sustained. 
From the perspective of many engineers, the management issue in irrigation has 
remained therefore, to a large extent, imaginary. There has remained thus a serious 
disjuncture in the perspectives of many irrigation professionals. Many of them have 
argued for the need for a more objective perspective on irrigation's performance to 
reunite the different professional perspectives, and as a prerequisite for the identification 
of relevant improvements. The topic of this study is such an improved insight in the 
management of irrigation, and ways to improve its performance. 
THE OBJECTIVES 
In addressing these issues, this study adopts the following two objectives: 1) the identifi-
cation of generalized directions of management change for performance improvement in 
the irrigation subsector; and 2) the testing of an analytical framework for irrigation 
management. 
Addressing these objectives requires firstly an effort to fill the fore mentioned gap 
toward the concept of irrigation management. Therefore, the concepts of management 
and control processes and conditions of an existing analytical management framework are 
translated for irrigation. Together they form this paper's so-called management perspec-
tive. Subsequently, this analytical framework is applied to irrigation. 
xix 
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EXISTING IRRIGATION MANAGEMENT CONCEPTS 
Few explicit efforts to develop irrigation management concepts appear to exist. Most 
concepts focus on the formal appearance of the organization, its structure. Of the 
reviewed concepts, only Diemer's approach was a process-oriented approach. All 
concepts remained vague about the relation between process and structure. None of them 
tried to take a management perspective, i.e., to consider all relevant factors for irrigation 
managers. This study's potential contribution is to fill these gaps by taking an explicit 
management perspective, and by systematically analyzing the relation between process 
and structure. Besides, other management conditions than structure only are considered 
such as financial control systems, human resources, and the provision of information and 
knowledge. 
AN INTEGRAL MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE 
This study's management perspective is based on an integral management framework 
developed by Kampfraath and his colleagues of the Department of Management Studies of 
the Wageningen Agricultural University, The Netherlands. 
The Figure below is a graphic representation of the different steps of this process-
based management analysis. The identification of key decisions in regard to water 
delivery is the first step in the development of this management perspective on irrigation 
(step 1 of the Figure below). For irrigation agencies, the management of water is 
considered the primary irrigation activity and measure of performance evaluation. 
Therefore, to evaluate the internal management processes in any irrigation system, the 
relevant key decisions for irrigation have to relate to the water delivery. 
During the capacity utilization, the seasonal allocation plan, in-seasonal allocation, 
and the flow regulation are considered to be such key decisions. For the capacity cre-
ation, the desired investment objectives, feasible investment objectives, and the functional 
requirements for the investment were taken as the most relevant key decisions. 
Performance-based management analysis 
Step 6 
A Step 4 
% !:..:Ste0v3:::::;;| 
Final 
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After the definition of the relevant key decisions, the contribution to the overall 
performance must be established for each of them (step 2). If this contribution is deemed 
unsatisfactory, the processes leading to the final decisions are analyzed, and the bottle-
necks in these processes are identified. The establishment of the so-called levels of 
sophistication of the key decisions is part of this analysis (step 3). Based on an analysis of 
the interaction between the processes and the management conditions, those changes in 
the management conditions are derived that are likely to lead to improved processes. 
Apart from the organizational structure and rules, this framework also considers such 
other management conditions as the human resources, their motivation and incentives, the 
provision of information and knowledge, and the financial control systems. This leads to 
an identification of the changes needed in management conditions that are likely to result 
in improved processes, improved decisions, and improved performance (step 4). The last 
step is then the identification of the required management-control processes to achieve 
these required improvements in processes and management conditions (step 5). 
This analytical framework thus links performance, physical processes, decision-
making processes, management conditions and management control in an analytical 
sequence. Thus providing an integral "management perspective" on irrigation perform-
ance. 
DATA COLLECTION 
This study's data collection occured during in-depth organizational analyses of two Sri 
Lankan irrigation organizations, and during comparative studies in Morocco, Sudan, and 
the Philippines. Besides, less intensive observations were done in India, Malaysia and 
Pakistan. 
The data collection on decision-making processes consisted of the interviewing of 
decision makers in irrigation and other line agencies, ministries, funding agencies and 
consultant companies. Also reports, files, records and other documentation were 
reviewed. In addition, a literature survey was done to shape and compare the findings. 
The following sections give short summaries of the most significant findings and 
recommendations for the management of the capacity utilization and the capacity creation 
of irrigation in LDCs. 
RESULTS: CAPACITY UTILIZATION 
The assessment of the available water supply in the observed irrigation systems tended to 
occur in an approximate rather than a precise way. They tended to be on the "safe" side 
—preferably at a 100 per cent probability, i.e., at no risk-to minimize cultivation risks, 
and to minimize the related conflicts with the farmers and politicians. This practice pre-
emped the inclusion of the trade-offs between lower risks for the few lucky farmers, and 
higher risks for more farmers. Other interested parties than the irrigation agency or 
officer were usually not aware of the exact probabilities of the availability of the water 
supply. Thus, they did not share the responsibility for any related risks. 
Contrary to common belief, the assessment of the demand, the allocation of water, 
and the regulation tended to be demand-driven in all case studies. This decision making 
was left almost completely to the field level staff. Higher level agency staff made water 
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schedules based on theoretical calculations. These excluded important aspects such as the 
scarcity of water and the required management inputs by agency staff and farmers to 
achieve high water efficiencies. These schedules seldom had any value for the actual 
implementation of water allocation and regulation. 
Higher level staff thereby tried to minimize their management inputs. Only when 
complaints occured did staff get involved. To minimize complaints they tended to allow 
field staff to satisfy the demand for water, and allowed a related superfluous water 
discharge in all canals (if the supply was available). The main canals thus often trans-
ported the maximum discharge. Systematic monitoring and evaluation was not done in 
any of the case studies, as the extra water in the canals and the "delegation" to field staff 
did not need any. 
This minimal management approach of the agencies favored the farmers at head-end 
reaches along the canals. So the tail enders often had problems in obtaining sufficient 
water as the design and actual discharge capacities of the canals were insufficient for this 
type of surplus water allocation. 
The flow regulation along the main canals appeared an "adhocracy". The individ-
ual operators had no contingency instructions on procedures for gate settings relative to 
the timing and size of flow fluctuations. They operated therefore often by trial-and-error 
and tended to favor thereby the distribution to the service area under their responsibility. 
This was done again to satisfy farmers and to minimize complaints, at the expense of the 
conveyance to downstrean canal reaches. Also gate operators that were responsible for 
tail-end reaches could not correct systematically such favoring by upstream reaches. The 
easiest way out for them was to request an increase of the total discharge in the main 
canal. 
Getting more water to the end of the canal was then only possible by the allocation 
of more discharge to the overall system, or, if that were impossible, by rotation or 
staggering. Introduction of the latter measures required increased management inputs by 
higher level staff, and occurred only if (a portion of the) farmers, superiors or politicians 
complained. 
The above processes were mainly caused by the low motivation of agency staff 
involved in the capacity utilization. The incentives to be involved appeared to be mainly 
the following "negative" ones: farmers were never satisfied, a lack of performance-related 
financial or career incentives, the continuous risk of political interference, and pro-
fessional and financial incentives for construction and maintenance rather than for the 
capacity utilization. Similarly, irrigation agencies as a whole had no performance-related 
incentives, other than the fore mentioned negative ones. 
The above practices, motivation and incentive constraints were more true in some 
countries than in others. In Morrocco, the management practices were at a more elevated 
level compared to the other case studies and some of the above generalizations did not 
apply to Morocco. Performance-related motivation and incentives were observed to be 
somewhat higher because of a more sophisticated management, with individual billing, 
and a volumetric water delivery to farmers. Yet, also in Morocco, the agencies appeared 
to have no financial incentives to manage the allocation and regulation along the main 
system, in order to prevent obvious and known water losses. 
Main recommendations. In all case studies, improvement of the capacity utilization 
would require increased inputs by higher level agency staff. This would require that 
they, as well as field staff, become more motivated for this type of work. This seemed 
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unlikely to occur if the agencies themselves would not become more interested in and 
accountable for the water-delivery performance. 
The overall recommended directions for institutional reform to improve the capacity 
utilization were the following: 
1. A decentralization of the irrigation agencies. This would allow greater 
information exchanges at lower levels between farmers and agency, and 
between different agency levels; 
2. More financial dependence of the irrigation agency on the water-delivery 
performance. This would introduce some accountability for the water-
delivery performance. For example through an increased dependence on 
service payments by farmers. More financial independence of the irrigation 
agencies means also a decreased dependence on the judiciary budgetary 
allocation by the government; 
3. A more performance-oriented human resources management, such as per-
formance-based incentive systems and career development, especially for 
higher level staff. This would require a decentralization of the related 
authority to the agency; 
4. A more explicit and specific mission statement; 
5. External public monitoring for more systematic accountability (if no financial 
or other accountability to the clients exists); 
6. More transparency of and thus accountability for the performance of the 
regulation through a separate, central "regulation unit"; 
7. If WUGs are to be functional, they need a more powerful position in the 
water-related decision-making processes than currently observed in all case 
studies. This could be achieved either through more administrative authority, 
or through financial accountability to the WUGs. An ultimate step as the 
transfer of the ownership of (part of) the system (and possibly the agency) 
would provide the collectivity of farmers with even stronger powers to make 
the managing agency accountable for the performance during the capacity 
utilization; 
8. More appropriate government regulations and related enforcement to reduce 
the observed adverse incentives in some more independent irrigation agencies. 
Given the involved interests of agencies, their staff and the farmers, the above changes 
can only be realized if they get serious support from political and donor levels. 
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RESULTS: CAPACITY CREATION 
The desired investment objectives. Decision taking on the desirable investment objectives 
was often observed to be done single-handedly by national politicians. Usually, donor 
staff in consultation with consultants and agency staff prepared such decisions. This 
preparation usually left little time and room for participatory interactions with other 
interest groups. 
Politicians often determined such politically relevant objectives as the site identifica-
tion and the selection of beneficiaries. The political pressure thereby caused the pro-
fessional guidance to become sometimes ineffective. 
The acquisition of external funding was observed to be the prevalent political and 
agency priority. It dominated the other desired objectives, other than those of political 
importance. Because of this priority for external funding, the funding agency had, in 
principle, and in practice, a large influence on the determination of the desirability of the 
investment objectives. Thus, the desirability of such investment objectives as the project 
size and the performance of the water delivery and agricultural production was in all case 
studies largely at the discretion of the donor staff or consultants. 
As a result, also the interests of farmers and other local interests were unlikely, and 
were observed not, to be adequately represented in the decision making on the desirable 
investment objectives. Often the desirability from the farmers' perspective was con-
sidered equal to the maximum funding level as the funds were perceived as "handouts" to 
localized voters. 
In combination with an observed supply-driven availability of financial resources for 
irrigation investment, such politically dominated processes and the related attitudes 
worked against choices for less capital-intensive, more effective investments in, for 
example, water management and conservation. This applied to all case studies. 
Yet, the major gap in this decision making seemed the observed absence of an 
explicit definition of the desired performance levels for the new investments. The 
widespread and long-established experiences with ineffective capacity utilization in 
irrigation made this absence all the more striking. Even if donors, governments or 
consultants were aware of the unlikeliness of achieving the assumed performance 
improvements in specific systems or projects, they were observed to ignore such 
considerations in the investment selection and design process. Assumed performance 
targets of irrigation investments were kept implicit in all case studies. 
The likely commitment of such stakeholders as the national politicians, governments 
and agencies to the implicitly defined performance targets was almost nil (except for the 
few who were internally motivated). The more so given the lack of incentives to achieve 
them, while ample incentives were observed to relate to the acquisition of new invest-
ments (in an environment with abundant availability of financial resources for irrigation 
investment). In all case studies, the commitment of staff of the national planning agency, 
the irrigation ministry and the irrigation agency toward performance improvements was 
observed to be almost absent. The widespread underutilization of irrigation capacities in 
the past did not seem to have led to a stronger conditionality toward the quality of 
subsequent investment decisions. The underlying reason seemed the conflict of the 
quality of investment decisions with the fund-channeling function of the donor agencies, 
i.e., with the quantity of the investments. 
The feasible investment objectives. Financial resources for irrigation seemed 
abundant mainly because of the nature of the feasibility and appraisal assessments. In all 
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case studies, the feasibility and appraisal assessments were observed to occur after the 
political decision to undertake the project. The different steps and methodologies served 
merely to justify the decision. Consideration of the feasibility of alternative types of 
projects, project sites, or a more phased development to achieve the same objectives, 
were ignored in all case studies. 
The preparation of the decision about what was feasible and what not, was observed 
to be mainly the task of donor staff and consultants. Sometimes because they were 
considered more "independent" than staff of the recipient country or agency, in other 
cases because they would prevent likely delays in loan disbursements. Yet, it was 
observed to be very difficult, if not impossible, for them to determine the true feasibility, 
especially of the assumed performance improvement. Recipient agency and government 
staff tended to represent vested interests to realize the funding, and were unlikely to 
provide any information counteracting these interests. Even in the few observed cases 
where they were willing to do so, they were usually not asked to. Also the assessment 
experts and donor staff, who were driven by their organization's targets, were not 
interested in an absolutely neutral feasibility assessment. 
The assumed performance improvements and other optimistic assumptions were thus 
typically not justified. They were kept implicit. Cost-benefit and sensitivity analyses 
were not allowed in any of the case studies to classify a project as unfeasible. They 
seemed therefore to have lost their functionality for an objective assessment of investment 
feasibility and appraisal. Instead, they were used to facilitate subsidies for irrigation 
investments. 
The observed funding agencies were observed to have undertaken remarkably little 
to minimize or counterbalance some of the tendency to be overly optimistic in feasibility 
assessments. Rather than demanding explicit evidence of assumed performance improve-
ments, virtually the only check and balance mechanism within the development banks was 
observed to be the mild "peer reviews". These meetings tended to be chaired by persons 
who were primarily responsible for the quantity of loans, rather than for their quality. 
Performance targets for investments were implicitly set during feasibility decision 
making, and tended to be mainly donor-driven. Commitment to, or awareness of, these 
targets by staff of national governments and agencies was very low to zero. 
Justifications for why an investment would not become another failure were mostly 
conceptual, rather than related to real-life. The different conceptual approaches devel-
oped to overcome the "management gap" (such as parallel field canals, on-farm water 
management, O&M manuals, water-management consultants, farmer participation and 
monitoring and evaluation) did not increase the commitment of the agency and govern-
ment as they did not touch upon the performance and accountability issues. In fact, these 
solutions increased the donors' influence in actual investment planning and design, 
whereby the agencies felt increasingly less responsible, resulting in a diminishing 
commitment from their side. Sequential conceptual solutions established in a donor-
driven mode, seemed to have produced progressively less and less commitment to their 
actual feasibility by the national agency staff. 
A logical and related effect of the observed manipulation of the assumptions 
pertaining to the economic internal rate of return (EIRR) was the increased lack of any 
control over capital expenditures from the national point of view. Limits on expenditures 
per resource unit were observed to be non-existent in all case studies. For example, the 
maximum investment per settler, per unit of increased agricultural production, per unit of 
volume stored or regulated, per job created, per area commanded were seldom deter-
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mined and were thus de-facto based only on political considerations. This led to 
investment maximization attitudes by irrigation agencies and politicians—at great economic 
loss for the overall country in current and future generations. 
The functional requirements for the investment. As for feasibility and appraisal 
assessments also the decision-making processes about the functional requirements for the 
design were observed to occur in all case studies at conceptual levels only. Engineers of 
donors, consultants and irrigation agencies together seemed to determine these concepts 
and to adjust them regularly. Yet, no interaction with local system managers and farmers 
was observed for the determination of an explicit "program of requirements" in any of the 
case studies. 
The resulting rigid application of the different design "blueprints" with insufficient 
localized information was observed to be widespread. It led to almost random turnout 
sizes, often arbitrary placement of structures, the planning for unsuitable soils and 
cropping patterns in the design and the suboptimal use of existing reservoirs and drainage 
lines. Also during design, the misuse of the theoretical formulae for crop water require-
ments was found. Sequential assessments were allowed to be inconsistent without related 
justification. Thus designs were adjusted to fit with the preceding overoptimistic 
appraisal assessments. In addition, political interference was observed to occur frequently 
in the design process. 
Although substantial opposition against these design blueprints can be found in the 
irrigation management literature, all the observed funding institutions had accepted them. 
From their perspective, the advantage of the conceptual design seemed that issues such as 
the performance of the service delivery and the agency's related management control 
could be circumvented, while still having a "solution". 
To a certain extent, awareness about the non-functionality of the designs was 
observed in the case studies. Still, the preferences tended to go for short-term investment 
at the expense of long-term performance. Construction and political priorities in the 
agencies together tended to resist performance arguments, and to impede changes to a 
more realistic professionalism. Considerable political maturity seemed required to reverse 
such processes. Over time, the design seemed to have become a routinized, uncreative 
exercise. 
Awareness of how present design concepts have evolved over time was thereby 
observed to fade away gradually with the younger generation of engineers. Scientific 
design concepts have become internalized and the question of functionality did often not 
even arise. 
Yet, the influence of donor staff and external consultants on the formulation of 
design concepts appeared tremendous. Although the supervision by donor staff was 
observed to be intermittent and minimal—their staff visited a project typically only once a 
year—, they appeared more responsible for project justification and success, and thus for 
the project's design concepts, than were the local executing agencies and government 
staff. To justify either new loans or loan continuation, the donor staff or consultants had 
to come up with solutions. These were necessarily conceptual due to their unfamiliarity 
with the actual local situation in terms of the institutions, farmers, and physical condi-
tions. The observed local parties, from' their side, were tempted to easily agree to almost 
any solution proposed as long as they themselves did not become responsible or account-
able. The actual functionality of the design seemed often a minor concern to govern-
ments, agencies, consultants, and donor. Accountability for it was a non-issue in the 
observed irrigation bureaucracies. ' 
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The visibility of capital-intensive irrigation investments is likely to remain political-
ly attractive. This impetus was probably an important reason for the observed donor 
efforts to develop ever-changing blueprints that were less dogmatic than the earlier design 
concepts. These provided the new solutions as justifications for new investments. The 
tragedy of these donor-driven, conceptual solutions was that, however appropriate these 
design concepts could have been, the donor was observed to become more and more co-
responsible for the performance of the new design concepts as they became more and 
more their intellectual property. Especially because the irrigation agencies were not 
really responsible or accountable for either the functionality of designs, or for the water-
delivery performance. 
From "classical times" the technical irrigation profession was developed entirely by 
trial-and-error. Despite the more conceptual approaches that were developed over time, 
the actual development of command areas still seems to occur by trial-and-error. The 
early pioneers experimented on a small scale before applying their concepts on a larger 
scale. Yet, nowadays the abundant resource availability seems to allow for large-scale 
trial-and-error, and thus also for large-scale errors. 
No lessons were learned from irrigation's large-scale errors, since the assumptions 
about the system's functions tended to remain implicit. Ideally, design should start from 
an agency-wide assessment of the affordable and feasible "programs of requirements" and 
levels of service for their investments. Such decisions were currently non-existent in the 
observed irrigation agencies. 
Main recommendations. In all case studies, improvement of the capacity creation would 
require increased management inputs by higher level agency staff. This would require 
that they, as well as field staff, become more motivated for this quality. This seemed 
unlikely to occur if the agencies themselves would not become more interested in and 
accountable for the quality of its investment decisions and the resulting water-delivery 
performance. 
The overall recommended directions for institutional reform to improve the capacity 
creation were the following: 
1. A direct link between an agency's finance and the quality of its capacity 
creation decisions, and the ultimate water-delivery performance. For exam-
ple, through cost-sharing by the agency and the clients, or through more tight 
funding through the reduction of the hidden (i.e., in the cost-benefit analysis) 
and other unconditional subsidies. The latter could be achieved through, for 
example, a reduction of the misuse of the cost-benefit analysis through checks 
and balances on all performance and other assumptions underlying the 
feasibility assessment (e.g., through the remedial principle). Also an explicit 
commitment to performance improvements could be introduced through, for 
example, the consistent use of a "performance and accountability balance 
sheet" by all major funding agencies; 
2. A decentralization of the decision making to the agency or project level. This 
would allow for an increased capacity to process information on experiences, 
preferences and requirements both quantitatively and qualitatively. Currently, 
the staff and consultants of the funding agencies were observed to take many 
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of the planning and design decisions. (By such a decentralization less 
reliance on conceptual approaches becomes necessary as well.); 
3. A more performance-oriented human resources management, such as per-
formance-based incentive systems and career development, especially for 
higher level staff. This would require a decentralization of the related 
authority to the agency; 
4. A more independent status of the irrigation agencies, also financially, seems 
the best way to ensure cost effectiveness and efficiency of irrigation invest-
ments. 
RESULTS: PRIORITIES FOR PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT 
Make performance an internal concern for the agency. An improved performance of an 
irrigation agency's service delivery can only be achieved by its managers, i.e., the staff 
of the managing agency. Short-term inputs by external actors cannot ensure such 
improved performance. Prerequisite for any of the observed managing agencies to 
improve its performance was that the agency made it a concern for its staff to improve 
their performance. The above described main recommendations were all examples of 
measures to make performance a concern of the staff of irrigation agencies. 
Make performance a local concern, rather than an external only. Yet, such 
measures seemed unlikely to be initiated by the observed agencies as long as performance 
improvement was not their concern. Therefore, either the central government, politicians 
or the funding agencies should make it a concern for the agency to do so. 
Possible measures to make performance a concern of irrigation agencies are, for 
example, the linkage of their finance to performance; the use of subsidies that do not 
reinforce biases of agencies toward the quantity of capacity creation (e.g., cost-sharing, 
fixed lump sums, proportional subsidies); the reduction of hidden subsidies; high quality 
investment appraisal decisions; more neutrality of donor staff toward the quantity of 
investment; the development of investment proposals by agencies only; and an external 
"water-delivery performance audit" in those situations where no financial or other 
accountability to clients exists. Accountability and performance issues should also 
become a serious issue in the so-called policy dialogues; 
Let the funding agencies become prudent financiers, financially at risk for perform-
ance. Prerequisite for a managing agency to improve its performance is that the central 
government, politicians or donors make it a concern for the agency to do so. Yet, even 
the observed funding agencies appeared mainly accountable for investment quantity, and 
not to the quality of the investment appraisal decisions. 
Possible measures to make the quality of investment appraisal decisions a concern 
for the funding agencies and its staff are, for example, more financial transparency and 
risk taking by donors. This can be achieved through, for example, direct lending to 
irrigation agencies rather than to governments. Irrigation agencies appeared never 
accountable for the (partial) repayment of the loans. Also, the funding agency could be 
made accountable to its board of governors for the quality of its investment appraisal 
decisions in terms of the match between appraised and achieved performance of its in-
vestments (rather than for the perceived professionalism and quantity). And the funding 
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agencies agency as a whole could be made accountable for their success in facilitating 
performance improvement, and in "getting the performance-related processes started". 
Overall, making recipients more performance-oriented requires the funding agencies to 
"Stick to the Knitting" (i.e., to banking) and to put "Quality First" (i.e., of investment 
appraisals). 
Manage and control towards a satisfactory wd(er-delivery performance. Still, if an 
accountability would be introduced as described above, higher levels of sophistication of 
the decision-making processes may not evolve automatically. The recommendations of 
this study therefore include many specific management control decisions that aim to 
develop, introduce and control performance-related requirements into the decision making 
about the capacity utilization and the capacity creation. 
EVALUATION 
The application of the analytical framework had the following advantages. Any frame-
work facilitates a more focused data collection and analysis. Further contributions to the 
above analysis of the used framework were: its facilitation of a consistency in analyzing 
processes; its enforcement of an objective analysis of the functionality of disciplinary ap-
proaches in the decision-making processes; its enforcement to consider the full scope of 
irrigation management concerns; its facilitation to consider the interaction and consistency 
between other issues than only the usually researched upon design-utilization interaction; 
and its integrated perspective on performance, decision-making processes, management 
conditions and the related management-control decisions. 
Disadvantages of working with the framework were the initial difficulty to be 
consistent in separating processes and conditions, and the repetitions in presentation and 
analysis of a systematic application of the framework on all important decision-making 
processes and management conditions. These disadvantages do not seem major impedi-
ments for the framework's application by others. These others could be a researcher or 
management specialist to do a management analysis. Though also an irrigation manager 
could use the framework's simple interrelations (as represented in the above Figure) to 
take a different perspective of his work. 
Prospects for future application of the framework as a check list of relevant 
irrigation management concerns are either the following: a systematic awareness creation 
about the managerial aspects of irrigation; a systematic development of research questions 
or manuals about the capacity utilization; and a professionalization of ex-post evaluations 
and impact studies of irrigation (and other development) investments. Also the 
framework's concept of the levels of sophistication could be used as a performance 
indicator for management in the following ways: to identify systematically opportunities 
for improvement; to assess management improvements quantitatively before and after 
management innovations; or, to develop normative indicators for irrigation management 
performance for different socio-economic and physical environments through comparative 
research. 
Recommendations about priorities for future research on the underperformance in 
the irrigation subsector that evolved from this study almost all related to measures to 
introduce accountability for the water-delivery performance. These were the following: 
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1. research on specific management-control methods and techniques that are' 
likely to bring accountability for performance into the financing of irrigation; 
2. the establishment of the probable potential for performance improvement in 
different countries or regions (these estimates could then be used for realistic 
investment norms per unit area that may not only prevent hidden subsidies in 
future irrigation investments, but may also attribute a more realistic economic 
and financial value to performance); 
3. the cost effectiveness and efficiency of the collection of service fees in 
smallholder systems; and 
4. appropriate structures for volumetric measuring of water in smallholder 
systems. 
Yet, much research seems to have been done on irrigation management already. 
Therefore, performance improvements in the irrigation subsector seem to need much 
more the application of the available knowledge to change the present management and 
control, rather than more research. 


CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
"What do the three blind mice have in common with 40% of distributary canals in the Punjab? 
Tliey all lost their tails."' 
IRRIGATION INVESTMENT TRENDS 
PAST AND PRESENT investments in irrigation worldwide are immense. Estimates by the 
World Bank of the total accrued investments in irrigation and drainage to date amount to US$ 
800 billion.2 The century before the mid-1950s knew only a moderate development. From the 
mid-1950s, the growth of irrigation worldwide was extremely rapid. In less developed countries 
(LDCs) alone, expenditures during this period totalled more than US$ 250 billion. Annual 
investments in the late 1970s to mid-1980s stood close to $15 billion.3 Anticipated additional 
investment in the period from 1985 to the end of century amounts to $150 billion.4 
Irrigation traditionally absorbed a large slice of the total investment aid in LDCs. A 
strong example of this favored status of irrigation is the World Bank. Irrigation investments 
represented more than 75 percent of total World Bank disbursements in the agricultural sector 
till the mid-1960s. Since then, it has varied between 25 and 40 percent, remaining the largest 
single sub-sector in the agricultural sector. The latter was by itself, with 30 percent of total 
lending by the mid 1970s, "by far the largest single component in the Bank's portfolio."5 
Throughout the World Bank's history, about 75 per cent of its agricultural lending has gone to 
irrigation and the directly related rural credit and area development projects.6 In general, 
irrigation investments absorbed between 16 and 22 per cent of total official bilateral and 
multilateral aid to agriculture in the period 1976-1980.7 
A variety of reasons underlie the investment boom in irrigation since the 1950s in the 
Third World. Important reasons were the intermittent food scarcities and high food prices, and 
(geo-)political interests. Also, irrigation "biases" in donor organizations seem to have been 
important, especially because of the ample resource availability through the credit lines for 
development investments.8 
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2 A MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE ON THE PERFORMANCE OF THE IRRIGATION SUBSECTOR 
THE PERFORMANCE GAP 
Since the mid-1960s the awareness spread that the performance of irrigation investments was far 
below its potential9, both in low-income and high-income countries. The most obvious signs 
of this underperformance were the underutilized or even dry tail-reaches of irrigation canals and 
command areas in underutilized systems. 
Undoubtedly, irrigation has contributed significantly to the growth in agricultural 
production of many LDCs, if not only for its facilitating role for the success of the "green 
revolution". Irrigation is often considered a critical component of the package of inputs that 
produced the green revolution. Seckler and Sampath, for example, have stated this for India as 
follows: 
"Except in rare and limited areas, there has been no green revolution in India on unirrigated land . . .The 
analysis indicates that irrigation accounts for one-half to two-thirds of the increase in food grain production in 
India over the past three decades; and without the indirect effect of irrigation development enabling the use of 
[high yielding varieties] and [fertilizer], most of the remainder would not have occurred. Irrigation is a Sine-
Oua Non of India food grain production."10 
Yet, despite this success for food production, the performance was much less than 
expected at the time of the investments. Apart from documenting this yield impact of irrigation, 
Seckler is also an irrigation professional who has documented irrigation's spectacular 
underperformance. Despite the reputed unreliability of statistics in LDCs, he has ventured to 
present the following embarrassing image: "A reasonable rule of thumb for irrigation projects 
in the LDCs is that they cost at least twice as much and deliver no more than half the effective 
irrigation benefits specified in the plans." 1 1 
The exact size of the underperformance is difficult to estimate. Only few and very rough 
approximations have been made. Seckler estimated in 1981 that while India created a potential 
of 30 million ha, it actually utilized only some 11 million ha. He estimated that this could be 
increased to about 21 million ha through improved management and improvements in the 
physical facilities. Similarly, in 1983 Chambers estimated the utilized area in India somewhat 
higher at 14 to 15 million ha. Also, according to both of them, the poor average yields in India 
could to an important extent be due to yields being not much higher than in rainfed agriculture 
in half the officially irrigated area. 1 2 
Seckler has also estimated the impact on food security of the above rough 
underperformance estimates. Such estimates depend to a large extent on the expected demand, 
i.e., the predicted population growth rates. Expecting a duplication of the population of LDCs 
in the period 1980-2010, a doubling of their agricultural output over the same time would be 
needed, according to Seckler. He has argued that given the described performance gap, the 
investment needs for food security between 1980-2000 in the non-Communist LDCs are in fact 
four times more than the generally perceived requirement of US$150 billion, i.e., a total of 
US$600 billion. For India alone this would amount to $12 billion per year. Else, even with the 
envisaged expenditures on irrigation of over $3 billion a year in India there may be a decrease 
in net irrigation output, due to the neglected maintenance of the existing irrigation capacity. 
These estimates of the underperformance and their consequences are "admittedly highly 
subjective and impressionistic" according to Seckler, but he added that "there are innumerable 
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scraps and pieces of evidence that can be gathered that the above calculations are 
conservative."13 
Though this is not the subject of this text, some qualification of Seckler's estimates seems 
required. It is well-known that distribution problems tend to dominate food scarcity. For 
example, food export figures by India and several African countries such as Ethiopia and Sudan 
have been considerable even during drought years. 1 4 Redistribution of just 5.6 per cent of 
India's and 2.5 per cent of Sudan's food production to the poorer sections of the population 
would wipe out hunger in these countries, according to the World Bank.1 5 Such figures on 
distributional problems stress the relative value of Seckler's estimates. Moreover, Seckler's 
long-term planning for food production through irrigation seems not entirely noncontroversial 
also in the light of the doubtful relationship between population growth and hunger (i.e., the 
main basis of his estimates); a small country like the Netherlands with one of the highest 
population densities, is also the second largest agricultural exporter in the world. 1 6 The 
processes of capacity creation and capacity utilization in LDCs are likely to be important as well 
for tackling world hunger and poverty. 
THE MANAGEMENT ISSUE AND ITS POTENTIAL FOR A "WATER REVOLUTION" 
The consideration of the managerial aspects for the underperformance problem in irrigation did 
not materialize overnight. During the 1960s and 1970s, the investment boom in irrigation 
capacities stimulated a construction-orientation of irrigation agencies. Though a few early 
publications in the 1960s reported upon the deficiencies of the system management,17 the 
utilization of this created potential received little attention. Also donors did not seriously follow 
up on numerous examples of disastrous underutilization. They were in a hurry to increase 
agricultural production through projects (i.e., new construction), rather than through the 
improvement of the performance of the existing facilities by means of less capital-intensive 
option of management improvement.18 Only at later stages, increased and widespread 
awareness of the systematic underperformance and the reduced availability of suitable sites for 
irrigation, made it increasingly difficult to justify new investments. Against this background the 
international attention for this underutilization, or performance problem, gained strength. 
Simultaneously with this increased awareness about underutilization, the perception 
gained strength that the level of management of the systems was backward in comparison with 
the construction efforts and expertise. The underutilization was considered not only a technical, 
but also a managerial problem. This applied equally for LDCs and developed countries. 
The Real Potential for a "Water Revolution" 
Most irrigation management professionals-admittedly, not the most objective group for such 
judgement-, tend to agree that performance of irrigation investments is not only less than 
projected at the time of investment, but also less than can be reasonably achieved with improved 
management.19 The higher levels of performance that private irrigators tend to achieve on 
smaller, more controllable, decentralized systems, especially with pumping, seem to proof such 
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potential for improvements and the perceived management flaw. 
The management aspect of the underutilization makes it hard to estimate the potential for 
improvement. Though several authors have tried. It is relevant to note that these estimates 
typically rely more on the assessor's personal experience, than on actual data. Examples are the 
fore mentioned estimates for India by Seckler and Chambers. Another example is the following 
estimate by Keller: "In both developed and developing countries, improved irrigation system 
management has the potential of increasing water and energy use efficiency by 10 to 15 per cent. 
Moreover, area irrigated and production can at least be doubled in many cases." 2 0 Chambers 
has suggested that most people estimate the most easily recoverable slack in the range of 10 to 
20 per cent, a slack that could benefit the presently deprived tail enders.2 1 Still, almost no 
absolute data are available on improvement potential. Most estimates are merely opinion- and 
experience-based guesstimates. 
Essentially three research projects in the late 1970s have provided the few available data 
on the real potential for performance improvement.22 The research projects consisted of 
experiments with improved system management practices in real-life irrigation systems in 
Philippines, Sri Lanka, and South India. Based on these experiments, researchers have 
suggested that in the predominantly rice-growing areas of Asia the proposed water management 
interventions can generate average production increases of at least 20 per cent at very low 
financial costs. 2 3 
Also based on these three experiments, Bottrall, amongst others, has foreseen, in analogy 
to the green revolution, the potential for a "water revolution". The revolution would result in 
major increases of crop production at a very favorable benefit-cost ratio. This potential for a 
sustainable "water revolution" remains, however, to date largely as it was, because the evidence 
of these three experiments has not been repeated or sustained. 
Not amazingly, therefore, even now many engineers around the world consider these 
perceived management flaws in irrigation as either exaggerated, or as inevitable. According to 
them, the performance problems could be solved to a large extent by technical solutions such 
as canal lining or the automation of the flow regulation. From their perspective, the 
management issue in irrigation remains, to a large extent, imaginary. There remains thus a 
serious disjuncture in the perspectives of many irrigation professionals. A more objective 
perspective on irrigation's performance problems seems required to reunite the different 
professional perspectives. 
THE PROBLEM DEFINITION 
In analogy with Chambers' recent book on managing canal irrigation, the main thesis here is that 
"past attempts to improve performance have failed because of defective analysis".2 4 
The fore mentioned three experiments were essentially the implementation of rotational 
deliveries of water. Many engineering textbooks prescribe rotational issues as a standard 
technique of saving water. If so, and if they were so beneficial for performance improvement, 
why were these rotations not generally applied? 
A more crucial question than the successful technique itself seems the question why these 
early experiments were not repeated on a wide scale, nor sustained. The related answers require 
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an understanding of how irrigation systems are currently managed, how irrigation agencies work 
internally, and how this relates to performance objectives. Such understanding demands 
analytical approaches different from those of traditional disciplines that study irrigation 
management such as engineering, agronomy, economics, sociology and others. 
These traditional disciplines have discipline-specific tools for problem analysis. This 
"biased" perspective usually frames the problem solving. Even after the past 15 years of 
increased attention for this performance issue in irrigation, a more objective and management-
relevant analytical approach has apparently not come about. The following remarks by Wade 
and Chambers of a decade ago therefore still hold: 
"Engineers are trained in construction and are predisposed professionally to see problems and potential in terms 
of physical works rather than in timing, location and amounts of water distributed, Agronomists are trained 
in crop biology and study crop water requirements; their eyes focus on plants, and especially plants in controlled 
conditions on research stations rather than plants subject to the vagaries of on-farm water supply. Economists 
think in terms of costs and benefits, and are inclined to recommend regulation through water pricing. 
Sociologists study water questions at the community level but not at the main system. But in between the areas 
illuminated by these disciplines there is a dark space. There is no professional discipline for main system 
management."25 
Wade and Chambers thus supported the idea of the development of a new irrigation 
professionalism "between" these traditional disciplines. They expected new, substantive 
approaches towards main system management. What the above list missed was the relevance 
for these disciplinary specialists to look at the internal organization of irrigation agencies. 
Whether or not they implement rotations, relates very much to the way irrigation agencies work 
internally. Or, as it will be called in this text, to their management and control. 
Many irrigation professionals nowadays acknowledge that they have no clear concept of 
irrigation management. Some examples of the resulting defective analysis are the total neglect 
of the management processes in investment evaluations26, and the "blueprint" project concepts 
incorporating a package of almost all possible ingredients without considering their utility. Often 
it results in a failure to address any of the crucial water management issues. Such defective 
analysis of irrigation management problems results in erroneous improvement attempts.27 
Several professionals have explicitly pleaded for the need for a clear concept of irrigation 
management. For example, Bottrall has pleaded for the development of "a systematic method 
for evaluating management performance which is able to produce a detailed and objective 
assessment in place of what could otherwise be represented as a superficial and arbitrary 
personal impression". According to Bottrall, such methods would force irrigation evaluators and 
planners to face sensitive political issues like water management.28 
Similarly, Chambers has written that the art and techniques of analysis for canal irrigation 
are in their infancy, because those who do it rarely write about how they do it. He knew of no 
analytical modes and tools that were water-based.29 Svendsen has added the following remark: 
Although frameworks exist within particular disciplines—agricultural engineering or economics, for example—we 
have little that cuts across them. When we want a more comprehensive understanding of something, we 
typically commission a one-time review of the topic utilizing an ad hoc conceptual framework of the author's 
preference . . .It is limiting and therefore regrettable that we have been unable to find a more substantive and 
durable way of organizing our thinking and discussions regarding irrigation management."30 
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In the recent past, many other irrigation practitioners as well as the World Bank31 have 
recognized the need for such an objective perspective.32 Chambers has stated that such 
an analytical framework should be interdisciplinary, resource-based (i.e., water-based), 
performance-based, and opportunity-oriented.33 
Past research results and reports thus point at a disappointing performance of investments 
in irrigation, and an inadequate insight in the concept of irrigation management. Also several 
researchers have explicitly stated the need for improved analytical frameworks. This means that 
more and more precise insights are required in the management and control of irrigation in 
LDCs, as a prerequisite for the identification of relevant improvements. The topic of this study 
is such an improved insight in the management of irrigation, and ways to improve it. 
THE OBJECTIVES 
In addressing these issues, this study aims to answer the following question: What are the 
generalized changes in management and control processes and conditions that are required for 
improved irrigation management in LDCs? 
Addressing this question requires firstly to make an effort to fill the fore mentioned gap 
toward the concept of irrigation management. Therefore, the concepts of management and 
control processes and conditions are translated for irrigation. Together they form this paper's 
so-called management perspective. Subsequently, this analytical framework is applied to 
irrigation. 
For the definition of this "management perspective" on irrigation performance, an 
existing integral, analytical management framework is translated for irrigation management. The 
used analytical management framework was originally developed by Kampfraath and his 
colleagues of the Department of Management Studies of Wageningen Agricultural University, 
the Netherlands.34 
This framework has the traits mentioned above by Chambers; its approach is 
interdisciplinary, resource-based (i.e., water-based), performance-based, and opportunity-
oriented. Apart from these traits, another advantage of the used framework is its consideration 
of the full scope of key decisions contributing to water-delivery performance, as well as the 
relevant management conditions. Chapter 3 elaborates upon the specifics of the framework's 
traits. 
The framework's development and elaboration for irrigation was done through detailed 
case studies of two major Sri Lankan irrigation systems35. Further testing and shaping of the 
management perspective was done in less intensive comparative research in Morocco, 
Philippines, Sudan, and India, and an extensive survey of the (irrigation) management literature. 
Objectives of this study in addressing the above problem definition are thus twofold: 1) 
the identification of generalized directions of management change for performance improvement 
in the irrigation subsector; and 2) the testing of an analytical framework for irrigation 
management. 
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LIMITATIONS AND FOCUS 
This section gives several clarifications about the irrigation performance indicators considered 
relevant in this study, and those that fall outside the study's scope. In addition, some definitions 
and other limitations are given. 
The Indicator Confusion 
The performance of irrigation is implicitly restricted in this text to the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the primary outputs of irrigation systems. Examples are the areas irrigated, the 
water use efficiency and the cropping intensities. 
The text focuses on the management of water as the primary irrigation process. 
Activities such as the agricultural production or the organizing of water users, are considered 
complimentary processes to the management of water. Other activities, such as maintenance, 
improvement or construction processes do not necessarily involve irrigation at all, and are 
therefore considered derived processes. Decision making about water does not only occur 
during capacity utilization (i.e., scheduling, flow regulation), but also during the creation of 
irrigation capacities (i.e., planning, investigations and design); both categories of decision 
making are analyzed here. 
Performance of irrigation projects can be evaluated in many other ways as well. In the 
past, criticism on irrigation's impact on the environment, health, income distribution and gender 
relations has been widespread. While their importance and relevance is not denied, this text 
does not discuss such impacts to facilitate a more direct and unambiguous analysis toward the 
primary performance problems. 
Underperformance is thus only evaluated here toward irrigation's primary objective, the 
delivery of water. Complementary objectives are not irrelevant, but are considered to be outside 
direct control of the managing agencies. Irrigation agencies control only the delivery of water, 
and farmers manage the agricultural production. Evaluating the performance of irrigation in 
terms of the complementary objectives risks a confusion about the accountability of the managing 
agencies for the only service they can really be kept accountable for, i.e., water delivery. 
To a large extent, the uncertainties on irrigation's real underperformance seems related 
to the multiple objectives involved in irrigation. Is the objective of irrigation an increased 
agricultural production or is it an increased control over water availability? Or, is it the 
settlement of landless people, whether for welfare, geopolitical or political reasons? The 
confusion about this question seems to linger on in the minds of many professionals, 
administrators and politicians in the irrigation scene. Therefore, a priority has to be made 
between the possible objectives of an irrigation agency. Besides, the water-delivery objective 
does not stand on its own, and interrelates with the complementary objectives. 
An experienced manager of Kenya's Mwea system also cautioned for such confusing 
influence of multiple objectives with the following phrase: "High productivity is the key...to 
paraphrase Matthew 'Seek ye first production and all these things shall be added on to you'". 3 6 
Using simple objectives has its limitations for completeness, but a multitude of objectives for 
one organization or person dilutes clear responsibility and accountability.37 
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An improved management of the water delivery is likely to provide for a necessary 
physical and management environment to deal with impact issues such as health, environment 
and poverty. Prerequisite for a serious and systematic reduction of other adverse impacts of 
irrigation is a general improvement of the management performance, accountability and control 
toward irrigation's primary process, the water delivery. 
Other Limitations 
Apart from the above restriction of performance indicators, this text recognizes some others. 
A far as irrigation system is concerned, "system" refers here not only to the physical 
infrastructure (i.e., canals and structures), and otherjacilities (e.g., radios, vehicles, computers, 
forms etc.) for the delivery of water to^the water users. Tt also includes all agency staff and 
other people that influence the decision-making processes. The water users are thus part of the 
system to the extent that they influence the decision-making processes about water delivery. 
However, for the actual service delivery they are the system's clients. System is thus a dynamic 
concept here. 
This management analysis focuses on agency management of small-holder gravity 
irrigation systems. Within these systems it focuses on the water delivery to water users. Water 
application by the water users is considered to be managed by the water users themselves. So, 
the analysis does not go into the specifics of the decision-making processes at the level of the 
field canal as well as on-farm. Neither does the analysis go into details of differences in interest 
of water users. Also the organization of water users in water user organizations is not studied. 
These activities have their own management perspective, with their own objectives and 
performance indicators. Instead, the analysis focuses on the agency processes and the ways that 
the different stakeholders participate in these processes. From that perspective, it also considers 
the effectiveness of the participation by farmers as the system's clients in the decision-making 
processes on the water delivery and the creation of irrigation capacity. 
In principle, the requirements for construction, maintenance and rehabilitation activities 
are derived from the water-related decision-making processes. The study excludes these derived 
activities as such, however, as they also have their own management perspective, with their own 
objectives and performance indicators. 
Water users or farmers in this text can be both male and female. 
ORGANIZATION OF THE CHAPTERS 
Chapter two reviews the few existing irrigation management concepts. Chapter three presents 
the characteristics of the used analytical management framework, as well as those of the 
developed irrigation management perspective. Subsequently it explains the research methodology 
and approach. Chapter four describes and analyzes the generalized decision-making processes 
and management conditions of the capacity utilization in irrigation, while chapter five does the 
same for the capacity creation. Chapter six integrates the findings from the perspectives of 
capacity utilization and capacity creation in the earlier chapters. It gives the generalized 
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subsector. Chapter seven evaluates the outcomes of the study and the specific contribution of 
the analytical framework. It concludes with suggestions for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Existing Irrigation Management Concepts 
"Tire old fable of the blind men and the elephant is well known. Each blind man, feeling a different bit, thought 
lie had something familiar. None recognized the beast. Scientists and engineers, faced with canal irrigation 
systems, are not blind, but they are trained to notice, observe and analyse only certain parts. 
PROCESS- VERSUS STRUCTURE-ORIENTED APPROACHES 
THIS CHAPTER GIVES a brief review of the few applied analytical frameworks in either 
irrigation management or in the management of development. To provide some perspective to 
this review, two major groups are distinguished, those concepts oriented on structures and those 
oriented on processes. 
Most existing management approaches are structure-oriented.2 Their primary focus of 
analysis is the satisfactory functioning of the existing organizational units, their tasks, functions, 
authorities and entitlements. Evolving solutions are inevitably also in terms of structural changes 
such as a new committee, another department or new jobs. 
Major disadvantage of such an approach is its blindness to the history and evolution of 
the organizational structure itself. Structural changes in the past originated typically not only 
from requirements of processes. They were also caused by the internal dynamics of the 
organization such as the evolution of existing hierarchical levels, the presence and influence of 
certain leading officers at a given moment, or the division of the organization into historically 
determined departments. Such internal dynamics of the organization have gradually "biased" 
the structure to the effectiveness of the processes. This bias should make it logical for an 
evaluator to forget temporarily about this "biased" structure in a management analysis of 
performance. 
A process-oriented approach is reverse. Such analysis focuses initially on the 
effectiveness and efficiency of different key decision-making processes in reaching an 
organization's output. The structural appearance of the organization is thereby temporarily 
omitted. The importance of structures is not denounced altogether. Structure is considered a 
mediating force in influencing decision-making processes and the resulting performance. 
Initially, however, they are considered of secondary relevance and therefore only sight-
disturbing. Figure 1 presents a schematic look at these two types of management approaches. 
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STRUCTURE-ORIENTED APPROACHES 
The World Bank seems to have undertaken one of the first explicit attempts to develop an 
analytical management approach. Yudelman, a former World Bank Director, has stated in the 
following citation that the systems approach strongly influenced the World Bank's approach to 
raise on-farm productivity during the 1960s: 
"Put simply this [systems] approach specified the necessary conditions for agricultural development and treated 
them like links in a chain; research, extension, delivery, infrastructure, credit system and incentives for farmers 
to raise productivity . . .This "ideological neutral" system provided an analytical framework and a check list 
that served as a basis for lending in nearly all agricultural economies. Of course, it was widely recognized that 
the system's components would vary enormously with socio-cultural factors and levels of development. 
Nonetheless, the Bank embraced this concept of a systems approach to developing and diffusing technological 
change."3 
This framework was intended for investment selection. In practice, it seems to have meant little 
more than providing all necessary physical conditions, and later also management conditions, 
that were required in a mechanistic way for improved productivity. The basis for these 
requirements was purely technical and structural; no operational processes were considered. The 
approach ignored the actual management process requirements and constraints. Therefore this 
type of systems approach, while widely used in practice, cannot really be considered a 
management framework. 
Although the absolute number of explicit efforts to develop such an analytical framework 
for irrigation management is very small, some efforts were made during the last decade. 
Coward's "analytic scheme" was one of the first. It consisted of rules, roles and groups as 
"important organizational elements" for the following basic irrigation tasks or activities; water 
allocation, system maintenance and conflict management.4 Although processes were made 
explicit, the approach was structuralist by assuming that provision of any of the conditions (i.e., 
rules, roles and groups) would lead in a mechanistic way to the required processes and results. 
The framework was thus more structure- than process-based. Moreover, the relation between 
processes, structure and performance remained undefined. 
Walker has developed another early framework. He adopted a systems approach to 
irrigation in his PhD thesis. He classified irrigation into sub-systems such as the socio-cultural, 
Figure 1. Management: structure and process orientations 
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technological, political, ecological, management, input, transformation, output and demand sub-
systems. He even made further sub-divisions, and analyzed the relations between those sub-
systems on the basis of the available irrigation management literature. Difficulty of such 
analysis was the overlaps of many of his sub-systems, though for unclear reasons he analyzed 
them separately.5 His analysis has remained theoretical, because he did not do additional field 
research. He thus had to elaborate on the conclusions of others, and did not develop many new 
insights in irrigation management. His thesis' primary purpose was also more the provision of 
check lists of relevant issues for irrigation management. Thus aiming at increased awareness 
among irrigation professionals about these issues, and to prevent thus that certain issues would 
be left out. 
Huppert and Walker did an interesting follow-up of Walker's thesis. They developed a 
contingency approach for the creation of irrigation capacities by defining several different 
environments with different levels of management uncertainty. Different investment strategies 
were advisable for these different environments.6 Compared to the fore mentioned approach 
of the World Bank, this contingency approach was a conceptual improvement. Unfortunately, 
according to informed irrigation professionals and donor organizations, their classifications 
appeared too abstract for practical use in investment decision making.7 
The relation between subsystem, management, water and performance remained 
undefined in Walker's framework. He intended it as a diagnostic tool for the planning of 
irrigation capacity only, and he provided no tools for analyzing the decision-making processes. 
On request of the World Bank, Bottrall has developed another explicit conceptual 
framework. It was essentially a long check list of factors important for irrigation management 
that he extracted from books on management science.8 Bottrall's framework compared sub-
systems and processes without much integration. Bottrall has stated, for example, that "quality 
of an organization's performance is partly a function of its structure . . .and partly a function 
of its management process".9 Yet, he did not further specify this relation between process and 
structure. Moreover, he frequently confused processes and structure. For example, he analyzed 
processes in terms of job descriptions, thus assuming a satisfactory functionality of these job 
descriptions in the actual decision-making processes. The study also classified possible reasons 
for performance problems in the three broad categories of resources, skills, and motivation, thus 
biasing the analysis and possible remedies considerably.10 
To its credit, Bottrall's report was the first to focus explicitly on a broad range of 
management issues in irrigation in a comparative way. A sequence of short visits to Taiwan, 
India, Pakistan and Indonesia was the basis for the analysis. He thus relied more on real-life 
irrigation management than Walker's thesis. 
Bottrall's framework was meant more for comparative than for diagnostic work. 
Although it looked at water and performance, the framework remained vague about the relation 
between physical processes, performance, decision-making processes and structure. So it did 
not really provide a conceptual framework in that respect." 
Many others have developed frameworks that focus on the relation and conflicts between 
farmers and the state. Taking such a perspective tends to make people "process-blind" to a 
certain degree. Often this has led to, for example, implicit assumptions such as that the gate 
operators represent the state rather than the farmers.12 Chapter 4 shows that the process reality 
is much more subtle and that, for example, often the operators (if not the entire system 
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management) do not really represent the state very much. 
PROCESS-ORIENTED APPROACHES 
Diemer has written a very interesting PhD thesis on irrigation in Africa. It seems to have been 
also the only analysis of agency-managed irrigation management that was explicitly process-
based.1 3 According to Diemer, anthropologists previously tended to focus on structures in 
societies. More recently the question how the structure had evolved over time had gained more 
interest. Diemer also claimed that no analytical framework had been developed by 
anthropologists about the relation between structure and the activities of individuals and groups, 
i.e., the processes.14 Diemer tried to fill this gap with Bourdieu's theory of the influence of 
internalized dispositions on the behavior of individuals. In terms of the interrelation between 
processes and structures in organizations his theory did not fill the gap. His analysis of 
irrigation engineering was, however, to a large extent process-based, though it did not aim to 
separate structure and process in a very consistent way. His process-based analysis has led to 
many findings similar to those in this text, especially those regarding the utility of different 
irrigation engineering and technological approaches. 
Diemer's thesis was absolutely unique in taking a historical perspective on irrigation 
technology and engineering, and the degree that irrigation professionalism has internalized them 
despite the disappearance of their original utility. He seems to have been also the only 
irrigation-related professional, who has explicitly recognized the danger of a structure-based 
analysis of an engineering system that is generally perceived as successful by irrigation 
professionals.15 He warned for the risk of seeing it as a well-oiled wheel-work of which all 
components are functional because only a process analysis is likely to show the components' 
disfunctionities. 
Diemer's analysis explicitly related physical processes, management and performance. 
However, it did not take a full management perspective, because it excluded the important role 
in irrigation management of politics, planning, donors, and finance. It focussed merely on 
irrigation engineering and technology. He also did not consider other management-control issues 
such as financial control and human resource management (the next chapter defines this concept 
of management control). 
Several authors have applied an almost pure process-based analysis to irrigation, though 
they remained implicit. Unlike Diemer, two authors, Repetto and Moore focused on finance in 
their analysis. They applied a rent-seeking analysis on irrigation capacity creation and 
utilization. The term "rent" comes from economics. It refers to the difference between the 
value of a resource to the person who controls it and the price he has to pay to obtain control 
over it. The existence of rents indicates flaws in the competitive market system.1 6 
Repetto and Moore have argued that rents provide major incentives for agencies and staff 
in the irrigation sub-sector worldwide. This makes them thus also major influencing factors in 
the analysis of the decision-making processes. Yet, the theory of rent-seeking ignored—as Moore 
remarks himself17—all other influences on decision making, such as the competing self-interests 
of rent-seekers, their satisfying instead of maximizing behavior, their internalized social 
norms 1 8, their lack of choice and information, the existing structures and rules, and the limited 
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rationality of organizations. Nevertheless, the dominating role of rents in the irrigation sub-
sector has made their analysis to become to a large extent process-based. 
Rents are necessarily performance- and water-based, and Repetto's analysis was, to a 
large extent, also process-based.19 Their analyses took a wider management perspective than 
Diemer's, but ignored above influences on decision making as well as, for example, Diemer's 
thesis of the intrinsic momentum of irrigation technology and engineering. Besides, their 
analyses did not analyze systematically the interrelation between process and structure.20 
Chambers has adopted implicitly a process-based analysis in an early article on the 
utilization of irrigation capacity in Sri Lanka and South India. This process-based analysis seems 
to have evolved almost accidentally, as Chambers first analyzed the allocation processes at 
community level, and subsequently the role of the bureaucracy. On the other hand, he defined 
management functions that were almost identical with the management concerns of this study 
(though they were related to structural units).21 Chambers' perspective focussed on a limited 
part of irrigation management, mainly allocation. 
Also Maass and Anderson have adopted implicitly a process-based analysis. They have 
evaluated the performance of institutions in terms of the level of satisfaction of the goals of the 
irrigation communities. This required a primary focus on objectives, criteria and their use in 
processes. They did this in great detail to become fully conversant with the institutions and 
procedures. They even took a historical perspective of the evolution of procedures and methods 
of water allocation and regulation.22 
All above authors have thus adopted a process-based approach. Most of these studies 
restricted their analysis to a certain portion of relevant factors for irrigation managers. The 
separation of structure and process tended to be less conscious, and thus also less consistent than 
will be pursued in this text. The above review does not claim to be exhaustive. Of course, 
many authors, without being aware of it and without adopting explicitly an analytical approach, 
have written on process-based experiences. Many references in further chapters are silent 
witnesses of this. 
OTHER APPROACHES 
Another analytical framework for irrigation management deserves mention here, although it does 
not fit in the above classification. Uphoff has developed an analytical framework for assessing 
possible participation activities in irrigation. The framework consisted of a three-dimensional 
matrix of activities related to: 
1) physical structure (i.e., design, construction, operation and maintenance); 
2) water-use (i.e., acquisition, allocation, distribution and drainage); and 
3) organizational activities (i.e., decision making, resource mobilization, 
communication or coordination and conflict management)23 
The objective of this analytical framework was merely to classify the type of processes and did 
thus not really relate to the structure of an organization. The above classification of process and 
structure-based does, therefore, not really apply.2 4 
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CONCLUSION 
Some conclusions can be drawn from this brief review of existing concepts of irrigation 
management. In the first place, the review demonstrates the few explicit efforts to develop such 
concepts. Of those few explicit efforts, only Diemer's approach was a process-oriented 
approach. All concepts remained vague about the relation between process and structure. None 
of them tried to take a management perspective, i.e., to consider all relevant factors for 
irrigation managers. The potential contribution of this study is thus to fill these gaps by taking 
an explicit management perspective, and by systematically analyzing the relation between process 
and structure. Moreover, it considers other management conditions than structure only, i.e., 
financial control systems, human resources, and the provision of information and knowledge. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Research Methodology 
THIS CHAPTER EXPLAINS the approach of this study. To that end, the concept of 
management is explained first. Subsequently, the concept is operationalized for the observation 
and analysis of irrigation management. The chapter concludes with a detailed description of the 
methods of data collection. 
WHAT IS MANAGEMENT? 
The last two decades have shown a growing attention for irrigation management. Yet, most 
irrigation professionals still acknowledge that the comprehension of the actual meaning of 
"management" in irrigation remains limited. This study is an explicit effort to fill this gap. 
This chapter thereto conceptualizes management into an integral, analytical management 
framework. 
Figure 2. Management Cloverleaf 
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= direct influence of the situation and policy on the results 
Prerequisite for a conceptualization of irrigation management is an awareness about what 
management includes, and what not. What it does and what it does not cover. Although 
different professionals tend to define management differently, the simple graph in Figure 2 
seems to represent a kind of consensus among management professionals about its boundaries.2 
The graph represents four distinct but inseparable elements of Kampfraath's so-called 
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"Management Cloverleaf ' of which "management and control" is one, and "results", "situation" 
and "policy" are the three others. The picture seems simple, but is essential, and can be very 
helpful, for understanding what is management and what it is not. 
The picture illustrates the idea of management as the major force to determine the results 
-and thus performance- in any organization, including irrigation agencies.3 So performance 
is always the result of decisions by people. In addition, an organization's policy and situation 
can directly influence the organization's results and performance as well. 
Management is thereby defined as initiating (starting up), directing (choosing from 
alternatives) and controlling activities oriented on a certain (set of) objectives. 
WHAT ARE THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK? 
This study focuses on only one leaf of the management cloverleaf, i.e., the "management and 
control" leaf. This cloverleaf takes the form here of an analytical management framework. This 
particular analytical management approach has several traits that may be beneficial to provide 
a management perspective on the irrigated subsector. These traits are discussed below. Where 
relevant, reference is made to alternative approaches. 
Process-Oriented4 
The general approach of this analytical framework is to focus on decision-making processes: 
decision making is considered the major force determining the performance of irrigation systems. 
The above definition of management is therefore in terms of processes rather than in terms of 
structures and organizational units (such as top management, a division, a department etc.). 5 
Chapter 2 has explained the major differences of a process-oriented with a structure-oriented 
approach. The approach used here is based largely on a management framework developed by 
Kampfraath in collaboration with his colleagues of the Department of Management Studies of 
the Wageningen Agricultural University, The Netherlands.6 
Figure 3 is a graphic representation of the different steps of this process-based 
management analysis. The identification of key decisions in regard to water delivery is the first 
step in the development of this management perspective on irrigation (step 1 of Figure 3). The 
potential contributions to the water-delivery performance of these key decisions are the basis to 
classify them into so-called management concerns.7 Examples of management concerns are the 
strategic and operational concerns. This classification is thus different from the more traditional 
functional divisions such as institutional development, personnel, design, communication, cost 
recovery, extension, finance or administration. 
Together the different management concerns encompass all those key decisions that an 
organization as a whole must take to reach a certain performance. Thus, the key decisions 
become components of the overall system performance. Performance evaluation is then the 
evaluation of the contributions of the different key-decision making processes to the water-
delivery performance. 
The key decisions also become the main orientation points for thinking about and 
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analyzing irrigation management here. Therefore, this management perspective on irrigation is 
different from those used by the traditional disciplines dealing with irrigated agriculture. 
Performance- and Water-Based 
The used analytical framework is also performance- and water-based. Overall starting point of 
the management analysis is the overall system performance. This performance is the result of 
the physical processes leading to it. And the physical processes (like water flows) are 
considered the direct and necessary results of decisions by people, for example, by gate 
operators.8 This performance-based analysis follows thus the following steps of Figure 3. 
After the definition of the relevant key decisions (step 1 in Figure 3), for each key decision its 
contribution to the overall performance must be established (step 2). If this contribution is 
deemed unsatisfactory, the processes leading to the final decisions are analyzed, and the 
bottlenecks in these processes are identified (step 3). Based on an analysis of the interaction 
between the processes and the management conditions, those changes in the management 
conditions are derived that are likely to lead to improved processes (step 4). The last step is 
then the identification of the required management-control processes to achieve these required 
improvements in processes and management conditions (step 5). 
This analytical framework thus links performance, physical processes, decision-making 
processes, management conditions and management control in a logical analytical sequence. 
This provides an integral "management perspective" on irrigation performance. 
Management conditions are means that influence the quality of the decision-making 
processes. They are not restricted to organizational structure only. The following categories 
of management conditions are recognized: 
1) Human Resources; 
2) Provision of Information; 
3) Financial Control Systems; 
4) Provision of Knowledge; and, 
5) Organizational Rules and Structure. 
Practical implications of considering the influence of other management conditions than structure 
only, are the following: 
1) changes in one management condition have to be done in an integrated manner with 
changes in other conditions. For example, a decentralization of responsibility for the water-
delivery performance can only be attempted in combination with related incentives for 
decentralized units; 
2) smaller changes in management conditions (such as a new form, procedure, or calculation 
method) than structural changes can be considered. Structural changes are often a major 
change, and the most rude and drastic possible. And these changes do not always contribute 
to the required results. Despite this, it is the only possible solution if one considers only 
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structure and rules. In practice, smaller changes are often preferable such as changes in the 
process within the given structure, or changes in the provision of information or financial 
control system. Only if these do not have the desired effect, changes in the structure can be 
attempted;9 
Figure 3. Performance- and water-based management analysis 
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The definition of control of this analytical framework is slightly different from the 
definitions used in most English and American literature. The definition of control here is also 
process-based. Object of control is thereby not only an organizational unit or a person, but also 
the physical process and the related decision making. 
Overall, this analytical framework distinguishes thus three types of processes: 
1) physical processes (A-process in Figure 4); and two superseding types of decision 
making, whereby 2) represents 
2) decision making and control about the physical conditions and processes (B-
process); while 3) exemplifies 
3) decision making and control about the management conditions and decision-
making processes, or the management control (C-process).10 
The dotted line in Figure 4 represents the notion that the management conditions for the B-
process and the C-process are essentially the same categories. Though the requirements for 
these same categories are different for the B- and C-processes. This analytical framework thus 
defines management as decision making and control. 
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Figure 4. Physical conditions and process (A-process), management conditions and process (B-process), and 
management-control process (C-process) 
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A Quantitative Performance Indicator for Processes: the Level of Sophistication 
Another characteristic of this particular analytical framework is its definition of process-oriented 
performance indicators. The so-called levels of sophistication are approximate quantitative 
indicators of processes. Such quantitative indicators can be used for the analysis of the 
interrelation between management conditions and processes. The higher the level of 
sophistication, the higher the likelihood of a higher quality of the decisions, and the more a 
reduction of the uncertainty. Reducing and controlling uncertainty" is widely recognized as 
the main drive of management as long as cost efficiency and effectiveness is not endangered. 
Few authors have tried to develop such quantitative indicators, although several have 
developed qualitative concepts. Weber and neo-classical economists assumed that people and 
organizations tend to optimize their objectives through such activities as systematic collection 
and processing of complete information, centralized decision making, formal scheduling, 
hierarchical control, and an objective rationality (i.e., "economic man"). 
Many management scientists have contested such over-rationalizations of human behavior. 
In the 1950s Simon proposed the concept of the bounded rationality of man. His concept 
recognized the limited capacity of human beings to obtain and process information and possible 
alternatives, their subjective picture of reality, and their "satisfying" rather than maximizing 
behavior (i.e., "administrative man"). Simon's concepts were widely recognized since. 1 2 
Also Lindblom adopted Simon's views. He added the idea mat the mutual interaction 
between individuals (having approximately equivalent power) can often lead to favorable or 
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acceptable results without any centralized analysis of information. As a result, the evolving 
direction of an organization may often be more incremental than purely rational. Different 
participants adjust thereby their objectives incrementally as well. 1 3 
Although such concepts facilitate understanding of the decision-making processes, they 
do not provide any quantitative guidelines or indicators for analyzing the relation between 
uncertainty in the processes and the management conditions. 
Kampfraath's concept of the levels of sophistication makes an indirect effort in this 
direction; a higher level of sophistication does not necessarily, but is likely to, reduce the level 
of uncertainty. His concept of levels of sophistication can be used as a quantitative performance 
indicator for the different key decision-making processes. 
Basic idea behind this concept is that the quality of decision making depends on the 
quantity of information used, and the way it is processed. The quality of the decision making 
is thus likely to increase as the processing becomes more systematic (1), incorporates more 
feedback (2), foresees the consequences of the decision more accurately (3) and integrates 
influencing decisions (4). Kampfraath used these four criteria based on information use and 
processing to develop the quantitative levels of the conversion matrix of Table 1. 
A very low or high classification is not a performance judgement in itself. A very low 
level of sophistication may lead to a satisfactory performance at low costs, and may thus be cost-
effective. Yet, if the performance is considered unsatisfactory, and the contribution of a 
particular key decision as well, then it is assumed that a higher level of sophistication is likely 
to lead to a higher performance. In this indirect way, this concept links management 
performance with system performance. 
The concept can be used to facilitate the mutual adaptation of processes and their 
management conditions. It also can be used for a very systematic analysis of the relation 
between overall system performance and the related contributions of the different key decisions. 
A normative judgement of the present level of sophistication of the decision making in 
a particular irrigation system is only possible in comparison with a statistically significant 
number of other systems in comparable environments. Thus three aspects of the management 
cloverleaf (Figure 2) have to be compared to use it as a performance standard. The International 
Irrigation Management Institute (LTMI) may undertake comparative research to develop such 
standards in the future.14 
This study uses the concept to identify the present level of sophistication of the different 
key decisions in several case studies. If the present quality of these decisions requires 
improvement, the concept is in addition used to identify in a systematic way the opportunities 
for improvement. Definition of such improvements is in terms of the required changes in the 
processes to achieve a higher level of sophistication of these processes, as well as in terms of 
the related requirements for different sets of management conditions. 
Conceptual Solutions 
A specific contribution of the selected analytical framework is that many elements that other 
management schools and approaches use such as strategic and operational management, 
management control, human resource management, financial control, and management 
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information systems, are logically linked into one integral framework.15 
The framework is thereby not normative in that it provides single solutions with general 
validity, or with validity for specific types of organization. In the analysis and approach of 
decision-making processes and its interrelation to management conditions it accepts the earlier 
described theories of Simon and Lindblom on human behavior. And also the political aspects 
of decision making are not excluded from the analysis. 
Instead, by putting performance, decision-making processes, management conditions and 
management control into one logical framework (as given in Figure 3), this analytical framework 
provides conceptual solutions. These can be used to develop tailor-made solutions, i.e., unique 
solutions for specific situations. 
Table 1. The levels of sophistication on a scale 0-100" 
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i n a b r o a d c o n t e x t : 
i m p o r t a n t i n f l u e n c i n g f a c t o r s 
a r e i n c o r p o r a t e d 
V e r y h i g h 
( 8 0 - 1 0 0 ) 
s y s t e m s : 
b a l a n c e d s y s t e m s o f m u t u a l l y 
a t t u n e d p r o c e d u r e s 
a l w a y s : 
a l l r e l e v a n t 
i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m t h e p a s t i s 
c o n s i d e r e d 
v e r y f a r : 
e x p e c t e d d e v e l o p m e n t s a r e 
r e v i e w e d a n d c o n s i d e r e d 
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HOW TO OPERATIONALIZE THE FRAMEWORK FOR IRRIGATION? 
The analytical framework presented above can be used in any organization. To facilitate its 
application and understanding in irrigation management it is made more irrigation-specific. A 
first step is the identification all irrigation-specific key decisions. Also, the levels of 
sophistication for these irrigation-specific key decisions are defined in detail. 
Identification of Key Decisions and Irrigation Management Concerns17 
To make the management perspective irrigation-specific, the key decisions for water delivery 
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must be defined. Two major groupings of key decisions are those dealing with 1) capacity 
creation, and those dealing with 2) capacity utilization. An essential difference between them 
is their respective time frames. Capacity creation involves the provision of capacity to enable 
its utilization over the medium to long term. Capacity utilization refers to water delivery over 
at most one year. 
Further sub-division and short descriptions of the different irrigation management 
concerns and key decisions follow hereafter. Figure 5 displays them graphically. 
1. Irrigation capacity creation 
This comprises the key decisions determining the irrigation capacities required to achieve the 
pursued capacity utilization processes, and ultimately the desired water-delivery performance. 
Examples of irrigation capacities are not only the "hardware" such as the physical 
infrastructure, transportation facilities and information systems, but also the "software" like 
the irrigation agency staff. 
Capacity creation may involve new construction, rehabilitation and maintenance activities. 
For simplicity reasons all these activities are referred to here as "capacity creation". In line 
with Kampfraath's definitions of management concerns, this group is divided below into two 
management concerns, the "strategic management" and "capacity management".18 
Strategic management covers three key decisions. The first is the determination of the 
organization's mission and related desired objectives for irrigation investments. The 
second is the matching of these desirable objectives with the resources available for 
investment, i.e., the decision on the so-called feasible investment objectives. And the 
third is the determination of the functional requirements for the envisaged irrigation 
investments. These three are described below. 
Desired objectives. An irrigation investment always intends to achieve certain 
desirabilities. These are defined here as the desirable objectives. This definition of 
desirable objectives excludes their feasibility as such, which is per definition part of the 
key decision about the feasible objectives. 
An obvious example of a desirability for an irrigation investment is the objectives 
of the reduction of cultivation risks (through more control over water in certain areas at 
a certain time). Other examples, whether implicitly or explicitly stated, are such 
objectives as an increased agricultural production, the alleviation of poverty, the 
reduction of unemployment, the settlement of landless people, the appeasement of 
political supporters or geopolitically sensitive areas, the saving of foreign exchange 
through increased exports or reduction of imports, the sustainability of the environment, 
and the like. These desired objectives evolve from the related objectives of different 
stakeholders such as the national government, the politicians, the donors, the local 
community and the beneficiaries. 
Feasible objectives. As soon as these desirabilities are matched with the available 
resources, another key decision comes into the picture, i.e., the decision on the so-called 
feasible investment objectives. Resources can be of a financial nature, but may refer also 
to the staffing capacity and capability, or to different physical resources. Examples are 
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such objectives as the area to be commanded (by irrigation water at a certain time), the 
different crops to be grown, the cropping intensities, the acceptable cultivation risks, the 
predicted water-delivery performance, etc. 
Prerequisite for the determination of the feasible objectives is the making of 
certain preliminary assumptions about the future functional requirements for the 
investments. In irrigation this is sometimes called the feasibility-level design. 
Functional requirements. Given the outcome of the decision making on the 
feasible investment objectives, further specifications of the functional requirements for 
the investments have to be set. Obvious examples are such straightforward requirements 
as the required water levels to command certain areas, and the required canals to 
maintain these water levels. Examples of more performance-related requirements are the 
required structures to control water flows and levels, the required storages to collect and 
store water from the catchment, and the required intermediate storages either for the 
collection of runoff, or the reuse of drainage water, or just an increased responsiveness 
at those locations. 
Capacity management is the management concern for the setting of the technical 
requirements for the investment. The functional requirements are thereby considered as 
fixed as they are per definition the outcome of the strategic management. Examples of 
technical infrastructure requirements are the different technical standards to be used such 
as the densities of engineering materials, the coefficients of expansion and shrinkage, the 
permissible concrete stresses, the seepage gradients and uplift or protection. Examples 
of technical staffing requirements are such requirements as the selection criteria and 
professional-development programs. 
Tendering of contracts for construction, rehabilitation, and maintenance contracts 
is part of this capacity management. And so is the monitoring and adjusting of the actual 
acquisition of the irrigation capacity. 
2. Irrigation capacity utilization 
The second major grouping of key decisions is the irrigation capacity utilization. It comprises 
the key decisions about the utilization of the available irrigation capacities to realize a certain 
water delivery. In line with Kampfraath's definitions of management concerns, this group is 
again split into two irrigation management concerns, the so-called "allocation management" 
and "regulation management".19 
Allocation management refers to the decisions about how much water is to be allocated, 
as well as when and where. This decision making usually deals with the matching of 
supply and demand (except situations where the allocation is fully supply-driven because 
of the absence of any gates in the system). This allocation management also entails the 
determination of the quality standards for the service delivery as well as the related 
indicators. Examples of indicators are timeliness, adequacy, equity, reliability, 
responsiveness, predictability, efficiency, variability, etc. There are two types of 
allocation decisions, the seasonal and in-seasonal allocation decisions. 
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Seasonal or annual allocation plan. The seasonal plan is the decision of what 
areas are to receive water, for what crops and at what time. At the beginning of each 
season or year, the matching of the available supply of water with the existing demand 
leads to such a plan for the allocation of water to subsystems. Of course, the subsystems 
can use this water for other purposes than irrigation as well. Such a seasonal allocation 
plan incorporates the envisaged cropping patterns and calendar, and the related cultivation 
risks. 
In-seasonal allocation. The in-seasonal plan is the decision about who gets how 
much water, and at what time. Matching of the available supply of water with the 
existing demand during the season leads to more or less regular in-seasonal allocations 
of water to subsystems. Also this plan incorporates the envisaged cropping patterns and 
calendar, and the related cultivation risks. These in-seasonal allocations are expressed 
in operational targets either for the capture of water from a source, or for the storage in 
(intermediate) reservoirs and canals, or for the conveyance along canals, or for the 
distribution through (different types of) offtakes. 
Many irrigation professionals consider the seasonal and in-seasonal allocation as 
the same plan as they seem to require almost the same type of information. Yet, the 
value of separate analysis is their different outcome. The outcome and performance 
indicators of the seasonal plan are more in terms of the cropping intensity, the cropping 
calendar and the cropping pattern. For the in-seasonal plan, these are more in terms of 
water duty and quality of the service delivery. 
Regulation management. The concern for flow regulation entails the decisions of the 
timing, the frequency and the size of the gate settings along the canals to get water to 
offtakes and thus effectuate the allocation decisions. Structures are operated to capture 
water from a source, to store it, to convey it through canals, and to distribute it through 
offtakes. Such operational methods are possibly in line with the operational targets. 
Managers therefore make decisions about the operational methods for the different gates 
of different structures. 
Depending on the pursued water-delivery performance, they possibly develop also 
a regulation plan. Such a plan coordinates the operational methods and procedures of 
the different structures along canals to regulate the water flows and levels. 
A mutual adjustment of the management of the allocation and the water-flow regulation 
is always necessary. The flow regulation practices provide in principle the inputs for the 
allocation management. At the same time, the allocation management produces the 
operational targets for the flow regulation. In all situations, the final decisions refer to the 
flow regulation processes to realize the water deliveries. The flow regulation determines thus 
ultimately the performance. 
Large overlaps exist between the information used and required for the above key 
decisions. The relevance of a separate management analysis is the different outcomes, 
requirements and constraints of these key decisions. These different key decisions thus 
represent different perspectives for the involved decision makers, and therefore require also 
different performance indicators. For the seasonal plan the outcome and performance 
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indicators are more in terms of cropping intensity, cropping calendar and cropping pattern. 
For the in-seasonal plan the outcome and performance indicators are more in terms of the 
water duty and quality of the service delivery. The performance indicators of the regulation 
relate more to the efficiencies of water conveyance and the quality of the water 
conveyance.20 
Except for the capacity management, this study discusses and analyzes the above three 
other irrigation management concerns of the framework. The omittance of the capacity 
management is due to the otherwise required detailed descriptions of the more informal processes 
of the capacity creation. The detailed discussion of, for example, the here and there existing 
mechanisms of corruption in construction and maintenance contracts, or the political and other 
influences in the hiring and firing of people are too sensitive to be incorporated in this text. 
Especially, if the text is to remain acceptable and accessible to a wide audience.21 
Figure 5. Irrigation management concerns 
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Definition of the Levels of Sophistication for the Key Decisions 
Another step of making the analytical framework irrigation-specific is the translation of the four 
criteria that determine the levels of sophistication (and the evolving conversion matrix of Table 
1) for the six key decisions. This translation can be found in Annex 1. 
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Based on the same criteria, Marcelis has developed a questionnaire for the different 
management concerns. Although the development of this questionnaire focused on maintenance 
management, the translation of the related questions for irrigation management was not difficult. 
Annex 2 shows this translation for the key decisions of the capacity utilization in irrigation.22 
Essentially the same values (see Annex 2) for similar types of activities were maintained to make 
use of the experience of Marcelis' in-depth work to establish them. Also the lack of any reliable 
values in irrigation to establish alternative values made it logical to use those developed by 
Marcelis. 
For the capacity creation such a questionnaire was not used. The political nature of these 
decision-making processes makes it less appropriate to make a quantitative comparison between 
different countries. Instead, chapter 5 gives a broad quantitative judgement based on the four 
criteria underlying the concept of the levels of sophistication. 
DATA COLLECTION 
Data collection on decision-making processes for this study consisted of the interviewing of the 
decision makers, and of studying reports, files, records and other documentation. Also, some 
direct observation of the decision-making processes and physical processes was done. 
This section explains the approach of the data collection. In general, the quality of (the 
application of) an analytical framework comprises the same components as any other knowledge 
product; its relevance and its reliability.23 These quality components are discussed below. 
Relevance : the Framework 
The above described framework itself provides a guideline for prioritizing and focusing on the 
enormous mass of issues, information, and opinions in irrigation systems and organizations. The 
framework thereby determines the relevant research questions for this management analysis of 
the irrigation sector. These are the general pictures of the six key decisions and the related 
decision-making processes. The managerial aspects of the decision-making processes are 
analyzed separately, as well as their mutual adaptation to the substantive aspects of the decision-
making processes. Additional relevant research questions are the opportunities and constraints 
in the processes and related management conditions. Chapter 7 evaluates the relevance of the 
framework as applied in the preceding chapters. 
Reliability : Opinion- versus Data-Based 
This section deals with the other component of a good analysis, i.e., its reliability. What has 
been done to generalize the decision-making processes here as reliable as possible? Though the 
reliability of research often benefits from quantitative data and facts (i.e., to be data-based), for 
decision-making processes this seems doubtful. One may try to quantify aspects of the decision-
making processes, for example, the frequency of a meeting. Yet, the question may linger on 
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if the meeting serves any consultative purposes. Similarly, any quantification of aspects of the 
decision-making process tends to depend again on the interpretation of the figures, and is thus 
again opinion-based.24 
Any generalized picture of a decision-making process therefore has to rely to a large 
extent on the opinions of people. If researchers want to trace a decision-making process, they 
have to rely to a large extent on the opinions of the people involved in the decision-making 
process. Decision-making processes are essentially processes of transformation of information. 
Information is their input, throughput and output. But information as input, throughput and 
output is not always traceable in files, memos or other documentation. A large part of the 
relevant information is "between the ears" of the people involved in the decision making. 
Tracing this information requires the interviewing of the involved decision makers, who give 
their opinion of the decision-making process. This study is therefore to a large extent opinion-
based. 
Yet much effort has gone into making the generalized picture of the decision-making 
processes as reliable as possible, and to distill from the multitude of opinions of people a 
balanced picture. This required the following approaches: 
1. First, the initial two in-depth case studies served to obtain an in-depth insight in the 
decision-making processes, the different opinions and related interests. The analytical 
management framework was developed gradually and in parallel with these in-depth case studies. 
Simultaneously, it was used for their analysis. Most of the related data collection occurred from 
March 1988 till March 1989, although it continued up to December 1989. EMI published the 
case studies as two Sri Lanka Country Papers2 5 that serve here as reference material. 
Although case studies are widely accepted as suitable for exploratory research, many 
scientists consider them less suitable for generalizing purposes.2 6 Still, many management 
scientists consider case studies appropriate for addressing many scientific research issues in 
management.27 For example, De Leeuw has stated that case studies are an appropriate research 
method to find out the exact picture of the decision making, or to identify relevant variables.28 
For this study, less intensive research in other localities supplemented the material of the in-
depth case studies (see item 5). 
2. Different rounds of interviews served to improve the data reliability further. The data 
collection for each case study started with a first, familiarizing round of interviews with different 
staff levels of irrigation-related agencies. Main subjects of the first interviews were the 
respondents' functions, tasks, responsibilities and entitlements, as well as a first inventory of 
their involvement in different steps of the different decision-making processes. Available reports 
and relevant research data helped the design and formulation of questions. Farmers involved 
in water-related decision making were interviewed in the same way. 
To stimulate the communication, the "open" interview technique was used. For the same 
reason, the bare minimum of interview notes was made. Instead, a full report of every interview 
was completed the same day. Although the interviews were unstructured, the interviewer used 
some interview-specific lists of relevant questions to be addressed. 
Several other rounds of interviews were needed to obtain a clear picture of formal and 
informal decision-making processes, as well as the biases, interests and constraints of different 
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participants and organizations. Without specific information and questions on the decision-
making processes during the first round of interviews, the gathered data tended to be general and 
broad. They often reflected merely the formal pattern.2 9 Obtaining a more profound picture 
of the actual decision-making processes required also a more detailed insight in the processes. 
Initially, this was difficult to achieve through interviewing only, and some form of participant 
observation of the decision-making processes and physical processes was necessary. Again 
reports and documents were important sources of background information and incidents that 
could be used for developing questions. Especially for capacity creation all sorts of project 
preparation, appraisal and evaluation documents were important sources of such incidents. The 
integration of such information (incidents etc.) in subsequent rounds of interviews contributed 
to an improved insight in the decision-making processes. A good insight in system level 
decision-making processes evolved only after also the higher echelons of different agencies and 
donor organizations were interviewed, either once or iteratively. 
Opinions of the different decision makers about organizations and their role in these 
processes facilitated an improved understanding of the actual decision making.3 0 Though cross-
checking of these opinions through repetitive and iterative questioning was of course necessary. 
The rounds of interviews helped to cross-check opinions of some respondents with those of 
others. Especially, if a certain opinion seemed linked to a certain interest, this opinion was 
checked with others of the same interest group as well as with those of a group with a different 
interest. 
This balancing of opinions became gradually easier through an increased familiarity with 
the organization and the actual processes.31 Especially, because more familiarity provoked 
respondents to give their opinion (which was usually not so in the first round of interviews).32 
This familiarity reinforced itself more and more. More familiarity with actual processes made 
it possible to raise more specific questions, leading again to more specific answers. 
The interpretation of the data on decision-making processes here relied to a certain degree 
on so-called teleological reasoning. Teleological reasoning uses the logic that people tend to do 
things they perceive as advantageous, and neglect things they perceive as disadvantageous. 
Practical management research frequently uses this type of internal logic for explaining human 
behavior, as well as for trying to influence it. 3 3 And so does this study in its interpretation of 
decision-making processes, and identification of opportunities for change in management 
processes and conditions. 
De Leeuw has argued that the determination of the quality of teleogical statements is per 
definition more cumbersome as they contain an intestable assumption: the assumed reality.34 
Therefore, teleological reasoning is used here only if respondents also confirmed the related 
behavior. 
3. It was mentioned above that the data collection on water-related decision-making 
processes required some insight in, and understanding of, the physical process, in a qualitative 
as well as, preferably^ a quantitative way. In addition, such data collection required some 
understanding of the substance of the decision-making processes, i.e., mostly irrigation 
engineering topics. The research set up thus had to envisage this in the related observational 
methods. 
The author's background in agricultural engineering facilitated the understanding of the 
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decision making regarding such technical issues as, for example, the theoretical crop water 
requirements calculations, irrigation scheduling, operational methods, backwater effects, 
sensitivity of structures, design criteria and assumptions. This technical background facilitated 
the understanding of the alternative choices in the decision making, the character of the technical 
criteria and priorities etc. 
Studying the available physical facilities and their usage helped to gain an insight into the 
physical processes. The study of the actual usage required the direct observation of, and 
interaction with, the gate tenders. This provided an understanding of the different influences, 
interests, constraints and arguments involved in this decision making (such as the unsteady 
flows, easiness and the frequency of operations, the availability, reliability and timeliness of 
operational targets, the problems to assess the discharge, and requests from farmers). 
The above observational methods were used in all case studies. In the two in-depth case 
studies in Sri Lanka, the following observational methods contributed to the quality of the data 
collection as well. A concurrent HMI project on main canal regulation in one case study, Sri 
Lanka's Kirindi Oya system, used an effective tool for studying the decision making about the 
physical process. It consisted of automatic water level recorders in combination with data 
loggers. This combination provided the opportunity to monitor actual gate operations day and 
night, and interview the gate tenders afterward based on the monitored operations about the how 
and why of their decisions.35 Especially for the study of the hydraulic behavior of the main 
system and the related decision making on the gate operations, this tool appeared valuable. 
Direct observations of decision making by higher hierarchical levels than the gate tenders 
and their immediate supervisors were done to a certain extent in the in-depth case studies by 
observing their activities for limited periods of time. The focus was thereby on the interaction 
between the different hierarchical levels and between the agency staff and the water users. In 
addition, participant observation was done by attending formal and informal meetings. 
Research notes of IIMI research assistants of different disciplinary background that 
worked and resided on-site in the two Sri Lankan sample areas, and discussions with them, 
improved the quality of the in-depth case studies at system level. 
These direct observations, research notes and consequent discussions, as well as the 
research results of parallel IIMI projects in the same systems provided the incidents and facts 
used for interviewing the different agency staff. Without such detailed information it would have 
been more difficult to interview these managers more than once about the specifics of their work 
to gain an exact picture of the actual decision-making processes. 
4. The concept of the level of sophistication is an analytical tool to compare decision-making 
processes in the different case studies in a more data-based mode than the case study approach. 
Decision making is essentially a transformation of information, as discussed above. Higher 
levels of sophistication characterize a more appropriate way of handling the information, and 
are thus likely to lead to better decisions. Although data collection on the levels of 
sophistication and thus on the use of information is to a large part opinion-based, compared to 
the human factor in the decision making, information use provides a somewhat neutral entrance 
for the comparative analysis of decision-making processes. 
5. Most reviewers of the initial two in-depth case studies remarked the wider validity of the 
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findings. To enable a further generalization of sufficient reliability, comparative case studies 
were undertaken in three other countries. The obtained familiarity with the physical and human 
behavior allowed the comparative case studies to be of a shorter duration than the in-depth case 
studies. Iterative rounds of interviews were necessary only for the key decision makers. 
Successive comparative case studies of durations between two and four weeks in Philippines, 
Morocco (four weeks each) and Sudan (two weeks). In both Morocco and the Philippines two 
case studies were done (i.e., the Gharb and Basse Moulouya systems in Morocco and UPRIIS 
and Allah systems in the Philippines), while in Sudan one (i.e., the Rahad system). In all 
countries, in addition, top managers, policy makers and researchers of relevant departments, 
ministries and international development banks were interviewed. 
The basis for the selection of the countries for the comparative case studies was the 
perception prevalent among irrigation professionals of a relatively weak (i.e., Sri Lanka and 
Sudan) and a strong (i.e., Philippines and Morocco) irrigation management in both rice-based 
and non-rice based irrigation environments. Morocco provided, in addition, for a more 
technology-intensive case. 3 6 
Additional field observations and interviews of even shorter duration were done in South 
India (Tamil Nadu) and Pakistan (Punjab). Also, ITMI's Management Development Program 
applied the management perspective provided by the framework in its Training Needs 
Assessment exercises, Top Management sessions and development of Training Modules in 
Malaysia and Bangladesh.37 The latter exercises provided additional observations for the 
management perspective presented here. 
6. This text presents generalized findings of the different case studies. As far as possible, 
references to international publications on similar findings further supplemented and validated 
these generalized findings. Especially regarding sensitive issues many such references to other 
professionals and official documents were used to ensure the highest reliability and objectivity 
possible (as most official documents tended to give as rosy a picture as possible on the 
investment performance). In addition, discussions with colleagues in IIMI and other 
international irrigation and management experts contributed significantly to the generalizing of 
the findings. 
IS GENERALIZATION ABOUT IRRIGATION MANAGEMENT APPROPRIATE? 
The subsequent chapters aim to provide a generalizing picture of the described management 
perspective. One may question to what degree such a generalization is appropriate at all. 
Although generalization about irrigation management has been much advocated in the 
past, its potential has been controversial all along. A likely reason is that nobody has ever 
considered a process-based generalization. Generalization of processes is possible, though one 
has to put many efforts in its reliability, as explained in the above section. The only similar 
generalization available to date, is Slabbers' comparison of indigenous and western water 
allocation principles.38 
Structure- or systems-based generalizations seem almost unattainable, not the least 
because of the wide heterogeneity of scale and relative water scarcity.39 Bottrall, for example, 
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has tested the representativeness of his sample systems against 24 different possible classification 
parameters.4 0 Despite many efforts, the classification problems that have to precede such 
generalizations have yet to be solved.41 
Chambers has expressed this generalization dilemma as follows: "If there is one clear 
lesson emerging, it is that each system is unique in its combination of resources, structures, 
institutions, procedures, conventions, problems and opportunities.1142 A process-based 
analytical management framework starts also with this assumption; it considers the prescription 
of blueprint structural changes per definition as inappropriate and as unadapted to a specific 
management situation. Yet, some generalized shortcomings with general indications of the kind 
of solutions may be possible. 
Based on a generalization of processes, this study identifies generalized opportunities for 
improvement. Still, one has to be aware that such recommendations remain broad indications 
for the whole irrigation sub-sector, rather than tailor-made solutions for specific organizations 
and systems. 
Notes 
1. Zuurbier et al. 1991:73, after an overhead of Kampfraath and Marcelis 1981. 
2. See, for example, West Churchman 1968:29. 
3. Simon 1971. 
4. "Processes" refers in this text to decision-making processes. 
5. This chapter remarks now and then a differing use of jargon by most English and American management professionals, 
thus suggesting the used analytical framework to be a new paradigm. To a certain degree it is as it tries to be pure and 
consistent in analyzing processes. Yet, process thinking itself has become widespread and is not a new paradigm. The 
framework used here can be seen as a synthesis of much of the American thinking regarding management principles -
particularly Simon, but also Drucker and others-. It has some specific characteristics, in which case reference is made 
to the original authors. In practice, the framework represents a new paradigm where it defines certain concepts. 
Management and control and management function are defined more consistently in their relation to decision-making 
processes than in most English and American literature. 
6. Kampfraath and Marcelis 1981; Zuurbier et al. 1991. 
7. Kampfraath's rationale for choosing "concern" rather than, for example, "function" is that concern is process-based. 
"Concern" refers to the necessity for the organization as a whole, or even outsiders influencing the decision making, to 
take these key decisions to achieve certain objectives. "Functions" always relate to organizational such as persons and 
departments. Thus, the process-oriented definition of concern corresponds to function only if applied to the organization 
as a whole. 
8. Irrigation's physical process refers to the de-facto gate operations - (thus not the decision to operate the gate and the 
method of operating, but the result of that decision) - and the consequent water flows. 
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9. This approach of conditioning or controlling the management processes by a systematic kind of trial-and-error, a 
cybernetical approach, has many management science supporters, both process-oriented and structuralist professionals. 
Only the approaches to analyze and solve the problem vary widely. 
10. Kampfraath has argued that the management control type of decision making consists theoretically of an infinite 
number of layers of decision-making processes. Unless only one person is involved, you can always find conditioning 
decisions for management control decisions. Because of the theoretical nature of this argument, more interesting for 
management scientists than irrigation professionals, it has not been used here. 
11. Uncertainty is defined as the difference between the amount of information required to perform a task and the amount 
of information already possessed by the organization (Galbraith 1973:5). This definition approaches the complement of 
the level of sophistication. Though, the latter concept leaves the judgement about the required level to the organization 
(or the management consultant). 
12. Simon 1971. 
13. Lindblom 1971. 
14. For a methodology to develop such indicators, see Nijman 1990. 
15. Conform Mantz 1984. 
16. After Kampfraath and Marcelis 1981:39. 
17. The irrigation management concerns are only made irrigation-specific for the decision making, i.e., not for the 
management control. Kampfraath has defined such management control concerns as well, but these are not used here. 
18. Kampfraath and Marcelis 1981:33. 
19. For management in general, Kampfraath has defined these concerns as "operational management" and 
"programming/manufacturing" respectively. 
20. An example of potential performance indicators for the different key decisions is provided in Nijman 1992b. 
21. For a description of these processes, see, for example, Wade 1982b. 
22. Marcelis 1984. 
23. De Leeuw 1990:50. 
24. Conform de Leeuw 1990:101. 
25. Nijman 1991 and 1992a. 
26. E.g., Yin 1984. 
27. E.g., De Leeuw 1990:131. 
28. Ibid. 
29. Conform, for example, Hunt and Hunt 1974. 
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30. Opinions of different people with different interests are very important to obtain a clear picture of the formal and 
informal organization. The in-depth observations for this study support the experiences of the interpretative sociologists 
that, apart from the physical appearance of the organization, organizations do not exist, other than as images in the eyes 
of the different participants (Lammers 1987:417). 
31. Wade is one of the few irrigation professionals who has written about his research methodologies. His research 
methodology in this respect is almost similar with the methodology of this study (Wade 1982a:291). 
32. Conform De Leeuw 1990:101. 
33. Ibid:37. 
34. Ibid:41. 
35. This method showed, for example, that the cross-regulators in a main system in the Philippines, were operated at 
night for fishing purposes (UMI 1989). 
36. A recent comparative Irrigation Impact Study by the World Bank selected its sample countries on the basis of almost 
identical criteria (World Bank 1990d:ii). 
37. IIMI/DID 1990 and HvII/BADC 1991; Nijman and Kampfraath 1991a; 1991b; 1991c. 
38. Slabbers 1989:679. 
39. Chambers 1981:3. 
40. Bottrall 1981a:41-42. 
41. The two most recent classifications can demonstrate this. A classification by Svendsen and Small 1990 sparked off 
a lot of criticism, partly directed on the lack of a conceptual basis. Murray-Rust and Snellen 1991 produced and applied 
a more workable classification that was partly process-based (mainly the allocation). However, the latter's focus was 
on design-performance interactions only. 
42. Chambers 1981:3. 

CHAPTER 4 
Results : Capacity Utilization 
"Professionals have always resisted attempts to hold them accountable. It is the essence of being a professional-
-so the doctor, lawyer, engineer, or priest has always argued—that one is not accountable to laymen and that 
qualification rather than performance is the ground of acceptance . . . Society must demand that these people 
think through what they should be held accountable for and that they take responsibility for their contribution."' 
"Management is based on the premise that things can be done better, which in turns means that one wants 
better performance. In a socio-political situation where what is legitimate is what one gets away with, can there 
be any concern for public system performance? And, if there is no desire to manage, what can management 
techniques do?... 'In the land of nudists, what can a washerman do?' —(Panchatantra). "2 
IRRIGATION PROFESSIONALS WHO write about capacity utilization typically focus on those 
aspects they are trained in. The simplified image is that engineers tend to be biased toward 
structures and formulae, economists toward numbers, and sociologists toward participation. 
Such "biased" approaches provide limited guidance for irrigation managers. Though 
every perspective is prone to have some biases, this chapter attempts to take a more objective 
perspective in both diagnosis and therapy toward the commonly applied disciplinary approaches 
in the capacity utilization. Apart from providing an innovative perspective on capacity 
utilization, this chapter identifies the related opportunities for improvement. 
The following characteristics make this perspective of a different nature in comparison 
to earlier publications: 
1) the framework's systematic focus on the substantive and managerial aspects and 
thus on the usefulness of different disciplinary approaches in actual decision-
making processes about capacity utilization; and, 
2) the framework's integrative perspective of how different management conditions 
(such as human resources, their motivation and incentives, the provision of 
information and knowledge, the organizational structure and the financial control 
systems) influence decision-making processes, and ultimately the performance of 
the irrigation organization. 
This perspective is different because disciplinary specialists are typically not trained to look at 
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these two aspects. 
The first step of the development of this perspective in this chapter is the definition of 
the key decisions of capacity utilization. These key decisions are the allocation and flow 
regulation decisions. They are the basic orientation points of the diagnosis and therapy in this 
chapter. This set of key decisions is already different from topics normally studied by most 
irrigation management professionals. 
For each defined key decision, the actual processes of decision making as they tend to 
occur in the case studies are described and analyzed. Also, a comparative performance 
assessment of these management processes in some selected irrigation environments is given. 
The concluding parts of the chapter use these analyses and performance assessments to 
derive opportunities for performance improvement. Improvements are suggested in an 
integrated manner in terms of requirements for 1) the decision-making processes (step 3 of 
Figure 3 in chapter 3); as well as, 2) the management conditions (step 4). 
WHAT ARE THE KEY DECISIONS FOR CAPACITY UTILIZATION? 
Prerequisite for a focus on decision-making processes here is a very precise definition of what 
key decisions have to be taken for irrigation capacity utilization. These key decisions are 
classified into two groups of management concerns: "allocation" and "flow regulation". 
Allocation management refers to the decisions about how much water is to be allocated, as 
well as when and where. This decision making involves the matching of supply and demand. 
Part of this allocation management is the determination of the quality standards for the 
service delivery as well as the related indicators. Examples of indicators are timeliness, 
adequacy, equity, reliability, responsiveness, predictability, efficiency, variability, etc. In 
general, allocation entails the following two key decisions. 
Seasonal or annual allocation plan. The seasonal plan is the decision about which areas 
are to receive water, for what crops and at what time. At the beginning of each season or 
year, the matching of the available supply of water with the existing demand leads to such 
a plan for the water allocation to subsystems. Water can be allocated for irrigation and for 
other purposes such as drinking water, bathing, and hydropower generation. This plan 
incorporates the envisaged cropping patterns and calendar, and the related cultivation risks. 
In-seasonal allocation. The in-seasonal plan is the decision who gets how much water, 
and at what time. Matching of the available supply of water with the existing demand during 
the season leads to more or less regular in-seasonal allocations of water to subsystems. Also 
this plan incorporates the envisaged cropping patterns and calendar, and the related cultivation 
risks. 
These in-seasonal allocations are expressed in operational targets for the different 
physical processes. Examples are the operational targets for the capture of water from a 
source, for the storage in (intermediate) reservoirs and canals, for the conveyance along 
canals and for the distribution through (different types of) offtakes. 
Many irrigation professionals consider seasonal and in-seasonal allocation as the same 
plan because it requires almost the same type of information. The value of analyzing them 
RESULTS: CAPACITY UTTLEATION 41 
separately is that their outcome is different. For the seasonal plan the outcome and 
performance indicators are more in terms of cropping intensity, cropping calendar and 
cropping pattern. For the in-seasonal plan the outcome and performance indicators are more 
in terms of water duty and quality of the service delivery. 
Flow regulation management. Flow regulation entails the decisions of timing, frequency and 
size of gate settings along the canals to get water to offtakes and thus effectuate the allocation 
decisions. Structures have to be operated to capture water from a source, to store it, to 
convey it through canals, and to distribute it through offtakes in line with the operational 
targets. Managers must therefore make decisions about operational methods for the different 
gates of different structures. 
Depending on the pursued water-delivery performance, they possibly have to develop also 
a regulation plan. Such a plan has to coordinate the operational methods and procedures of 
the different structures along canals to regulate water flows and levels. 
The essential difference between allocation and regulation also can be shown with Figure 
6. The large vertical arrow in the Figure 6 represents the regulation as the repetitive operations 
of the same gates by operating division A at times tO, t l , etc. The management of the 
contributions by one of the operating divisions for improved gate settings and procedures is 
essentially a localized concern. Yet, the contributions of the different divisions have to 
incorporate the hydraulic interdependence of water flows along the canal. Decisions on 
regulation should establish the best operational methods of gates for different flow patterns, and 
so determine the potential quality of the water-delivery service. Overall, the flow regulation 
covers the management of the more technical, hydraulic aspects of the capacity utilization. 
Figure 6. Irrigation capacity utilization3 
MANASINQ WATER FLOW REGULATION 
(SIZE, TIME & FREQUENCY BATE SETTINGS, CALIBRATIONS, WHO) 
A B C D 
OPERATING DIVISION FOR SUB-SYSTEM 
The large diagonal arrow of Figure 6 represents the allocation management of volumes 
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of water at different times along a canal and between subdivisions A, B, C, D etc. This 
planning determines the pursued allocations RI, R2, etc. and the required outputs from the 
different divisions (when, where and how much) to achieve them. These requirements are 
derived from the pursued allocations. For example, from the desired allocation R2, the 
allocation planning first derives the required output from division D, subsequently from division 
C etc. 
The allocation management thus indicates the operational targets for the regulation by the 
different operating divisions. These operational targets can be expressed in water levels or 
discharges. Overall, this allocation management cares for the overall performance of the 
capacity utilization. In practice, the management of allocation and regulation interact very 
closely. 
Allocation-Regulation Interactions 
Large overlaps exist between the information used and required for the allocation and the 
regulation decisions. An allocation decision requires insights in the quality of regulation that 
can be delivered by the different operating divisions. A decision on regulation is typically in 
the form of "if..." a certain flow situation occurs, "...then" it is regulated in a particular 
manner. Examples of such "if...then" decisions are operational methods and procedures to be 
applied after particular flow variations due to rainfall or operation of the head sluice. 
Allocation planning of operational targets needs such information of the "possible" 
regulation. The other way around, the operational targets for conveyance through and 
distribution from a canal are the output of the in-seasonal allocation, and the input for regulation 
decisions. Such targets may encompass requirements on timing, duration and discharge to 
different canal reaches. 
The final decision on the water delivery is always an actual gate setting, i.e., a regulation 
decision. These regulation decisions may or may not be in line with the allocation plan. The 
less these allocation decisions consider the requirements of the regulation—or the less the 
regulating staff likes to follow the suppositions of the allocation schedules—, the larger are the 
deviations between scheduled and actual allocations. 
The decision-making processes about allocation and regulation, even while mutually 
exclusive in perspective, should thus be strongly adapted to each other. Analyzing the 
management of the capacity utilization remains incomplete and defective, if one considers only 
one of these two key decisions. 
Allocation-Distribution versus Allocation-Regulation 
A misleading concept in irrigation management is "distribution". Its confusing nature is 
explained here with the help of the fore described "management-relevant" perspective on 
capacity utilization. 
Most irrigation professionals use this concept of distribution.4 Yet, all use it with a 
different meaning and almost nobody defines the concept.5 Naturally, this confuses the 
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discussion, analysis and comparison of the methodology and results of research on and 
interventions in irrigation management. 
A listing of explicit and implicit definitions used for distribution is less interesting and 
is time-consuming. However, a working group of Cornell University developed a definition to 
which many professionals adhere. 
Cornell defined the concepts of allocation, distribution, decision making and conflict 
management6 as essential tasks for system management.7 The difference between allocation 
and distribution relates thereby to the physical infrastructure; water is "allocated" from the water 
source, and "distributed" in a distribution network. 
For decision making, and thus for a management analysis, this physical difference is 
irrelevant and even misleading. It assumes that distribution within the distribution network does 
not involve any allocation decisions anymore. It also assumes that this so-called "allocation-
distribution" paradigm covers the full scope of management issues relevant for irrigation capacity 
utilization. So, professionals working with this paradigm typically ignore the more technical, 
hydraulic perspective of the management of flow regulation. 
The difference between the "allocation-distribution" and the here proposed "allocation-
regulation" paradigms may seem theoretical or trivial. Yet, the practical consequences are a 
systematic neglect by most irrigation practitioners of the management requirements of flow 
regulation, in theory as well as in practice. While many practitioners have written about the 
relevance of main system management,8 this major management component is usually not 
considered. Some exceptions exist9, but mostly in more technically oriented research on 
regulation. Typically only engineers execute and report upon these. The hydraulic 
characteristics and related physical and management processes tend to be considered only in the 
design phase, and, even then, only in a theoretical way. 
A more "management-relevant" analysis of irrigation capacity utilization requires thus 
an explicit awareness of the existence and use of this "allocation-distribution" paradigm. This 
may lead to a complete and balanced approach toward the technical and managerial aspects of 
the capacity utilization in irrigation. And thus reduce the present widespread confusion in its 
analysis. 
Unless in quotation, this text uses the word "distribution" only in reference to physical 
processes; i.e., to distinguish between the physical processes of "conveyance" of water along 
a canal, and "distribution" from a canal into offtaking canals. 
ALLOCATION PROCESSES 
This section gives a generalized picture of the actual decision-making processes in irrigation 
systems for one of the two basic orientation points of this chapter, namely the water allocation. 
As said before, the case studies in Sri Lanka, Morocco, Philippines, Sudan, India and 
Malaysia are the main basis for this generalized picture. References to similar findings in the 
international literature on irrigation management provide for further justification and validation 
of the generalized picture. Following the presentation of this generalized picture, a comparative 
performance assessment is given of the management processes in the selected irrigation 
environments. These analyses and performance assessments are then used to derive 
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opportunities for performance improvement. Opportunities for performance improvements are 
suggested in terms of requirements for the decision-making processes as well as for the 
management conditions. 
This section on allocation processes has four different subsections, representing the 
following four separate components of the allocation decision-making process: 1) the preparation 
of decisions on water allocation commences with an assessment of the supply; 2) as well as an 
assessment of the demand for water; 3) the decision preparation generally leads to some form 
of an allocation plan or schedule; and 4) this plan may then be, or not be, the basis for the 
actual allocation decisions, their implementation, monitoring and evaluation. 
For each of these four components, an initial description of the general picture of the 
substantive and management aspects is given. These are followed by the observed levels of 
sophistication in the different case studies. For some components the different observed 
management options are given as well. Then follows a separate analysis of the management 
aspects, or the "management process". It focuses on questions like what information is used, 
what are the main criteria, who participate, and what are the different steps in the 
decision-making process. Finally, an evaluation of the mutual adaptation of the substantive and 
managerial aspects concludes the analysis of the allocation processes. 
Supply Assessment 
The first component of the allocation decision-making process described here is the assessment 
of the supply. This supply assessment can happen for the system as a whole, as well as for 
different subsystems. This level depends also on the levels where decision making on the 
allocation takes place. For example, in a not imaginary situation, it can be the gate operators 
who make allocation decisions by themselves. To that end, they also assess the available supply 
by assessing the water level in either the upstream canal reach or the intermediate reservoir. 
This supply assessment can, in principle, incorporate several sources of supply. 
Examples are the rainfall in the catchment area, the hydrological simulations or probability 
curves of inflow, as well as the actual inflow and storage in reservoirs. For their assessment 
several modern forecasting techniques in communications, electronics and micro-processing are, 
in principle, available. Examples of such techniques are minimal stream-gauging, precipitation 
stations, snow-pack monitoring and regional and local weather tracking. 
Observed practices. Such forecasting of the likely inflow and rainfall does not seem to occur 
in practice. In all case studies the only basis for the supply assessment observed was either the 
actual inflow or the reservoir storage. Thus, the 100 per cent probable supply was used, rather 
than a forecast of a less reliable supply. 
Frederiksen has had similar experiences with supply assessment. According to him, the 
experience of the system manager or operator is usually the only basis for inflow expectations. 
If at all, it is "sometimes augmented by inadequate data". 1 0 
One problem observed with historic data and probability curves is the frequently doubtful 
reliability of the underlying data and calibration curves. Worldwide trends of changing inflow 
patterns due to deforestation in upstream catchment areas further augment this problem. 
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Calibration curves of the reservoir capacities and main intakes of systems were observed 
to be often only theoretical. In general, they tended to remain unchanged after the original 
construction of the system. Due to siltation, weed growth and erosion of canals over time the 
absolute value of supply assessments with such calibration curves becomes negligible. Such a 
theoretical nature of calibration curves was observed in the studied run-of-the-river systems of 
the Philippines and India, and the reservoir systems in Sri Lanka and Sudan. Also in Morocco 
the volumetric modules were observed to be uncalibrated. (The error involved in the latter case 
was probably less, because the discharge released from such modules is less sensitive to water 
level fluctuations). 
Observed management processes. The above described mode of supply assessment clearly has 
only a relative value. It provides system managers only with an indication of the supply, which 
is apparently often satisfactory enough for them. 
The observed rationale for many system managers to be satisfied with such relative 
supply assessments is the difficulty to keep them accountable for the quality of their allocation 
planning. Simultaneously, the general unreliability of data and assessments makes it also more 
difficult to keep them accountable for their actual allocation decisions. And thus also for the 
quality of their supply assessments. 
Forecasting of the likely inflow increases moreover the absolute uncertainty of the 
assessed supply, and thus of the cultivation risks envisaged in the allocation plan. This again 
increases the likelihood of complaints by their superiors, the farmers, or politicians. Generally 
speaking, it is thus, and has been observed to be, in the interest of the system manager to play 
"safe"11 in their allocation decisions. And thus to make conservative estimates of the available 
supply as well, 1 2 preferably even at a 100 per cent probability. So forecasting of the likely 
inflow is generally not done. 
As the use of inflow forecasts increases the absolute cultivation risks, system managers 
will only do it if there is need for them to do so. Such pressure may be exercised by, for 
example, the agency itself. Or it may be exercised by an interested group of farmers, that 
attaches some value to a less conservative estimate to allow a more economic use of the available 
land and water resources. 
An agency may do this, for example, if a group of farmers exert pressure to use the extra 
water,—i.e., the used margin in the conservative estimate- for an extra crop or area. This was 
observed, for example, in Morocco's Gharb system. There, system managers make these 
forecasts typically every six months and one month before the starting date of the season as part 
of the preparation for the decision to start rice cultivation. A particular group of farmers in 
Gharb can only cultivate rice in very wet years. These farmers have thus an obvious interest 
in a more precise supply assessment. So they exert in this respect a strong pressure on local 
authorities and the irrigation agency. Also here, however, the basis for the final decision was 
observed to be the 100 per cent reliable supply, that was assessed just before the start of the 
actual rice cultivation. 
The fore mentioned low priority of system managers for more accurate and early supply 
assessments was observed to engender in general the approximate and relative nature of these 
assessments. The limited availability of funds and limited communication and transport facilities 
to make more timely and accurate assessments was observed to be usually a consequence of this 
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low priority. 
Demand Assessment 
Decision making on allocation not only requires the assessment of the water supply, but also the 
assessment of the demand for water. Like for the assessment of supply, the demand can be 
assessed for the system as a whole, but also for different subsystems and even for the individual 
client. 
What is demand] This question is relevant given the common and persistent confusion 
in irrigation-related disciplines of the requirements of crops and people. There can be little 
doubt that in day-to-day irrigation system management demand refers to the "soft" water 
requirements as expressed by people and institutions such as water users, politicians, and staff 
of involved agencies. This demand may be both for irrigation and non-irrigation purposes. 
Such demand can be expressed in requirements such as the areas to be irrigated, the water 
duty" and levels, the cropping pattern, the cultivation calendar and the related cultivation risks 
for the different subsystems. 
The irrigation and agronomy sciences restrict demand usually to only the "hard" water 
requirements of crops, soils and canals. Unfortunately, these "hard" requirements also dominate 
the thinking of most irrigation professionals. Further parts of this chapter elaborate upon this 
issue. 
In this text, demand includes both the "hard" and "soft" water requirements. So, demand 
assessment thus can incorporate several or all of the following parameters: 
* cultivation and irrigation plans or progress of farmers; 
* envisaged, historical or measured on-farm vertical percolation and lateral seepage 
rates or canal seepage rates; 
* expected, historical or measured rainfall in the cultivated command area; 
* canal operational losses; 
* actual or theoretical evapotransporation of crops; 
* the water level at the head of the concerned subsystem; and, 
* requests of water users or politicians regarding the above parameters. 
Important demand parameters for the pre-seasonal planning are the irrigated area, and 
the cropping pattern and calendar. During a cultivation season, however, the quantity and 
quality of the day-to-day water delivery for different subsystems is more important. Cultivation 
risks and related uncertainties are always important. 
In principle, demand can be assessed on a more or less frequent basis. This frequency 
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may vary with the water availability. 
Observed practices. The generalized description and analysis of the decision-making processes 
to assess irrigation demand is given below. A classification of different degrees of demand 
assessment is used to focus this description and analysis. Simultaneously, this classification 
reflects the different levels of management inputs by higher staff levels in this decision making. 
No demand assessment. In several irrigation environments such as Pakistan and the 
Indian Punjab, the original design of the irrigation systems precluded any demand assessment 
by agency staff. Design and construction of these systems envisaged very few gates to allow 
the spreading of water over a large area. These systems served thereby subsistence purposes, 
rather than the achievement of high yields per unit area. 1 4 
Allocations to and from the main system are largely supply-driven in these systems. No 
demand assessment is necessary or seems to happen, other than possibly the determination of 
the starting date for the cultivation season or the closure dates for maintenance. 
Field-level demand assessment. Apart from the above fixed type of design concept, all 
other design concepts do provide for more flexibility to respond to changes in demand and 
supply. These other design concepts, in principle, always assume that demand assessment 
involves higher level staff than field staff. (Field staff refers in this text to the gate operators 
and their immediate supervisors whose physical basis is near the irrigation canals under their 
responsibility. Higher level staff are those whose basis is in an office that coordinates the 
capacity utilization for a (sub)system.) 
In practice, this seems seldom the case. In all case studies, higher level staff were 
observed to become directly involved in demand assessment only if their superiors, farmers or 
politicians complained about water issues. Thus, they had a reactive rather than active 
management role in demand assessment. 
Few publications make generalizing remarks about demand assessment. Levine states 
for Indian irrigation agencies that information flows were to a large extent downward "with 
relatively little of an operational nature moving upward." 1 5 This implied the absence of any 
demand assessment by higher level staff. 
Few interviewed irrigation professionals denied the lack of involvement of higher level 
agency staff in demand assessment. Neither did they deny the general validity of the fore 
mentioned reactive attitude of higher-level agency staff in this decision making. The generally 
given excuse was the general lack of motivation and incentives for agency staff to put many 
efforts in demand assessment. 
In general it seems that the assessment of demandfor water in manually operated systems 
typically occurs at field level by the farmers, gate operators and their immediate supervisors. 
This does not mean that system managers or other higher level staff never make field visits. Of 
course, most do an occasional basis, and some do even more regularly. Yet, for the demand 
assessment this usually plays a marginal role. 
Higher staff levels often considered themselves to be involved in demand assessment in 
an indirect way through their assessment of the theoretical crop water requirements. Several 
theoretical formulae were developed since the early 1970s. Their intention was to enable 
irrigation managers to improve performance of irrigation systems through better assessment of 
crop water requirements.16 Often, however, irrigation managers used these theoretical 
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formulae as the only demand assessment, even while they only represented the technical, "hard" 
requirements. They thus omitted from the equation such "soft" parameters as the scarcity value 
of water and related required inefficiencies in water allocation. 
In contrast to the illusion given by the scientific formulae, even the "hard" requirements 
cannot be predicted accurately with these formulae for individual farms and small subsystems. 
It is hard to assess accurately most parameters required in the formulae, such as the irrigated 
area, the progress of the land preparation, requirements for land soaking, effective rainfall, and 
seepage and percolation rates. For example, IIMI measured the actual land soaking 
requirements in Kirindi Oya to be 400 per cent to 750 per cent of the calculated total water 
requirements.17 Similarly, nMI measured the seepage and percolation rates in Uda Walawe 
to be 475 per cent to 530 per cent higher than estimated.18 
With such large deviations, the validity of the outcomes of the formulae depends to a 
large extent on the accuracy of the assessment of seepage and percolation. The latter usually 
varies considerably from one field to the other within one system, and even within one 
allotment.19 So in developed countries, the use of such theoretically determined on-farm 
requirements is often in combination with a field-level assessment or calibration by farmers. 
There farmers even apply sophisticated tools like tensiometers for that purpose. 
Also in all case studies, these indirect, theoretical demand assessments by higher staff 
were usually replaced or complemented in practice by field-level demand assessments. Higher 
level staff usually assessed only the aggregate, and inaccurate water demand for main and 
secondary canals; either through secondary data collected by field staff, or through irregular in-
situ assessments of water levels in the canals. 
In many systems, higher staff levels assessed only the seasonal demand regarding the 
cropping pattern and calendar (i.e., required starting dates and crops for different sub-systems). 
Sometimes, they assessed this directly in coordination meetings with water user representatives 
and local authorities. In other cases, they assessed this demand indirectly through information 
collected by field staff. This type of seasonal demand assessment by higher level staff happened 
in the case studies in the humid tropics of Asia, but also in, for example, Morocco. 
Accurate or approximate demand assessment. Higher level staff, as was mentioned 
before, seldom had information to judge the water demand of farmers. So the assessment of 
water demand by them often occured only in an approximate way. This was the case, for 
example, in most systems in the humid tropics of Asia. 
The expression of water demand at field level was usually in terms of an approximate 
water level or duration, rather than in terms of a volume or a discharge. This had several 
reasons. Farmers and gate operators were not always familiar with discharge or volumetric 
quantities. Measurement facilities, if available at all, were often not working properly; either 
because they were not calibrated, because of backwater effects, or due to faulty construction. 
Thus also higher staff levels could only obtain information in terms of approximate water levels 
or discharges. 
In some cases higher staff levels made efforts to assess the water demand despite the lack 
of reliable and detailed information from the field level. This demand assessment through water 
level or theoretical formulae could only be approximate as well. 
Accurate demand assessments occured only in those exceptional countries where every 
farmer submitted an individual request for a certain volume of water. In Morocco demand 
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assessment was more accurate, because farmers expressed their weekly requirements in terms 
of volume. The availability of measuring facilities (i.e., fixed-discharge modules) at the farm 
gate facilitated this volumetric awareness. An important reason that it happened at all there, was 
the enforcement of the related volumetric billing of water. The latter made volumetric demand 
assessment more a necessity than in the other case studies. 
This accurate type of demand assessment brought with it considerable administration costs 
as well. Yet, Moroccan authorities claim it to be cost efficient so far. 2 0 Unfortunately, very 
little comparative data are available on these administration costs for smallholder irrigation. 
Also demand assessment regarding cropping calendar and pattern was usually in an 
approximate way only. Data collection on preferred or actual cultivation patterns often existed 
in Asian irrigation systems. Yet, due to low motivation of involved staff, these data were often 
not very reliable. Also, in the Asian case studies, for example, the demand assessment 
regarding cropping calendar by higher level staff was usually in meetings for groups of farmers, 
and never for individual farmers. Only in Morocco the agencies assessed the individual farmers' 
cropping plans rather accurately.21 
Observed management processes. This priority for field-level demand assessment had several 
reasons. Most important was usually the desire of higher staff levels to minimize their 
management inputs in demand assessment. The field-level assessment was partly also the result 
of the recognition by irrigation managers that higher staff levels seldom have information to 
judge the actual farmers' water demand. Partly, it was also the result of the tendency of field 
staff to accommodate demands of farmers as far as possible, even if they were excessive. Still, 
the most important reason for the field level assessments was the first mentioned lack of 
motivation of and incentives for higher staff levels to put efforts in more accurate assessments. 
Hard and soft. The question if demand refers to people or to crops seems a major point 
of confusion among irrigation professionals. Engineers and agronomists tended to consider the 
crop, water and farmers as part of a rational system.22 They neglected by that the "soft" 
parameters, such as the opportunities of time utilization by farmers, and the scarcity of water 
because of the involved cultivation risks. 
Strangely enough, this misconception persists against the odds. Some economists have 
pointed out the theoretical misconceptions for some time now. 2 3 Still, many engineers in the 
case studies insisted on using the theoretical crop water requirements without any other yardstick 
to judge water demand. Even though the limitations of its usefulness~and misuse in other cases-
-only increased since the 1970s, because of the increased use of high yielding varieties, and 
other field crops than rice (OFC). (Most new crops increase the absolute cultivation risks, and 
thus the relative scarcity of water and uncertainties for farmers24). 
To a certain extent, the persistent misuse of these theoretical approaches is understandable 
given the few alternatives that were available to engineers. Really, the only alternative was to 
increase their management inputs in interacting with field staff and farmers for a more accurate 
demand assessment. So far the pressure for such increased management inputs was absent 
(according to interviewed engineers in Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Morocco and Philippines), so 
engineers could afford to sustain this type of theoretical demand assessments. 
In public systems, where water was seldom sold on a volumetric basis, the demand was 
rarely short. As long as water was available, the allocation thus usually focused on mamtaining 
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sufficient supply, rather than on assessing the actual demand.25 
The professional confusion about what really represents "demand" combined with the 
absence of accountability toward more accurate assessments stimulated a situation where many 
engineers continued to put vain efforts in calculating these theoretical crop water requirements. 
The outcomes of these calculations usually deviated considerably from the actual demand 
assessment at field level. 
Sometimes engineers were aware of these anomalies. Unfortunately enough, often they 
were not. Also, irrigation curriculae continue to train engineers in these theoretical formulae 
as the best and only way to determine irrigation requirements. 
This persistence of irrigation professionals to base their demand assessment mainly on 
"hard" parameters contrasts with the day-to-day decision making by farmers and field staff of 
irrigation agencies. For the latter, "soft" parameters are the main basis, as for farmers reducing 
uncertainty and risk is the driving factor to provide irrigation water to crops. 
So farmers who have to pay for water often prefer to pay and use much more water than 
necessary for the crops from a purely physical point of view. Examples from the USA, 
Morocco and Pakistan have demonstrated this. 2 6 In the Pakistan case, farmers were even 
willful to pay a price twenty times higher for the assured water from their neighbor's tube-well— 
to supplement the water supply from the gravity system—than for the unreliable water supply 
from the canal system. 
Also in farmer-managed irrigation systems (FMIS), researchers have found many other 
criteria than physical efficiency alone to be important components of farmers' water 
requirements. Widely known are the substitution of individual costs for the farmers such as 
farm labor, draught and weedicides by a higher on-farm water use. These are clear examples 
of situations where the physical efficiency of water use (i.e., the interest of the national 
economy) may conflict with individual interests.27 Slabbers has quoted several generalized 
principles that appeared important in case studies in FMIS around the world. Among others, 
he has mentioned the minimizing of conflicts with "co-users, relatives, group or village 
members" and the consideration of overall income effects of irrigation for individual farmers 
(rather than a consideration of profitability of irrigation per se). 2 8 Minimizing conflicts is even 
more necessary for those farmers who do not have their fields adjacent to a canal, and who thus 
have to receive water through another farmer's field.29 
"Soft" demand parameters tend to be dominant as well in actual decision making by all 
levels of agency staff in most LDCs. A main critérium observed to be used in assessing water 
demand by field and higher level staff in all case studies was the minimizing of conflicts. 
Similarly, for example, the Commission for Irrigation Utilization of the Government of Andhra 
Pradesh (India) has found this to be the general guideline adopted by all irrigation staff.30 
Such behavior of agency staff leads to an underrepresentation of the national interest, if 
no other resource allocation systems, like the price system, enforce some balance on the physical 
water efficiency. Although many engineers know this, they insist on using the theoretical crop 
water requirements. This gives them at least some kind of balance for the physical and 
economic efficiency and thus for the national interest.31 
Also in developed countries such "soft" demand parameters seem very important. In 
France, for example, pressures on politicians have led in the early 1950s to a law that prescribed 
agencies to deliver water to farmers on demand. Fortunately, against a certain price. Similarly, 
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Maass and Anderson have described in detail how six irrigation communities in Spain and 
America managed to defend, as part of their water demand, other objectives than purely the 
physical and even economic efficiency.32 They concluded from their case studies amongst 
others that the crystallization of such interests into the water demand requires necessarily long-
lasting and thus costly processes for irrigation communities.33 
Field-level based assessment. Apart from the issues of water wastage and local favoring, 
all above arguments and observations strengthen the case for field-level based assessment of 
irrigation water demand, as generally applied in practice (in those systems that are not 
completely supply-driven). At these levels the many conflicting criteria and interests can still 
be matched. Besides, local knowledge about the nonuniform soils and topography seems 
indispensable for demand assessment. This strengthens the need for field-level assessment and 
the participation of farmers in the related decision making.3 4 
In the past, such participation has been pursued in several countries in two different 
ways; either through hiring local people as so-called "common-irrigators"35 or, more 
widespread, through direct interaction by field-level agency staff with farmers regarding their 
water needs. 
For both these solutions, however, engineers have yet been unable to judge the 
accurateness of demand assessments by field staff. They lack any norms in this respect. 
Colonial engineers in Indonesia, for example, recognized their inability to judge instantaneous 
demand assessments by their field staff as occurring, for example, during meetings. At the time, 
they expected that a better agricultural knowledge of the field supervisors, or a link with the 
agricultural department could improve such judgments.3 6 Something which is easier said than 
done in practice, and this problem has not been solved even today. 
A management tool that may facilitate more accurate demand assessment is a water right. 
Water rights make the demand of (sub)systems more explicit, and may thus improve the clarity 
and quality of the demand assessment. Yet, in most agency-managed systems, especially in 
Asia, water rights are absent.37 The section below on matching of supply and demand further 
discusses the role of water rights in decision making on water allocation. 
The only system observed in the case studies and in the literature (on agency-managed 
systems) that led effectively to more accurate demand assessment and simultaneously addressed 
the issues of water wastage and local favoring was in Morocco. It consisted of the provision 
of incentives at field level to assess more accurately. Farmers in Morocco have such incentives 
because they have to pay for their water use. 
Matching of Supply and Demand into Allocation Plans or Schedules 
On the basis of one of the patterns of the above described assessments of demand and supply, 
the decision preparation generally leads to matching these two into some form of an allocation 
plan or schedule. These processes are described below separately for the (pre-)seasonal and in-
seasonal allocation planning. 
Observed general picture of seasonal planning. The observed seasonal allocation tended to take 
place along the simplified lines as described hereafter. The system engineer often limited the 
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matching of supply and demand for the pre-seasonal planning to an initial estimate of the 
(probable) available supply. Matched with gross water duties, —often adopted as the demand per 
unit area--, this initial gross supply estimate led to a proposed starting date and potential area 
to be irrigated, sometimes specified with an explicit cultivation risk.38 
Observed estimates of expected rainfall and of the expected demand for the different 
areas were only approximate, either based on historical experiences39 or on the theoretical crop 
water requirements alone. The latter was sometimes somewhat adapted to reflect again the 
historically derived gross water duties4 0. 
Often agricultural staff did a parallel assessment of the cultivation plans of the farmers. 
Due to the low motivation of staff, these assessments tended to be rather unreliable and more 
"desk-based" than "field-based". 
After these two separate assessments by engineer and agricultural staff, a coordination 
meeting was usually organized. Local authorities convened these meetings if it involved 
different line agencies.4 1 Sometimes, if an authority type of organization set up existed, the 
Director or Project Manager initiated them. 4 2 
Over time, most observed systems had developed rules of thumb of a certain reservoir 
or river level that justified the commencement of the cultivation for (part of) the system. 
Observed levels of sophistication. The above practices do not reflect the differences in 
management performance among the different case studies. Figure 7 gives the observed 
comparative picture of the levels of sophistication of matching of supply and demand for the 
different case studies. The underlying questions and answers can be found in Annex 3. 
In the Sri Lankan and Philippine case studies the observed seasonal planning consisted 
mainly of theoretical scheduling. The Sri Lankan agencies thereby incorporated the experiences 
from the past more often than in the Philippines. Examples of experiences from the past are the 
historical water duties, irrigated areas and related cropping patterns and calendars. In the 
Philippines the schedules were observed to be an objective in themselves for the system 
managers. The results did not go beyond their desk. 
In Sri Lanka a pre-seasonal meeting tended to be held with all farmers before the start 
of the cultivation season. This is an additional reason the seasonal allocation in Sri Lanka was 
of a somewhat higher level of sophistication than in the Philippines. Yet, usually the Sri Lankan 
irrigation agency already drew up the seasonal plan beforehand, and was unwilling to change 
it during the meeting. No serious matching of supply and demand in such meetings were thus 
observed, neither possible with a large number of farmers. In practice, the meeting tended to 
serve only to inform farmers about the plans. In the Philippines, such a pre-seasonal meeting 
was usually completely absent.4 3 
In the Sudan, the observed seasonal planning incorporated the demand side to a still 
lesser extent. The planning consisted mainly of desk work. Although the plan missed the 
relevant information, the agency still expected the farmers to follow this plan. Still, its level 
of sophistication is higher than in the Asian case studies because the agency enforced a certain 
cropping pattern, and did the related planning. 
In Morocco, the observed level of sophistication of this decision making was completely 
different. Before the cultivation, farmers had to submit a written request to the gate operators. 
This included a request for the allocation of a specified quantity of water related to a specified 
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crop 4 4, and to a specific part of the system. Cultivation had to start thereby at a specified date. 
Farmers had to sign for this request and were later billed for the requested water, unless rainfall 
occurred. The gate operators submitted this request and related water-delivery plan to their 
superiors, and they subsequently submitted it to a central water control office. 
Figure 7. Levels of sophistication of the matching of supply and demand 
Note: 1. Seasonal allocation plan 
4. In-seasonal allocation plan 
Unless water was short, farmers were allocated the requested amounts, because they were 
billed for these volumes; the incentive for water saving lied in the farmers' hands. Farmers paid 
a subsidized, but still substantial price for the water. (Still, the agencies had few financial 
incentives to save water, because they depended partly on budgetary allocations from the central 
government.) If water was short, high-level meetings by agency, regional authorities and 
farmers' representatives established the priorities between crops and areas. 
Observed seasonal allocation options. A more refined insight in the above generalized pictures 
of the seasonal planning processes requires an understanding of the generally applied criteria. 
The two criteria observed to be dominating this decision making were 1) the desire by 
higher staff levels to minimize their management inputs in this decision making, while 2) 
minimizing complaints. Only seldom water saving appeared to be an important criterium, unless 
as a way to minimize complaints. The following descriptions of frequently observed practices 
elaborate upon the prevalence of these two criteria. 
The above two criteria imply a tendency to issue in practice the maximum discharge to 
the system. Consequently, an observed practical supply constraint for the seasonal planning was 
frequently the physical discharge capacity of main and other canals. This was especially so at 
the beginning of a cultivation season when the irrigation requirements are usually the maximum 
to allow for land soaking and land preparation. 
Several seasonal allocation options were observed that dealt with such capacity constraints 
in the main canal. Four options are discussed below. As described above, the logical sorting 
criterion for these four options is the required levels of management inputs. The less 
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management required, the more frequent the option was observed: 
1. The observed easiest solution for system management was to open the sluice and see 
where the water will go, and where not. It was almost equal to a no-intervention approach 
by agency staff. It favored the farmers situated at the head reaches of canals, or farmers that 
were otherwise powerful and influential. It was a "free for the fortunate few" solution. 
In the past, such an extremely passive role of the irrigation agency was the official policy 
of, for example, Sri Lanka's Irrigation Department. At the time the Agricultural Department 
and Revenue Division were still fully responsible for capacity utilization below the head 
sluice. The design concept of the main system was somewhat adapted to this approach as 
well. The main canals had no gated cross-regulators so that, in absence of any control by 
the managing agency, interference with conveyance to the tail-end reaches of the system was 
less easy. 
Also the River Valley Development Board adopted this practice in Sri Lanka's Uda 
Walawe system, till the Mahaweli Authority took over from them in the early 1980s. It had 
disastrous consequences for the tail-end reaches; ten years after its original construction only 
30 per cent of the command area had received any water.4 5 
This no-intervention solution was observed to be still the main practice in the river 
diversion systems in the Philippines.46 There tail-end problems were serious as well. For 
example, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) has found in an impact evaluation study of a 
number of systems in the Philippines that 30 per cent of the average command area never 
received any irrigation water. 4 7 
For this no-intervention approach, the preparation of a seasonal plan or schedule is not 
really necessary. So the seasonal planning and scheduling in Philippines was also observed 
to be a nominal desk exercise, bearing little relation with the actual implementation. 
Gated cross-regulators in main canals in such systems increase the options for 
interference by upstream farmers and operators, and thus increase the likelihood for tail-end 
problems. The utility of these (generally applied) structures in the Philippines, for example, 
seems therefore doubtful if not negative within the context of the current management 
practices. 
2. The second easiest option for agencies to reduce overloading of the main canal is an 
organized reduction of the irrigated area for a particular cultivation season. A rotation of the 
cultivation between different areas between different seasons achieves this. This management 
option requires the availability of cross-regulating capacity in the main canal. The advantage 
of this strategy is the concentration of the discharges. 
This strategy was observed only when serious water shortages existed, for example, in 
Sri Lanka's Kirindi Oya system. According to Chambers, this approach is quite common in 
South India. 4 8 
3. The introduction of staggering of the cultivation along the main system is another option. 
It was observed to be more management intensive and controversial for the agency compared 
to the former two options. Staggering replaces the "natural and wild" implementation, or 
"involuntary" staggering49 resulting from no intervention at all. Staggering of the cultivation 
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may facilitate the reduction of canal overloading, and the acceleration of the implementation 
of the seasonal plan. This option also requires cross-regulating capacity in the main canal. 
Irrigation professionals have claimed the following advantages of staggering: 1) the 
concentration of peak discharges that allows for a faster implementation and thus for an 
extension of the total command area5 0; 2) the spreading of peak demands for farm labor and 
power (e.g., draught animals, tractors)51; 3) it allows a better matching of the scheduled 
peak discharges with the peaks of the river discharge. Observations for this study suggest 
that the latter advantage is, to a certain degree at least, rather theoretical in view of the 
"involuntary" staggering that occurs anyhow.5 2 The spreading of the farm power and labor 
factor, in coordination with more concentrated discharges must be considered therefore as the 
main advantages of the staggering. The first factor especially has a serious delaying influence 
on the implementation of the cultivation season in many countries, as argued before. 
Staggering of the cultivation was observed to be effectively applied in the Moroccan case 
studies, and in Sri Lanka's Kirindi Oya system. No agency-initiated staggering was observed 
in the Philippine and Sudanese studies. 
Staggering of the cultivation was also introduced rather successfully around the turn of 
the century in colonial Indonesia (i.e., the so-called "golongan" system). However, the 
required close interaction with the rice farmers apparently weakened during the 1920s, and 
the system did not sustain.53 Yet, IIMI researchers have observed that some form of 
staggering prevails in many Indonesian systems. It consisted of the simultaneous starting of 
all head-enders within a period of three or four days, followed some weeks later by the 
simultaneous starting of all tail enders.5 4 In general, staggering seems much easier to 
introduce in new systems55 than in old systems. Changing the prevailing habits in an 
existing system requires comparatively large management efforts. 
4. The introduction of rotational water allocation along the main canal was observed to 
require even more management inputs of the agency. Several systems implemented a rotation 
along the main canal. Usually it occurred during temporary water shortages, or if problems 
existed to command tail-end reaches of the main canal. The involved reaches of the main 
canal varied from the tail-end reaches only (if the flow regulation problem was not very 
serious) to rotations from the reservoir in the most extreme cases. 
Murray-Rust has observed the latter, for example, in Sri Lanka's Gal Oya system. The 
head-end reaches appropriated much of the discharge there. The only way of commanding 
the tail-end reaches was to overload the main canal during some days, while closing the head-
end offtakes.56 
Rotation as a management option to overcome the main canal capacity constraint is a 
different objective from saving water. Irrigation professionals often believe and recommend 
the implementation of a rotation to save water. During this study, no systems were observed 
where this was the actual objective of the introduction of the rotation, even if the rotation had 
some water saving effects. 
In Sri Lanka's Uda Walawe system the observed rotation did not reduce water waste. 
Although it restricted the duration to head enders, it did not restrict the discharge. Murray-
Rust and Snellen have found this as well in South India's Tungabhadra system.57 Moreover, 
seepage losses may increase considerably due to refilling of canals, or due to temporarily 
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increased heads during the rotation. 
Replogle has described different types of rotation by combining in different ways the 
following three determinants of a rotation: discharge, duration and frequency. He varied all 
three from fully fixed to fully flexible.58 He has also described the perceived advantages 
and disadvantages for irrigation managers of the different types of rotation. Flexible rotations 
tend to provide more freedom for the field level staff to make ad hoc adjustments to the 
rotation on request of farmers. Rigid rotations tend to "ease delivery system complexities and 
problems." 5 9 According to Replogle, the fully fixed rotation "requires the least capital 
investment in canals or distribution pipelines and involves the least water-agency management 
and operational input." 6 0 A more flexible rotation increases the required management input 
by the agency. Though a fixed rotation discourages an accurate match between water 
delivery and the physical crop water and labor requirements because it "restricts crops to 
those adaptable to the set frequency". Besides, not all soils in a project are similar, and well 
suited to the selected frequency.61 
In practice, agency staff in most observed case studies preferred a fixed rotation. It 
reduced the need for interaction, and it reduced the fight between farmers for water. On the 
other hand, there were many instances where agency staff erroneously claimed they 
implemented a fixed rotation. The actual rotation in the field then often appeared to have 
some flexibility, especially at the tail of the rotation period. 
The above four management options reflect increasing degrees of management efforts to 
deal with constraints in canal capacity. These options did not necessarily, or primarily, deal with 
water conservation or the reduction of water wastage in irrigation systems. In general, water 
rationing was observed to be a little important criterion in the seasonal water allocation. 
Exceptions existed, however. Observations for this study and the literature provided the 
following examples of practices that are more specifically intended to ration water: 
1. Zoning is an example of a policy that aims partly on water saving. Zoning implies the 
restriction of the cultivation of certain crops to certain parts of an irrigation system. Apart 
from water saving, the intention of zoning is also to achieve a better match of crops and soils. 
In several countries this policy exists. For example, such a policy was observed in 
Morocco (the so-called assolement). It intended to force farmers to cultivate those crops that 
the planning had envisaged during the original project development stage. By thus restricting 
the cultivation of the more water-consuming crops, like the semi-tropical fruit trees, the 
government tried to ensure the achievement of the planned profitability.62 To facilitate 
enforcement of this policy, crucial design criteria, such as canal capacities, field-level layouts 
and land consolidation, were adjusted accordingly. Despite these efforts, the policy 
succeeded only with variable degrees for the fruit trees and sugar crops, and largely failed 
for most other crops. 
Different zoning policies exist also in several states of India. Chambers, amongst others, 
has reported on, for example, the so-called "localization" in South India, and "blocks" in 
Maharashtra.63 These policies intended to enforce the cultivation of certain crops on the 
most appropriate soils, and to omit areas unfit for irrigation. Facilitation of water 
management and conservation was the major driving force in these Indian states. Several 
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authors have observed that this policy failed completely. The related discharge capacities of 
the canals were apparently also dysfunctional.64 
Also in colonial Indonesia, the zoning and staggering of sugar and rice cultivation 
existed. The enforcement of this zoning and staggering occurred only after water shortages 
led to conflicts between sugar and rice growers. The objective of the zoning policy was to 
ensure water for the sugar cultivation, if necessary, through the rationing of water from the 
rice areas. The combined pressure of zoning and staggering policies on the water availability 
for the rice areas was quite serious. The shift of many farmers toward the cultivation of less 
water-consuming crops, like sweet potatoes instead of maize, proved this. 6 5 
The strategy in rice-based irrigation systems to stimulate farmers to grow alternative 
crops such as shorter duration varieties of rice 6 6, or other field crops than rice (OFCs), 
relates somewhat to zoning. It partly intends to save water by either shortening the 
cultivation season or by growing a less thirsty crop. 
Observations in all case studies were, however, that farmers in large-scale systems were 
unwilling to change their most preferred cropping pattern only to save water for the interest 
of the state or of the tail-end farmers. This suggests that zoning is unlikely to succeed unless 
farmers experience some form of related force or incentive. Examples are the cultivation 
permits or rights that were observed in Morocco, and the (preferential) water pricing or water 
scarcity for certain rice farmers in colonial Indonesia. 
2. Yield optimization is another measure specifically intended to ration water. In Indonesia 
and Morocco two different types of yield optimization seem to occur. 
During droughts in Morocco, a special meeting was observed to set the priorities for the 
water allocations. Interested parties such as the local authorities, the different line agencies 
and the representatives of commodity-based farmer groups tended to attend this meeting. The 
usual priority was the saving of the most valuable crops (like tree crops), while assuring also 
the survival of certain food crops important for the national food situation. A clear and 
explicit strategy for yield optimization was usually decided upon and implemented. 
During droughts in the observed Asian irrigation systems, the physical inability to 
command certain areas was more important than any organized type of yield optimization. 
Though some efforts have been made in Asia in the past. 
For example, the colonial administration in Indonesia, especially in East Java, introduced 
the so-called "pasten" system to cope with water shortages during the dry period.6 7 Pasten 
describes the relationship between the available water supply at the intake gate and turnouts, 
and the water needed by crops at different growth stages. Based on theoretical crop water 
requirements, "relative non-rice crop areas" must be calculated. The multiplication of the 
latter and the total system deficit factor (Factor K) makes an equitable distribution plan for 
the limited available water. The Pasten system aimed at balancing out the yield response 
functions for different crops, and by that for maximum crop yield within individual blocks 
(whereby sugar got again preferential treatment). 
Although theoretically sound to a certain extent (vide the earlier remarks in the section 
on Demand Assessment), and possibly feasible under colonial rule, the system is very 
sensitive to inaccuracies and less committed management. Researchers and other 
professionals have reported that in practice the planning either adapts itself to the water 
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availability, or bears no relation to the implementation, thus rendering the system 
meaningless.68 
3. A last form of water rationing is the introduction of certain spatial and temporal 
cultivation rights. These can be found only in some traditional farmer-managed irrigation 
systems (FMIS). Different types of spatial and temporal cultivation rights exist. Examples 
are the scattering of one family's holding through several zones of which one or more may 
receive water, or a sequence of rights to cultivate the same piece of land. 6 9 Chambers has 
remarked that these systems successfully facilitate the concentration of similar crops, and thus 
more efficient water use. 7 0 
Agency staff were thus observed to only marginally apply the latter three management options 
for water saving. Comparatively, they were frequently observed to apply the options to deal 
with constraints of discharge capacity of the main canal during the implementation of the 
cultivation season. 
This reliance on a physical impediment reconfirms the starting point of the classification; 
the fore mentioned negative incentives of agency staff toward the water-delivery performance 
tended to be the main drive for the choice for any of the above management options. The same 
incentives were observed to dominate the other key decisions of capacity utilization, i.e., in-
seasonal allocation, described hereafter, and the flow regulation. 
Observed general picture of the in-seasonal allocation planning or scheduling. This in-seasonal 
allocation planning is often called water scheduling and this term is used hereafter as well. The 
observed in seasonal allocation tended to take place along the simplified lines as described 
hereafter. 
The system engineer often limited the matching of supply and demand to estimates of the 
(probable) available supply. Matched with gross water duties—often adopted as the demand per 
unit area-, this gross supply estimate usually led to a proposed water schedule for field-based 
agency staff. 
Observed estimates of expected rainfall and of the expected demand for the different 
areas were only approximate, either based on historical experiences or on the theoretical crop 
water requirements alone. The latter was sometimes adapted to reflect again the historically 
derived gross water duties. 
No systematic interaction on these schedules was observed to occur with farmers and 
field staff. Although the implementation of these schedules were observed sometimes in the 
main system, they were seldom so within the distributary system. 
Observed levels of sophistication. The above generalized description applies in different degrees 
to the different case studies. There were considerable differences between them. Figure 7 gives 
the observed levels of sophistication of the in-seasonal allocation in the different case studies. 
The scheduling during the season in the Sri Lankan and Philippine case studies did 
usually not relate to the demand-driven allocation practiced at the field level. This demand-
driven type of allocation is described more extensively below. In Sri Lanka, the schedules 
tended to incorporate more the historical water duties, rather than theoretical only. Reliance on 
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theoretical duties was observed to be the general practice in the Philippines. 
In Sudan, the in-seasonal scheduling, the so-called "indenting", was observed to be at 
field level similar to the demand-driven allocation prevalent in the Asian case studies. 
In Morocco, also during the season farmers were observed to submit a written and signed 
request for a certain volume and timing of the water delivery before the implementation of the 
10-day water-delivery schedules. This request had to be submitted to the gate operator. 
Officially, they had to sign also after the actual delivery, but this was observed to be done 
irregularly. If farmers wanted extra water (i.e., above the requested amount) during a certain 
water delivery, the gate operators could authorize this at the end of the delivery period. They 
did this with numbered notes, of which the central water control office strictly checked the 
distribution. 
Observed scheduling options. As for the seasonal planning, a more profound description of the 
in-seasonal allocation processes is organized here around the dominating criteria used in these 
processes. These criteria are the same as those for the other key decisions of capacity 
utilization, being the desire by higher staff levels to minimize their management inputs in this 
decision making, while minimizing complaints. Water saving is only seldom an important 
criterion, unless to minimize complaints. 
A logical organizing principle for the management options is thus the required levels of 
management inputs by higher level agency staff. In-seasonal schedules can essentially 
incorporate the water demand in three different ways. These are discussed below in sequence 
of increasing management intensity for higher level staff: 
1. "On demand" or demand driven allocation means that fanners are allocated water 
individually, as requested by them, and within a period of a few days or a week. This was 
observed to be the least management-intensive option for higher level staff, because it is 
usually done by either the field staff or by the designed "hardware". 
In contrast to common belief of (especially control-oriented) engineers, this demand-
driven allocation appeared possible in all design concepts up to a certain level (though it may 
require different levels of management inputs).7 1 This is described hereafter. 
In France, for example, this type of water allocation is national policy. As a result the 
French developed irrigation-specific downstream control technologies. Downstream control 
means that control over water allocations is decentralized to the field level, and that 
information on water demand is transmitted hydraulically. This considerably reduces the need 
for information exchange between different hierarchical management levels. So such 
downstream control infrastructure does not require any schedules. 
Demand-driven allocation appeared also possible with design concepts providing for some 
upstream control regulators. (With the latter, downstream water levels cannot, or can only 
partly, influence the water allocations.) Demand-driven allocation in upstream control design 
concepts tended to be usually a way of reducing management inputs for higher level staff. 
Demand-driven allocation in a main system with upstream control regulators always 
requires some "water wastage" on top of the normal conveyance losses. Efficient matching 
of changes in demand with allocated discharges all the way from the head sluice requires a 
very efficient and responsive internal management information system. Such a high level of 
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responsiveness seems difficult to achieve without real-time management through, for example, 
radio or electronic communication devices.7 2 
Even with high-tech management, a certain "water wastage" remains always necessary. 
This water wastage is a "pressure" or margin of extra discharge in the main system to cope 
with immediate requirements that cannot be satisfied otherwise due to the response time or 
inertia of the main system. They are thus the management requirements, or the so-called 
slack.7 3 If the management information system is less efficient, these slack requirements 
become larger. 
Although most South and South-East Asian systems are designed for upstream controlled 
variable flows, only demand-driven allocation was observed in the case studies.74 The latter 
overrided thereby any regular scheduling. Instead, considerable slacks were observed to be 
issued to the main system to compensate for insufficient management inputs by higher level 
staff.75 
Moroccan systems are usually considered better managed than their counterparts in Asia. 
Yet, considerable slacks in the main systems with upstream regulators in Morocco were 
observed there as well. These slacks allowed to compensate for low levels of management 
inputs in matching supply in the main system with the demand for water, and the related flow 
regulation. Still, such slacks in the Moroccan systems were observed to be restricted to 
mainly the main system. Within the distributary system, the demand-driven allocation was 
observed to be well-managed by higher level staff in comparison to the other case studies. 
An example of such a "managed" demand-driven allocation in a main system with mainly 
upstream regulators was observed in the right bank main canal of the Moroccan Basse 
Moulouya system. In this system, provisions existed at field level for weekly scheduling as 
well as adjustments to these schedules. The gate operator developed schedules and 
adjustments based on written requests from farmers. These requests had to be submitted to 
the gate operator prior to the implementation of the schedule. Any adjustments had to be 
covered in the slack period at the end of the scheduled period of ten days, but within the total 
scheduled allocation period and volume to a sub-system that was irrigated from one offtake 
in the main canal. In general, schedules and adjustments below these offtakes were observed 
to be implemented strictly and the allocation was thus completely demand-driven.76 
An assumption in systems that are designed for demand-driven allocation is that, because 
farmers have to pay for water volumetrically, they themselves economize their water use. 
Thus, the price system would take over the water allocation function, and effectively delegate 
it to the farmer. Some factors constrain a more widespread use of this water pricing than the 
present level. 
Apart for the downstream control and computerized controlled systems, there are serious 
imperfections of this market as the water delivery tends to be unpredictable and unreliable. 
Moreover, if it starts raining at the moment of actual delivery, farmers usually refuse to buy 
and suddenly the water is of no value (as was observed in several Moroccan systems). 
Even if the market is perfect, farmers may still waste water if they value the reduction 
of uncertainty very high. This can be observed, for example, in Pakistan, Morocco, and even 
in California. Higher water prices would be the only solution to such physical inefficiencies. 
Unfortunately, the feasibility and acceptability of higher water prices in most LDCs relate to 
extremely sensitive issues of food policy. 
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Another relevant factor in this individual billing is the collection costs of water charges 
itself. These can be considerable in smallholder systems as those in Morocco and 
Philippines. Reduction of these collection costs was one rationale for introducing water user 
groups in Philippines. 
In Asian systems no volumetric billing exists. The demand-driven allocation that was 
observed in all Asian case studies thus leads to wasteful on-farm water use. 
In Sudan no volumetric billing exists as well. However, several researchers have 
reported that, despite the observed demand-driven allocation, this does not lead to much on-
farm water waste in Sudan.77 Likely reasons are the exceptionally low percolation and flat 
topography of the Sudanese irrigation systems. 
2. Arranged or "modified demand". The so-called arranged or modified demand is a 
scheduling practice that is more management-intensive for higher level staff than the demand-
driven allocation. Modification of demand means that farmers' requests are the basis for 
regular allocation schedules, but that their water demands are not fully satisfied. They are 
modified. Possible forms of modification are the following: 
* Modified volume: a maximum volume of water is allocated to either a unit area 
or to a farmer. 
As yet, no indicators exist for determining such a volume in a manner that is neutral and 
reliable toward soil or crop. The theoretical water requirements that are supported by on-
farm or intensive field experiments may provide for some broad indicators. In practice, 
large variations were observed to occur with real-life requirements (vide criticism in the 
section on Demand Assessment). Although all observed irrigation systems intended to 
implement this arranged allocation with the theoretical crop water requirements, and all 
observed operation and maintenance manuals assumed it, no observed irrigation system 
successfully applied it. 
Calibrated crop water requirements may provide a tool.however, for making an initial 
estimate of the required water volume during the commissioning of a system. This was 
observed in Sri Lanka's Kirindi Oya system for estimating the releases from the head 
sluice. On the other hand, such a gross estimate could be estimated without the theoretical 
water requirements as well. 
No modified volume schedules were observed in situations of sufficient water 
availability. During drought, volumetric rationing was observed to be used in the 
schedules of most case studies. 
Also Moore has reported that even the most reliable water schedules in Asia, like those 
for Taiwan, do not give the volume of water. They give just the date, crop and rotational 
methods, if any. 7 8 
* Modified timing: the water requests are restricted to a certain period to fit a 
certain rotational schedule. 
A limited canal capacity may make this necessary, or, possibly, it may be considered 
necessary to concentrate discharges to save water. This type of arranged allocation is 
prevalent around the world. It seldom is, however, for water saving reasons, as argued 
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before in the section on Demand Assessment. 
* Modified frequency: the agency can try to influence the crop choice by imposing 
certain frequencies. 
In Sri Lanka, for example, this type of modification has enforced the cultivation of other 
field crops than rice in System H of the Mahaweli. This method is probably not 
frequently applied in LDCs. Replogle has reported it to be used for small ranchettes and 
lawn waterings in the United States.7 9 
* Modified discharge: the water requests are considered in the schedule only in 
terms of a maximum or minimum discharge, or in terms of certain standard quantities. 
Maximum discharge may be determined, and also made necessary, by canal or offtake 
capacities.80 This was observed in, for example, the main system of Sri Lanka's Uda 
Walawe. There, the scheduled discharges from the main canal were only specific in 
duration because these canals would take the maximum discharge anyway. Minimum 
discharge may be related to the minimum at acceptable efficiency of the water conveyance. 
Agency staff and farmers often internalize maximum and minimum discharge 
modifications. This means that neither party even thinks about excessive overloading of 
canals, or about asking for a very small discharge to be conveyed over a large distance. 
Even if internalized, this type of modification is still real, but it is theoretical as well. 
On the other hand, in most observed South and South-East Asian systems such 
modifications were not even realized. Canals were frequently overloaded or operated at 
minimal, continuous discharges. In such cases, a possible modified discharge is a very 
real management option, of course. 
Formal scheduling often applied standard discharges. Many irrigation systems have also 
been designed for a perceived farmer-friendly, on-farm discharge (i.e., design discharge 
or "main d'eau") of 301/s. 8 1 Such standard discharges seldom materialize in actual field-
level allocations unless an exceptional level of flow regulation exists, and farm gates are 
provided with either so-called fixed offtakes, on-off gates or modules with openings for 
standardized discharges (e.g., in Morocco). 
Only in Morocco standard discharges were observed to be applied. Farmers request 
water also only in terms of these standard discharges. This modification is thus 
internalized. The difference with the demand-driven type of allocation is therefore 
somewhat theoretical.82 
In comparison to demand-driven allocation, the introduction of the above forms of modified 
demand requires increased management inputs by higher staff levels. 
3. Supply driven allocation means that agency staff determine allocations without 
consideration of the actual demand of farmers. 
To implement such schedules requires either a very high level of management inputs 
from higher level staff to manage the operation of the gates, or a design with with little 
flexibility (i.e., almost no gates). Else farmers and gate operators are likely to subvert the 
schedule. In practice, only systems with either little flexibility—and thus with little 
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management inputs by higher level staff- or with water shortage tend to implement this mode 
of water schedule. 
An example of the first, are the systems in Pakistan and the Indian Punjab. There the 
absence of movable gates in the physical infrastructure enforces this type of allocation. 
Canals can be operated essentially on an on-off basis only. Officially, a fixed rotation (called 
"warabandi"), already foreseen during the design, is the only possible way to operate these 
systems. The warabandi was designed to fight famine by spreading a limited discharge over 
a very large area, rather than providing water for optimum yields per unit area. In practice, 
researchers have found below the outlet all sorts of informal rotations. Above the outlet, 
however, warabandi is a supply-driven rotation in a water-short environment. 
All other observed supply-driven scheduling occurred only in systems where water supply 
was short. This water shortage was either permanent, due to limited water supply or limited 
canal capacities, or temporary, during periods of peak demand or reduced water supply. (Of 
course, a supply-driven schedule during water shortage can also be arranged with farmers. 
Then, however, it is here defined again as an arranged or "modified demand" schedule.) 
Even in the only observed main system with duckbill weirs as cross-regulators (in Sri 
Lanka's Mahaweli system H), the allocation appeared to be demand-driven. If a particular 
secondary canals required more water than scheduled, the operators could give it by giving 
less to other canals or by requesting an increase of the discharge from the headsluice.83 
Such partial inflexibility thus did not prevent the system management to allocate water in a 
demand-driven mode. 
In flexible systems, a fully supply-driven allocation was not observed to happen under 
abundant availability of water. Objectives of a supply-driven allocation under these 
conditions could be either to enforce economic water use in reservoir-based systems, or to 
accelerate the implementation of the cultivation season (i.e., by advancing the sowing dates 
of different subsystems) in river diversion systems. Even under colonial administrations this 
type of supply-driven allocation did not materialize. Only through enforcement of the 
physical infrastructure, like for warabandi, a supply-driven allocation seems implementable. 
Even there, however, this physical force can be and has been found to be subverted to a 
certain degree. 
Despite this apparent impossibility to implement supply-driven schedules in flexible 
designs, they were observed to be the basis for many irrigation engineering practices and 
manuals in South and South-East Asia. Some frequently observed examples of the 
results/outcomes of this "supply-driven" thinking (i.e., allocation without any consultation 
with farmers) were the theories of the crop water requirements advocated in operation and 
maintenance (O&M) manuals; the one-cusec field canal; the gated cross-regulators; the 
measuring structures at farm turnouts and offtakes to field canals. The observed Sri Lankan 
agencies, for example, did not give the latter structures any function in terms of [modified] 
demand-driven allocation. They only had to facilitate enforcement of supply-driven 
allocation.84 Similarly, the measuring structures in distributary canals and at the head of the 
main canal, were based on such supply-driven rationales in all Asian case studies.85 Even 
most observed monitoring and evaluation systems envisaged in O&M manuals of the Asian 
case studies intended to enforce a supply-driven allocation86. 
Apparently irrigation professionals are often biased toward approaching allocation in a 
64 A MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE ON THE PERFORMANCE OF THE IRRIGATION SUBSECTOR 
theoretical, supply-driven way. Several factors seem to cause this behavior. One observed 
reason was the lack of reliable indicators to guide the modification of demand volumetrically, 
neither to modify it instantaneously. Another, and more important, reason that was observed 
was the limited experience, interest and need for staff of agencies and consultants to deal with 
real-life constraints in matching of supply and demand. 
Combinations of the fore mentioned different methods of incorporating demand into 
allocation schedules were observed to occur in all case studies simultaneously in one system 
during one cultivation season. This is something that planning and design considerations seldom 
take into account. 
How does the above typology of scheduling options relate to other typologies? The 
advantage of the above typology compared to others is its consistent management significance, 
rather than physical significance only. So the above generalized picture deals with "realities" 
and "probabilities", rather than the more common "possibilities". (The latter's advantage, on 
the other hand, is its convenience for designers and planners.) 
Most existing typologies of schedules define them in their physical appearances, such as 
free, on-demand, continuous, rotation, modified-demand etc. Horst, for example, has 
recognized the following types of water deliveries: continuous and intermittent. The latter is 
further subdivided into free, on-demand and rotational.87 Similarly, the recent guide for 
preparation of O&M manuals and strategies prepared by the World Bank (in collaboration with 
the Working Group on Management, Maintenance and Operation of the International 
Commission of Irrigation and Drainage) talks about demand, modified demand, rotation and 
continuous flow.8 8 
In terms of management these classifications are inconsistent. For example, although 
rotation and continuous flow are physically different, they can in terms of management be used 
for demand, modified demand and supply-driven allocation. 
Also Cornell University has recently developed an "operational typology" as a 
combination of schedule, degree of responsiveness, and type of operational procedures. It 
defined schedule, however, in terms of continuous and intermittent deliveries, and it thus based 
its classification only on its physical significance.89 
Chambers has remarked in his latest book on irrigation that "classifications and categories 
used for describing types and aspects of different schedules are still at a primitive stage". 9 0 
In view of the above examples of physical- rather than management-based typologies of several 
important actors in the irrigation subsector, his remark seemed fully justified. 
Those who have defined typologies, seldom elaborated upon them in terms of the related 
real-life practice and operational objectives. An exception is Replogle. He has made efforts to 
elaborate systematically on the relation between schedule and management objectives. Primary 
objective of his typology was the development of a standard terminology for schedules that also 
conveyed "the intended operating concept".91 He thus did not intend to write about the actual 
operating concept. 
He was correct in defining supply-driven as rigid. On the other hand, he used the word 
"rotation" incorrectly as a synonym for rigid. He did this, as he said, to yield "somewhat to 
tradition".9 2 
Replogle's supply-driven type rotations were all fully crop-based. He did not specify the 
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real-life function of farmers, if any, in his different typologies. His typologies thus may have 
been completely theoretical, and he may even have intended them for classification purposes 
only. His flexible schedules93 comprised the demand and modified demand schedules used in 
this text. He defined the latter scheduling options in terms of their potential interests and 
disinterests for farmers. 
Replogle has written his terminology mainly for the irrigation environment in the United 
States. Given the above arguments, most of his terminology and examples seem hypothetical 
also for the United States, but certainly out of place for LDCs. 9 4 
Another aspect of scheduling that the literature on scheduling typologies has neglected 
is the incorporation of the hydraulic characteristics and rainfall. One of the few references to 
this issue does not elaborate much more than the following related statement: "Difficult areas 
in preparing a delivery schedule are the estimation of water propagation time, water use 
efficiencies and effect of rain interruptions."95 
In actual practice, this difficulty was observed to be solved in most case studies by 
issuing extra discharge, or slack, in the main system. Efficiencies, water propagation time, and 
rainfall may be known to the agency staff, even in the comparatively sophisticated water 
scheduling in the observed Moroccan case studies, they were not quantitatively integrated in the 
schedule. Often the gross water release at the head of the main canal integrated them in an 
approximate way only. After rainfall, or other flow fluctuations, the typical reaction in all case 
studies was an approximate minor change at the head of the main system. 
This slack in the main system seems therefore indeed the "central gap" in irrigation 
management, as Chambers has called it. The sections of this chapter on flow regulation discuss 
the underlying reasons for this gap in more detail. 
Management process. The pre-seasonal matching of supply and demand results in important, 
political, decisions about who will cultivate, what and where. The political nature of this 
decision making makes it logical for governments to make provisions for local authorities to 
chair and lead this decision making. This was also observed in most case studies. These 
provisions were regulated either by laws (e.g., in Sri Lanka), or through guidelines (e.g., in 
Philippines and Morocco). In Sri Lanka, for example, the law even demanded farmers to 
approve the seasonal plan in a so-called cultivation meeting. 
Engineers usually did the preparation of the plan. Sometimes field staff of the 
agricultural department or division provided them with data on cultivation plans. Except 
Morocco, no interaction with farmers occurred during the preparation. 
Limited motivation of agricultural field staff to carry out the data collection on cultivation 
plans was observed to make the reliability of the data often doubtful. And so was thus the 
reliability of the evolving cultivation plans. 
The only observed cases where these data were reliable enough to be useful for the 
seasonal planning were the Moroccan. This reliability was high because the plans coincided with 
water orders by farmers. Farmers had to sign for them, and received bills for them. The 
accountability and interests were thus quite direct. In addition, the data were more reliable as 
they came straight from the primary source.9 6 Apart from Morocco, however, these data were 
not seriously used in seasonal planning, and usually engineers prepared the seasonal plan behind 
their desk. 
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Engineers were thereby observed to keep their planning assumptions implicit, and to take 
as little risk as possible. Murray-Rust has described a typical case for Sri Lanka's Gal Oya 
system. There, engineers made very conservative estimates of irrigable areas. The farmers in 
the remainder of the command area subsequently caused these estimates to be exceeded 
considerably. These farmers speculated on a larger availability of water, and thus rendered the 
engineer's planning useless. The engineers were reported to keep their estimates secret for 
outsiders on purpose to prevent any accountability for the planning.9 7 
This type of planning fails to reduce uncertainty. It also maintains unjustified 
expectations of farmers who are unlikely to get what they want. It thus boosts speculative 
behavior of farmers to get what they want anyway. Such speculative behavior and growing 
distrust in the agency's planning itself was observed in Sri Lanka's Kirindi Oya system to lead 
to more and more problems and political intervention for the managing agency. 
System managers were also observed to do the scheduling of the in-seasonal allocation 
behind their desk, without relating to the actual demand assessment. That is to say, if 
scheduling was at all done. Replogle, for example, has reported on the absence of planning in 
most systems in the USA as follows: " . . .most schedules have been in place for several 
decades and were chosen for reasons usually valid at that time . . .not necessarily . . .still 
valid". 9 8 Such types of non-schedules were also observed in Sri Lanka's Uda Walawe and the 
Philippine case studies. Schedules that were fixed at the beginning of the season were often 
observed to remain unchanged during the season, even after rainfall.99 Thus the schedule 
became a purpose in itself, rather than a tool to guide and plan the actual matching of supply 
and demand. 
Without effective scheduling, the gate operators were observed to develop and establish 
the allocations with little support of superiors other than a field-level supervisor. System 
managers usually had very little insight or knowledge in the actual way of matching demand with 
available supply. 
An example of this was a senior engineer in Sri Lanka's Mahaweli Economic Agency. 
He sincerely rejected the possibility of the Technical Officers of Uda Walawe, a system he was 
directly involved with, being the de-facto system managers: " . . .these people do not take 
decisions, but only do what they are told." The reality was-and engineers were often unaware 
of this—that gate operators, and their immediate supervisors took most, and sometimes all, 
decisions on allocation and regulation. 
Gate operators left on their own to decide on allocations, are likely—and were also 
observed—to choose the easiest way out, through favoring farmers within their area of 
responsibility. Individual operators represent localized rather than system wide interests, and 
along the main system such solutions favors head enders. Even if the gate operators do not want 
to favor head-end reaches or powerful farmers within their area without effective support from 
superiors they have few options other than to give in to those farmers. If those farmers feel they 
get too little, those farmers are likely to take just more either by influencing the gate tenders, 
by demolishing the structures, or by blocking the canals. Such processes were observed in all 
case studies, although they were less prominent in Morocco than in the others. 
Of course, the just described processes may happen also to a certain degree if higher staff 
levels attempt to make a schedule and guide, monitor and evaluate its implementation by gate 
operators. Suppose, for example, that a senior staff member wants to economize on water use— 
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without starting to put much time and effort in managing his or her subordinates and initiate a 
systematic monitoring and evaluation system--; the only thing he or she can really do is to judge 
and to refuse water increases at the head of main, branch or distributary canals. However, they 
have no arguments to do so. 1 0 0 This is thus a risky strategy, because he or she also becomes 
thereby responsible for possible crop failures if water is short due to their refusal. 
Motivation for investing much time and efforts to take up such risks is unlikely, 
especially without an institutional expectation and support for water saving. The actual 
expectation is even "negative" given the likely opposition of colleagues if career, construction 
and cultivation interests are conflicting. Besides, water users are seldom satisfied whatever the 
performance, and there is a constant possibility of interventions by politicians. A more likely 
choice for a responsible decision maker, who is left alone, is to maintain a low profile. 
Such constraints confronting an individually motivated system manager were observed 
and reported upon in detail for Sri Lanka's Kirindi Oya system.1 0 1 Several irrigation 
professionals such as Chambers, Moore and Levine, have reported on similar institutional 
impediments and negative incentives for performance improvement.102 
Schedules that have been developed at field level in the fore mentioned permissive ways, 
necessarily favor the head enders to a certain extent. This applies to all types of canals, whether 
main, branch, distributary or field channels. 
Water-based corruption. Even more extreme are the cases that Wade has found in South 
India. There system managers sold water for their individual benefit. They thus created 
uncertainties by increasing the value of water. Theoretically, this price system might have led 
to a more efficient water allocation. Yet, Wade has convincingly argued that the market was 
"highly imperfect, because the farmers cannot be sure in advance that they will get what they 
paid for, or that when they get it, it will be worth what they expect (if heavy rains fall in the 
mean time, the value of irrigation water may be very small)". 1 0 3 Moreover, the extraction of 
money concentrated on a few critical and incidental points, and did not lead to a better control 
over flow regulation and allocation.104 
Wade's corruption in South India seemed extreme, however. There are few other cases 
reported upon of such systematic and systematically organized (i.e., up to the state-level 
politicians) water selling, although it seems to happen in some other parts of India and Pakistan 
as well. Corruption was a major incentive in all observed irrigation agencies, and seems 
endemic in most irrigation agencies in LDCs. 1 0 5 Apart from Wade's observations, however, 
it has usually been related to construction and maintenance activities rather than to water 
delivery. 
Political aspects. The water allocation process of "who gets what, when and where" is 
indeed, as several irrigation professionals have reported, "essentially a political process". 1 0 6 
Water allocation was observed to be often misused for political purposes, conflicting with the 
common interests. 
In the observed Asian systems, the intervention by politicians in the water allocation was 
omni-present. It thus continuously influenced the attitude and behavior of irrigation managers. 
Only a minority of irrigation managers seemed able to win the support of politicians for more 
consistent water allocation and regulation. 
Seemingly extreme cases where the President or Minister himself decided to authorize 
the cultivation in a certain area or not were unfortunately quite normal; whether they were at 
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great water loss or not, or at the expense of others. The seasonal water allocation in the 
Thamrivarani system in Tamil Nadu (South India), for example, was observed to happen entirely 
at political levels in Madras, some 700 km away. 
Politicians typically did not seem to get feedback on the sometimes disastrous 
consequences of some of their decisions for their supporters, or those that result from decisions 
by other politicians. Even if they did, they often did not seem to care--i.e., instant popularity 
at the expense of the medium- or long-term national interest. 
In this respect, certain areas and countries were observed to be better than others, of 
course. Only in Morocco this political intervention (and thus misuse) of water allocation was 
observed to be as good as absent. 
Responsibility for water saving. The above provides a multitude of arguments against 
taking up the responsibility for water saving in most irrigation systems. So this responsibility 
was indeed observed to be often ill and vaguely defined for the whole, or part of the, system. 
Even in Morocco, nobody was typically responsible for limiting or reducing water waste. 
Thus the national interest in saving water did not yet crystallize, and the observed 
agencies and engineers were so far successful in circumventing the few attempts to hold them 
accountable. Individual interests of farmers and agency staff were here at conflict with the 
national interest. 
Awareness among engineers about such resistance was observed in all case studies. In 
addition, professionals have reported explicitly on such resistance for Sri Lanka, Sudan, and 
Pakistan.1 0 7 
Water rights. A water schedule may serve to reduce uncertainty of the water delivery 
from the farmers' perspective, and to increase the clarity of the responsibility of the irrigation 
agency and its staff. The allocation of water rights to farmers or subsystems may have a similar 
function. Such water entitlements can be in the form of a share per unit area, a share per 
person/household, a fixed discharge per unit area, a fixed volume, or instantaneous demand. 1 0 8 
In most farmer-managed irrigation systems, water rights are an important criterion in the 
decision making on the allocation of water. Radosevisch has found that in agency-managed 
systems, especially in Asia, it is usually absent. He has stated this as follows: 
"The problem that exists in many countries is the lack of commitment by the government to allocate water in 
a definitive fashion. As a result there is little reliability for the water user to take the risk of his own investment 
. . .It is recommended that governments develop a system for allocating water to users and identify the type, 
quantity, source and location of use in the form of some documentation. This raises the issue of "water rights" 
versus "licenses" or "ownership" versus an "interest" by the water user."105 
He also found that in the few cases where a kind of water right exists in Asian agency-managed 
systems, it never obliges the agency to pay indemnities for crop failures due to faulty service 
delivery.1 1 0 
In many systems "customary laws" have been found111 whether or not stimulated by 
the absence of official water rights. Maass and Anderson have reported on such customary laws 
to be enforced through court cases, sometimes in combination with official water rights. 1 1 2 
Such customary water rights often reflect values like time-priority (e.g., first in time, first in 
right or prior appropriation), which do not necessarily correspond to the most efficient or 
effective water use. In many countries, farmers were observed to establish a customary water 
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right from either fellow farmers or gate tenders, once they had planted their crop. 
The achievement of more certainty to farmers and agency can be greatly facilitated by 
the establishment of water rights by the state or agency. 1 1 3 Attaching a quantitative value to 
customary laws or priority rights can increase certainty for everybody, and can make it possible 
to refuse water to head enders in certain cases. Fixing or confirmation of such water rights 
prior to new construction or rehabilitation is also likely to improve the planning and design 
decisions.1 1 4 
On the other hand, formal water rights and laws probably can force only limited 
accountability from agency staff on a day-to-day basis, especially regarding the water efficiency. 
Such accountability depends on the strength of the law, but also on the internal control and 
incentive systems of the managing agency. Also Maass and Anderson have stressed such 
relative value of water rights as follows: 
"One gains a highly imperfect sense of how water is distributed in irrigated areas by reading the vast literature 
on national and state water codes and laws or the equally abundant literature on the legal nature of water rights. 
There is a difference between legal concepts of water rights and water practice, and many students of irrigation 
have overstressed the importance of rights, about which they can write at length without leaving their 
desks."115 
Overall, water rights can give more certainty to farmers and agency, but on their own 
they are unlikely to fill the accountability gap in the irrigated subsector. 
Implementation, Progress Monitoring and Evaluation 
The last part of the allocation decision-making process consists of its actual implementation, and 
its subsequent monitoring and evaluation. 
Observed levels of sophistication. Figures 8 and 9 give the observed levels of sophistication of 
the implementation, monitoring and evaluation in the different case studies. 
Implementation. In the Philippines and Sudan, the implementation of the allocation 
decisions was observed to be fully determined by ad hoc requests and urgencies of water users. 
The intervention by the higher level staff of the irrigation agencies was thereby minimal. 
Schedules were observed to be purely theoretical and very different from the actual 
implementation. 
In Sri Lanka, there appeared to be somewhat more intervention. Although, there were 
some official rules and instructions on starting dates, rotation and fines for delays of the 
implementation of the seasonal allocation decisions, these were not always applied. Still, the 
observed Sri Lankan systems had some important rules and rule sof thumb laid down in 
schedules, though they were not strictly implemented. 
In Morocco, many rules applied to the implementation. These were also observed to be 
reflected in the schedule and to be implemented to a large extent. 
Monitoring and evaluation. In Sri Lanka, Philippines and Sudan, the monitoring and 
evaluation of the implementation of allocation decisions was observed to be very limited. This 
was again a consequence of the demand-driven allocation, which in principle did not require any. 
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The observed monitoring and evaluation of actual allocations was not perfect in Morocco 
as well. Still, it was of a much higher level of sophistication than in the other case studies. 
Observed practices. In the observed South and South-East Asian systems, the implementation 
of the land preparation was delayed in comparison to both the potential and scheduled 
implementation. 
A quick implementation represents the theoretical system interest, because delays in the 
implementation influence directly the potential starting dates for the second cultivation during 
the dry season. Thus they influence the annual potential cultivated area and cropping intensity. 
This was observed to be true for all systems where the canal capacity was the main controlling 
factor on a season's implementation speed. It was observed to be especially true for the 
observed river diversion systems in the Philippines. 
Figure 8. Levels of sophistication oftlte implementation 
Levels ol Sophistication 
5. In-seasonal allocation plan 
Figure 9. Levels of sophistication of the progress monitoring and evaluation 
Levels ol Sophistication 
Note: 3. Seasonal allocation plan 
6. In-seasonal allocation plan 
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A quick implementation was observed, however, to conflict with individual interests of 
farmers. Individual farmers preferred to have maximum flexibility of the water supply during 
this time. Such maximum flexibility helped them cope with such problems as the acquisition 
and costs of different inputs, labor and farm power (e.g., tractors and animals). 
Agencies usually succumbed to this pressure and allocated water on-demand. No efforts 
were observed to speed up the land preparation through systematic monitoring and evaluation 
to better match water supply with farmers' demands. 
This approach during the land preparation has consequences for a system's water 
efficiency and cropping intensity. For water efficiency the implications are serious given that 
the normal amount of water used during the land preparation is between 35 per cent and 40 per 
cent of a season's total, while it can be as high as 50 per cent. 1 1 6 Thus, for example, a 
reduction of the sixweek period of land preparation by one week in Uda Walawe was observed 
to lead to an increase of the water efficiency by about 9 per cent. 1 1 7 
During the cultivation season, the implementation of allocation decisions without any 
monitoring and evaluation was observed to occur in all systems, except the Moroccan. 
Actual allocation was by trial-and-error and ad hoc, and monitoring was based on 
complaints of water users or field staff. Even during rainfall, water discharges were usually not 
changed, unless the canal bunds started to overflow; important criteria during rainfall were the 
minimization of management inputs and the protection of the physical infrastructure. 
Similar to the above observations on South and South-East Asian irrigation systems, 
Levine has observed that monitoring in India is more exception than rule: "Monitoring of the 
performance of irrigation systems in India is practised only to a very limited extent, limited in 
terms of the number of systems, and in terms of the character of the monitoring.1 , 1 1 8 
Only in one observed Moroccan system, effective monitoring and evaluation did occur. 
Repetto has claimed this to occur also in Tunisia, Mexico, and China. 1 1 9 
The evolution of monitoring requirements. Levine has remarked that the semi-arid zones 
of India and Pakistan traditionally needed little monitoring and evaluation, because few control 
structures were available anyway. 1 2 0 There, monitoring and evaluation would only be useful 
to measure either the water level at the tail-end, or the rainfall or for maintenance purposes. 
According to Levine, in the humid zones of Asia, on the other hand, irrigation's function 
has always been different from those in semi-arid zones; it "was intended primarily as a 
supplement to rainfall during the rainy season. It was the mechanism for carrying the crop -
usually rice— through the occasionally extended dry periods within the rainy season, and for 
some limited dry season agriculture on a relatively small fraction of the command area. Under 
these conditions the irrigation supply frequently was in substantial excess most of the time, and 
managing the water was of importance only infrequently."121 
The only South and South-East Asian cases of serious attempts to introduce systematic 
monitoring as reported upon in the literature were for Indonesia under colonial rule. They 
resulted from the desire to protect the sugar interests against water scarcity in the dry periods. 
To that end, the following monitoring system was introduced. Gate operators had to note down 
hourly in their note books who had received water, for what duration, what discharge and for 
what area. Some engineers commented later that if these note books would be checked often 
and irregularly, it would be possible to reduce manipulations. Still, they did not mention if this 
checking really happened.1 2 2 The literature suggests that monitoring and evaluation happened 
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only in the rice areas adjacent to the sugar areas, i.e., to ensure the rice areas would not take 
more than their allocated quantity.1 2 3 Overall, the literature suggests that also this attempt of 
monitoring and evaluation was only partly successful. 
The need for monitoring has increased considerably over the last decades, at least 
theoretically. Although chapter 5 substantiates this further, an introductory background for this 
increased need for monitoring is the following. 
Economic and technical justification of large investments in the irrigation subsector 
during the past decades have made it necessary to assume higher water efficiencies than 
traditionally achieved in Asia. To facilitate such improved irrigation management, but also to 
facilitate the irrigation of the high yielding varieties, new design concepts had to be introduced. 
These designs generally tended to envisage more control and measurement structures. Thus 
assuming that increased management inputs were necessary as well. The introduction of higher 
densities of measuring facilities would facilitate a more precise allocation, although it required 
increased efforts of monitoring and evaluation of actual deliveries. 
Using these measuring facilities in a functional manner was observed to have the 
following two major constraints: 
1) Technical deficiencies. Comparative IIMI research in Sri Lanka and Philippines into the 
functionality of measuring facilities has exposed an unexpected high vulnerability toward 
technical flaws. UMI has found backwater effects due to siltation or improper construction 
of canals or structures, as well as a systematic lack of calibration.124 Only fixed-discharge 
modules, which are somewhat independent of upstream water levels, were observed to pose 
such constraints much less, as was observed in Morocco. 1 2 5 
2) No incentives to use them. A more serious constraint relates to the required management 
input. The observed practice of (modified) demand-driven allocation in all case studies other 
than Morocco, with its considerable slacks to compensate for management inputs by staff and 
individual farmers, did not necessitate any quantitative flow assessment.126 Thus, the 
measuring facilities were not used for monitoring in most cases, and their actual technical 
non-functionality remained an irrelevant and minor problem. 
Several irrigation professionals have doubted also the cost effectiveness of volumetric metering 
in smallholder irrigation systems. Repetto has contested this vision. According to him, for 
Egypt estimates of such costs are only 3 per cent of the full costs to deliver water. He has 
argued also that several LDCs such as Morocco, Tunisia, Mexico, and China, do meter water 
in smallholder systems. According to him also, only few economic studies have been done on 
this metering of irrigation systems in LDCs. 1 2 7 
Another function of measurement structures in some exceptional cases is the possibility 
of farmers to check the delivered discharge.1 2 8 The present fixed-discharge orifice modules 
(Neyrpic) were observed in Morocco to provide this opportunity. Although this function per 
definition is less important for improving the control by the agency itself over water wastage, 
it may help marginally by an additional possibility to monitor the performance of field staff. 
Literature and observations for this study suggest that measuring structures are used only 
for discharge measurement in countries such as Morocco and Mexico, where farmers buy water 
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volumetrically. Systematic monitoring and evaluation seem to occur only in these countries as 
well. Although there have been many attempts in other countries to introduce monitoring and 
evaluation systems, their implementation tended to be an objective per se. As no pressure to 
improve the water-delivery performance guided them, the quality of data evolving from such 
systems was often low. 
Management process. Increasing the performance of irrigation systems requires incentives for 
those who waste it. Or, it requires the tightening of the control by the managing agency over 
water wastage by the involved users. 1 2 9 Users can refer thereby to farmers as well as agency 
staff. Tightening the control of the agency can only be achieved through monitoring and 
evaluation of the implementation of allocation decisions. 
Despite the need for increased monitoring and evaluation, the related attitudes and efforts 
of engineers were observed to have changed little over the past decades. In all case studies, 
monitoring was observed to be resisted by agency staff to prevent more accountability. Such 
resistance was typically strongest from those who would have to initiate and realize the improved 
performance, the engineers at the level of the irrigation system.1 3 0 In some cases, 
manipulation of the monitored data prevented them from reflecting the actual performance.131 
Negative incentives toward water-delivery performance. Observed reasons why engineers 
resisted this monitoring and related accountability were many. 
In all case studies, positive financial incentives existed for engineers and irrigation 
agencies as a whole through skimming contracts for construction and maintenance. In all case 
studies, these positive incentives for contracts were observed to work as "negative" incentives 
toward involvement and performance in water delivery because no comparable incentives were 
available.1 3 2 
Levine has found the following negative incentives toward monitoring and evaluation, 
which applied equally well in all case studies: 
"Promotion is primarily based upon seniority (though specific assignments may reflect other factors, such as 
political influence), rather than specific performance. It is more important to avoid trouble, especially that 
which must be transferred upward, than to vigorously carry out operational mandates. There is no reward, 
other than negative, for "treading on someone else's turf." Becoming concerned about what the farmers do 
impinges on the responsibilities of the agriculture department . . .Monitoring, beyond the minimum, is extra 
work with no intrinsic reward. Evaluation is likely to identify or at least focus on things that are wrong rather 
than right. Almost all signals give the same advice: don't put effort in monitoring and evaluation."133 
Such negative incentives for the whole agency made it unlikely in all observed agencies 
to introduce any or a more serious monitoring and evaluation for tighter control and internal 
accountability for water wastage. 
No official support for water-delivery performance. In some cases individual irrigation 
managers had the courage and motivation to implement formal rules. But they were observed 
to be often withheld the required support by their superiors. An example were system managers 
in Sri Lanka and in the Philippines, who tried try to punish a farmer who has demolished an 
irrigation structure. They were observed to receive little official support and to have to pay the 
costs of the court case out of their pocket. 
In the same countries, also the official regulations on service fee payments could not be 
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enforced before court. After farmers complained to politicians and top management, the 
engineers usually adhered to their demands. Individuals were observed to have little influence 
on this system. 1 3 4 Only, top managers, whether at system or agency level, probably can make 
an impact as individuals.135 
Such institutional and legal support was lacking in most case studies, though it is essential 
for enforcing any schedule, rule or discipline. For example, the willingness of the agency to 
sanction the water-delivery rules and laws was of utmost importance for the relative success of 
warabandi in Northwest India. 1 3 6 
Of the observed countries, only in Morocco the agencies supported enforcement of rules 
to a meaningful extent. This was an important reason there was some discipline and control in 
the Moroccan systems, and why farmers paid their bills. 
Such enforcement was not observed to be necessarily "against" the farmers' interests as 
it increased the general quality of the water delivery. Similarly, Chambers has reported on 
several environments where farmers preferred a more decisive management system, more 
enforcement and "prompt and condign punishment".1 3 7 
Mutual Adaptation of the Substance and Processes of Allocation Decisions 
The fore going observations on the allocation decisions provided also separate discussions of the 
related management processes. Several professional approaches such as the theoretical water 
requirements and measurement structures appeared to be less useful than they were originally 
designed for. This section briefly summarizes such mutual adaptations of the substantive and 
managerial aspects of this decision making. 
Most professional approaches for assessing supply and demand, scheduling, monitoring 
and evaluation, were observed to be often useless in actual decision making. The use of such 
approaches thereby often deviated the attention of staff from tackling the real issues. 
These approaches could not compensate for the absence in all case studies of an agency-
wide support for delivering water at reduced levels of water waste. This applied equally to 
specific irrigation engineering and management solutions such as schedules, measurement 
facilities, monitoring and evaluation systems, crop water requirements, organization structures, 
on-farm techniques, land levelling, canal lining, rehabilitation, performance indicators, water 
user groups, water management consultants, improved water-delivery techniques or procedures. 
Only in the Moroccan case studies, several professional approaches (such as the 
schedules, measurement facilities, monitoring and evaluation systems, crop Water requirements, 
organization structures, and to certain degree, on-farm techniques), were observed to be more 
functional in the allocation decision making. 
The accountability and responsibility gap that was observed in all other cases was not a 
technical problem, but a political problem. Reducing water waste represents a theoretical 
national interest within the professional domain of irrigation engineers that was not enforced on 
agency and farmers in all case studies. 
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FLOW REGULATION PROCESSES 
So far this chapter dealt only with allocation processes; who gets how much water for what part 
of the system, for what crop and at what time. The complementary decision for capacity 
utilization, and second basic orientation point of this chapter, is the regulation decision. This 
decision deals with the actual transport of the water in line with the allocation decisions. 
Regulation has its own requirements. These may be different from those foreseen in the 
allocation decisions, also because of the time lags between the two types of key decisions. 
Therefore, the actual regulation may deviate from that envisaged in the allocation decisions. 
Regulation is less frequently studied in irrigation management. The prevalence of the 
"allocation-distribution" paradigm seems the main cause for this. Therefore it may be useful 
"to set the stage" on the regulation concept with an elaborate, descriptive definition as follows: 
"Water flow regulation requires contributions of staff for operation of the different control structures and related 
communication. Preparation and calculation of these contributions can reduce the occurrence of inappropriate 
operational methods, losses and unnecessary delays in water delivery. The costs of preparation and calculation 
have to be outweighed by increased water flow regulation and delivery efficiencies. Especially if iterative 
processes occur like for water flow regulation and delivery, preparation and calculation will be useful. 
Preparation and calculation of flow regulation refer mainly to operational methods of control structures, 
and possibly an operational plan for integrated and coordinated operation of different structures along canals. 
Operational methods (or procedures) mean the timing, frequency and size of gate settings of individual 
control structures to realize flow changes through these structures. These operational methods can vary for 
different flow conditions in a canal. For example, the filling and emptying of canals, flow and level variations, 
little or heavy rainfall, or an emergency shut-down. The operational method can incorporate different 
\ parameters like upstream and downstream water levels, back water effects, level(s)-discharge curves. These 
curves can be assessed by experience, through theoretical formulae, or through more or less frequent 
calibrations. The operational method can be determined more and less frequent, and at different hierarchical 
levels. The operational methods may or may not be laid down in an operational plan. 
An operational plan will indicate how and at what times, (part of) the control structures in a (sub-
)system have to be operated during a certain period in line with certain choices made concerning the allocation. 
These operational plans can be made more or less frequent, and at different hierarchical levels. Such a plan 
may or may not cover different types of structures (e.g., intake works, cross-regulators, offtakes, turnouts). 
After the completion of the preparatory stage of the water flow regulation, the division of water flow 
regulation activities over different staff can be done through more or less specific instructions, and may or may 
not be adapted to the actual time required."138 
Much more than for the allocation, the generalization on regulation here refers less to 
similar findings in the international literature. Few such descriptions in literature appeared to 
exist. This absence of case material reveals also a major part of the message of this section: 
regulation processes are a no-man's land, a blind spot. Discussion with UMI colleagues and 
observations for this study confirmed this. Irrigation professionals in developed and less 
developed countries alike seem to have little insight in the actual operational methods and 
procedures of gates by gate operators. 
Two different sorts of professional biases seem to have caused this. First, many 
engineers talk about canal regulation, but only in terms of design options of physical 
infrastructure, and seldom in terms of practices by system management.139 Secondly, and as 
mentioned before, many irrigation professionals have neglected this "other" key area of main 
system management, by their application of the "allocation-distribution" paradigm in diagnosis 
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of system management. This concept conceals the management concern for regulation, and 
related hydraulic phenomena. So, this section is more based on observations for this study than 
on references to literature. 
Observed levels of sophistication. Figure 10 gives the observed comparative picture of the levels 
of sophistication of the flow regulation for the different case studies. Flow regulation, or 
coordination of operations along canals, is weak in all cases studied. In both the Sri Lankan and 
Philippine case studies higher level staff had not given such instructions. In the Sri Lankan case 
studies a standing order existed that required that the water level upstream of the cross-regulators 
was maintained at full supply depth. This was an inappropriate instruction given the limited 
information available to the operators, and given the unsteady flow in the canal. 
Higher level staff only got involved in coordination of flow regulation during water 
shortages. If tail enders claimed part of the available water resources to be allocated to them 
during a temporarily shortage, higher level staff would have to get involved in introducing and 
implementing rotations to the tail-end reaches. During more permanent water shortages, higher 
level staff got involved only if tail-ender farmers managed to mobilize sufficient political 
support, or other pressures on engineers, to secure systematically water for these tail-end 
reaches. These were thus reactive management interventions. 
Figure 10. Levels of sophistication of the flow regulation 
Levels ol Sophistication 
S H Morocco 
M Sudan 
'! 'i Sri Lanka 
Philippines 
Note: 7. Preparation of operational methods and plan 
8. Control over staff utilization 
Even in Morocco 1 4 0, no management efforts were made to regulate the flow along the 
main systems. The Moroccan designs provide for sophisticated technical regulation. These did 
not prevent gate operators to operate the few available manual gates for localized allocation 
purposes, thereby interfering with the designed regulation concept. Superiors who were aware 
of such practices did not manage them, even if they were aware of the resulting losses through 
spillways and overflowing of canal bunds. Like in most irrigation systems, these superiors 
allowed a higher discharge in the main system as pressure to compensate for such irregularities. 
Only in the main system of Sudan's Rahad system, it was observed that superiors made 
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an effort to give specific instructions to gate operators in terms of timing and size of gate 
settings. Still, in view of the unsteady hydraulic behavior of the water flows, these superiors 
did not have sufficient information to give such specific instructions. On the other hand, they 
may have had some experience in regulating specific canals and thus managed to control the 
regulation to some extent. 
The levels of sophistication of the control over time utilization by field staff were 
observed to be very low in all case studies. The supervision of gate operators by their 
immediate field-level supervisors was observed to be somewhat more intensive in the Moroccan 
case studies, but remained very low. Naturally, a high level of control is difficult to achieve 
given the large geographical distances in most irrigation systems. 
Observed practices. A more refined insight in the above generalized pictures of the regulation 
processes requires a more thorough understanding of the generally applied practices and criteria. 
Given the hydraulic interdependence of water flow, the most logical way to structure the 
description and analysis of the regulation processes here is to follow the water flow from source 
to field. The management description in this section deals thus sequentially with the following 
physical processes 1) the water issues from the head sluice; 2) the conveyance along the main 
canal; 3) the distribution from main canal to distributary canals; and it concludes with 4) the 
operational plans as more systematic forms of coordination of the operations along canals. 
Flow regulation in any system starts with the regulation of the inflow into the system 
from a river or reservoir. Observations in most case studies showed that the agency's 
operational targets for distribution from the head sluice were usually better defined than any 
other operational target. 
In many systems it is defined in terms of discharge. A certain theoretical relationship 
between water level and discharge is thereby assumed. This was observed in, for example, Sri 
Lanka's Kirindi Oya system. Calibrations of such formulae were not observed in any of the case 
studies. 
In many other systems it is defined only in terms of a water level. Usually this is the 
water level that satisfies the (modified) on-demand delivery in the rest of the system. This latter 
level corresponds frequently to the maximum water level possible without overflowing of the 
main canal. This was observed in Sri Lanka's Uda Walawe and Morocco's Basse Moulouya 
systems. Also, it was observed to be standard practice in most of the Philippine diversion 
systems. In all observed systems the agencies did not monitor the discharge or level at the head 
sluice. For Morocco, the Basse Moulouya system seems an exception in this respect. 
Operational targets seldom seem to be expressed in a precise time. In all case studies, 
an approximate timing of this starting point of the entire regulation in the system was considered 
sufficient. Instructions for operation of the head sluice typically indicated the changed discharge 
or level only, and not the desired timing of the operation. Only in Sri Lanka's Uda Walawe 
system, it has been observed that a fixed timing of operation of the head sluice was claimed to 
be maintained. (This practice facilitated the calculation of stored volumes on a 12-hourly basis 
for hydropower purposes.) 
Instructions regarding undesirable times of flow changes were never observed. An 
example of such an instruction would be the preferred timing of the last water issue of the day. 
This could prevent undesired flow fluctuations at downstream reaches during the night. 
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Feedback of the actual time of operation of the head sluice does probably occur more 
regularly. Still, it has been observed for this study only in those systems where also facilities 
for hydropower generation used the water issues from the head sluice. 
Given the fore mentioned approximate nature of the timing of the head sluice operation, 
it is impossible to provide operational targets for conveyance along the main canal in terms of 
time. Such time targets would be necessary to enable coordination of the regulation to stabilize 
flow fluctuations. 
Such coordination is less necessary for main canals without (gated) cross-regulators. This 
was observed, for example, in Sri Lanka's Uda Walawe system. There, the operational targets 
tended to be integrated in the allocation decisions. Given the few opportunities to interfere with 
the conveyance in such canals, the flow stabilized comparatively quickly. Still, the allocations 
to subsystems along the main canal were usually not completely fixed, and some fluctuations at 
the tail end tended to remain even in such canals. 
In main canals with gated cross-regulators, however, coordination of the operations of 
different cross-regulators is indispensable for the stabilization of flow fluctuations. 
Determination of any useful operational target for conveyance without precise information on 
timing is very difficult. While gated cross-regulators are provided to operate the main canal at 
variable flows —often intended rather optimistically to facilitate more effective use of rainfall—, 
the canal is simultaneously divided uva cascade of small reservoirs situated upstream of each 
regulator. Theoretically, the storage upstream of each of these regulators has to be managed to 
stabilize flows along the canal, especially at the tail-end reaches. Theoretically, this requires 
advance instructions to the different gate operators of the expected time, size and frequency of 
gate settings. Such warnings to field staff of expected discharge changes were not observed in 
any of the case studies. Given the frequent practice of approximate timing of the head sluice 
operation, such warnings were also unlikely. 
In the studied Philippine systems which were provided with gated cross-regulators, no 
operational targets for conveyance at all were observed. Instead, gate operators used the cross-
regulators for localized allocation objectives; i.e., the manipulation of the water level to allow 
increased distribution through upstream offtakes.141 So the water levels at the tail of such main 
canals fluctuated considerably. 
Also in Morocco, no operational targets for conveyance were observed. Partly this was 
a logical consequence of the small absolute number of cross-regulators that can be manually 
operated in Morocco. Although these gates were mainly meant for maintenance and repair 
purposes, they were operated on an ad hoc basis. Therefore the influence of the absence of 
operational targets for the conveyance, was, although less extreme, still existent. 
In the only observed main system with duckbill weirs (i.e., in Sri Lanka's Mahaweli 
system H) no operational targets for the conveyance appeared to be necessary as only offtakes 
were available. The instructions for these few offtakes appeared integrated with the 
requirements for a stable conveyance along the main system. Thus the duckbill weirs appeared 
to ease the flow regulation considerably.142 
The only operational targets for conveyance that were observed for this study were 
expressed in water level. Such targets were observed in Sri Lanka's Kirindi Oya and Sudan's 
Rahad systems. 
In Kirindi Oya, the control water level upstream of the gated cross-regulators had to be 
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maintained at full supply depth (FSD). FSD was a standing order in Sri Lanka's Irrigation 
Department, and was based on the assumption of steady flow. In actual practice the water levels 
in the main canals were constantly fluctuating, and the target of FSD could not be adhered to. 
The observed operational methods of the cross-regulators focused on maintaining a control water 
level to achieve a distribution target through upstream offtakes rather than on any conveyance 
objective. Like in the Philippines, this localized operation of cross-regulators caused 
considerable fluctuations along the main canal, increasingly so from head to tail reaches. 
Also in Sudan's Rahad system, system managers of the Ministry of Irrigation were 
observed to collect information about water levels. They did so every three hours at important, 
but uncalibrated, locations along the main canals. Also, they made daily, or at least regular, 
inspections of the water levels along the laterals. Only in Rahad the irrigation managers were 
observed to give specific operational targets to operators in terms of timing and size of gate 
settings. Still, they did not have enough information on actual flows to justify such instructions. 
Although their regular data collection and field visits may have provided them with some 
relevant experience to manage the flow regulation along the main and lateral canals. 
Rahad's high level of management inputs in regulation in comparison to the other cases 
seemed directly linked to their formal and informal143 accountability to their client, the 
powerful Rahad Agricultural Corporation.144 In the other cases, the clients consisted of 
individual farmers or weak farmer groups. These could not and did not enforce any serious 
accountability of the agency for its service delivery. 
In all cases, system managers were thus observed to add an excessive slack to the main 
system discharge instead of managing the cascade of small reservoirs along the main system. 
In certain situations this slack could be physically observed even. In Kirindi Oya, for 
example, a branch canal served at a certain stage to drain fluctuations in the main canal. 
Simultaneously, the maintenance of a considerable slack in the canal compensated for 
fluctuations and kept the farmers satisfied. A spillway halfway the 120 km right bank main 
canal of Morocco's Basse Moulouya system had the same function. In both cases, it was 
physically obvious that the system management added a considerable slack to the main canal 
discharge, rather than that it managed the water levels along the main system. 
The introduction of some operational targets for conveyance was only observed if 
management inputs of field staff were the sole preventive measure for overflowing of the canal 
bund. 1 4 5 Otherwise, field staff and their superiors did not worry about the slacks involved in 
conveying water along the main system. 
What are the major causes for these slacks in the main system? The obvious major cause 
for such slacks to occur was the observed lack of accountability for the regulation in the main 
system. Only in Sudan's Rahad system some accountability existed in this respect. In addition 
there were also technical constraints to develop appropriate instructions. 
The technical constraints related to the hydraulic interdependence of the upstream and 
downstream water levels of gated cross-regulators. The hydraulic interdependence made it 
difficult to determine, or even to calibrate, the discharge through the gates. Such hydraulic 
interdependence could extend over distances of many kilometers.1 4 6 Even if a calibration 
would be done, it should be repeated regularly, because of the changing hydraulic resistance (or 
rugosity) of a canal reach due to weed growth and siltation.147 This naturally impeded 
appropriate instructions for regulation. Though it did not justify their absence. 
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The technical and accountability aspects are likely to have reinforced each other in the 
past. Together they seem the major reason that main system management remains a blind gap 
for irrigation professionals. Only during the last decade some efforts in modelling its hydraulic 
behavior have started to address this seemingly crucial aspect of the main system management. 
The next physical process to be managed by the regulation is the distribution from main 
canal to distributary (or lateral) canals. 
The related operational targets are usually expressed in terms of a certain water level 
over a weir at the head of the distributaries. In principle, a schedule indicates the timing as 
well. But in neither of the case studies schedules were observed that specified the required size 
and frequency of the gate settings. 
As described before in this chapter, the actual operational targets for distribution in all 
observed irrigation systems were the resultant of the (modified) demand-driven allocation and 
regulation downstream, rather than the consequence of some plan or schedule from higher 
hierarchical levels. This study found only two exceptions: 1) if there were no gates available 
to influence flow as in the warabandi systems of Pakistan and Indian Punjab; or, 2) in the 
Moroccan systems where the operational target for distribution from the main canals was 
somewhat well-controlled, both physically and managerial^. 
Physically, the offtake in Morocco consisted of a combination of a downstream control 
counter-balancing gate and a balancing reservoir with the Neyrpic orifice modules. This 
construction was sensitive toward precise installation as well as toward interference by farmers 
of the balancing gate. On the other hand, the modules allowed only a limited range of discharge 
fluctuations, so interference by farmers had only limited impact. 1 4 8 
By comparatively good decision preparation and monitoring of its implementation in 
Morocco, the agencies could maintain operational targets for this distribution from the main 
canal. Thus they could maintain a schedule on a discharge (and volumetric) basis. 
Within distributary canals, schedules sometimes incorporated operational targets for 
distribution from the distributary. Though they never did so for conveyance along the 
distributary. Within the distributary canals, the allocation and regulation were usually the 
responsibility of only one gate operator. Such operators determined their targets on an ad hoc 
basis, and thus integrated allocation and regulation in their tours along the canal. In practice, 
there was often no operator active anymore at that level, and the management (or the battle for 
water) was done by, or left to, the farmers. This was observed in certain parts of Sri Lanka's 
Uda Walawe system, and in several Philippine systems. 
Operational plans in terms of integrated operational methods and procedures in time, size 
and frequency of adjustment of gate settings for the different offtaking and cross-regulating 
structures along the same canals were not observed in any of the case studies. The literature 
survey and discussion with irrigation professionals suggest that such operational plans are almost 
absent in LDCs, like in many developed countries. Techniques and monitoring systems to 
facilitate the preparation and implementation of integrated operational methods and procedures 
seem to be still in their infancy. 
Some innovative research efforts in this direction are currently undertaken, although on 
a limited scale. Sri Lanka's Irrigation Department and 1IMI experiment with such methods in 
Sri Lanka's Kirindi Oya system. 1 4 9 They found that two or three targeted gate settings after 
a flow variation could restabilize the flow within a day. The agency's practice was the opposite; 
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frequent and ad hoc gate operations in reaction to localized water level fluctuations. 
A simulation model facilitates the above research. Given the unsteady and complicated 
hydraulic nature of water flows and control structures, it seems also very hard to develop more 
integrated operational methods and plans without such a simulation model. Even, very large 
management inputs by irrigation managers probably would not suffice to understand and control 
fully the dynamic hydraulic behavior of canal flows. Several knowledgeable HMI colleagues 
confirmed this possibility. 
In some exceptional cases, an integrated operational method or procedure was observed. 
For example, in Sri Lanka's Kirindi Oya a procedure existed by which the officer, who was 
primarily responsible for allocation to the tail-end reach of the main system, was simultaneously 
responsible for monitoring the conveyance through the main canal, and for the allocation to 
different upstream reaches. A clever idea, in principle, because it is in the officer's interest to 
safeguard sufficient water for the tail end. Instead, unless there was a water shortage, the 
manager was observed to claim a larger slack to the canal as a whole, thus making his work a 
lot easier. Still, this operational procedure was an improvement compared to no monitoring at 
all. 
A small remark about design consequences. The absence of integrated operational 
methods (as well as the lack of related motivation and incentives, of course) challenges the 
general practice in South and South-East Asia of designing main systems for variable flows and 
assuming supply-driven allocation. The enforcement of supply-driven allocation seems 
impossible in the whole region~if anywhere-if the water supply is abundant, which is the case 
most of the time. (This of course excludes the fixed design concepts where the hardware 
enforces the supply-driven allocation to a large extent.) The resulting demand-driven allocation 
in the supply-driven design concepts is only possible by systematically adding considerable slacks 
in the main system. The question arises if the design concept should be oriented toward 
facilitating the reduction of slack either during the major part of the season or during the few 
dry periods only? Or, is it possible to design for slack reduction during the whole season? 
Very little knowledge exists so far about the actual size of the slack. The fore mentioned 
HMI research hopes to quantify this for Kirindi Oya. Few professionals have reported on the 
slack at all, leave alone that they have tried to estimate its size. Replogle, as one of these few, 
has mentioned such "carry water" or "push water" to be 25 per cent for a system in the United 
States. 1 5 0 
Replogle's rejection of the need for any slack for flow regulation again demonstrates that 
flow regulation is a real no man's land. The geographical distances, the dynamic behavior of 
canal flows, and the immediate risks for crops make a certain slack an absolute necessity. Even 
high-tech dynamic regulation cannot prevent some slack as an extra pressure for flexibility in 
allocation and regulation and their interaction. Replogle has remarked correctly that if the slack 
is reused in the tail ends as a "prompt, special service", "this process works against scheduling 
procedures that are intended to reduce excess irrigation and improve on-farm system distribution 
uniformity."1 5 1 Yet, this points more to insufficient scheduling quality as it does not reduce 
the need for this extra "pressure" for regulation in its interaction with any variable allocation, 
whether of perfect quality or not. 1 5 2 
Also in developed countries, the managerial aspects of main system management are 
likely to have remained a no man's land as well. In France, for example, irrigation 
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professionals use the term "dynamic regulation" for flow regulation that is supported by active 
utilization of simulation models, a network of remote water-level sensors and an electronic data-
transmission network facilitating real-time operations.1 5 3 The intermediate step of dynamic 
regulation through better management methods or procedures seems to have been by-passed there 
as well. 1 5 4 The half a dozen French regulation specialists who were interviewed in this regard 
all confirmed that this may well have been the case. 
Management process. Just like for the allocation, the flow regulation decision making was fully 
delegated to gate operators. (Although without any monitoring and evaluation by higher level 
supervisors, "left" seems a better term than "delegated".) Although gate tenders were sometimes 
warned about the approximate timing of flow changes, they were never informed about the size 
and duration of flow changes. Operation of gated cross-regulators after a discharge change— 
whether because of a discharge change from the head sluice, or due to rainfall, or to the 
operation of upstream gates—, was thus necessarily a time-consuming trial-and-error process for 
the gate operators. Higher level staff seldom determined margins of allowed fluctuations, even 
though some operators were observed to use such margins for their own convenience.155 
Therefore, the operator of an upstream regulator typically released flow changes on an ad hoc 
basis, and all downstream operators were confronted with the resulting fluctuations. 
Performance evaluation of the regulation focused only on the level of complaints by other 
agency staff, farmers or politicians; i.e., on the allocation rather than the regulation itself. 
Against this background it was very logical for gate operators to give priority to localized 
favoring of the physical distribution function (i.e., to achieve an allocation objective) over the 
physical conveyance function to tail-end areas (i.e., a flow regulation objective). 
Gate operators had several regulation options to favor localized distribution at the expense 
of conveyance. In a system with gated cross-regulators in the main system —a common feature 
of systems built in Asia during the past decades-, the gate operators were observed to have 
typically the following options: 
"* If they can allocate enough water to the distributary canals without impairing the standing 
orders (i.e., full supply depth and the gradual release of increased flow), they probably will 
do so, but will issue a certain extra discharge to allow against fluctuations in the main canal. 
These fluctuations can become substantial for offtakes further upstream of the cross-regulators 
QM1 1989a:F.71); 
* They can also issue too much water to the distributary canal anyway, to be sure that water 
users will not complain; 
* If they cannot get enough discharge to the distributary canal, they can close the gates of the 
cross-regulator a little and allow a certain overflowing of the cross-regulator; either 
temporarily, as they can always defend their case to any supervisor by arguing that the water 
level in the main canal is fluctuating (i.e., rising), or permanently, if the water users claim 
that they do no get enough water. 
In practice, it has been observed that the most frequently chosen option by the gate tenders is the 
operation of one or more gates of the cross-regulators only, without operating the gates of the offtakes (IIMI 
1989a:94). This means that the allocation to the distributary canal is realized through manipulation of the 
control water surface in the main canal, at the expense of the operational targets for the conveyance through 
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the main canal."156 
Except for Sudan's Rahad system, system managers were not observed to make efforts 
for any systematic monitoring of the regulation. Even if higher level staff would make an effort 
to monitor actual operational methods, this would have been very hard because of the 
fluctuations occurring. Also the sheer geographical distance made it often difficult for higher 
level staff to monitor a main canal seriously. (Which was still not sufficient excuse to abstain 
from any related efforts.) Besides, the whole management system discouraged bottom-up 
information. 
Superiors were observed to discourage bottom-up information; sometimes actively by 
blaming subordinates for those problems, but often also passively by their superior attitudes 
toward subordinates. Subordinates, on their turn, were observed to refrain from Morming 
superiors in many instances. This strategy caused them to retain more discretion for 
themselves.1 5 7 A sound strategy, given the details involved in day-to-day decision making on 
allocation. This applies even more for flow regulation, because these decisions have to be taken 
in real-time. On the other hand, this real-time nature as well as the geographical distances 
involved makes the regulation decisions even less accessible for higher level managers than 
allocation decisions. 
Field staff working under such freedom and without clear performance objectives and 
indicators are unlikely (and were observed not) to maximize their management inputs and 
vigilance to economize water. Rather, like higher level staff, they usually preferred to minimize 
their own management inputs as well, even if obvious water wastage occurred such as in 
Morocco's Basse Moulouya and Sri Lanka's Kirindi Oya. 1 5 8 Only, if physical threats existed 
such as the overflowing of canal bunds, a higher level of management inputs was observed.1 5 9 
Mutual Adaptation of the Substance and Processes of Regulation Decisions 
The fore going observations on the regulation decisions provided also separate discussions of the 
related management processes. This section summarizes how well the existing professional 
approaches toward flow regulation, if any, were adapted to the processes of decision making. 
Few professional approaches toward flow regulation appeared to exist in all case studies. 
These few applied mainly to design concepts and had little relation to actual regulation 
processes. 
So far, regulation seems to have been an exclusive domain of engineers. Most of the 
interviewed engineers defined and considered regulation a physical and design issue, and were 
unwilling to accept possible processes deviating from those assumed during design. 1 6 0 The 
idea that flow regulation requires a slack, or "pressure", is rejected even by some well-known 
engineers. This shows a blindness of a large part of the irrigation engineers to the management 
processes required for this perceived technical problem. 
As such, this is not surprising. The following, similar case in an edible oil processing 
industry shows the learned, but almost innate, inability of engineers to imagine behavior 
deviating from their "logical" design: 
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"Initially, the management requested.a study into their operation to propose measures for energy saving. 
According to them, the study had to be done by management specialists with a technical background, because 
the perceived problem and the solutions were technical. We contested this prejudice, and explained them that 
whatever occurred in the factory, was a result of decisions, and thus a management problem. Although, within 
this management picture, technical aspects and causes could be important. 
The study revealed that fluctuations of energy consumption occurred. Operators reacted upon these based on 
their personal judgement and preferences, apparently in a completely chaotic way. Also, the instructions by 
engineer and production supervisors to the operators were conflicting. The actual operations depended fully 
on the judgement of the operator and the production manager. The engineers never even imagined to check 
if the actual operations differed from those instructed and were not aware of the impact of the operators' 
judgements. This confirmed our initial idea of a management problem with some technical aspects."161 
The similarities of this industrial case with the irrigation sector's regulation problems are 
remarkable. The process industry has even a comparative advantage over the irrigation sector 
in this respect, because the geographic proximity of the actual operations facilitates monitoring 
considerably. Moreover, in profit-driven process industries, engineers have a stronger urge to 
reduce slacks (a reason they invited management specialists in the first place). Even then, the 
engineers in this edible oil industry could not imagine that operators would do things differently 
than assumed. Against this background, the neglect by engineers and other professionals of the 
managerial aspects of the regulation in irrigation is thus not that bizarre. 
As a result, it is also not surprising that several regulation concepts used by irrigation 
engineers are somewhat misleading toward their functionality in day-to-day system management. 
Suggestive concepts such as "passive" and "active" control, or upstream and downstream 
control—Annex 3 gives definitions of these concepts—should be read with utmost care in this 
respect. Although these concepts are defined as design options, they tend to be used in an 
inductive mode to discuss allocation and flow regulation. 
In practice, upstream control concepts become often downstream control by the actual 
management practices.1 6 2 Even passive control structures like high-head orifices can be used 
actively by operators for a downstream mode of regulation. Only canal capacities tend to be 
absolute physical controls as they cannot be seriously changed by staff or farmers without 
considerable investments. So the mentioned "control" classifications could better be replaced 
by a less suggestive one like an upstream and downstream mode of regulation. The latter 
terminology can be better adapted to field realities, rather than to hydraulic concepts only. 
Annex 2 makes some first efforts toward such a terminology, though it is not more than that. 
REQUIRED CHANGES IN PROCESSES TO IMPROVE CAPACITY UTILIZATION 
The Present Management Performance : The Levels of Sophistication 
Figure 11 provides a comparative picture of the levels of management performance, or levels 
of sophistication, of the key decisions of capacity utilization in Morocco, Sudan, Philippines and 
Sri Lanka. Chapter 3 describes the basic rationale behind this concept. A short note on its use 
here follows below. 
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How The Concept is Used 
The concept's application in the chapter's fore going parts serves primarily to provide an 
impression of the different levels of sophistication of irrigation management in the sample 
countries. In addition, it is used here to identify systematically the opportunities for 
improvement (step 3-5 in Figure 3 of chapter 3), if the present quality of decisions requires 
improvement. 
The definition of opportunities for improvement here is in terms of requirements of the 
processes to achieve a higher sophistication of the processes (step 3). Also the related 
requirements for different sets of management conditions are given (step 4). The management-
control decisions required to achieve these different sets of management conditions (step 5) are 
subsequently discussed in chapter 6. Both the required management conditions for capacity 
utilization and capacity creation are thereby considered. 
The identified requirements for improvements apply for the average picture that evolved 
from the case studies. Some requirements for improvement apply thus less to the Moroccan 
cases, where the level of sophistication of several key decisions was observed to be higher than 
in the other case studies. 
A very low or high classification of level of sophistication is not a performance 
judgement in itself, as argued before in chapter 3. A very low level of sophistication may still 
lead to a satisfactory performance and may thus be cost-effective. But if the performance is 
considered unsatisfactory, and the contribution of a related key decision as well, a higher level 
of sophistication may lead to an improved performance. Only in this indirect way, this concept 
links management performance with irrigation system performance. 
Figure 11. Levels of sophistication of the capacity utilization 
levels oi sophistication 
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Note: Seasonal allocation: 1. Matching of supply and demand 
2. Scheduling the implementation 
3. Progress monitoring and evaluation 
In-seasonal allocation: 4. Matching of supply and demand 
5. Scheduling the implementation 
6. Progress monitoring and evaluation 
Flow regulation: 7. Preparation of operational methods and plans 
8. Control over staff utilization 
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What are the Changes Required in the Processes? 
Allocation. Increased levels of sophistication require in most case studies new approaches of 
demand assessment. This requires an improved match of the assessments of farmers' 
requirements (regarding cultivation calendar, cultivation pattern, cultivation risks, and water 
deliveries) by field staff and their superiors. Most engineers currently devote their efforts to 
assess the farmer's water requirements based on the theoretical water requirements. This 
practice deviates their attention from assessing the real-life requirements. 
A changed professional approach requires a formal recognition by agencies and engineers 
that improved assessment also must rely on water levels or discharges, rather than on theoretical 
assessments alone. Water levels or discharges may have to be combined with farmers' requests. 
Such higher quality demand assessment by higher staff levels was observed only in the Moroccan 
case study. Even there, the matching of supply at main system level with the demand can be 
improved considerably. 
Logically, higher level staff can never assess the multitude of individual demands of 
farmers by themselves. So their demand assessments must rely on those by field staff and 
farmers, whereby higher level staff should be involved in the assessment of the reliability of this 
field-level demand assessment. They can do so through increased guidance, monitoring and 
evaluation of field staff, and through increased interaction with farmers. Monitoring and 
evaluation of the water allocation by field staff often requires also (better calibrated) 
measurement structures. 
More interaction with farmers before and during the cultivation season may also facilitate 
a reduction of divergent expectations, and thus a better goal congruence among of farmers and 
between farmers and agency in the decision-preparation stages. 
More explicitness about the involved cultivation risks and water-delivery performance 
targets and trade-offs makes the farmers more co-responsible for the success of the season. The 
irrigation agency then becomes mainly responsible for the quality of the water delivery, rather 
than for the success of the season. The risk implied in estimating the probable rainfall is then 
not the responsibility of the agency alone anymore. 
Flow regulation. A higher level of sophistication of main system flow regulation implies 
an improved coordination of operations along the main system. A direct implication is an 
improved separation of the conveyance along the main system and the distribution to offtakes 
along the canal. 
Water levels along the main canal must be used as inputs for instructions for conveyance 
by higher level staff. These instructions must be specific in terms of timing, frequency and size 
of gate settings. Without involvement of higher level staff such coordination is very difficult, 
also given the likely localized favoring of head-end reaches by gate operators. Without 
systemizing such instructing and guidance by higher level staff, the monitoring of the actual 
operations by them remains very difficult. This is especially so given the fluctuating water 
levels, and the ad hoc operations by gate operators. 
A higher level of sophistication of flow regulation seems more difficult to achieve than 
for allocation. It requires the measurement of the timing of gate operations and water levels, 
and of the resulting transport of water volumes. Related instructions on gate settings require 
rapid information exchanges between field staff and higher staff levels. This complexity of the 
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regulation is one obvious reason for its widespread neglect so far. Simultaneously, the managing 
agencies sustain its neglect as they do not like to become accountable for the actual water 
delivery. 
Are these Changes Really Required? 
The above requirements are not absolute. Neither are they a plea for the capacity utilization as 
the best opportunity to reduce irrigation's underperformance. A priority between capacity 
creation and capacity utilization can only be made after the analysis of the capacity creation in 
the next chapter. 
Higher levels of sophistication, and thus higher management inputs, of capacity utilization 
are not always feasible or desired. Although prioritizing between opportunities for improvement 
in specific cases can best be done by either the responsible managing agency, the government 
or the financier, this analysis concludes on some generalized priorities for the whole irrigation 
subsector. 
The major alternative to the above requirements is an increased level of sophistication 
of the key decisions of capacity creation. The next chapter discusses these. An agency may 
perceive the above higher levels of sophistication for capacity utilization as inachievable. Then, 
it may be preferable to adjust, for example, its design concepts so that it assumes lower levels 
of sophistication during capacity utilization. An example is a lower density of control and 
measurement structures, which is one rationale behind the warabandi systems in Pakistan and 
Indian Punjab. 
If, on the other hand, either allocation or flow regulation gets priority, the above 
requirements are definite for the subsector as a whole, and for the direction of individual cases. 
Although the details may be different for a particular case. 
CHANGES IN MANAGEMENT CONDITIONS REQUIRED TO IMPROVE CAPACITY 
UTILIZATION 
This section identifies those changes required in management conditions that are likely to lead 
to improved processes (step 4 in Figure 3 of chapter 3). The improvements in the processes of 
capacity utilization in the previous section are the basis for the changes in management 
conditions. 
The following classes of management conditions are considered: human resources, 
provision of information, financial control systems, provision of knowledge, and organizational 
rules and structure. A change in one management conditions may require complementary 
changes in other conditions. For example, the introduction of a monitoring and evaluation 
system (Provision of Information) is only useful, if, for example, staff (Human Resources) are 
also given incentives to use the system for performance improvement. Overall conclusions and 
recommendations of required changes are thus best considered in an integrated manner. 
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Human Resources 
Decisions are always made by people. Consequently people are the most important management 
condition in an irrigation system, like in any organization. In contrast, irrigation professionals 
have neglected this management condition in comparison to other disciplinary interests. 
Chambers has described this as follows: 
"Canal systems are all too easily thought of as delimited by the physical domain of the capture, distribution and 
application of water, and by the bio-economic domain of the growth and disposal of crops. But the human 
domain so dominates in operating the system that to limit analysis to the physical and bio-economic domains 
is not just misleading. It is, in a practical sense unscientific. It is people who make changes. And those with 
the greatest power to make changes are the managers in charge. Whether it is improving scheduling, reducing 
losses at night, instituting joint management with farmers, or other interventions, the managers hold the 
initiative. They are not just part of the system; for purposes of reform, they are the key. To understand the 
environment they work in, their motivation and their behavior is, thus, crucial in any search for an improvement 
in performance."163 
Increased attention of irrigation professionals for this important factor of management control 
has come only in the 1980s, according to Chambers.1 6 4 
Observed constraints in the provision of staff. Several deficiencies in the irrigation 
agency's human resources were observed in all case studies. 
The attitudes of agency staff tended to impede effective information exchanges about 
water issues. Attitudes and behavior of engineers and other agency staff toward the farmers and 
field staff tended to be rather top-down and hierarchical. So the agency staff often appeared to 
discourage interaction with farmers and their own field staff. Of course, many exceptions to this 
general picture existed as well. 
Traditionally, field staff was always suspected to be more loyal to localized interests than 
to the agency. 1 6 5 Without clearly defined and enforced agency or "system" interests, also 
higher level staff was observed to adapt the same permissive attitude toward localized interest. 
Over time, the attitudes related to no or minimal capacity utilization seem to have gained their 
own momentum. Such attitudes as such already seem to become an obstacle to improved 
capacity utilization.166 
Technical knowledge of agency staff was observed to be at sufficiently high levels for 
the capacity utilization. As far as expatriate consultants were present in the case studies, then-
presence tended to relate to management constraints in the capacity utilization such as water 
management, the introduction of non-traditional crops, and project management. The technical 
knowledge of consultants was deemed indispensable only for very specialized technical issues 
such as major dam construction. 
Knowledge and skills of the engineers of the irrigation agencies about the management 
of the water allocation and regulation was low in all case studies. 
Insufficient staff was also a frequent complaint of interviewed agency staff. Although 
the O&M budgets were indeed small compared to the actual needs, the performance of the 
available staff was low. No performance-related incentives led in all cases to low staff 
motivation for performance improvement. So, in all cases, more staff would not necessarily 
have led to increased performance without changes in the related incentives. Therefore, the 
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potential need for more staff in different agencies is considered here subordinate to the need for 
improved motivation. Or, as Chambers has said: "The conditions, motivation and incentives of 
managers are the key." 1 6 7 
Incentives. The incentives of irrigation staff seemed pretty much similar to those of other 
professionals; convenience and amenity, promotion and career, status, income, and avoidance 
of stress, and professional satisfaction.168 In all case studies, however, these incentives tended 
to direct irrigation staff toward construction and maintenance, rather than toward water-delivery 
activities. 
Construction and maintenance provided for a multitude of positive incentives. The 
following observations by Chambers about what most engineers perceive to be the advantages 
of a construction job, were observed in all case studies: 
"More for "hard" applied science people; offered more independence of action; were less monotonous and 
offered more variety of experience; carried better promotion prospects; involved less public relations; were less 
vulnerable to transfers by dissatisfied politicians."189 
More importantly, funds for construction and maintenance activities provided for the 
major financial incentives for irrigation agencies, and thus for the individuals in those 
organizations. Each contract was considered to provide ways of skimming more or less financial 
or in-kind benefits for the involved agency and individual staff members, whether legally or 
illegally. In addition, each contract provided an agency with new infrastructure, new vehicles 
and other facilities, and sometimes a contribution to its general overhead. 1 7 0 And these 
contracts were for free for the agency, because the agency itself is seldom required to repay the 
capital investments, not even partly. 
Without any performance requirements from national government or farmers for the 
agency's capacity utilization, a distorted financial setting for the irrigation agency was observed. 
Their actual operation was to a certain extent similar to that of a consultant. These financial 
gains from projects were observed to have biased, over time, the whole incentive structure in 
all observed irrigation agencies and ministries. 
Also the political visibility of construction works was observed to reinforce this bias. 
Overall, major positive incentives for construction were observed. 
Water-delivery activities, on the other hand, appeared to provide merely "negative" 
incentives. Staff instructions tended to be the minimization of both upward information, and 
complaints by farmers to politicians and superiors.171 
Several irrigation professionals have also observed that incentives exist for bad 
management, as summarized by Chambers: 
"If they gain income from bad management: from lack of scheduling, unpredictable water deliveries, poor 
communications, and misinformation, then ways have to be sought to make it rational for them to change. 
Otherwise, many nice manuals are written, poor performance will persist."172 
Frequent political interference in hiring and firing, promotion or transfer in agencies 
further reinforced this biased goal congruence.173 
Motivation. All fore mentioned pressures work in the same direction and against the 
motivation to do a quality job in capacity utilization. In all key decision-making processes this 
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low motivation appeared a dominating constraint toward performance improvements. Any 
solutions to improve the performance will thus have to address this crucial constraint. 
The management of human resources. What to do about the deficiencies in managerial 
attitudes and behavior? Specific management training might be capable to change such attitudes 
or, at least, increase awareness about them. 1 7 4 However, such changes in attitude and 
management skills cannot be sustained without the development of more priority for capacity 
utilization. 
Related incentives for all involved staff or farmers seem to be the most crucial 
requirement. Such incentives can be provided by the introduction of performance monitoring and 
evaluation, in combination with related financial or career incentives. Although the introduction 
of the latter was often observed to be difficult for the reasons given hereafter. 
All studied irrigation agencies depended for most policies on human resource 
management (HRM) on the national government and politicians. Hiring and firing, salary levels, 
performance-related bonuses were centrally controlled in the line departments, but even in the 
observed semi-autonomous irrigation corporations in Sri Lanka, Philippines, Morocco and 
Sudan. 
Many managers, researchers and donor staff seem to accept this lack of freedom in HRM 
as inevitable.1 7 5 They focus their attention, instead, on other solutions like the development 
and introduction of systems for performance monitoring and evaluation. They hope thereby on 
some performance improvement, even in the absence of any link with HRM policies. 
Performance monitoring and evaluation, however, seem to be useless, unless it can be 
linked to the incentives for irrigation staff. Moreover, a reasonable separation from political 
interference is required. Therefore, the present lack of freedom regarding HRM should be 
considered a major weakness of the observed irrigation institutions. And a major reason to 
change them. Similar observations were made for Sri Lanka by Chambers, for Indonesia by 
Kelley and Johnson, and for Morocco by Development Finance Consultants.1 7 6 
HRM and organizational structure. The section on "Organizational Structure" at the end 
of this chapter elaborates on this subject. Nonetheless, some remarks are made here on the 
interrelation of performance and incentives for different institutional set ups. 
A linkage between performance and incentives exists in all cases where capacity 
utilization is generally perceived to be (comparatively) well managed. For example, in some 
irrigation systems in the USA and Taiwan 1 7 7, farmers apparently have the power to hire and 
fire irrigation staff, including the engineers. Hiring and firing are the more negative incentives, 
and thus the weakest link. 1 7 8 Yet, links between positive incentives such as rewards or praise 
can be found as well in comparatively well-managed systems. This seems to be the case in 
private irrigation companies, in France, and in New Zealand. There the survival of the 
irrigation agency depends on the collection of service fees that is based on the quality of the 
service delivery. 
In LDCs, no such fully independent irrigation corporations seem to exist yet, and 
incentive systems seem always to be separated from performance in capacity utilization. Such 
dépendance can be rooted in different funding arrangements. Either, dépendance is caused by 
straightforward government-supported or -guaranteed funding for operation and maintenance of 
an irrigation corporation, like in most such organizations in Philippines, Morocco, Sudan and 
Sri Lanka. Or, it can be based in less direct, and more hidden, government-support for 
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irrigation investments in deferred maintenance/rehabilitation or modernization, like in most 
organizations in LDCs. 
An additional big advantage from a HRM perspective of being more independent of the 
government is the likely reduced level of vulnerability to political interference. Even if political 
interference persists, its financial consequences is more readily obvious and clear. A reduction 
of the level of political interference reduces the influence of this other major disincentive for 
irrigation managers to be involved in capacity utilization. Thus it also increases the credibility 
of merit-based careers. 
What should be clear from the above, however, is that, compared to the importance of 
the fore mentioned incentive and accountability issues, other measures seem of little relevance 
for improving the management processes, if they stand on their own. Solutions such as technical 
training1 7 9, manuals1 8 0, external consultants181, more staff or other facilities will be 
irrelevant as long these fore mentioned issues remain unaddressed. Repetto has stated it as 
follows: 
"..."better management" is an elusive goal, since the dominant parties involved have weak, if any, interests in 
attaining it. Without fundamental changes in the incentives that motivate these parties [i.e., changes in the 
management control], efforts to strengthen irrigation management probably won't substantially improve 
performance in public systems. To a large extent, the current emphasis on management as the critical problem 
in public irrigation reflects acceptance of the long-dominant engineering perspective. Most engineers, who still 
run virtually all irrigation agencies, conceptualize irrigation projects as hydraulic systems designed and built 
to operate in certain ways. If they don't actually operate that way in practice, then, according to the engineers, 
"they are not being managed properly." However, seen not as hydraulic but as socio-economic systems, those 
same irrigation projects are designed to operate in a quite different way—in accordance with the principles of 
rent-seeking—and, in fact, they do so." 1 8 2 
Amazingly enough, all studied aid donors had made little efforts to incorporate in their 
investment considerations the influence of these incentive structures on capacity utilization. 1 8 3 
Chapters 5 and 6 elaborate on these donor considerations. 
Provision of Information 
Information provision is crucial for effective and efficient management of an organization. 
Decision making relates to processes in the minds of different involved actors, which essentially 
depend on information for its preparation, enlightenment, and energy. Decision making involves 
choices among alternatives, among different compositions of information. A decision is 
essentially a transformation of information. 
Observed constraints in the provision of information. In all case studies, except the 
Moroccan, more information regarding the actual requirements of the farmers was needed for 
the seasonal allocation planning to achieve an average level of sophistication. Their preferences 
relate to the cultivation calendar, the cropping pattern, the irrigable area, the staggered 
cultivation, and cultivation risks, the water duties, as well as the trade-offs between them. 
Especially, the preparatory stages and the implementation of the seasonal allocation decisions 
require such information. 
In all case studies, except the Moroccan, the seasonal allocation planning did not consider 
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the actual water users' requirements at the levels of the project, block (or branch canal) and 
distributary channel. Such information should become available, especially during the 
preparatory phases of the allocation planning by the system-level O&M division (and possibly 
the Agricultural division). Improved mutual understanding and adjustment, and fewer divergent 
expectations of clients may evolve. 
In all case studies, improved informing of the water users about the decisions, arguments, 
and criteria used in the different steps may strengthen their confidence in the decision-making 
processes. 
In all case studies, except the Moroccan, no reliable historical measurement data on 
realized water deliveries to important subsystems were available for the determination of realistic 
water duties. Higher levels of sophistication require therefore at least one, but preferably more, 
regular calibrations (e.g., every two or three years, depending on the siltation in a specific 
location). 
In all case studies, except the Moroccan, no weekly information was available at block 
and project level regarding the actual implementation of the seasonal allocation plan. Neither 
were by the end of the land preparation, evaluation reports on the actual implementation sent to 
an agency's head office. 
To achieve at least an average level of sophistication (i.e., a score of 40-60, see also 
Annex 1), the staff level that prepares the in-seasonal allocation schedules requires regular or 
frequent feedback of realized water issues to branch canals, distributary and field channels, and 
of corresponding water levels in the main and branch canals. In all case studies, such feedback 
was only partly observed. Also, it should get feedback on adjustments of scheduled allocations. 
This feedback could be realized through forms, in which case they should be cross-checked. 
Cross-checking can be done by daily independent measurements of water issues to at least 
distributary canals, and through regular field visits by project-level staff. 
The achievement of at least an average level of sophistication requires regular feedback 
of the residual effective rainfall. This was not observed in any of the case studies, although the 
frequent feedback in the Morrocan cases of the actual demand incorporated the effective rainfall. 
The achievement of at least an average level of sophistication requires good 
communication lines to react on important deviations from the scheduled allocations (i.e., those 
that cannot be covered by the established allowable margins). This was not observed in any of 
the case studies. 
Reacting on important deviations also could be facilitated by an improved information-
processing capacity; the use of computers and standard software could be applied to make 
frequent and quick changes in the schedules and to produce notes for dissemination of the new 
schedules to field staff and water users. It would also make the management system less 
dependent on individual staff members if allocation experiences were recorded, for example, in 
a database, seasonal reports, etc. Such facilities were nowhere observed. 
The achievement of at least an average level of sophistication requires performance 
evaluation by the agency's head office. It requires registration of allocation schedules and 
comparison with important earlier experiences, and regular monitoring and evaluation of actual 
implementation of the most important operational targets. Potential performance indicators for 
the in-seasonal allocation are the water duties for different main and branch canals and 
distributary channels. These could be monitored regularly. Only in Morocco this was observed. 
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Although even there the water duty was not a serious performance indicator for the service 
delivery as a higher consumption meant more income for the agency. 
Serious performance evaluation requires, again, an increased accountability of the 
irrigation agency as a whole toward its water-delivery performance. This is unlikely to come 
about without any related external requirements. 
The achievement of at least an average level of sophistication of the flow regulation 
requires the provision of the O&M divisions with the actual time of operation of the reservoir 
sluices and realized discharges. This was not observed in any of the case studies. 
The achievement of at least an average level of sophistication requires the informing of 
gate tenders about the exact time and size of flow variation at their structures. But also they 
should be instructed about the required time and size of gate adjustment and the frequency of 
checking the resulting level changes, and the frequency of adjustment of the gate settings. 
The achievement of at least an average level of sophistication requires also the feedback 
to higher-level staff of the actual time and size of gate adjustments required for the flow 
variation to reach important points along the main and branch canals (e.g., the tail ends, or the 
head ends of branch canals and distributary channels). Also, they should receive feedback of 
the time required to stabilize at these points after an important change of discharge through the 
reservoir sluices, after heavy rainfall, or after important changes in distribution in upstream 
reaches of the main and branch canals. Also, information on all changes in distribution realized 
along the main and branch canals should be fed back to higher-level staff regularly. Moreover, 
for an average level of sophistication regular feedback should occur about variations in water 
level along the main and branch canals. Such feedback on flow regulation was not observed 
in any of the case studies, except for Sudan's Rahad system. There some feedback occurred on 
water levels along the main system. 
Average levels of sophistication require information flows as mentioned above. They 
require increased management inputs and efforts of different staff levels in all case studies, 
except the Moroccan. These are unlikely to occur without increased institutional support from 
an agency's head office. Such support could be in the form of guidance, evaluation, and 
appreciation of increased performance. To this end, regular or frequent monitoring of the 
processes of the allocation decision making by an agency's head office is required at least for 
guidance, and evaluation and especially for stimulation of staff. In the present situation in most 
case studies, the involved staff is not appraised for its performance, other than "negatively", i.e., 
in cases of complaints. 
Errors. The foregoing argued that irrigation managers in all case studies, except the 
Morrocan, had access to very little relevant management information. In addition, errors in the 
available information appeared a problem for higher staff levels in all observed irrigation 
agencies.1 8 4 This reduced the usefulness of the available information for capacity utilization. 
Improving this quality would require again the assistance of, and the monitoring and 
evaluation by higher staff. Especially in large systems, and even more in smallholder systems, 
it is physically and managemently impossible for top managers to control adequately this quality 
by themselves. On the other hand, errors were often irrelevant because the information "is not 
used anyway". 1 8 5 
Information provision and organizational structure. In all irrigation systems, the required 
quantity and quality (e.g., timeliness, reliability, appropriateness) of information about the 
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requirements of farmers and field staff seems enormous. This is due to the high variability of 
soils, topography and socio-economic situations186, and the considerable geographic distances. 
Especially in LDCs, the large numbers of farmers in large-scale smallholder systems aggravate 
this information load. It becomes even more cumbersome with high intensities of flow-control 
structures. 
Such huge information needs easily cause information overloads for higher hierarchical 
levels of staff. One way to moderate these constraints is through pre-processing of information 
through, for example, "management by exception". Another way is through improved 
telecommunication or transport facilities187, as introduced in some modernization programs 
nowadays. Especially for flow regulation the latter options may facilitate increased and better 
information exchanges. However, the quality of "management by exception" and the reliability 
of monitoring and evaluation still require regular on-the-spot checking. This is especially so if 
localized interests overshadow possible incentives of staff to economize on water use. (Given 
the localized interests for excess water availability, information systems without such incentives 
will function only marginally anyway.) 
This suggests that, supposing such incentives exist, from the perspective of information 
exchange requirements alone, only decentralization of this information processing and decision 
making can lead to higher levels of sophistication of capacity utilization.188 
Potential and logical units of decentralization are either the system level, or the subsystem 
served by one or more main, distributary or lateral canals. 1 8 9 Generalizations about the 
appropriate level and size for decentralized units are difficult to make, however. Such 
generalizations cannot depend on information considerations alone, but also on the coherence of 
the problem. Some relevant factors are discussed in the section on Organizational Rules and 
Structures. 
Decentralization without incentives to achieve higher performance levels will not lead to 
higher levels of sophistication. In such cases, the pressures by localized interests are likely to 
lead to even more local water waste. Performance improvements can only be attained if the 
decentralized units have incentives to achieve them. 
Financial Control Systems1 9 0 
Irrigation service fees have received much attention in the past by donors and recipient national 
governments. Donors seem to have pushed for this form of cost recovery of their irrigation 
investments largely for ideological reasons; i.e., for the perceived effect of more efficient 
resource allocation and more adequate O&M funding.191 Despite this attention, the collection 
of service fees in most countries has been disappointing, and donors met "widespread non-
compliance with these lending covenants"192 by the national governments. 
In all cases of this study, except the Moroccan, service fee collection rates were very 
low. Neither was there any relation between the volumetric water delivery and the size of the 
service fees. Duane, a World Bank staff member, has reported that most irrigation agencies in 
LDCs cannot and do not try to measure water volumetrically193, a necessary condition for any 
relation between cost recovery and efficiency.194 An often mentioned exception in Asia seems 
Taiwan—of course nowadays more a Newly Industrializing Country (NIC) than a LDC. Taiwan 
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is often quoted for the links there between the collection rate of service fees and the management 
performance.1 9 5 
Moore has recently reviewed the technical and political feasibility of measuring volume 
in Asia and of the introduction of related water pricing. He was pessimistic about such 
opportunities and argued that Taiwan's perceived example was a misconception.196 He may 
have a point, but he may also be wrong. Because cost recovery seems a rather donor-driven 
issue, chapter 5 gives a more extensive discussion, also of Moore's objections, in the section on 
Feasible Cost Recovery. 
A larger constraint than the volumetric measuring seems the will of politicians and donors 
to enforce such payments from the Asian farmers. In all Asian case studies politicians were 
unwilling to seriously introduce service fees for irrigation water. In the Moroccan case studies, 
volumetric water charging occurred, but also in Sudan it did not. 
The financial control in all observed irrigation agencies mainly focused on minimizing 
the expenditures on operation and maintenance. Finance for the organizations as a whole as well 
as for the different units depended on the government budgetary allocation, and lacked any 
relation to their performance.197 Without any financial control system that related the finance 
for an organizational unit to its performance, the efficiency argument implicitly pursued by the 
donors did not evolve. 
Most governments of LDCs are not eager to make irrigation agencies more independent. 
Duane has nicely described why they are not eager to do so: "to keep such agencies firmly in 
the political domain where there is maximum opportunity to exercise discretion and minimum 
constraint from the rules of commercial undertakings."198 Similar observations were made in 
all case studies. 
It seems precisely for this reason, that very few, if any, really independent large 
irrigation agencies exist in the LDCs. Semi-autonomous agencies such as the National Irrigation 
Administration (NLA) in Philippines, and the Office Regional de Mise en Valeur Agricole 
(ORMVA) in Morocco, were observed to depend still on annual budgetary allocations and 
guarantees from their national government. As a result, the institutional pressures on staff in 
those agencies to reduce water waste were still limited. 
In contrast, in more financial autonomous irrigation agencies or organizational units, the 
agency or unit as a whole has incentives for improvement of service delivery.1 9 9 This has 
been claimed for, for example, Australia, New Zealand and France. 
More financial autonomy may lead also to more independence of the organization to 
provide incentives to its staff and to become more independent in its human resource 
management policies. The latter were observed to be often difficult to realize within a 
government agency because financial reward systems tended to be centrally controlled and to be 
set on an across-the-board government basis. 2 0 0 
Yet, even without financial independence different other forms of financial control and 
accounting could probably stimulate, to a certain extent, a better accountability of different 
organizational units. Accounting systems that would make the resource use and efficiency of 
these units more clear may itself provide, to a certain degree, for an incentive. They may 
facilitate more decentralization of decision making to these units as well. Yet, similar to the 
above incentive system, central governments often prescribe accounting systems, and it may be 
difficult to change the accounting system for an irrigation agency only. Besides, introduction 
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of accounting systems without any financial accountability for the agency as a whole may render 
them less useful. 
Provision of Knowledge 
The provision of formal knowledge to irrigation managers about relevant management techniques 
and attitudes of capacity utilization is very limited. Since the 1970s, workshops, literature and 
the more formal education familiarized irrigation managers in all case studies with the technical 
methods of water scheduling and demand assessment. Similar knowledge about the management 
aspects of capacity utilization was unavailable to irrigation managers in most case studies. 
Though some ad hoc knowledge transfer was observed to occur between irrigation managers. 
An observed exception was a recent publication of the Moroccan ICID on the allocation 
practices in different Moroccan systems.2 0 1 The publication describes and compares different 
technical and managerial approaches in Moroccan irrigation systems. The study seems unique, 
because no similar study could be traced for this study from any other country. 
Irrigation managers in Sri Lanka and Philippines were observed to be provided with much 
knowledge about organizing farmers into water user groups. Yet, the knowledge how to interact 
with them on capacity utilization issues appeared not to be part of such trainings. 
In general, the knowledge about relevant managerial techniques for capacity utilization 
was observed to be very limited. No synthesis or systematic exchanges of experiences by 
different irrigation managers were apparent in all case studies, except the Moroccan. Nothing 
was observed to be known about managerial techniques and attitudes that have proved more or 
less successful in reaching mutually acceptable seasonal allocation decisions in different 
irrigation systems under different water availability scenarios. 
Especially the technical and managerial knowledge of coordinating the gate settings along 
main systems were observed to be a blind spot in all case studies. Such knowledge could be 
developed through trial-run techniques in different systems. Or, through the application of 
simulation models to experiment with different operational methods and procedures for flow 
regulation. Some earlier described innovative action research with flow simulation models by 
IIMI and the Sri Lanka's Irrigation Department tries to fill this gap of flow regulation in one 
specific system. Still, this remains a meager effort compared to the size of this professional gap. 
Several authors have observed such missing knowledge in the past. One is Chambers, 
quoted below: 
"To my knowledge, though, there is no source book of methods for working out schedules for different 
conditions, and no textbook or manual for scheduling and delivery. Nor will compiling such a textbook or 
manual be easy, for it to be realistic it must tackle problems of inadequate information-scheduling with few facts 
and poor communications. But since scheduling and delivery are at the core of main system management, and 
main system management is the key to improved performance, those who pioneer and develop methods, manuals 
and training materials for better scheduling and delivery will be at a frontier of immense professional and social 
significance."202 
Reducing the listed gaps in knowledge is desirable. On the other hand, the importance 
of such gaps in canal management must not be exaggerated (as some irrigation professionals tend 
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to do). This may lead to a focus on an improved irrigation professionalism only, while leaving 
the crucial performance and accountability issues untouched. Weak professionalism seems more 
a consequence of the weak motivation and accountability, and thus of inexperience, to manage 
these canals, than the cause of it. Improved knowledge about canal management can facilitate 
improvement processes. But it cannot be the sole entrance. 
Organizational Rules and Structure 
Explicit and specific mission statement. Not all studied irrigation agencies had a mission to 
deliver water. In the Sri Lankan and Philippine case studies2 0 3 the water delivery was not 
defined as a responsibility for the irrigation agency. Instead it was left to the farmers, or the 
agricultural agency. The agency's responsibility in those cases, was restricted to the creation 
of capacity and the opening of the head sluices. Also in India a government commission has 
found such a basic gap in responsibility and accountability of irrigation agencies, as reflected 
in the following quotation: 
"..the Indian Commission 1901-1903 . . .opined that the irrigation officers should keep as strict an account of 
the disposition of every cubic foot of the water entering their canals . . .and it is only by doing so they can . 
. .prevent an unequal or ineffective distribution of water . . .the Second Irrigation Commission of 1972 
considered that it is necessary for the Irrigation Engineer to know how and where water is being used or 
misused and if he is expected to run the system efficiently he must know the details of the end use of the water 
which is being supplied and for this purpose the Irrigation Department should be made responsible for the 
management of water from the sources to the field . . .The National Commission on Agriculture 1976 was of 
the opinion that the Irrigation Department should be responsible both for efficient conveyance of water from 
its sources to the field and for fair distribution . . .none of the above mentioned suggestions and 
recommendations of the three Commissions from 1901-1976 have been processed or implemented by the State 
Government"204 (underline added, cn) 
Precondition for any improvement of the creation and utilization of irrigation capacities 
by an irrigation agency is such an explicit mission statement. Only if a mission statement exists, 
responsibilities and accountabilities of an agency can be defined and monitored. 
Accountability. Systematic monitoring of the service delivery was observed in Morocco 
only. And even there the monitoring was not always that systematic and regular. The observed 
information exchanges in the other irrigation agencies were mostly ad hoc and reactive to 
complaints by field staff and farmers.2 0 5 Therefore, the observed systematic monitoring was 
mainly by farmers. Levine has observed this in India as well. 2 0 6 
Such information on system performance in itself is indispensable for any accountability 
of the staff of a managing agency. Even if higher hierarchical levels do not use it for staff 
performance assessment and related incentive systems, its availability alone would provide for 
some accountability and incentive for agency staff. For this obvious reason, it could be 
observed in most case studies that the few efforts to make such information systematically 
available met passive and active resistance from irrigation agencies and engineers.2 0 7 
Unfortunately, this resistance was rather successful. External monitoring (i.e., by an external 
party) is then a possible way of making irrigation agencies accountable for its service delivery 
in a systematic way (if they do not yet financially depend on the quality of their services). 
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Especially if there is a link between the budget for the agency and such audits, the use of neutral 
"external water auditors" may be useful. 
Literature on irrigation management provides several references to the nominal function 
of monitoring systems for system operation amongst others in Morocco, Indonesia, India and 
Sri Lanka. 2 0 8 Amazingly enough, this has seldom led to the conclusion that a monitoring and 
evaluation system alone does not necessarily make an agency more accountable in a systematic 
way. Only Wade has explicitly recognized this. He has suggested therefore the introduction 
of external public monitoring of irrigation agencies to enforce more systematic 
accountability.209 
Several countries practice such external monitoring. In the USA, for example, the 
General Accounting Office monitors and evaluates the performance of irrigation agencies.2 1 0 
Also Malaysia's Prime Minister's Office currently tries to initiate a similar process. In both 
cases, the central government supervises this external monitoring, which is probably the best 
possible guarantee for its neutrality.211 
Central versus local control. Another structural issue is the degree of centralization of 
irrigation agencies. The sections on the management conditions Human Resources and Provision 
of Information touched upon this issue already. 
In all case studies, the irrigation agencies were formally highly centralized. Only in the 
Moroccan agencies several responsibilities were more decentralized from the central to the 
authority level. Despite this formal picture, the processes of capacity utilization described in 
this chapter demonstrated a weak central control. Only in Morocco the decentralized authorities 
resulted in a stronger control at field level. 
The observed weak central control seemed related to a certain degree to the so-called 
"soft" states2 1 2 of most LDCs. Only in Morocco, the state did not refrain from enforcing 
certain regulations. These "soft" states make a stronger control with the traditional 
organizational set ups unlikely. To a certain degree, the weakness of the central control seems 
also more likely for the irrigation subsector than for other sectors for such reasons as the great 
variability in local conditions and needs of fanners, and the large physical distances in most 
systems. This may be the reason Maass and Anderson have observed that also in countries 
where the state was much stronger at irrigation system level, the central control appeared to be 
limited: 
"...formal centralization of authority, where it has occurred, has not meant substantial loss of local control de 
facto. General administrative, legislative, and judicial norms laid down by higher authorities have not negated 
customary procedures . . .authorities do not seek central controls but acted rather as adjuncts to traditional 
cellular irrigation authorities"213 
Limited control seems a fact of life in most irrigation systems in LDCs. 2 1 4 The 
information required for increased control over local units is available only at the local level. 
Increased control over local units can therefore only be expected if the local managers have 
sufficient incentives 1) to provide a level of service delivery that is satisfactory to these local 
units; and 2) to represent the system-wide interests against localized interests. 
Improved control seems therefore to require an increased decentralization of most, 
presently centralized irrigation agencies. Although a "central coordinating unit" should be 
maintained to represent the system-wide interests along the main system, and to regulate the 
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flows along it. Naturally, such decentralization only works with performance-related incentives 
for decentralized decision makers. 
Potential and logical units of decentralization are the subsystems served by one or more 
main, distributary or lateral canals. Such generalizations about the appropriate level and size 
for decentralized units are difficult to make, however. It depends on such system-specific 
factors as the size of the main system, the intensity of flow control structures (and other design 
characteristics), the number of farmers, and the size of complexity and uncertainties of the 
cultivation. But also the envisaged level of water-delivery service, the acceptable quantity of 
slack resources, the motivation and incentive systems for agency staff and farmers, and even the 
political and socio-economic situation of the system and farmers may be factors influencing the 
appropriate level of decentralization. 
The presently centralized organizational structures of most irrigation agencies in LDCs 
originate often from, and correspond to, the information requirements during colonial, or other 
centralized control-oriented governments. The following quotation of Levine reflects this: 
"To a large extent the flow of information was downward, with relatively little of an operational 
nature moving upward. Since the operations were considered to be governed by fixed rules, 
monitoring was only to insure the rules were carried out." 2 1 5 Performance improvements 
require different information processing (e.g., also upward), and thus different organization 
structures. 
Separate structures for main system regulation. The section on Flow Regulation 
Processes shows that this management concern was done in Sudan at a comparatively high level 
of sophistication. The observations suggested the following structural influences. First, a 
separate organizational structure was responsible solely for conveyance along the main system, 
and delivery to the minor systems (i.e., the Sudanese tertiary canal). Secondly, the agency had 
a certain financial accountability for the delivery toward the agricultural corporation (agency 
staff tended to receive annual bonuses from the agricultural corporation). Complaints about the 
quality of water delivery to the minor systems~the formal transferpoint of water from the 
irrigation agency to the client-by the powerful agricultural corporations and tenants' union 
forced the managing agency to pay comparatively more attention to the regulation. 
The interaction between these two different organizations at the transfer point between 
main and minor system, makes the quality of the deliveries more transparent than it would have 
been if only one agency managed the water from the source to (groups of) farmers. In the latter 
case, as observed in the other case studies, it appeared very difficult for (groups of) farmers to 
trace and recognize the actual flow regulation due to the continuous fluctuations of water levels. 
Recognizing whether a certain actual delivery was the result of an allocation decision or of 
imperfect regulation in an upstream canal was impossible for them. Moreover, farmers' groups 
could complain but were too weak to enforce a systematic quality improvement. 
Although the positive evidence comes from this one Sudanese case only, the related logic 
suggests the following conclusions. A separate structural unit 2 1 6 for managing the flow in the 
main canal may benefit the quality of the flow regulation of the main system. Precondition for 
success of such a "regulation unit" is a clear transfer point of the service delivery to other units. 
In addition, the latter also must have enough power to keep them accountable, for example, 
through payment for the delivered services. 
This "regulation unit" must be the same as the earlier mentioned "central coordinating 
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unit", though the two units satisfy different management requirements. The latter's objective 
is to represent the system interest versus localized interests along the main canal, i.e., an 
allocation concern. The former's function is to make the quality of the flow regulation along 
the main system more transparent, and thus become accountable for it, i.e., a regulation 
concern. 
Such a separate unit can, in principle, be provided with incentives to improve its 
performance by making them profit centers. Such profit centers would buy water from the 
source and sell it to other units. This set up can be found in France. There, irrigation 
companies exist that provide such regulation services to irrigation systems. One such company 
even offered the farmers-who own the large-scale system~to try to manage the system by 
themselves, or to try finding another company that could deliver the service at competitive 
terms. Initially, the farmers tried by themselves but eventually they gave up, and decided to hire 
again the fore mentioned irrigation company. A superior example of a merit-based, and thus 
professional, irrigation agency. 
Water user groups. The introduction of water user groups (WUGs) was observed to be 
a standard ingredient of irrigation projects during the past 15 years. The main rationale seemed 
that only WUGs can make irrigation agencies accountable for the quality of design and 
construction and for system performance. Another important reason was that the modern design 
concepts assume farmers to share water along a field canal, and WUGs supposedly would 
facilitate this process. The following observations on the functionality of WUGs were made in 
the case studies. 
For a seasonal decision it appeared comparatively easy to get all farmers on a common 
line through WUGs. In Morocco, it was even possible without them, because the scheduling 
system allowed to a certain degree the incorporation of individual preferences. The farmers' 
individual seasonal plans were the starting point for the agency's seasonal planning. 
For day-to-day decisions, the required processes were observed to be much more 
difficult, due to the conflicting interests of different farmers in smallholder systems. No 
convincing systematic contribution of WUGs in the in-seasonal allocation was observed in the 
case studies. 
Rather than trying to share water to economize water for other subsystems, WUGs were 
observed to consider it their common interest to claim more water for their own group. This 
type of group representation usually existed already prior to the official WUGs. During the 
interviews in the two countries with major efforts to initiate WUGs, Sri Lanka and the 
Philippines, the impression grew stronger that most WUG leaders were more interested in 
potential individual or group benefits from a project's financial assistance than in the 
improvement of the allocation decisions. 
The dynamics of main system regulation itself was observed to be another consttaining 
factor for the functionality of WUGs. Virtually no rules and procedures were observed to exist 
for this decision making, resulting in an "adhocracy" type of regulation by the operators. 
Combined with the hydraulic behavior of the flows, this decision making was observed to be 
very little transparent, and thus difficult to influence for WUGs. 
For single decisions, like the seasonal plan, however, WUGs may facilitate a certain 
accountability from an irrigation agency. The attitude of the staff of all observed agencies was 
such that enforcement of such accountability in a systematic way was extremely unlikely without 
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any administrative authority for, or financial accountability to, the WUG. 
The above shows quite some practical constraints for WUGs to function in allocation and 
regulation processes. The question arises if the discussions on WUGs consider such constraints, 
and to what extent something can be done to make WUGs work better. 
Several authors have argued in the past that the conflicting interests of different farmers 
along canals impeded the functionality of the WUG concept in many LDCs, especially in social 
and political environments with values like "grabbing anything one can get away with". 2 1 7 
Although such attitudes can be considered, of course, a consequence of a lousy service delivery 
rather than its cause, WUGs are indeed unlikely to change such attitudes and processes. 
Unfortunately, the advocates of WUGs seldom seem to consider the consequences of such 
arguments in their discussions on WUGs. The discussions of the impact of most case studies 
of WUGs by its advocates and adversaries tend to be equally biased. 2 1 8 The advocates have 
amply documented some perceived successes of WUGs, notably the first system-wide pilot 
project in Sri Lanka's Gal Oya system. Although the concept has been implemented in many 
countries since, more systematic and widespread success is not obvious. Despite this void, 
awareness about the necessity of WUGs has increased considerably during the last decade. 
Awareness about their precise role in the decision-making processes remains however obscure. 
Theoretically, WUGs are a necessity. In the context of our present discussion an 
effective WUG would require the following two conditions: 
1. Irrigation agencies and its staff are only likely to make them functional in the 
decision-making processes if there is a need to do so. Either because farmers 
have the administrative authority, so that they can directly influence their 
incentives. Or, if they have incentives to increase the system's performance, and 
this were possible only through cooperation with WUGs. Several types of 
administrative authority of farmers are possible: farmers can own the irrigation 
agency (e.g., France, USA); they can influence transfer, promotion decisions 
(USA); they can threaten the financial viability of the organization (e.g., through 
service fees); or, they may have other administrative authority or influence over 
agency staff (e.g., Taiwan). 
2. The crystallization of conflicting interests between farmers and between WUGs 
and agency seems to require a long time. Maass and Anderson have derived 
from history that the usefulness of WUGs for allocation decisions cannot come 
overnight, as described hereafter: 
"...the problems of dividing and distributing water are complex, uniquely so for each system. How 
to manage a distribution system so that each cultivator receives water in the amount and at the time 
required by his crops; how to divide the water so that each irrigator receives the amount to which his 
water right or his interest in the system entitles him; and how to organize a force and a system for 
water delivery that will accomplish these results without great friction, at a cost irrigators will pay, 
and in accordance with their objectives are questions that no irrigation community has been able to 
settle except by long and costly experience."219 (underline added, cn) 
Without the above accompanying institutional arrangements and time, the following remark of 
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Wade seems quite true: "Much of the discussion on 'people's participation generally, and on 
water users' associations specifically, misses the point." 2 2 0 
Agricultural authority set up. Several countries, notably Sudan and Morocco, have 
extended the tasks of the irrigation agencies into delivering other inputs (e.g., fertilizer) for 
agricultural production as well. The delivery of these other inputs than water is either to the 
farmers or directly to the crop. The three perceived advantages behind this so-called agricultural 
authority set up are the following: 
1) the application of these inputs could be better coordinated with the other 
agricultural practices. Through such a bigger role of the agency, the total 
agricultural production could be improved; 
2) the higher coordination would lead to a more timely implementation of the land 
preparation, also in view of the design canal capacities, and thus to an improved 
capacity utilization; and, 
3) the other inputs than water would be more readily available, or at lower prices, 
than in the private sector. 
The second issue would tackle one cause of the head-tail problems in irrigation systems, because 
a delayed cultivation means less cultivation for the tail-end reaches. 
Pre-condition for the latter benefits of the authority set up are the means and will to 
provide a better service of water and other inputs. It also requires the will to interact with field 
staff and farmers to make them adhere to the system-wide interest to a certain degree, rather 
than to localized interests only. Observations in all case studies proved these assumptions 
unjustified. 
In the past a certain discipline seems to have prevailed, to a more and less degree, in the 
Sudanese and Moroccan agricultural authorities. The initial impact in those countries was a 
considerable adherence of farmers to the enforced cropping pattern and calendar. Over time 
these were observed to have eroded considerably. 
In a newly started authority such as the observed Sri Lankan Mahaweli Authority, a 
satisfactory service delivery neither such discipline were introduced. The adherence was much 
less than in the former two countries, and was not much different from the regular Sri Lankan 
line agency, the Irrigation Department. The functionality of the authority set up toward this 
water-related objective seemed thus low. 
The advantages of an enforced cropping pattern and calendar-originally the case in the 
Moroccan and Sudanese case studies—are also not that obvious as it seems to many engineers. 
An advantage for the government is that it can ensure certain quota of crops to be produced. 
On the other hand, the provision of the different inputs by the state was observed to be highly 
subsidized and often supply- rather than demand-based.221 Besides, the opportunities for 
farmers that the market provides tend to be missed with an enforced cropping pattern. 
More recently the limited de-facto impact on the adherence to cropping calendar and 
pattern has been more widely recognized. Together with the recognition of the high costs to 
society as a whole, the Sudanese and Moroccan agricultural authorities presently engage in 
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drastic disengagements in these activities. Ultimately they may reduce their activities to those 
of a regular line agency. This concept of an agricultural authority is thus likely to suffer an 
early end. 
Fake structural solutions. Over time, different structural solutions were observed to have 
been proposed and tried out in the different case studies to solve the systematic performance 
deficiencies. Several of these had little chance of success in view of their limited impact on the 
real management-control problems. A few of them are discussed hereafter. 
One such a fake solution was the creation of a separate structural unit for irrigation 
management purposes without allocating such a unit any related responsibility. Observed 
examples of such efforts were Sri Lanka's Irrigation Management Division (IMD) and India's 
Command Area Development Authority (CADA). Both were supposed to improve irrigation 
management, while the related authority and responsibility remained with the traditional 
irrigation agencies. This was an impossible solution in view of both the resistance in these 
agencies to put more efforts in the water delivery, and in view of the absence of accountability 
for the water-delivery performance of any of these organizations. 
A similar mistake was made in the Philippines with the creation of an institutional 
development division in all offices of the National Irrigation Administration. The division had 
a completely separate staff to run the water user organizations, and this caused it to remain 
separate from the agency's core activities. 
Another such fake solution was observed to be the hiring of external water management 
consultants without any direct authority and responsibility for the water delivery. Withou such 
responsibility their function appeared very limited in all observed cases given the persistence of 
the incentive, motivation and accountability problems in the agencies. 2 2 2 This was especially 
so where their presence was externally stimulated or enforced. It was observed that, most 
probably because of these constraints, and given the frequent absence of a commitment of the 
agency to tackle them, the presently hired water-management consultants tended to focus their 
activities on production of O&M manuals and developing training courses. But these manuals 
and training did not change the fore mentioned constraints.223 In addition, the manuals were 
time- and situation-specific, and became obsolete as soon as the managers or other important 
factors changed~due to the weak institutional setting, the quality of the individual manager has 
an exceptional dominant influence on the whole management and control. 
External facilitators or consultants are likely to contribute only to capacity utilization if 
there is an organizational environment that is committed to achieve certain objectives pursued 
by the external actor. Else they are likely to fill a gap for which nobody in the organization is 
or will be responsible. 
Unfortunately, donor organizations were observed to prefer and push the above fake 
solutions above solutions that really addressed the accountability and motivational issues of the 
recipient organizations. Some interviewed donor and government staff were well aware that the 
donors tended to opt for fake solutions. Most of them acknowledged that donors tended to shy 
away from addressing the sensitive issues that related to incentive systems and accountability 
issues. Levine and Heaver amongst others have published similar observations.2 2 4 Chapter 
6 elaborates on the related processes. 
Given the interests of the irrigation agencies, their staff and the farmers, the above changes 
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probably can be realized only if they get serious support from political and donor levels. 
Moreover, the above are the required changes in management conditions from the perspective 
of capacity utilization only. A full management perspective requires the consideration of the 
capacity creation as well. The next chapter gives this capacity creation perspective. Chapter 
6 subsequently integrates the required changes in management conditions from an overall 
management perspective, and derives the related management-control decisions. 
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of a variety of crops for the local market, among others sugar beet and sugar cane for state factories. The government 
thus forced farmers to grow certain crops, instead of relying on the price mechanism. 
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63. Chambers 1982:18. 
64. See, for example, GOAP 1982; Berkoff 1990. 
65. Ter Hofstede and Van Santbrink 1979:43. 
66. Widely stimulated by agencies in Sri Lanka at present times, though Harris mentions that this occurred already during 
the 1920s (Harriss 1977:368). 
67. Bloemen and De Moor 1983:620. 
68. E.g., Kelley and Johnson 1989:531. Similarly, a consultant writes that "every farmer can instruct every operator, 
if present, discipline is completely absent" (Nedeco 1979:1 in Ter Hofstede and Van Santbrink 1979:189). And, aWorld 
Bank discussion paper: "field evidence has long suggested...that, more often than not, the formal processes, even if 
ostensibly followed, differ -often significantly-from what actually happens in the field." (World Bank 1990c:5) The 
paper demonstrates that while "The levels of sophistication in Indonesia's irrigation infrastructure (hardware) and 
Indonesia's underlying principles of water management (software) are some of the highest, .in South and Southeast 
Asia...." at the same time, if any of the assumptions regarding planted area for different crops and crop stages, 
discharges, losses and timing of gate settings "are violated, the operational method is liable to error" (DMI 1987:E-2 in 
ibid:6). Under colonial rule such failures did not concern the sugar interests, but the rice only. The pasten system's 
function was securing water for sugar during a short annual period of water shortage, rather than saving water. 
69. E.g., Chambers 1982:20. 
70. Chambers 1982:20. Such examples seem only transplantable to large-scale, agency-managed systems, if the water 
saving system is acceptable to all farmers, and if the introduction is done through an intensive and serious effort by the 
managing agency. 
71. An exception may be trickle irrigation that has almost no flexibility at all. 
72. Verdier (1987) and Plusquellec (1988) have given good overviews of design options and related information 
collection, transfer and processing options (like remote controlled actuators and sensors, teletransmission systems and 
data processing by micro-computers) for more sophisticated flow regulation. Some engineers may feel these options 
should be introduced more widely without delay, because of its potential for water saving or service delivery 
improvements. This potential will not always be utilized, however. Such options seem to require an appropriate 
management and political environment, which is problematic in many systems (conform Chambers 1988:127). 
73. The term "slack" is used in this text, because the term is commonly used in management science. It refers to the 
phenomenon of preventing an information overload at higher hierarchical levels by reducing the required level of 
performance through adding additional resources such as physical infrastructure and water (see, for example, Galbraith 
1973). It is amazing, that though slack is a pervasive phenomenon in irrigation, the only irrigation professionals that 
seem to have used this term to date are Wade and Chambers (e.g., Wade 1980:157; and Chambers 1981:12). 
74. Farmers in rice-based system in Asia tend to prefer continuous issues to their fields. In practice, in systems designed 
for variable flows, such continuous issues represent also demand-driven allocation. 
75. In downstream control systems, hydraulic behavior of the flow thus replaces information. In upstream control 
systems the needs for information exchanges are often reduced by creating slack resources, i.e., extra water in the main 
canal. 
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76. Own observations; ANAFID 1990. Only, during peak demand periods, when the demand exceeds the main canal 
capacity, the duration of one scheduling period had to be extended from nine to twelve days, thus necessitating a 
somewhat more "modified demand". 
77. E.g., Barnett 1977; Levine and Bailey 1987. 
78. Moore 1987:21. 
79. Replogle 1986:131. 
80. Conform ibid: 129. 
81. In Sri Lanka this 30 1/s is assumed to be used simultaneously by two farmers. Apparently, engineers of the Indian 
colonial administration have introduced this 30 1/s mainly for reasons of convenience in their calculations (30 1/s is one 
cubic feet per second or cusec). 
82. Internalized modifications exist probably in most demand-driven systems. Accepting internalized modification as 
modified demand would mean that demand-driven in its pure form is non-existent. 
83. UMI 1989. 
84. See, for example, the operation and maintenance manuals of Kirindi Oya (AHT/SCG 1987) and Uda Walawe (MMP 
1986) and design manual of the Sri Lankan Irrigation Department (Ponradjah 1989). 
85. Measurement structures at the head of the main canal are only in exceptional cases allotted a function for [modified] 
demand-driven allocation. See, for example, for Gal Oya (Murray-Rust 1983). 
86. See note 74 of this chapter. 
87. Horst 1983a:26. 
88. ICID 1989:27. 
89. Steiner and Walter 1988:69. Operational procedures were divided in demand-driven and rule-driven. This is a 
structure-based division. It ignores the frequent non-functionality of rules and is a division between two theoretical 
extremes only. The combination of these three classifications into an operational typology adds little value to the 
individual ones, and its purpose remains unclear. 
90. Chambers 1988:126. 
91. Replogle 1986:124. 
92. Ibid: 124. 
93. Replogle has also used "schedule" somewhat different than in this text, because it referred to the schedule for a whole 
season, rather than a new schedule for every week, ten days or so. Flexible thus meant that the whole schedule could 
be changed during the season. This text uses flexible for the possibility to change the schedule regularly during its 
implementation, something which Replogle's terminology did not consider at all. These different definitions are of minor 
importance compared to the unique effort made by Replogle. 
94. Conform Chambers 1988:126. 
110 A MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE ON THE PERFORMANCE OF THE IRRIGATION SUBSECTOR 
95. ICH> 1989:30. 
96. See also, ANAFID 1990. 
97. Murray-Rust 1983. 
98. Replogle 1986:120. 
99. For example, in Kirindi Oya, Uda Walawe and many other Sri Lankan systems, and in Philippines. 
100. This problem was also explicitly recognized by the colonial administration in Indonesia (Numans 1916:342 in Ter 
Hofstede and Van Santbrink 1979:153). 
101. Nijman 1992a. 
102. Conform the following quotation of Chambers: "It is also not surprising that water control staff, in these 
circumstances, weigh up the situation, in the absence of countervailing incentives, decide to choose a quiet and perhaps 
modestly profitable life. The simplest course for them is to follow the policy of, to quote one observer: "You open the 
sluice and go to sleep"." (Chambers 1977a:108). See also Moore 1980:106; and Levine 1985:96. 
103. Wade 1982a:300. 
104. Ibid; The Economist 1991b. 
105. Own observations. This point is better not proved here. Neither does it have to be proved as most irrigation and 
development professionals know it. The author as well as many other professionals tend to refer to this incentive as, 
for example, the construction-biases of irrigation engineers. These biases are partly professional. To a major extent 
though they also relate to the overall priorities in irrigation agencies to do contracts, and to obtain funding for it. Read 
here for construction-bias thus contract-bias. Some brief references to the internal dynamics of this system can be found 
in later chapters. 
106. Chambers 1980:345; Wade 1980:A-111. 
107. While quite a few irrigation professionals are aware of such active resistance, only few have reported upon it. 
Repetto has been one of these few, as reflected in the following observation: "operators have reportedly opposed and 
circumvented efforts to publicize the operating rules and schedules of the system because publicity makes irregularities 
easier to detect and limits their discretion to reallocate water in exchange for favors." (Repetto 1986:25). Other examples 
of the few literature references of such explicit resistance by engineers exist for the Sudan (Barnett 1977:10), Sri Lanka 
(Murray-Rust and Moore 1983:293 in Chambers 1988:131), and Pakistan (Mohtadullah 1982:175). The latter has stated 
it for public enterprises in LDCs in general:"One reason is that we in the public enterprises ourselves like to leave things 
ambiguous for obvious reasons" (ibid). 
108. Murray-Rust and Snellen 1991:19. 
109. Radosevich 1986:476. 
110. Ibid:497. 
111. Maass and Anderson 1986; for Indonesia, Radosevisch 1986:497. 
112. Maass and Anderson 1986:372. 
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113. Murray-Rust and Snellen have recently argued that an agreed contract between agency and water user was an 
absolute necessity and minimum. They have even listed the minimum contents of such a contract (Murray-Rust and 
Snellen 1991:16). 
114. For example, Coward 1986:501. 
115. Maass and Anderson 1986:424. 
116. Murray-Rust pers. comm. 
117. For two weeks reduction per season, the related benefit-cost ratio could be as high as 192, provided that the water 
would be used for additional cultivation. The related benefits could be as high as a 3-month-salary-worth bonus to all 
employees, or a 12-month-salary-worth bonus to the water management related employees (Kikuchi in Nijman 1991:52). 
118. Levine 1985:94. 
119. Repetto 1986:30. 
122. Paerels and Eysvoogel 1926 in Ter Hofstede and Van Santbrink 1979:157. 
123. Ter Hofstede and Van Santbrink 1979:157. Some monitoring of the cultivation progress was apparently practiced 
in colonial Ceylon as well (Harriss 1977:369). 
124. EMI 1989:144. 
125. This seems to have been overseen or ignored by some writers on water pricing and metering like Moore 1987:20. 
126. Moore has made a mistake here by stating that smallholder irrigation systems, unlike electricity/domestic water 
supply systems, are not "demand scheduled" (Moore 1987:21). His argument that even Taiwan does not schedule 
volumetrically did not prove his point, only that Asian countries apparently have so far not introduced volumetric delivery 
and charging. Underlying reasons may have been, for example, that so far the economic, social and political pressures 
on water have not necessitated this, or because reliable volumetric charging is considered technically and/or managerially 
too cumbersome, or a combination of both. The Mediterranean countries have a longer history and more experience with 
scarcity and economizing of water, and thus introduced volumetric charging at an earlier stage. The increasing 
competition in Asia for water may lead to a similar scarcity value of water, and thus possibly to volumetric metering. 
127. Repetto 1986:30. If correct, this kind of research seems indeed one of the priority topics for irrigation management 
research. Repetto also argues that a kind of approximate volumetric pricing, and thus monitoring, is possible on the basis 
of the number of "turns" that farmers take or receive if some stability in flow rates can be achieved through design 
improvements. He quotes a project in Pakistan, Gujarat and some districts in Mexico where this system is apparently 
used (Repetto 1986:31). Moore does not agree with the examples, which Repetto used to prove that wholesaling of water 
did exist already. The Gujarat case is apparently a persistent myth, which reality and spreading were documented by 
Chambers. However, Moore does not elaborate on his objections to Repetto's Mexican example (Moore 1987:25). 
128. This was apparently the case with the proportional weirs in Indonesia (Ter Hofstede and Van Santbrink 1979). 
129. Chambers 1980:27; Moore 1987:26. 
120. Ibid. 
121. Ibid. 
130. Wade has found similar resistances (see also note 107). 
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131. This has been found also in, for example, India as follows: ""It may not be wrong that the areas are overstated 
because no one being really responsible...and no one would like to report figures which might cast a reflection of his 
performance." (Government of Andhra Pradesh 1982:22) 
132. On the other hand, Wade has reported on cases of positive water-related incentives through straightforward rent-
seeking in the water allocation. 
133. Levine 1985:96. 
134. See also Kirindi Oya where the efforts of a motivated individual were effectively neutralized by his colleagues and 
superiors (Nijman 1992a). 
135. Gunadase has described a good example of this in his case study of Sri Lanka's Kimbulwana system (Gunadase 
1989). 
136. Wade 1982b: 177. 
137. Chambers 1980:359. 
138. Nijman 1991. 
139. Their solutions to regulation problems are thus typically always in the form of other regulation structures or 
concepts, rather than a different practice for the operator. 
140. Unlike the other three studied countries, the Moroccan irrigation systems were rather heterogenous in their physical 
infrastructure and related management control systems. The generalized picture as given could still be derived, however. 
Also the Moroccan ICID committee has tried this in a recent publication on its capacity utilization practices (ANAFID 
1990). This publication is unique in that it is one of the only, if not the only, where managing agencies themselves have 
described and analyzed their capacity utilization practices. Unfortunately, also this publication has not described the 
managerial aspects of flow regulation. 
141. The following quotation suggests that the operation in India is probably quite similar : "The operation of the canal 
system, both the main canal and minors, occurs without specific regulation of discharge, elevation, timing or duration, 
and with no consistent criteria for decisions, record of water levels, nor any knowledge of the flow rate at any point in 
the system." (WMSP 1983a:33 in Chambers 1988:128) 
142. IIMI 1989. 
143. The informal part consisted in Rahad of an annual financial bonus paid by the Rahad Agricultural Corporation for 
services rendered by the individual main system managers (who were formally employed by the Ministry of Irrigation). 
144. The agricultural corporation was financially and otherwise powerful, because it effectively controlled a large part 
of the agricultural processing and marketing in the system. 
145. E.g., Nijman 1992a. 
146. Measured in Kirindi Oya (IIMI 1989) and observed for the United States (Replogle 1989:805). 
147. Despite the extremely complex hydraulic reality of this design concept, most designers tend to assume, rather 
dogmatically, that such canals are operated under steady flow conditions. A more pragmatic assumption for designers 
would be to assume that any gate envisaged in the design of a main canal, whether meant for purposes of operation or 
maintenance, introduces unsteady flow. And introduces thus a need for management inputs by higher level staff to get 
RESULTS: CAPACITY UTILIZATION 113 
it stabilized! 
148. On the other hand, it was observed that if farmers were dissatisfied with the arrangements, they could damage the 
gates of the modules rather easily, and thus obstruct the system management. 
149. See, for example, UMI 1989. 
150. Replogle 1989:806. 
151. Ibid. 
152. Ibid. 
153. Such systems are operational in France, Morocco and Greece. 
154. The only example of a management intermediate traced during this study was the practice of "timed gate operation" 
used on the California Aqueduct (Burt and Lord 1981:153). 
155. E.g., Malaterre 1989:18; Nijman 1992a:60. Also, in the main systems of Morocco's Basse Moulouya and Sudan's 
Rahad system, operators used such informal margins. 
156. Nijman 1992a:61. 
157. Moore 1980 in Chambers 1988:129. 
158. Cases of knowingly overloading of the canal while simultaneously spilling or draining at a downstream location were 
observed in Morocco's Basse Moulouya and in Sri Lanka's Kirindi Oya (Nijman 1992a). 
159. E.g., ibid. 
160. Consultants seemed to have often few realistic ideas about this flow regulation as well. In Uda Walawe, the water 
management consultant omitted this crucial issue completely in the operation and maintenance manual (MMP 1986 in 
Nijman 1991). In Kirindi Oya, the instructions and procedures proposed were highly theoretical and unrealistic, both 
in a managerial and technical sense (AHT/SCG 1989 in Nijman 1992a). 
161. Kampfraath pers. comm. 
162. The term "control" refers in irrigation engineering to the definition of a hydraulic control (see Annex 3). This is 
a confusing concept in an environment where management control is often more important than any physical control. 
163. Chambers 1988:182. 
164. Ibid:182. Chambers referred to contributions by Bottrall 1981a,1985; Kamalpuri 1986; Moore 1980, 1981; Pant 
1981; Ramamurthy 1986; and especially Wade 1981, 1982a, 1982b, 1984, 1985. 
165. For example, for Indonesia under colonial rule as follows: "...the water delivery at tertiary and quartenairy block 
level depends actually completely of the way the responsible person (the ulu-ulu) executes his task requirements, 
which can hardly be expected of rather little educated and lowly paid employees." (Haringhuizen 1931:351 in Ter 
Hofstede and Van Santbrink 1979:152). 
166. Conform Mohtadullah 1982:176. 
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167. Chambers 1988:206. 
168. Conform Chambers 1988:181. 
169. Chambers 1981:17. 
170. In the Philippines, each contract was observed to provide even a contribution to the agency's general overhead. 
This five per cent overhead on each donor-funded project was observed to be an important source of its income (see also 
NIA 1990). 
171. For example, such negative incentives underlied also the following remark by Bottrall: "Good water 
distribution...requires...a management system which will make it rational for officials to deny extra water to the more 
powerful and better located, despite the unpopularity and loss of 'unofficial income' this will entail." (Bottrall 1981a: 13). 
172. Chambers 1988:132. 
173. Conform Wade 1982a:302. 
174. E.g., UMI/DID 1990; UMI/BADC 1991. 
175. For example, Wade 1982b: 180. 
176. Chambers 1975, 1980:360; Kelley and Johnson 1989; and Development Finance Consultants (DFC) 1990:1.2. 
177. Easter and Welsch 1986:36. 
178. The scope for motivation of agency staff and farmers through mainly "negative" incentives like the enforcement 
of system-wide economic water use seems to be rather limited for the water allocation. In colonial settings, enforcement 
was usually translated in the disciplining of field staff and farmers (e.g., Indonesia and Sudan), but only in those 
situations where colonial commercial interests had to be secured or favored against water shortage. Nowadays, the 
effective dominance of such commercial interests versus individual farmers has weakened considerably, to the extent that 
the weakened discipline has caused most supply-driven allocation systems to shift to demand-driven. 
179. Levine 1985:98; Bottrall 1985:17. 
180. Chambers 1988:132. Also, similar findings in the TJda Walawe case study on the functionality of water 
management consultants and operation and maintenance manuals were fully supported by the involved consultant (MMP 
1990:14). 
181. Ibid; NEDECO 1979:1 in Ter Hofstede and Van Santbrink 1979:189; PRC 1982. 
182. Repetto 1986:10. Also Heaver has written extensively on this incentive structure (Heaver 1982). 
183. For example, Levine has criticized the World Bank's recent National Water Management Project and US AID's 
training program, both in India, for "leaving the questions of organizational and physical infrastructure changes to other 
programmes" and leaving the existing incentive systems untouched (Levine 1985:98). Only seldom these large donors 
effectively address performance related issues in their investment decisions, other than enforcing perceived needs (ibid) 
or solutions to solve these performance problems. 
184. Levine has observed this also in, for example, India (Levine 1985:99). 
185. See Nijman 1991. Also Chambers has reported on similar remarks (Chambers 1988:129). 
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186. Conform DFC 1990:11.2. 
187. Ignoring the cost effectiveness and efficiency of the following technological development, from an information point 
of view, it is, of course, very promising: computerized control with almost instantaneous information feedback and 
instructions, also regarding rainfall and water demand and levels. Such a system can achieve the highest levels of 
sophistication. 
188. Conform Levine 1985:100; DFC 1990:11.2. 
189. Only in Morocco such decentralization was seriously contemplated. There, the decentralized units were a number 
of distributary canals (DFC 1990). 
190. In principle, this section deals with all material and immaterial control systems and methods other than incentive 
systems and information systems. The latter two are discussed under the earlier sections on Human Resources and 
Provision of Information. In practice, only the most important management control system, the financial control, is 
discussed. In addition, Annex 4 discusses some systems that tend to be considered erroneously as management control 
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191. Duane 1986:6. The section on Feasible Cost Recovery from Beneficiaries of chapter 5 elaborates on this issue. 
192. Ibid:5. 
193. Some related proxy to volume can achieve the same effect. Examples are the length of time of delivery, the number 
of times the crop is irrigated, or the share of the variable water supply a farmer is entitled to (Small 1989a: 130). 
194. Small has mentioned another option, i.e., different service fees for different types of crops. Though he has added 
that the difference in water consumption of these crops is mostly too small to have a serious influence on efficiency 
(Small 1989a:129-130). 
195. Bottrall 1981a: 12. 
196. Moore 1987:26. 
197. Duane has generalized these findings to all LDCs (Duane 1986:7). 
198. Ibid. 
199. Small 1989a:133. 
200. Heaver has generalized this to the public sector in all LDCs (Heaver 1982:9). 
201. ANAFID 1990. 
202. Chambers 1988:127. 
203. For the Philippines, see also Wickham and Valera 1976:12. 
204. GOAP 1982:xviii. See also Ibid:22,31. 
205. See, for Morocco (DFC 1990:11.12); and for Sri Lanka (Nijman 1991; 1992a.) 
206. Levine 1985:100. 
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207. Many irrigation professionals tend to blame the lack of "output" orientation of irrigation agencies to unawareness. 
Many interviewed engineers were well aware of this, and were well aware of the related active resistance. See also note 
102. 
208. For example, for Indonesia (UMI 1989); for Sri Lanka and India (Chambers 1988:129); for Morocco (DFC 
1990:11.12). 
209. Wade 1982b:180. 
210. Burt 1988:37. 
211. Amongst others, Wade and Chambers have warned for the risk that such external audits become "part of the 
system" as follows: "They are, indeed, themselves liable to be part of the system, as instruments of political pressure, 
and may even make things worse. Who, may it be asked, is vigilant in overseeing Vigilance cells?" (Chambers 
1988:193). 
212. Moore 1980:6. This term well reflects the weak representation of the national interest by the states of most LDCs. 
213. Maass and Anderson 1986:366. Also under colonial rule, this control seems to have been quite different de-facto. 
See, for example, the following quotation on the British colonial administration in India: "The administrators at the top 
served the political ends of imperial rule and tried to distance themselves from village politics. The sub-ordinate 
establishment, on the other hand, was firmly rooted in the political economy and tried to consolidate its position by 
distributing water based on status, reciprocity, and bribery (Stone 1984)." (Ramamurthy 1989:43). 
214. Unfortunately, the slack involved in this limited control is usually ignored by engineers, and the designs of huge 
main systems usually ignore this organizational reality. 
215. Levine 1985:96. 
216. A "unit" refers to a (part of a) separate organization, or part of the same organization. 
217. Sundar, P.S. Rao and others. For example, P.S.Rao has warned against organizing WUGs in countries with 
"exploitative social structures" in (Jurriens, Bottrall et al. 1984:19). Gupta has critized the "naive view that farmers can 
form an association around a commodity like water which will not have conflicts between big and small partners." (ibid), 
and Khan the notion that the "human skills to co-operate and manage do not come naturally but have to be imparted." 
(ibid:20). 
218. Levine has remarked in this respect that the role of WUGs is determined on the basis of "a priori judgements rather 
than by analysis of potentials and trade-offs." (Levine 1980:15). 
219. Maass and Anderson 1986:366. 
220. Wade 1982b:181. 
221. Conform Frederiksen 1987:5. It is somewhat ironical to see that the World Bank initially pushed governments to 
adopt such an interventionist approach toward irrigated agriculture (e.g., DeLeeuw 1985:298), while at present they push 
them to disengage again. 
222. Ter Hofstede has quoted a letter of a Dutch consultant, NEDECO admitting that "the proposed management can 
work only if "we" supervise it permanently...and O&M long termer" (Ter Hofstede and Van Santbrink 1979:191). Even 
if this may be "the purest form of neo-colonialism" (ibid:192), as Ter Hofstede argued, it seems the only workable mode 
for a water-management consultant. Though only if the consultant becomes accountable to the water-delivery 
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performance. 
223. See, for example, page 103. 
224. Levine 1985:98; Heaver 1982. 

CHAPTER 5 
Results : Capacity Creation 
"The average congressman can re-dedicate the same dam for four or five consecutive elections. First, he 
dedicates the ground breaking. Then he dedicates the land purchases. Then he comes back and dedicates the 
flood abutments. And then he dedicates the flagpoles. A congressman's future in many parts of the country, 
as the saying goes, is written in concrete."' 
"The problems of professional bias are not limited to economists. Most practitioners are trained and must 
develop their careers within a particular discipline (engineering, agronomy) and this predisposes evaluators to 
see problems in sectoral terms . . .The whole tradition of technical assistance reinforces this tendency, since 
the assumption behind [technical assistance] is technical ignorance, and as soon as the problem is defined in 
these terms, the prescription of a sector expert follows naturally. The wrong definition of problems through 
approaches concentrating on sectoral/technical symptoms contributes to the neglect of management root 
causes. "2 
"Seckler's image of canals rolling up behind as new ones are rolled out in front then becomes a metaphor for 
the whole development administration. "3 
"When the King says it is midnight at noon, the wise man says behold the moon. "4 
THIS CHAPTER ATTEMPTS to provide an objective perspective in both diagnosis and therapy 
of the creation processes of irrigation capacity. Apart from providing an innovative perspective 
on capacity creation, this chapter identifies the related opportunities for improvement. 
The first step of the development of a management perspective in this chapter is the 
definition of the key decisions of the capacity creation (i.e., only for the strategic management, 
and not for the capacity management as explained in chapter 3 and on page 121). These key 
decisions are the desired objectives, the feasible objectives and the functional requirements of 
the investments. They are the basic orientation points of the diagnosis and therapy. This set 
of key decisions is already different from topics normally studied by most irrigation management 
professionals. 
For each defined key decision, the actual processes of decision making as they tend to 
occur in the case studies are described and analyzed. No comparative assessment of the levels 
of sophistication is given as the political nature of this decision making makes a quantitative 
comparison between different countries less appropriate. Instead, this chapter gives a broad 
quantitative judgement for the capacity creation based on the four criteria underlying the concept 
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of the levels of sophistication. 
The concluding parts of the chapter use these analyses and performance assessments to 
derive opportunities for performance improvement. Improvements are suggested in an 
integrated manner in terms of requirements for 1) the decision-making processes (step 3 of 
Figure 3 in chapter 3); as well as, 2) the management conditions (step 4). Chapter 6 discusses 
the related management-control decisions (step 5). 
Like in chapter 4, the case studies in Sri Lanka, Morocco, Philippines, Sudan, India, and 
Malaysia are the main basis for the generalized picture. These comparative case studies included 
interviews with numerous agency staff in these countries and with staff of two donor agencies, 
the World Bank and the ADB. As the findings of the two in-depth case studies appeared 
sensitive to some involved parties, this chapter refers more (than chapter 4) to similar findings 
in the literature or other formal documentation on the performance of investments in irrigation. 
WHAT ARE THE KEY DECISIONS FOR CAPACITY CREATION? 
Prerequisite for a focus on decision-making processes in this chapter is a very precise and 
mutually exclusive definition of what key decisions have to be taken for irrigation capacity 
creation. Capacity creation may involve new construction, rehabilitation and maintenance 
activities. For simplicity reasons all these activities are called here "capacity creation". This 
analysis focuses thereby more on investment in construction and rehabilitation than in 
maintenance, as described in chapter 1. In line with Kampfraath's definitions of management 
concerns, this group is divided below into two management concerns, the "strategic 
management" and "capacity management".5 
Strategic management covers three key decisions. The first is the determination of the 
the desired objectives for irrigation investments. The second is the matching of these 
desirable objectives with the resources available for investment, i.e., the decision on the 
so-called feasible investment objectives. And the mird is the determination of the 
functional requirements for the envisaged irrigation investments. These three are 
described below. 
Desired objectives. An irrigation investment always intends to achieve certain 
desirabilities. These are defined here as the desirable objectives. This definition of 
desirable objectives excludes their feasibility as such, which is per definition part of the 
key decision about the feasible objectives. 
Examples of the desirability for an irrigation investment, whether implicitly or 
explicitly stated, are such objectives as an increased agricultural production, the 
alleviation of poverty, the reduction of unemployment, the settlement of landless people, 
the appeasement of political supporters or geopolitically sensitive areas, the saving of 
foreign exchange through increased exports or reduction of imports, the sustainability of 
the environment, and the like. These desired objectives evolve from the related 
objectives of different stakeholders such as the national government, the politicians, the 
donors, the local community and the beneficiaries. 
Feasible objectives. As soon as these desirabilities are matched with the available 
RESULTS: CAPACITY CREATION 121 
resources, another key decision comes into the picture, i.e., the decision on the so-called 
feasible investment objectives. Resources can be of a financial nature, but may refer also 
to the staffing capacity and capability, or to different physical resources. Examples are 
such objectives as the area to be commanded (by irrigation water at a certain time), the 
different crops to be grown, the cropping intensities, the acceptable cultivation risks, and 
the predicted water-delivery performance. 
Prerequisite for the determination of the feasible objectives is the making of 
certain preliminary assumptions about the future functional requirements for the 
investments. In irrigation this is sometimes called the feasibility-level design. 
Functional requirements. Given the outcome of the decision making on the 
feasible investment objectives, further specifications of the functional requirements for 
the investments have to be set. Obvious examples are such straightforward requirements 
as the required water levels to command certain areas, and the required canals to 
maintain these water levels. Examples of more performance-related requirements are the 
required structures to control water flows and levels, the required storages to collect and 
store water from the catchment, and the required intermediate storages either for the 
collection of runoff, or the reuse of drainage water, or just an increased responsiveness 
at those locations. Also the required management capacities of agency staff and water 
users are part of the functional requirements. 
Capacity management is the management concern for the setting of the technical 
requirements for the investment. The functional requirements are thereby considered as 
fixed as they are per definition the outcome of the strategic management. Examples of 
technical infrastructure requirements are the different technical standards to be used such 
as the densities of engineering materials, the coefficients of expansion and shrinkage, the 
permissible concrete stresses, the seepage gradients and uplift or protection. Examples 
of technical staffing requirements are such requirements as the selection criteria and 
professional-development programs. 
Tendering of contracts for construction, rehabilitation, and maintenance is part 
of this capacity management. And so is the monitoring and adjusting of the actual 
acquisition of the irrigation capacity. 
This study does not discuss the processes of capacity management as it would also 
require detailed descriptions of the more informal processes of the creation of irrigation 
capacity. The detailed discussion of, for example, the mechanisms of corruption in 
construction and maintenance contracts, the political interference and nepotism in the 
hiring and firing of people are too sensitive to incorporate in this text. Especially, if the 
text is to remain acceptable and accessible to a wide audience. 
Planiung-Design-Utilization-Performance Interaction6 
The previous chapter's observations on the interrelation of capacity utilization and performance 
are an input for this chapter's analysis of the consideration of performance achievements in 
investment decisions. The planning and design decisions are thus evaluated here toward their 
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consistency with local management and performance experiences. The analyses of the few 
existing studies on planning-design-utilization have not integrated the actual decision-making 
processes. Instead, they usually related to the design and performance only, thereby implicitly 
assuming certain management practices. Assuming certain utilization practices implies 
simultaneously assuming certain functionalities of the design. Yet, the latter should be the 
outcome of the equation. 
DESIRED INVESTMENT OBJECTIVES : PLANNING-UTILIZATION INTERACTION 
This section gives a generalized picture of the actual decision-making processes in irrigation 
systems for one of the three basic orientation points of this chapter, being the desired investment 
objectives. 
Political objectives tend to dominate the desired objectives for irrigation investments. 
Sometimes these objectives are stated, but often they are not. The most relevant perspective for 
this study is to consider all these influences on investment selection decisions, whether stated 
or unstated. 
Stated Investment Objectives 
The following stated objectives were observed in the case studies: 
1. An increase of the national food production was an explicit objective of irrigation 
investments in all case studies, both for self-sufficiency in food production as for 
the production of cash crops. Similarly, Small has found this objective to be 
underlying irrigation development in many countries.7 
2. Providing7»od and income to subsistence farmers was an explicit objective in the 
case studies in the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Sudan. In Morocco, such welfare 
objectives were explicitly important only for two major irrigation development 
projects in the poorer regions situated in the South-eastern parts of the Atlas 
mountains. Also, such poverty alleviation has been reported as major objectives 
for irrigation development in India and Pakistan during the late 19th and early 
20th century.8 
3. In all case studies, the irrigation investments were complemented with other 
investments for regional development such as infrastructure, rural water supply, 
facilities for marketing and food processing etc. Often irrigation systems included 
land settlement. Much of the irrigation development in Sudan, Morocco and the 
Dry Zone of Sri Lanka were observed to pursue such regional development and 
land settlement. Similar objectives have been reported as major objectives for the 
irrigation development in the western USA.9 
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4. In the Sudanese case study, the government in addition pursued an increase in 
government revenues through its control over the agricultural production and its 
marketing. In several other African countries this is a well-known and explicit 
objective for irrigation development. Similarly, Small has reported this to be one 
of the two major objectives of irrigation development in India and Pakistan during 
the late 19th and early 20th centuries.10 
5. In all case studies, the donor documents also mentioned the saving of foreign 
currency through import substitution as an important reason for the irrigation 
development. 
6. Another objective of the governments and the international development banks 
was their desire to make a "decisive move" in achieving the above objectives, 
though this objective was not always that explicit.11 This objective implied a 
preference for capital-intensive investments, i.e., large investments in a relative 
short period.1 2 
Unstated Investment Objectives 
At least as important as these stated objectives for irrigation investments were the unstated 
objectives. Though this can be said for most development investments, it appeared to apply even 
more to irrigation investments given their political visibility and their capital-intensive nature. 
The following unstated objectives for investment in irrigation were observed in the case studies: 
1. Political and geo-political objectives. Recipient governments are almost always 
pursuing political and geo-political objectives with irrigation investments.13 Also 
in all case studies such objectives could be observed. Sometimes these were 
stated, but mostly they were not. For example, in the Sri Lankan case studies the 
handing out of irrigated land to political supporters was observed to be a 
dominant objective of irrigation investment. Geo-political motives were observed 
to be important for the case studies in the Philippine Allah system and the 
Moroccan Basse Moulouya. 
Many literature references to such objectives exist as well. For example, 
literature references have demonstrated the frequent geo-political backgrounds for 
projects in Africa and Asia.1 4 Similarly, a recent task force of most western 
donor governments (to evaluate the effectiveness of aid) has reported that most 
donor governments tend to pursue either geo-political or their own interests, 
rather than the purely "altruistic" suggestion implied in the word aid. 1 5 Apart 
from these geo-political motivations, several researchers have remarked that 
investment objectives in irrigation "normally have a political background".16 
Just like politicians in developed countries tend to perceive that dam projects "win 
votes", 1 7 they tend to do so in LDCs. 
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2. Rent-seeking. In all case studies, rent-seeking was observed to be a dominating 
incentive for considering irrigation investments desirable. Apart from personal 
financial gains, the irrigation agencies as a whole benefitted financially from large 
irrigation investments. They were observed to benefit either 1) through payments 
of a regular overhead to the supervising agency; 2) through all sorts of 
investment-related facilities such as cars, per diems, buildings, and training funds; 
or, 3) through the reduced necessity for recurrent investments (strengthening 
again the tendency to defer maintenance). The last two benefits applied to the 
investments of all observed irrigation agencies, including the semi-private 
irrigation corporations in Morocco and the Philippines, as none of them had to 
repay (a part of) the capital costs of the investments. The first benefit was 
observed for the Philippine National Irrigation Administration (NLA) that earned 
a 5 per cent overhead on all externally-funded projects. Such overhead gave them 
an additional interest for investment through projects over recurrent investments 
from their regular budget.1 8 In addition, NIA was observed to benefit from the 
bank dividend on such funds.19 Even national governments seem to be rent-
seeking if they use the available foreign exchange for irrigation investments for 
relieve of balance of payments problems.2 0 
In all case studies, the irrigation agency appeared a comparatively 
powerful agency. Researchers have also remarked that the lobbies of irrigation 
agencies worldwide were traditionally very powerful and effective in securing 
projects.21 
Though references to personal financial gains are sensitive, some examples 
in the international literature generalizing about the existence of such incentives 
in the irrigation subsector are the following: 
"Because water supply decisions are largely made in the political arena rather than in the marketplace, 
there is great incentive for special-interest groups to obscure the real issues involved in government-
subsidized water projects and to exploit public romanticism for "making the desert bloom even as the 
rose", thus obtaining public support for their own financial gain."22 
"...in a political environment where politicians are interested less in long-term development goals than 
in the disbursement of short-term material benefits to those who support them, the consistent political 
commitment to irrigation investment. . .needs explaining . . .the answer has something to do with the 
way in which irrigation investment does provide an abundant stream of short-term material benefits 
able to be profited from by politicians and state officials."23 
The high subsidies on irrigation investment, and related horse-trading, 
have also been reported to have inevitably bred corruption in rich countries like 
the USA. 2 4 In LDCs, the checks and balances on corruption are per definition 
much weaker—or themselves incentives for corruption--, and organized corruption 
has thus more potential.25 
Comparatively little documented is the size of this skimming of irrigation 
investments for personal financial gain. The few figures available and 
observations for this study suggested percentages between 30 and 70 per cent. 2 6 
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3. Engineering prestige. Another observed objective underlying certain irrigation 
investments was the prestige of the irrigation agency to build a huge dam, canal 
or system. For example, in the Sri Lankan case studies such objectives appeared 
important. 
Besides the above, the following unstated investment objectives were observed to be relevant for 
development investments in general: 
4. Policy reform. Increased influence and leverage of donor organizations on the 
recipient organization and government to adapt better policies were observed to 
be important objectives of any development investment for the international 
development banks. References and internal documents of development banks 
have remarked this as well. 2 7 To further increase such influence (or leverage), 
the international development banks have introduced such funding techniques as 
the "carrot and stick" mechanisms in their sector and subsector loans. The latter 
provided the government with more freedom in resource allocation in return for 
the simultaneous introduction of certain policies. 
5. Fund-channeling from rich to poor countries.28 Fund-channeling from rich to 
poor countries was observed to be an important objective of the international 
development banks, and of their investments. In combination with all above 
reasons, this fund-channeling function of donors led often to supply-driven 
investment decisions. 
Supply-driven investment selection, or a bias for investment "quantity", 
can easily lead to, and was observed, to conflict with the "quality" of the 
investment decisions. As quality and quantity are important concepts in this 
chapter they are elaborated upon here. 
"Quality" is used in this text as an image for the quality of the investment 
decisions, both for the substantive and managerial quality of the decision. A 
higher quality of the investment decision means that it envisages a realistic level 
of the water-delivery performance of the agency staff, that it envisages a realistic 
level of maintenance, that it envisages a realistic level of service fee collection, 
and that it is likely to be functional during its lifetime. 
The quality of the investment decision is not the same as its performance. 
The performance of capacity creation decisions are the effectiveness and 
efficiency of taking decisions about the feasible objectives or the design as such. 
The cost-effectiveness and cost-efficiency of the investments are not part of the 
performance of the capacity creation decisions, but are part of its quality. The 
quality of the investment decision has a direct influence on the performance of the 
capacity utilization through its influence on the capital and recurrent costs. This 
image of quality is used as the opposite of "quantity" that is often used as the 
image for the fund-channeling function of the donors of development aid. 
Also an Expert Group on the evaluation of the effectiveness of aid on 
behalf of the Development Assistance Committee (i.e., the Joint Ministerial 
126 A MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE ON THE PERFORMANCE OF THE IRRIGATION SUBSECTOR 
Committee of the Board of Governors of the World Bank and the IMF) has 
identified in 1984 the bias for investment quantity as a serious threat to the 
quality of investment decisions.29 And two World Bank documents have 
admitted, though somewhat implicit, the World Bank's bias for quantity in the 
early 1970s, and the related risks for quality of investment decisions, as follows: 
"For the Bank, [1968-1980] was a period of ambitious growth in lending, driven by a humanitarian 
concern with poverty alleviation . . .It was perhaps inevitable, for both borrowers and the Bank, that 
many of these outcomes would be difficult to predict and plan for."30 
"...the very range, nature and objectives of Bank lending in the 1970s raised the risk of failure".31 
Irrigation investments seemed thereby a privileged solution for the international 
development banks. Several interviewees of national governments and donors suggested that a 
lack of alternative opportunities for large-scale, capital-intensive investment in many LDCs cause 
the supply-driven investments in development to turn often to irrigation. Irrigation lends itself 
well for capital-intensive investment either as large-scale new construction or rehabilitation 
projects, or as packages of small-scale systems in a short period of time. Some researchers have 
suggested that the professional backgrounds of important staff in donor organizations also 
contributed to irrigation as a "privileged solution" for development.32 
The Observed Management Processes 
Decision taking on the desirable investment objectives was often observed to be done single-
handedly by national politicians. Usually, donor staff in consultation with consultants and 
agency staff prepared such decisions. The preparation of such decisions usually left little time 
and room for manoeuvre for participatory processes with other interest groups. Moris and 
Bottrall have found a similar picture of decision taking.3 3 
Politicians often determined such politically relevant aspects as the site identification and 
the selection of beneficiaries. The political pressure thereby caused the professional guidance 
sometimes to become ineffective or rather one-sided. This was observed, for example, in the 
Sri Lankan case studies for the selection of site and beneficiaries. There, the determination of 
the dam site was based on an engineering rationale, against the interest of both local and national 
community. Also Moris has reported such one-dimensional biases for the site selection for 
Kenya's Bura scheme as follows: If professional guidance for site identification was available, 
it was often based on "the assumption that a site that was attractive from an engineering 
standpoint was the main requisite for a successful project design. As the Bura case illustrates, 
knowing the 'solution' in advance made it unnecessary to learn about local soil conditions, 
existing resource utilization, optimal crop combinations, or farmer's interests. The commitment 
to irrigation occurred before local costs and impacts could be evaluated, and continues despite 
adverse experience.1 , 3 4 
The acquisition of external funding was observed to be the prevalent political and agency 
priority. It dominated the other desired objectives, other than those of political importance. As 
a result of this priority for external funding, the donor agency had, in principle, and in practice, 
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a large influence on the determination of the desirability of the remainder of investment 
objectives. Thus, the desirability of such investment objectives as the project size and the 
performance of the water delivery and agricultural production was largely at the discretion of 
the donor staff or consultant in all case studies. 
As a result of this priority for funding, also the interests of farmers and other local 
interests, were unlikely, and were observed not, to be adequately represented in the decision 
making on the desirable investment objectives.35 Often the desirability from the farmers' 
perspective was considered equal to the maximum funding level as the funds were perceived as 
"handouts" to localized voters. Bottrall has generalized this latter phenomenon for LDCs, while 
Laycock has described such attitudes for irrigation investment in the USA. 3 6 
Uncoordinated watershed development resulting from political dominance of this decision 
taking was observed in Morocco and Sri Lanka. A politically relevant location for a new 
upstream reservoir resulted thereby in a reduction of the water supply to an existing downstream 
reservoir. Obviously, these were not very desirable investments from a local perspective. Yet, 
most interviewees considered such political priorities as absolute, not withstanding possible 
institutions for watershed planning. 
In combination with the fore mentioned supply-driven availability of financial resources 
for irrigation investment, such politically dominated processes and related attitudes worked 
against less capital-intensive, more effective investments in, for example, water management and 
conservation. This applied to all case studies. Sheridan has described similar processes and 
consequences for the USA, while Repetto and Moore have generalized them for LDCs. 3 7 
Though the major gap in this decision making seemed the observed absence of an explicit 
definition of the desired performance levels for the new investments. The widespread and long-
established experiences with ineffective capacity utilization in irrigation made this absence even 
more amazing. Even if donors, government or consultants were aware of the unlikeliness of the 
assumed performance improvements for a specific system or project, they were observed to 
ignore them in the investment considerations. Assumed performance targets of irrigation 
investments were always kept implicit. Bottrall has found this as well. 3 8 
The likely commitment of such stakeholders as the national politicians, government and 
agencies to such implicitly defined performance targets is almost nihil. The more so given the 
lack of incentives to achieve them, while ample incentives were observed to relate to the 
acquisition of new investments (in an environment with abundant availability of financial 
resources for irrigation investment, as described before). In all case studies, the commitment 
of staff of the national planning, irrigation ministry and irrigation agency toward performance 
improvement was observed to be almost absent. The widespread underutilization of irrigation 
capacities in the past does not seem to have led to a stronger conditionality toward the 
performance of sequential investments. The underlying reason was described above. 
The donor-driven decision-making processes sometimes led to cases where the 
desirabilities of donor and recipient were conflicting. And it sometimes led to investments that 
the involved national stakeholders such as the government or the agency considered undesirable. 
A reputed example is the repetitive investments in the rehabilitation of earlier disappointing 
investments with cycles of 15 year or less (vide also Seckler's quotation at the beginning of the 
chapter). Such iterative rehabilitations often served merely the cover up of a disappointing 
economic viability of the preceding investments. The related internal donor justification 
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processes thereby were observed to have a tendency of creating their own momentum of 
investment desirability. This was observed in both Sri Lankan case studies. Frederiksen has 
made generalizing statements in this respect.3 9 
INVESTMENT FEASIBILITY ASSESSMENTS : PLANNING-UTILIZATION 
INTERACTION 
This section provides an insight in the decision making on the chapter's second basic orientation 
point, the feasible objectives for investments in the irrigation subsector. Such objectives tend 
to be determined during the feasibility and appraisal phases of the project cycle of investment 
decision making. Most aid donors and recipients use this project cycle. 
Feasibility assessment relates to the economic feasibility and the national investment 
opportunities. Besides, it relates to the technical, managerial and political feasibilities of the 
underlying assumptions. Examples of underlying assumptions are the parameters of the 
investment's physical performance such as the available water resources, the irrigation 
requirements, the size of the command area, the water-delivery concept, and the cropping 
patterns, calendars, intensities and yields. Other important underlying assumptions are the 
recurrent costs and the related life span of the investments, the cost recovery and the 
implementation schedule. This section analyzes all these aspects of the feasibility assessment. 
Available Water Resources 
The available water resources are a basic input for the feasibility assessment of an irrigation 
investment. They are also a major factor of its technical feasibility. 
Yet, irrigation agencies often appeared to treat the hydrological data for feasibility 
assessments rather nonchalant. Partly, such assessment appeared based on inadequate data due 
to the hurry to get loans processed. In some other cases, their assessment was biased toward 
project feasibility. The latter was observed in the Sri Lankan and in one Philippine case. The 
size of the overestimation in one Sri Lankan case was between 40 and 60 per cent. 4 0 
Others have observed the overestimation of the available water resources as well, and it 
seems therefore systematic. For example, Chambers has suggested its endemicness as follows: 
"Less water entering systems or captured by them than planned is probably common."4 1 Also 
several evaluation reports or publications have mentioned individual examples of disastrous 
overestimation—though seldom of underestimation. A committee of the government of Andhra 
Pradesh (GOAP) has reported overestimations of 53 per cent in South India.4 2 An impact 
survey by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in nine Philippine irrigation systems has found 
that in six systems the river flows appeared less than expected due to inadequate and/or 
unreliable hydrological data during project preparation.43 And the following comment of a 
World Bank division on the conclusions of four impact studies in Philippines and Thailand has 
generalized the insufficiency of data in its feasibility assessments, and provides also an 
impression of the related pressures: 
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"The 30% shortfall between planned vs. actual river discharge is likely the consequence of inadequate data. 
The Bank/borrower has often pushed projects (and still does) before the basic resources were adequately known. 
And hydrological measurements with 15 to 25% error, as well as, far too short periods for collecting 
hydrological records have been accepted in the rush to begin work . . .The cost to Bank projects of an 
insufficient data base is a matter that should be flagged by [the Operations Evaluation Department]. It's ignored 
repeatedly by the Bank."44 
Despite the frequent overestimations, the studied agencies, governments and donors were 
not observed to set criteria for the required dependability of the water availability for certain 
regions or countries. These criteria were left to the involved specialists. Also, if a water 
balance was made, the related likely number of crop failures was seldom stated explicitly. 
Overall, the assessment of available water resources tended to be done in an 
unprofessional and nonchalant manner. Yet, major mistakes in the hydrological data had serious 
and direct implications for an investment's feasibility. They resulted in water shortages, or no 
water at all for parts of the system, and the related wasted investments. 
Some interviewed Sri Lankan and Philippine engineers remarked that for certain projects 
the hydrological data were manipulated consciously and considerably to fit project feasibility. 
Also Chambers has referred to the occurrence of "deliberate falsification to overestimate water 
supplies", and has quoted two Indian examples described by Wade. Also in Wade's examples 
pushing politicians had prompted the overestimations.45 Such incidents demonstrate again the 
strength of the pressures on the involved decision makers to comply with the priorities of the 
agency, the politicians and the donor (vide, for example, the above quotation of the World Bank) 
to realize the pursued project funding. 
Physical Performance Assumptions in Feasibility Assessments 
Several assumptions in feasibility assessments relate to the expected levels of service delivery, 
or the water-delivery performance. Examples are the feasible levels and magnitude of the 
irrigation requirements, the command area, the cropping intensities, and the cropping pattern and 
yields. These are crucial assumptions for investment feasibility as they are core determinants 
of the investments' output and benefits. 
Level of service delivery, irrigation requirements and efficiency. Sequential feasibility 
and appraisal assessments in 1977, 1977 and 1986 in Sri Lanka's Kirindi Oya system were 
observed to show departures from local performance achievements of 86 per cent, 9 per cent and 
56 per cent respectively. No justifications were given in 1977 for the probability that an 86 per 
cent performance improvement would be reached in the planned system. No reference to, 
neither justification for, the sequential variations were given in the appraisal reports as well. 
Observations in the other Sri Lankan and one Philippine case study were similar. (In the other 
case studies in the Philippines, Morocco and Sudan, no such detailed observations were done.) 
Thus, these observations suggested a systematic, unjustified overoptimism of the assumptions 
of the water-delivery performance. The level of assumed improvements in feasibility and 
appraisal reports were thereby kept implicit. 
Other comparative studies have shown similar overoptimistic assumptions. Most relevant 
generalizations are the comparative studies of project performance audit reports (PPAR), and 
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the impact studies of irrigation investments. During the last decade, several such studies were 
undertaken. Some of those that included a comparison of the planned and achieved irrigation 
requirements and efficiencies are cited hereafter. 
A proper understanding of the figures in this chapter though requires a short qualification 
of "achieved". In a project audit report "achieved" refers to either the moment of project 
completion, or one or two years after it. Yet, in a project impact study, "achieved" relates to 
at least five years after project completion. Of course, the figures of the latter type of studies 
are more relevant for evaluation purposes. 
Comparative World Bank audit studies in a number of South Indian systems have found 
systematic overestimations of water efficiencies, and thus of investment benefits, of 50 per cent 
to 100 per cent. 4 6 An evaluation study of the US Department of Agriculture in nine major 
systems (i.e., new irrigation projects in Asia, Africa and Latin America), has found shortfalls 
in the actual irrigated area with an average of 33 per cent.4 7 Similarly, the Commission for 
Irrigation Utilisation of the Government of Andhra Pradesh (GOAP), India, has found in 11 
studied systems underestimations of the actual requirements of between 19 per cent and 83 per 
cent.4 8 
In all case studies, peak demand was observed to be underestimated. Others have 
observed this as well. A World Bank staff member, for example, has remarked on South Indian 
irrigation that "the duties adopted . . .have not only been optimistic but have tended to reflect 
average water needs rather than peak requirements ("the trap of averages")".4 9 Also, the Study 
Team of the Consultative Group of International Agricultural Research (CGIAR)-investigating 
in 1982 the need for an international institute specialized in irrigation management-, has 
generalized this as follows: "Canals are often of inadequate capacity in relation to peak 
demand."5 0 
The first ADB impact survey of irrigation investments was in ten major and five 
communal Philippine irrigation systems. It has shown actual irrigation efficiencies of around 
35 per cent against planned efficiencies of 65 per cent, or a difference of almost 50 per cent. 
Also, an average shortfall of the irrigation coverage of 40 per cent was found in the same 
systems,51 while "in all cases it was concluded that appraisal estimates of project-induced 
production were overoptimistic".52 
The next ADB impact study in 1990 on 12 other projects in different countries has even 
acknowledged the systematically theoretical nature of this feasibility assessment: "In the past, 
design assumptions, including conveyance efficiencies, were seldom based on actual assessments 
of local capacities to operate the systems, and were generally too optimistic."53 
The only similar impact figures compiled by the World Bank so far, have found that 
actual water efficiencies in nine studied systems in Mexico, Morocco, Sudan, Colombia, 
Philippines and Thailand were on average 69 per cent lower than those estimated at appraisal.54 
The reports on Morocco and Mexico have generalized "a tendency in the Bank to make over-
optimistic projections as regards water use efficiency".55 
Cropping patterns, calendars, intensities and yields. In the Sri Lankan case studies, the 
cropping patterns were based on the requirements of the economic feasibility, rather than on 
their actual feasibility, and even after such unfeasibility was proven. (In the other case studies, 
the cropping patterns were not studied.) Assumptions about cropping intensities of an unrealistic 
200 per cent for Sri Lanka's Uda Walawe system implied improvements of 64 per cent in 1979 
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and 38 per cent in 1984. Likely improvement through the investments appeared less than 20 per 
cent. For the Kirindi Oya system the assumed improvements were of a similar magnitude (i.e., 
up to 200 per cent) compared to the average achievements. Also for these assumptions the level 
of assumed improvements in feasibility and appraisal reports were kept implicit. No related 
justifications could be observed. 
The following quotations from three paragraphs of the first ADB impact study of 
irrigation investments give an impression of the reliability of such assessments: 
"The [Project Evaluation Missions] concluded in all cases that appraisal targets of production were 
overoptimistic. "With project" estimates were lowered by 8 . . .and 17 percent. . ., while "without project" 
estimates were raised by 40 per cent and 44 per cent. . .apparently [Project Evaluation Missions] were quite 
optimistic about the future since . . .less than one-half of the revised incremental production targets had at that 
time actually been achieved . . .The sharp upward revision of "without project" production targets was . . 
.intended to correct a consistent downward bias in appraisal estimates of yield per ha without the project."56 
Comparative studies have shown the assumptions on cropping intensities to be just as 
heroic as those of the irrigation requirements and efficiencies. For example, the fore mentioned 
long term impact studies of the World Bank have made the following observations: "The 
cropping intensity was lower than projected at completion in 18 projects (about 85 per cent) . 
. .the average cropping intensity of the sample was 106% at the time of impact evaluation, 
compared with 135% and 146% expected respectively at the time of completion and 
appraisal."57 Similarly, an impact evaluation by the European Economic Community of 11 
African projects has found that all, except one, assumed at appraisal a cropping intensity of 200 
per cent, while the average achieved by ten of them was only 110 per cent.5 8 Again, a World 
Bank report on the recent impact evaluations has blamed this tendency of the operations' 
divisions of the donors to overestimate yields and cropping intensities at appraisal, and even at 
project completion, for the disappointing achievements.59 
Several studies have suggested even a neutral or negative impact of irrigation capacity 
creation on cropping intensities, though they were not quantified. For example, Diemer has 
remarked that, for example, the Senegalese government by constructing infrastructure additional 
to the existing village irrigation, it attained, in practice, the reverse result, i.e., a reduction in 
the cropping intensity compared to the pre-construction situation.60 Similarly, unpublished 
results of the ADB impact study of 1986 have also found unchanged and reduced cropping 
intensities in several studied systems.61 Also in India, cropping intensities have been said to 
remain unchanged or to decrease sometimes after the creation of the irrigation "potential".62 
On the other hand, it is unlikely that the underutilization is really that large. Though, 
it remains difficult to assess due to the observed tendency to manipulate virtually all assessments 
of the benefits "with" and "without" the project. 
Another, more technical deficiency observed in this feasibility assessment was the 
omittance of the probabilities of the available water resources in the assumed cropping 
intensities. For example, an 80 per cent probable water resource obviously requires a 
diminution of the likely cropping intensity with 20 per cent, but this link was not made in the 
Sri Lankan case studies for example. 
Also cropping patterns and yields were observed to be manipulated in the Sri Lankan case 
studies to make the projects economically feasible. The following three quotations from the 
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report of a government commission in India suggest that overestimation through manipulation 
of cropping patterns is even easier than for water efficiencies: 
"The Irrigation Department has been planning irrigation projects on the basis of a designed cropping pattern 
to give a favorable benefit cost ratio."63 
"The Commission has not been able to investigate the rationale behind some of the rules issued on localisation 
. . .No one examined by the Commission has been able to throw any light on the rationale of all these decisions 
or for the deviations from these principles in actual implementation. All these rules and actions appear to be 
highly arbitrary and inequitable and have resulted in large scale indiscipline amongst the farmers who though 
within reach of the water at upper reaches were denied any share in the water as the localisation policy 
preferred the tail-enders to the total exclusion of the top enders in some cases. The assumed cropping pattern 
adopted only to achieve a favorable benefit cost ration was so unrealistic that the farmers did not adopt it."64 
"The "design cropping pattern" of the Irrigation Department serves only to determine the water demand for 
designing the capacity of the irrigation canals, and estimating the benefits from irrigation. "It bears no 
relationship to actual cropping patterns adopted by the farmers from time to time according to various 
constraints and compulsions . . .the Agriculture Department has not been able to perform its legitimate role in 
the development of irrigated agriculture and the Irrigation Engineers continue to function in the same manner 
as they used to, before the Department of Agriculture was created."65 
Carruthers has indicated that cropping patterns are often fixed at an early stage of the project 
preparation as the input for many calculations. The required iterative planning is usually not 
done, according to him. 6 6 
The above Indian government commission has also observed that the farmer that seemed 
to them "the best judge to decide which crops are suited for the soils in his holding", was 
typically "not at all consulted in the matter of the cropping pattern".6 7 Tiffen has observed that 
although this cropping pattern has a major influence on the farmers' income, feasibility 
assessment procedures of the World Bank and others do usually not assess the farmer's likely 
income.6 8 Or, they consider it subordinate to the income impact for the national economy.69 
The relative impact of the manipulation of cropping patterns on the total underutilization 
is more difficult to estimate in a generalized way than for the irrigation efficiencies, intensities 
and yields. In one case, it has been calculated for 11 projects in South India to have caused 
between 10 per cent to 55 per cent of the total underatiUzation.70 
The mechanics of the over-optimistic performance assumptions. All the above 
comparative figures and facts elucidate that feasibility assessors were generally not at risk for 
overoptimistic assumptions. On the contrary, they seemed often encouraged to make them. The 
mechanics of this process are described hereafter. 
The importance attributed to theoretical concepts about crop water requirements and 
related "possible" irrigation efficiencies was observed to facilitate partly the above systematic 
over-optimism about feasible performance targets. The mentioned Indian government 
commission has observed this as well. 7 1 Consequently, these concepts have made irrigation 
efficiency a controversial and confusing issue. 
The theoretical concepts on crop water requirements were developed in the early 1970s. 
Since then they were much researched upon and applied for project planning and design.72 
Levine has published as early as 1977 the following criticisms on the neglect of the "human 
factor" in these conceptual definitions of irrigation requirements and efficiency: 
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"(1) Our knowledge of the interrelationships between water and plant growth far exceeds our knowledge 
of the inter-relations between water and the human element in delivery and utilisation: in other words, 
irrigation engineers face the same social problems, as say, veterinary surgeons. 
(2) The efficiency concepts used in irrigation system design tend to understress the human component as 
a factor in water use crop production. 
(3) Irrigation systems, on the one hand, and the farmers they serve, on the other, have criteria of optimal 
efficiencies of water use which may not coincide. When they are far apart there is friction between 
the system and the farmers and/or between the farmers. 
(4) Within the resources available to the farmers and to the system, the operational optima for both parties 
can be brought closer together by effective liaison, e.g. feedback and response mechanisms. 
(5) As a result of (1) to (4) above, it is usually better for the irrigation engineer to 'recognise' probabilities 
initially and strive, through reasonably acceptable change, towards possibilities."73 
Many others have made similar remarks about the theoretical formulae since that time. 7 4 Yet, 
despite these efforts, efficiency estimates during planning and design continued to rely mainly 
on theoretical formulae rather than on Levine's recommended no-nonsense "probabilities" and 
"possibilities". 
This persistent use of theoretical efficiencies, against the odds, was observed to be less 
a matter of coincidence, than of complicity of the different involved actors. The frequent 
references to the over-optimistic nature of the assumptions already suggest this. "Over-
optimistic" implies a tendency to be more optimistic than justified. Some interviewed 
professionals in Sri Lanka and the Philippines confirmed their awareness during the 1960s and 
1970s that the new scientific estimates of irrigation requirements and water efficiencies were 
much lower than the traditional gross estimates, though the related modern design concepts 
would not necessarily lead to such maximum efficiency. More recently, a senior official of Sri 
Lanka's Irrigation Department has remarked during an HMI seminar on the Kirindi Oya case 
study that the "major reason we do not measure actual seepage and percolation values is 
political; not one project would be feasible."75 Some interviewed engineers and donor staff in 
the other case studies voiced similar arguments. And almost all interviewed donor staff 
acknowledged off-the-record the hypothetical value of the performance assumptions. 
Explicit references to this complicity of decision makers are few. An exception is 
Heaver's description of the decision-making processes up to Cabinet level for Sri Lanka's 
Mahaweli project.76 The Commission for Irrigation Underutilization in Andhra Pradesh, India, 
has been very explicit in, for example, the reference of page 131, as well as in the following: 
"At present the area to be irrigated is being decided on the basis of a rough assessment of the proportion of the 
black soils and red soils in the project command area . . .The proportion of wet and [irrigated dry] is being 
decided on an ad hoc basis, keeping in view broadly the localisation pattern in the earlier projects. This 
proportion undergoes changes in an arbitrary manner to achieve the desired benefit cost ratio for the 
schemes."77 
Yet, implicit references are almost as many as the papers on irrigation undemtilization. Also 
the small number of impact evaluations done until the mid-1980s (i.e., despite the widespread 
disappointing utilization of irrigation capacities) seem to demonstrate more than pure 
coincidence.78 
The persistent theoretical assessment was observed to have a major impact. The 
justification of a high physical performance and high investments in any system was observed 
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to be a typical consequence of this persistent use of the theoretical assessment of project benefits. 
This appeared possible for the national agency, donor staff and consultants even for a system 
like, for example, Uda Walawe, that was nationally, and even internationally79, reputed for its 
weak management. There, although the basic cause for failure of an earlier investment was 
explicitly recognized as weak management, the government, donor and consultants could respond 
with a purely physical rehabilitation to pursue the original water efficiency targets.8 0 Such 
reasoning seems possible up to the present. 
Another typical consequence of the theoretical assessments was that recipient governments 
and agencies obviously have never felt any commitment to achieve performance estimates that 
were set in such a supply-driven mode. The following quotation of a senior staff member of 
the World Bank reflects this: 
"A recent review of 30 audits by the Bank's Operation Evaluation Department revealed that most project 
agencies were not prepared to undertake system operation after completion of construction . . .Some project 
analyses have indicated that more attention to O&M could easily add at least 10 per cent to the amount of land 
capable of being irrigated with existing systems."81 
The earlier quoted government commission on Andhra Pradesh, India has made similar 
statements.82 
Feasible Maintenance and Related Life Span of Investments 
The sufficient availability of maintenance funds is the key assumption for the justification of a 
certain feasible life span of irrigation investments. The availability of sufficient funds for 
maintenance was observed to be problematic in all case studies (like it is for almost all public 
sectors in most LDCs). Despite this, the observed donors typically assumed a feasible life span 
of 50 years for new construction and of 30 years for a rehabilitation. An over-optimistic life 
span would increase the prospects for an investment's economic feasibility, though its influence 
is minor compared to the influence of the other factors discussed in this chapter. 
Yet, in practice major rehabilitation of the downstream development of many irrigation 
systems is often necessary approximately every 15 years. Some recognition of the highly 
unrealistic nature of the assumed levels of maintenance funding has recently gained influence 
williin some donor organizations like the ADB. 8 3 
The typical approach of appraisal missions to circumvent this questionable assumption 
seemed the explicit discharging of the related responsibility84 to the national government in the 
so-called loan covenants on O&M budgets and cost recovery. The interviewed donor staff and 
government officials tended to designate these loan covenants as a "ritual" justification as both 
sides were well aware that many of these covenants would not be complied with for all sorts of 
reasons (see also the next section). Reviews of the World Bank and ADB of the compliance 
with such covenant have observed similar attitudes.85 
The fore mentioned problematic nature of the availability of maintenance funding as such 
was observed to have three reasons. First, the recurrent budget problems of the responsible 
governments in general were an important reason. Secondly, it was due to the government's 
incapability to ensure that the few available money was really, at least partly, spent on 
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maintenance. Howell has argued similarly, and so did a discussion during an IIMI/World Bank 
seminar.86 And thirdly, the available project- or sector-based funding for rehabilitation and 
maintenance also encouraged it. Also this argument has surfaced during the IIMI/World Bank 
seminar.87 
The feeling of development professionals that "Maintenance is commonly deficient in part 
because engineers, civil servants, and donors find investing in new schemes more attractive."88 
has in recent years led to more project-based and sector funding for maintenance. This seems 
a simplified and short-term solution as it solves the first problem, but not the second; the lack 
of control on effective utilization of the recurrent budget is likely to remain a dominating factor. 
Thus, the present sector loans, essentially meant to solve the first reason in the short-term, do 
not tackle the second reason, and are likely to worsen the first point in the long-term. 
Several senior officials of the World Bank have argued in the past that the lousy 
construction quality~an implicit reference to corruption-is the major determinant for the 
deficient maintenance.89 Though construction quality was often low, a good construction 
quality is unlikely to replace fully the need for maintenance funds. In Sri Lanka and South 
India, where the actual available maintenance funds were observed to be not much more than 
the money for the salaries of the operational staff, an improved construction quality is unlikely 
to solve all maintenance deficiencies.90 Besides, as follows from the third reason above, the 
same corruption and non-commitment causing low construction quality is likely to cause low 
maintenance quality as well, if the money were available. 
Feasible Cost Recovery from Beneficiaries 
More than any of the other investment-related issues, the issue of cost recovery in irrigation was 
observed to be extremely complex and a subject of controversy within the World Bank, and 
between the studied development banks and its borrowers. A World Bank review of its 
experiences with cost recovery has remarked this as well. 9 1 The following citation from this 
review confirms this study's observations in all case studies, except the Moroccan, of the related 
disappointing experiences: 
"Overall, the cost recovery record in irrigation projects has not been good. Frequently, the Bank's requirements 
as expressed in loan covenants, particularly with respect to recovery of investment costs, have been so vague 
that compliance or non-compliance is difficult to determine. In at least two-thirds of the projects reviewed the 
covenant requiring that cost recovery satisfy O&M funding has not been complied with. The proportion of 
O&M costs recovered was frequently between 15% and 45%. In addition, there were very few cases where 
capital costs were recovered."92 
Similarly, Repetto has stated that the average cost recovery in irrigation projects in a sample of 
countries in which the World Bank invests in irrigation was only 7 per cent of project costs. 
(He also remarked that usually the treasuries collected them rather than the managing 
agencies.)93 
In contrast to such low figures, the donors and recipient governments were observed to 
have spent considerably more efforts in enforcement of the cost recovery of irrigation 
investments and recurrent costs (i.e., O&M funds) through service fees than in any other quality-
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related aspect of the decision making about the capacity creation. The origins and intentions for 
this seem to have been the implicit assumption that irrigation agencies would thus be provoked 
to operate as public utilities.94 Until a recent policy change in the World Bank, this cost 
recovery issue had apparently become over the years an ideological issue at Board level9 5 in 
the World Bank. This caused the World Bank's continuation of the enforcement of cost 
recovery and its comparatively large efforts to make it more successful,96 despite the 
widespread skepticism of its feasibility and functionality among staff of the World Bank and the 
recipient governments. 
Such skepticism was observed to relate to political, managerial and even technical 
constraints to cost recovery. Technically, service fees are only useful for performance 
improvement if the water delivery can be measured volumetrically. This was only observed in 
the Moroccan case studies. Moore, Levine and Wickham have generalized its absence for Asia, 
the continent with by far the largest area under irrigation.97 Managerially, the usefulness of 
service fees for "efficiency" purposes seem to depend also to a large extent on the degree of the 
financial independence of the managing agency; as long as the budgetary allocation by the 
government remains important, the incentives to make serious efforts for improved service 
delivery seem limited. Increased financial independence, in its turn, appeared controversial in 
Morocco, Philippines and Sudan, and beyond imagination in the Sri Lankan case studies. In 
all case studies, governments and politicians seemed to prefer a high level of central control. 
Duane has generalized this for all LDCs. 9 8 
Most important source of resistance to the introduction of service fees was observed to 
be political, especially in the Asian case studies. This political resistance appeared to have such 
different backgrounds as the government's welfare policies (e.g., in India and Sri Lanka), the 
strategic subsidizing of the local food production (e.g., in Malaysia), the government's indirect 
or direct tax income through levies on, for example, land, crops and fertilizers (e.g., in the 
Philippines and Indonesia). Despite such an explicit difference in priorities, the international 
development banks "continued to invoke in its legal documents the need for stronger recovery 
efforts."99 
Most interviewed staff of donors and governments remarked the symbolic interaction in 
this respect. Similarly, the recent reviews by the World Bank and the ADB of the compliance 
with such loan covenants have remarked the inadequacy of the dialogues between government 
officials and bank staff and the whole preparation of the formulation of loan covenants. Thus 
no mutual agreements evolved, according to the reviews. So, despite the loan covenants, the 
reviews have found the prevalence of a lack of abiding commitment of the recipient governments 
toward cost recovery. 1 0 0 
A demonstration of the little serious nature of such dialogues is the problems faced by 
the fore mentioned World Bank review to figure out at all if governments had complied with 
loan covenants or not. The following citation reflects this: 
"Most of the covenants on investment cost recovery were quite general, with nearly half of them containing 
wording pertaining to recovery levels such as "as much as is practicable" or "a reasonable portion of capital 
costs". Some merely stated that a study should be undertaken to determine what should be done. There were 
very few cases where significant capital costs was recovered. Nonetheless, in view of the wording of 
covenants, it is not possible to state categorically that these covenants were violated."101 
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Not amazingly, this World Bank review of compliance in 48 irrigation systems had to confirm 
"the conventional view that covenants are seldom enforced, often relaxed and sometimes 
ignored." 1 0 2 
The cost recovery issue shows a centralized, directive type of decision making in the 
major policy-making development institution, the World Bank, without an accountability for the 
related performance consequences. It shows the substantive influence of a dogmatic perception 
of the Board of Governors of the World Bank on actual investment decisions and policies in 
recipient countries, even against widespread negative experiences and skepticism of its own staff. 
The observed consequences of such centralized, directive decision making were a waste of 
efforts by its own staff and of the recipient governments to implement policies with little 
relevance for project performance. Even worse, it seems to have diverted for a long time the 
attention and efforts from the real performance-related issues. Duane, a senior staff member 
of the World Bank, has made the following, similar observations: 
"...such a notion-that irrigation finance can mimic the public utility model and obtain some of its benefits 
without the necessary institutional reform-has had three consequences. First, it has delayed the proper (Bank) 
recognition and enforcement of stronger, more direct covenants that Borrowers should finance O&M properly, 
without regard to sources of revenue. Second, it has obscured the need to interpret and apply Bank policy on 
overall recovery (concerning O&M and capital costs) according to the varying motives upon which Borrowers 
base both their support of public sector irrigation and their recovery of associated costs. And third, it has 
fostered a myth that inadequate O&M is somehow the fault of inadequate cost recovery. Given the institutional 
arrangements that are typical for public irrigation, poor O&M reflects simply the low priority accorded by most 
Governments and their irrigation agencies to O&M relative to capital expenditures for new projects."103 
Only after approximately two decades of pushing cost recovery, the World Bank has 
abandoned it after a process of gradual policy changes. Only in the mid-1980s, the World 
Bank's focus in cost recovery made a first shift away from the perceived functionality for the 
economy of the resource allocation. It was a shift toward cost recovery to obtain maintenance 
funds. 1 0 4 More recently, the World Bank has decided finally that service charges would only 
be necessary if wanted by the recipient government itself. To make the interaction with 
governments on policy issues like the cost recovery more effective, the donors increasingly try 
to have so-called policy dialogues that are in principle less tied to a specific project or loan. 1 0 5 
Fortunately, the persistent and dogmatic pressure from top levels of a major development 
institution of an issue like cost recovery has ultimately moderated itself toward arguments from 
real-life. Yet, the cost recovery issue has shown the very centralized nature of such 
development bureaucracies, as well as the big time gap between feedback on the quality of the 
interventions and some related accountability. Such type of directive operation has important 
drawbacks for developing far-away countries, and seems to bring along high risks of retarding 
local processes and opportunities. 
Feasible Investment Cost and Implementation Schedule 
Assumptions about the feasible investment cost and implementation schedule have a major 
influence on an investment's economic feasibility. 
The observed discrepancy between planned and actual performances was also observed 
138 A MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE ON THE PERFORMANCE OF THE IRRIGATION SUBSECTOR 
for the implementation of the investment projects and the related costs. In all case studies, 
considerable time and cost overruns were observed. In the observed Sri Lankan Kirindi Oya 
system the cost and time overruns were as high as 104 and 100 per cent respectively. Two 
important publications on irrigation and development respectively have made the following 
generalizations that delays of project implementation and cost overruns are more rule than 
exception: 
"Irrigation projects probably suffer neither more or less from problems in construction phase than other civil 
engineering problems. Evaluations [including non-official World Bank and US AH) confidential reviews] reveal 
that almost all irrigation projects suffer from delays and cost overruns. The regularity of both occurrences 
makes the coincidence of planning forecasts and actual construction duration or cost a remarkable matter for 
congratulations, even astonishment. Perhaps it is time to review the assumptions on these issues in project 
appraisals. It is estimated that realistic cost and time assumptions might take 5-10% off the internal rate of 
return to projects."106 
"Three near-universal aspects of the execution of irrigation development are time delays, cost overruns, and 
under-funding of key components . . .An obvious inference from this experience is that at the appraisal stage 
planners should be much less sanguine in their assumptions about implementation and the immediate impact on 
production, especially where projects are large and complex."107 
Carruthers thus suggested these completion delays and cost overruns to apply to almost 
all development projects, and not just to irrigation. Project audit data of two major donors 
compiled since then, and given below, support his observation. 
In the period 1974-1988, 88 percent of all 1,627 evaluated World Bank projects were 
found to have an average time overrun of 69 per cent. 1 0 8 Implementation delays for all 313 
evaluated ADB projects between 1973 and 1989 were observed to average 72.5 per cent. 1 0 9 
Similarly, in the period 1974-1988, 63 per cent of all 1,778 evaluated World Bank 
projects were found to average a cost overrun of 37 per cent, while the remainder had an 
average cost underrun of 18 per cent. 1 1 0 An Indian government committee has investigated 
64 dam projects and has found average cost overruns of 108 per cent. 1 1 1 Average cost 
overruns of all 313 evaluated ADB projects during the period 1973-1987 were found to average 
41 per cent, though since then average cost overruns have decreased considerably to averages 
of 0.6 per cent and minus 18 per cent for 1988 and 1989 respectively.112 (The latter reduction 
is interesting, and is discussed hereafter.) 
Despite such high time and cost overruns, all observed donor appraisal reports typically 
assumed a maximum of one year delay in project implementation, and 10 per cent cost overrun, 
and, in the best case, a combination of the two. Such practices in contrast to the (long) available 
evidence, show again the institutional tendencies to give priority to quantity above quality. 
Overoptimistic assumptions were again the major cause for the time and cost overruns. 
ADB's annual review of post-evaluation reports for 1989 has implicitly recognized this 
tendency toward overoptimism by recommending to "make further improvements in estimating 
realistic and achievable time schedules with due consideration to historical trends". 1 1 3 Apart 
from an implicit recognition of overoptimism, the following remarks in a note on the 
effectiveness of feedback of post-evaluation results in irrigation projects have shown some 
attempts of the ADB to curb this tendency: 
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"More careful project preparation has resulted in more realistic estimates of the required implementation period. 
Compared with the average actual implementation period for post-evaluated irrigation and rural development 
projects of 7.2 years, the average estimated implementation for the eleven recently approved projects took 5.9 
years. This was a distinct improvement over the average appraisal estimate of 3.9 years for post-evaluated 
projects in irrigation and rural development.""4 
ADB's explicit attempts to relate the envisaged time schedules to historical trends was 
the only observed systematic check in the scanning of the whole feasibility decision making for 
this study. Although it is likely that the ADB has implemented a similar check for cost overruns 
some years earlier. The likely reason that the ADB has introduced such checks only for cost 
overruns and implementation delays seems that those two aspects of the feasibility assessments 
were probably considered more a donor-determined than the investment's benefits and 
performance. 
Economic and Financial Feasibility 
So far this chapter addressed most assumptions underlying the economic feasibility, the main 
criterion for investment selection by donors and governments. These assumptions are also the 
basis for an investment's financial feasibility. The difference between the economic and the 
financial feasibility assessments lies in the different attribution of particular costs and benefits. 
In the economic analysis the so-called "transfer costs" such as taxes and subsidies are not 
considered real costs. Yet, for the financial analyses these are included as real costs for the 
involved individuals and organizations. Besides, the use of so-called shadow prices in an 
economic analysis neutralizes the distortions of the market prices. This section examines and 
generalizes the decision-making processes on both the economic and financial feasibility of 
irrigation investments. 
For the feasibility assessment different methods can be used such as the cost-benefit 
analysis, the net present value (NPV) and the economic internal rate of return (EIRR). The 
latter is used most frequently. The EIRR has an advantage over the NPV in representing the 
purely economic feasibility as the former is neutral toward the scale of a project, while the latter 
is higher for a larger project.1 1 5 
Economic feasibility. Just like for the underlying assumptions, the gaps between 
appraisal estimates of the EIRR and the reestimated EIRRs at project audit were found to be 
significant in general, and to be systematically lower at project completion and audit than at 
feasibility and appraisal. Figure 8 displays the average gap of all World Bank projects approved 
between 1968 and 1980. 
The actual picture is likely to be even worse as the existing impact studies have shown. 
More relevant than the EIRR at project completion or audit (i.e., at most two years after 
completion of the new construction) are the World Bank's few long-term impact evaluations 
(i.e., at least five years after the completion) of irrigation investments. These studies have 
suggested this gap to be even wider than represented in Figure 8, as described in the following 
quotation from the study: "The unweighed average EIRR was re-estimated at 9.3%, or 
respectively 53% and 63% of appraisal and completion projections."1 1 6 Also the following 
generalization in a recent annual report of the World Bank's Operations Evaluation Division has 
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suggested the gap to be wider: " . . .although only a few impact evaluation reports are available, 
compared with the number of audits, the preliminary findings of several of these reports show 
that the EIRR tends to decline, rather than rise, in the years after operations are completed."1 1 7 
Other donors and governments have experienced similar gaps. For example, an EEC 
impact study has found that only one of 11 African projects had an EIRR above the appraisal 
cut-off level of 10 per cent, while four had even negative EIRRs. 1 1 8 
Also two other observed forms of manipulation are likely to make the actual level of the 
EIRR of the investments even lower. These were the "without benefits" and the sunk costs. 
Though it was an important distortion in Sri Lanka's Kirindi Oya system and the Philippine case 
studies, the under-estimation of the "without" project benefits seemed little documented. In 
contrast, many professionals have generalized the frequent neglect of the sunk costs in 
investment decisions. For example, a senior World Bank staff member has published the 
following two strong generalizing statements on its neglect for the rehabilitation of irrigation 
systems: 
"Sunk costs are a wonderful mechanism to generate high rates of return and justifying pouring more money into 
a disastrous situation—and a good diversion from addressing the real problem—institutions. And combining this 
mechanism with an imagined, glowing future for the project, one can have repeated rehabilitation projects on 
the same site-ongoing work for all—until bankruptcy . . .But it is not fair to the nation or the farmers. 
Undertaking involving much more sophisticated O&M —airlines, railroads, electrical supply, municipal water 
are found in these same countries under these same conditions. We should not allow anything less in irrigation 
and drainage when project upgrading is considered or .new projects is undertaken."1" 
"Rehabilitation project proposals often demonstrate extremely high rates of return, citing sunk cost as though 
a project virtue-but with no mention of the initial loss or that there is really no reason to believe that it will 
not happen to this investment too . . .The shocking fact is that the vast majority of these works in need of 
reconstruction were recently built. Many are only 20 years old. Some are only five years old. Numerous have 
been partially rebuilt three times in the past 25-30 years. How this incredible situation incurring huge costs 
evolved, how the responsible agencies can continue to hide it, and how institutions of every type can continue 
to ignore are baffling. Its a "King's New Clothes" situation. The implications for future food production are 
and for future demands on funds is frightening!"120 
Despite irrigation's widespread underperformance, its average EIRR at audit is one of 
the highest in the whole development business.1 2 1 A possible explanation is following. 
During the droughts and famines of the 1960s and 1970s rice prices increased far beyond the 
wildest expectations, and thus probably beyond the appraised estimates. This may have reduced 
the average gap between the EIRR at appraisal and at audit in comparison to other development 
sectors. 1 2 2 
Financial feasibility. Tiffen has reviewed the most influential donor guidelines123 on 
their consideration of the financial viability of investments for the individual farmers or their 
households. The manuals for feasibility assessments in agriculture and irrigation developed for 
LDCs appeared to give much less attention to this aspect than similar manuals for developed 
countries. According to Tiffen, if requirements toward this financial viability existed at all, the 
typical requirement was that: 
"the project provides attractive incomes to the farmers, although low objectives are set for this—the projected 
net cash income should not be lower in any year than it was before the project (thus disregarding the fact that 
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irrigation typically requires much more work on the part of the farmer and his family)."124 
Directly related is the for this study observed tendency to assume the "without" project 
opportunities for labor, soil, and even the resource water, at zero. While these zero 
opportunities were incorrect even from a national perspective125, they were very incorrect for 
the project's individual beneficiaries or participants. 
Figure 12. Gap between appraisal and audit ElKRs of all World Bank projects, by year of approval, 1968-80126 
Rate of Return (%) 
According to Tiffen only guidelines developed for the USA and Europe have considered 
it essential to deal with private profitability: 
"before making the profitability calculation from the national standpoint. They suggest that farmers will look 
for double or treble their present cash income if they are to be induced to make the necessary complementary 
investments and to utilize fully the water provided. They include the calculation of the financial viability of 
the operating organization where it is an independent legal entity, as it often is in Europe."127 
Yet, only in the Philippine case studies an assessment of the financial viability of the managing 
agency was observed to have occurred.1 2 8 
Some Remarks on Missed Opportunities 
This chapter's analysis of the feasibility assessment looks at the matching of the desired 
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investment objectives with the available resources. The availability of resources for the irrigated 
subsector depends, in principle, on their opportunities. This section considers these national 
opportunities of the resources used for irrigation investment. 
Although the EIRR is expressly presumed to assess the national opportunities of the 
invested money, it appeared incapable to do so due to its systematic misuse. One type of misuse 
was observed to be the non-consideration of alternative investments in actual practice. Also 
Tiffen has delineated convincingly that alternative opportunities for the investments are seldom 
compared at national level: 
"The ability to compare unlike projects is one of the chief theoretical benefits of the EIRR. It should make it 
possible for a government to decide whether to put its money into a road or a factory or a dam. Actually, it 
is seldom so used; each Ministry typically compiles its own projects. Theoretically again, it should enable a 
Ministry to decide which of several projects is the most desirable. Actually it is likely that only one major 
project is studied in detail at a time, except perhaps in the case of a river basin study. More usually, therefore, 
the EIRR or [Net Present Value] is used to decide if a project reaches or exceeds the target currently established 
for project adoption."'29 
Instead, the donor's cut-off rate of the EIRR at appraisal (usually 10 per cent) is meant to set 
a theoretical opportunity for the investment. Yet, the other type of misuse was the in this 
chapter described manipulation of the underlying assumptions. And the latter made the EIRR 
incapable of assessing the national opportunities for the investment funds. 
For both types of misuse the lack of political stability seemed an important determinant 
for the lack of consideration of the national opportunities. It was observed to reinforce short-
term interests at the expense of national interests. Also a senior Indian planner, quoted hereafter 
by Repetto, has observed this: 
"There is also a tendency for political power centres to view and demonstrate their performance in terms of the 
number of projects they are instrumental in getting approved and started, irrespective of whether the projects 
are sound and irrespective of the number which can be effectively implemented within the overall resource 
constraint."130 
Similarly, an interviewed top-level Sri Lankan civil servant acknowledged that the loans were 
considered grants for 80 per cent, and that it was thus their objective to acquire maximum 
foreign funding. Such attitudes suggested that the national interests were thus wasted for 80 per 
cent from the very beginning. Simultaneously, it showed the difference in stated rationales of 
the donors and the recipients. Yet, given their coinciding interests for fund-channelling their 
functional rationales were analogous. 
The influence of this political instability was not confined to irrigation investments, but 
seemed to apply equally to the entire national planning. The World Bank's head of development 
planning has acknowledged this as follows: 
"Probably one of the best early reviews of the theory and experience of development planning is found in the 
two volumes edited by Faber and Seers (1972)...They also indicated that the conventional approach to planning 
assumed existence of political stability, of economic certainties, of political will and of administrative 
capabilities to carry out the plans. Needless to say, these assumptions [are] seldom obtained in most developing 
countries . . .the need to move away from the concept of planning as aimed at producing "plans", and towards 
visualizing "planning as a process".131 
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According to Cassen, many LDCs either do not even have a planning unit at all, or have formed 
it only recently.1 3 2 It thus appears that no accountability exists for the performance of 
development investments. Repetto has formulated this as follows: "The main problem is that, 
unlike in private investment decisions, neither financial responsibility nor the need to repay 
capital invested in projects imposes a check against inaccuracy and bias in the projected 
returns." 1 3 3 
Thus, although the international development banks have stated to be against subsidies, 
the precise result of the lack of a national interest and of manipulation of the economic feasibility 
assessments was a huge hidden subsidy to irrigation investment. These have allowed major 
investments that only few people had to judge a necessity for development.134 Especially, in 
countries like India mat spent huge portions of the national budget on irrigation, the wastage of 
national opportunities seems immense. 1 3 5 
The Observed Management Processes 
Decision preparation about what was feasible and what not, was observed to be mainly the job 
of donor staff and consultants. Although in some cases, the preliminary investigations were 
done by the national irrigation agencies. The data collection of such prek'minary investigations 
was observed to be usually very basic. A request for external funding, whether or not after such 
preh'minary investigations, led in all case studies to decision preparation and taking on the 
feasibility assessment by donor staff or consultants. The involvement of the national agencies 
tended to be limited to the provision of data required for the theoretical approaches of different 
disciplines involved in the project preparation. Though often external consultants also did such 
data collection. 
Although preliminary investigations could sometimes take several decades, in other cases 
they were completely omitted. The feasibility assessments in most case studies were observed 
to take less than six months, though in some cases they were done either iteratively or in parts. 
The investment appraisal assessments by the funding agency that typically followed such 
feasibility assessments were observed to take less than a month. The latter usually relied fully 
on the data collection by the feasibility assessment. Both feasibility and appraisal assessments 
were done mainly by donor staff and consultants. 
Supply-driven investment decisions. In all case studies, the feasibility and appraisal 
assessments were observed to occur after the decision to undertake the project. The different 
steps and methodologies served merely to justify the decision. Several publications have 
generalized this justifying mode of the feasibility and appraisal assessments for irrigation and 
other development investments.136 In all case studies, the overoptimistic assumptions were 
usually caused by the manipulation of data that underlie these assessments. Several publications 
have generalized this manipulation of data for irrigation and other development investments.137 
Also a World Bank evaluation report on 1065 operations approved in the period 1968-1980 has 
indirectly acknowledged such manipulation as follows: 
"As reported in the past, there is a continuing large difference between forecast and re-estimated BRRs . . .the 
findings emphasize the importance of using realistic assumptions in the analysis of returns."'38 
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Performance targets for the investments were set implicitly during this feasibility decision 
making. They were not justified and tended to be entirely donor-driven. Not surprisingly, the 
commitment to, or even awareness of, these targets by the staff of national government and 
agencies was very low to zero. 
Incentives to overoptimize. Many professionals have noted that since the early 1970s 
capital was less a constraining resource in the development business, than the availability of 
good projects. 1 3 9 This caused probably the non-calculation of the ELRR of capital-extensive 
investment alternatives (that were observed to be much higher in the Sri Lankan case studies, 
for example). 1 4 0 Donor staff were at the time apparently "desperately keen" 1 4 1 to find 
projects. If they could not find them, they were reproached to be a "negative thinker" or 
"unrealistic", designations nobody was likely to pursue. 1 4 2 De Leeuw has been one of the few 
to give a detailed description of the resulting processes for his case study of Kenya's Bura 
system. The case studies and observations underlying this manuscript showed the same 
pressures and resulting processes to be still at work. A bias for investment quantity was 
observed to dominate this decision making. Many interviewed staff of agencies, donors, 
governments and consultants confirmed this bias for investment quantity in their assessments. 
Several major evaluations of development aid have generalized this bias for investment quantity, 
and some of its consequences for the quality of the investment decisions.1 4 3 
For example, Cassen has written a consultant report to evaluate the performance of 
development aid for the Development Committee (the Joint Committee of the Boards of 
Governors of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund). In that report he has 
explained in the following excerpts how this bias for quantity has become internalized in most 
funding organizations as the major drives for their staff: 
"There is a strong incentive for the staff of donor agencies to 'get the money lent'. In part this results from 
a creditable wish to get things done—after all, that is what the agencies are there for; but it can also reflect a 
civil servant's aversion to having his budget reduced because money was unspent by a particular date. And 
there is a widespread belief that, during the rapid expansion of aid budgets in the 1970s, officers' promotion 
prospects were strongly influenced by the volume of lending they managed to initiate. The DAC gave this 
phenomenon a name, 'the fund-channeling function', and identified it as a serious threat to project quality.144 
The danger from it is clear—bad projects may be identified as suitable for support, or projects may be too big 
to be effectively implemented."145 
"lust as the performance of the Agency itself is measured by its ability to spend the funds allocated to it, so too 
is the performance of its individual staff members . . .There is no incentive to be innovative since innovative 
projects, as a rule, require more time to plan and implement than do run-of-the-mill activities."146 
"Another major problem identified in much evaluation experience is the influence on the quality of aid of the 
pressure to commit funds . . .Problems only arise if quantity is the enemy of quality. At almost every stage 
in the processing of a loan, staff in donor agencies have incentives to ensure the loan is made. Career 
incentives from project staff to senior management are on the side of quantity. So is the annual budgetary 
process, and its requirement that funds in a given department be committed at the end of the fiscal year on pain 
of facing budget cuts next year. Obviously, these factors are strongest when an agency is going through a 
period of major and rapid expansion."147 
...It is unlikely, and not obviously desirable, that agencies will abandon annual budgeting for rolling 
budgets. Nor will career structures be designed in which promptly discharged responsibilities for making loans 
will dwindle in their influence on promotion prospects. Nor will officers be kept at the same desks right 
throughout evaluation cycles, which may be of ten years or more . . .Apart from improving the information 
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flow (see above), the problem can be tackled in two ways: weakening the effect of the quantity incentives or 
strengthening the quality incentives 
...Agencies vary in the extent to which they can escape the inflexibility of annual budgeting processes. 
In some, the scope is considerable. Within budgeted amounts, departments can shift lending among countries 
and projects, even among years in certain cases. It helps in this process to have a 'shelf of projects to be taken 
up if obstacles are encountered in parts of a lending programme. 'Accordion' projects, which can be enlarged 
to take on additional components without loss of quality if funds permit, can also help to use additional funds 
effectively."148 
There were observed to be several reasons that the decision preparation about an 
investment's feasibility was mainly the job of donor staff and consultants. Sometimes they were 
considered more "independent" than staff of the recipient country or agency, in other cases they 
would prevent likely delays in loan disbursements. Yet, apart from their fore mentioned bias 
for quantity, it was observed to be very difficult, if not impossible, for them to determine the 
true feasibility of an investment, especially of the assumed performance improvements. 
Recipient agency and government staff tended to represent vested interests to realize the funding, 
and were unlikely to provide any information counteracting these interests. Even in the few 
observed cases where they were willing to do so, 1 4 9 they were usually not asked to by their 
superiors, or donor staff or consultant. So the coinciding interests of donors and recipient 
governments encouraged the manipulations. Also the assessment experts and donor staff, who 
were driven by their organization's targets, appeared not interested in an absolutely neutral 
feasibility assessment. The following description by Goldsmith et al. fits well the involved 
interests observed for this study: 
"Expertise is as saleable a commodity as gold. The old adage that 'he who pays the piper calls the tune' is as 
apt today as when it was first coined. Indeed, the record of industry generally is littered with examples of 
cover-ups in order to justify the marketing of products which are unsafe or suspected of causing harm.150 
Always and everywhere, an 'independent' expert is on hand to tell the public what industry would like it to 
hear. Nor should that surprise us. Like everybody else, the scientists and consultants who work in industry 
are ruled by everyday concerns - the mortgage, the need to provide for a family, the fear of failure and 
criticism. They know that promotion is not won by rocking the boat and that there is little profit in gaining the 
reputation of a trouble maker. Is it any wonder, then, that many are tempted to cut corners and 'believe the 
best' for the sake of their companies and their careers?"151 
No accountability for the quality of investment decisions. In view of the consequences 
for both the quality of investment decisions and the commitment to performance, one wonders 
how it is possible that staff of national governments and major donors can continue to justify 
such over-optimistic assumptions? Staff of national governments in all case studies were 
observed to lack effective criteria in this respect as the political priority went for the acquisition 
of foreign funding for the pursued irrigation investments. Also the observed funding 
organizations appeared to have no effective mechanisms for judging the quality of a feasibility 
assessment, i.e., to balance the tendency to be over-optimistic.152 For both parties, 
quantitative targets appeared to overrule such quality-related issues. 
To a certain degree the manipulation of data about the underlying assumptions to justify 
investments that get priority from an organization's top management tends to occur in many 
organizations. For example, Galbraith has generalized this tendency for profit 
organizations.153 And Dyson generalized the difficulty to present probabilities, risks and 
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uncertainty to senior management during the processes of investment selection.154 Still, the 
size and systematics of its misuse in development investment would have made it logical to 
introduce some related checks and balances. Yet, the absence of such checks and balances was 
manifest in the case studies where large departures from local performance achievements and 
considerable variations between sequential assessments were observed. The quotation from the 
first ADB irrigation impact study on page 131 showed a similar picture. 
Donors were observed to be rather passive toward the quality problems of its investment 
decisions. Although the international development banks must have known since their early days 
about the "natural bends" of planners and the related consequences (see also Figure 8), they 
were observed to have undertaken remarkably little "to minimize or at least counterbalance some 
of the tendency to be overly optimistic". Levine and Wickham have generalized this. 1 5 5 
Typical in this respect was the remark of an interviewee that it would be interesting to study the 
donors' starting up processes of projects as they seem somehow unable to stop the ball after it 
has started rolling. Others remarked that when an identification or feasibility mission goes out 
for the first time, the decision to do the project has usually been made already. A publication 
by a former World Bank staff member has generalized this. 1 5 6 
Also to date, the observed donors appeared to abstain from requirements about the 
explicitness and justification of performance assumptions. Only in the ADB, a few recent 
improvements were observed. ADB's Post Evaluation Office was observed to have explicitly 
recommended that appraisals make reference to "technical performance and practices in similar 
irrigation systems in the area." 1 5 7 Though this recommendation was apparently not 
followed.158 In the World Bank, the only observed check on performance-related assumptions 
consisted of a "peer review" by colleagues who were supposed to criticize unrealistic 
assumptions. Also there, the final judgement on the feasibility seemed dominated by the 
quantity interests in the bank's operations divisions. 
The observed development banks seemed to have also a peculiar vision on the 
performance of its investments. A convincing example was the following excerpt from a World 
Bank's internal judgement that its loan and credits projects were its most successful, while 
simultaneously remarking that they lacked insight in the actual loan and cost recovery as follows: 
"Even for credit and irrigation projects, which have been the most successful types of projects 
supported by the Bank, their long-term viability could be threatened by poor loan and cost 
recovery." 1 5 9 As long as development banks can get away with such judgments, then it may 
be true that "rigourous evaluation is generally not in the short-term interest of the operating 
authorities of the aid donors." 1 6 0 
The evolving picture of irrigation investment is a replica of the reputed plot between 
politicians, farmers and bureaucrats in the USA to build large dams at highly subsidized rates. 
There farmers pay only 10 per cent of the actual total costs, and water-demanding crops as rice 
use the scarce water. 1 6 1 Likewise in the case studies, staff and consultants of the agency, 
government and donor connived to accomplish similar objectives, the creation of irrigation 
capacities at highly subsidized rates. 
The suspicious nature of this process itself is less well documented, and probably not 
evident to all involved actors. Yet, it was there, as demonstrated by earlier quotations on page 
133 and, for example, by the following remarks of key decision makers in respectively Morocco 
and the World Bank: 
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"En effet, si on se limite un raisonnement financier, il n'y aurait plus beaucoup de projets hydro-agricole 
rentables et bancables."182 
"It is, however, necessary to do certain big infrastructure investments for which you have to steal money of the 
rest of the country."m 
Subsidies versus performance. Cost-benefit analysis and related sensitivity analysis were 
not allowed in any of the case studies to classify a project as unfeasible. They seemed therefore 
to have lost their theoretical functionality for the assessment of investment feasibility and 
appraisal. Instead, they were used to facilitate subsidies for irrigation investments. 
Several professionals have justified the necessity of subsidies for irrigation because of the 
cyclic nature of the long-term irrigation investment trends. 1 6 4 Yet, this subsidy-oriented 
reasoning seems to have ignored the here observed influence of these supply-driven subsidies 
on the incentives to perform in the "water-related" decision-making processes. Ignoring these 
incentives is likely to become a self-fulfilling prophecy: as long as you do not allocate more 
value to the performance during the capacity utilization by unconditional huge subsidies for 
capacity creation-through a low quality of the feasibility assessment--, the underutilization of 
the created capacity make further investments in capacity creation necessary. 
The challenge seems to get a process started of both improved capacity creation and 
improved utilization of the existing capacities. Even, if the likely evolving moderating 
influence, at least in the short-term, on the quantity of investments, may imply some risks for 
food security in the long-term. (Yet, this is not a necessary result as there are several other 
options to increase food security such as direct income transfer to to those who cannot afford 
it). 
One of the few development publications on this linkage between subsidies and incentives 
in development is a World Bank Staff Working Paper by Heaver. Heaver seems to have hit the 
crux of the underperformance in development investment by defining the latter as a dynamic 
process, whereby financial incentives for human efforts cannot be separated from the economic 
cost-benefit analysis.1 6 5 According to Heaver, getting this dynamic process started requires 
thus at least a consideration of the probable management performance in the cost-benefit 
analysis, thus attributing some value to the scarce resource management. 
FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS OF INVESTMENTS : DESIGN-UTILIZATION 
INTERACTION 
"..modern irrigation has more than its share of systems designed on the basis of possibilities that were not 
realized"66 
"...hardware changes in an otherwise management starved environment are an invitation to disaster. ",6? 
This section gives a generalized picture of the decision-making processes for the third and last 
basic orientation point of this chapter, the functional requirements for investments in the 
irrigation subsector. These requirements are usually determined during the design stage. 
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Though major decisions are often fixed during the feasibility and appraisal phases of investment 
decision making because of their cost implications. So several aspects of the functional 
requirements were touched upon already in the section on feasibility. There, the emphasis was 
on the impact of certain functional requirements on total costs or benefits, and not so much on 
the detailed functionalities of the designs. This section elaborates more on such details of the 
functionality of different design criteria. 
Examples of functional requirements are the (peak) irrigation requirements and the related 
physical control required from the layout, the flow-control structures, and the traits of managers 
and farmers to achieve a level of service as evolved from the preceding feasibility assessment. 
System Layout and Flow Control 
Irrigation system layouts in all case studies had adopted during the past three decades the so-
called "rationalized" design criteria as they tend to be applied in irrigation engineering 
worldwide. Although the terminology and details varied, the following description of these 
criteria was generally applicable. The "rationalized" layout consisted of a "regular" hierarchy 
of main, distributary, and field canals with equal-sized square or rectangular plots situated along 
them. The areas served by the distributary and field canals were thereby standardized. The 
distributary and field canals tended to be situated parallel to upstream canals, so that, in 
principle, the plots only received water from a field canal. 
Such a regular layout pattern was generally deemed to facilitate the monitoring and 
control of water flows. It also allowed to base the farm sizes on such explicit criteria as the land 
use classification, the cropping patterns, and income. Economic efficiency, the related water 
efficiency and a desire to control the service delivery seemed the underlying criteria of this 
design concept. 
In contrast, the traditional,168 irregular patterns of canals and plots had highly variable 
sizes, discharges and numbers of farmers per canal. Many engineers perceived these traits as 
a "major inconvenience"169 for flow control, as a consultant in one Sri Lankan case study 
argued. In addition, more flexible water delivery, that was generally perceived to be required 
in the rationalized irrigation designs, required a higher density of canals and structures as 
well. 1 7 0 
Yet, the effectiveness of this "regular" pattern in facilitating monitoring and control, 
flexibility, and convenience seemed never assessed. Not even its cost effectiveness has been 
tested to date. This seemed amazing in view of the elevated costs required for the regular 
pattern. Higher costs were observed to be caused by such related measures as the increased 
canal density, the higher excavation volumes, the increased concrete costs for structures,171 
the increased requirements of construction quality, the higher operation and maintenance costs, 
the reduction of conflicting property boundaries, the "rational" water sharing between the water 
users, and the required higher management capacities and higher inputs of agency staff.172 
These costs were observed to be even more elevated as they had to be introduced in the short 
time frames available for foreign-funded irrigation projects. 
Several drawbacks of this design concept require more elaboration. The rationalized 
design concept tended to be used as "blueprints" that required only a standardized data collection 
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through surveys to design on a large-scale. These design concepts were observed to ignore 
usually those criteria crucially important to farmers, such as the future arrangements of 
ownership or rights of land and water, and the local experiences with the suitability of the soils. 
Others have remarked this as well. 1 7 3 Besides, the field canals, instead of facilitating efficient 
water sharing among water users, were observed to introduce merely new stresses among the 
farmers and between the farmers and the agency. Also Levine and Coward have observed 
this. 1 7 4 Moreover, the rational designs assumed that all relevant information about topography, 
soil suitabilities, drainage conditions etc. required for the determination of an irrigation system's 
functions, could be obtained through large-scale surveys. Yet, in the observed practices of 
large-scale irrigation development, these data tended to be of very low quality. Though this 
appeared to be no constraint for their use in the detailed designs.1 7 5 
Distinct criticisms on the effectiveness of the rational design have been expressed more 
specifically for flooded paddy cultivation. For example, Levine and Coward have argued that 
for paddy the traditional field-to-field irrigation "can be as effective and efficient as individual 
field outlets"1 7 6 in terms of water efficiency alone. Hence, given their lower cost, their 
effectiveness and efficiency seemed much higher than the rational design concept. Another 
aspect observed to render heavy investment in individual field outlets and increased canal 
intensities inefficient and ineffective was the frequent re-use of drainage water in watersheds. 
The above observations on the rationalized design criteria did not apply to Morocco. 
There, the rationalized layout was observed to be functional to a comparatively satisfactory level. 
This higher level of functionality seemed more due to the higher levels of sophistication of the 
decision-making processes about the capacity utilization than in the other case studies. This 
probably would have made any design concept more functional than in the other case studies 
because of the better match between the assumed and achieved levels of management inputs. 
(The level of sophistication of the capacity creation in Morocco was observed to be similar to 
the other case studies.) 
How did the drawbacks of these rationalized design concepts compare to the more 
traditional design concepts! Traditional investment planning and design in many LDCs was 
based on least-cost construction and the maximizing of the re-use of drainage water, rather than 
on the modern concepts of increased flow control, and, possibly, of reducing seepage by the 
expensive canal lining. 1 7 7 These traditional, least-cost combined with low-performance 
approaches clearly rooted more in a management reality than the observed rationalized design 
concepts in all case studies except Morocco. Yet, apart from the role of the disciplinary biases, 
the rationalized options were stimulated, and in certain cases even enforced,178 by the supply-
driven irrigation investments of the last decades. 
Recently the capital-intensive, unsuccessful nature of the modern design concepts seems 
to get more recognition. Whereby some senior engineers and economists in the World Bank 
have pleaded for the design of irrigation systems primarily based on re-use of the primary 
resource.1 7 9 Ironically, similar arguments at the national level in early stages of the 
determination of the rationalized design criteria were typically ignored; for example, in Sri 
Lanka the same arguments were proposed unsuccessfully by Farmer in 1957 and Mendis in 
1977. 1 8 0 
Especially in the design of field canals and tertiary units the rational design approaches 
were observed to run into trouble in all case studies including Morocco. Prerequisite for design 
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at these levels seemed an interactive process with farmers to obtain relevant localized 
information. For example, Small has described this for the topographical design aspects as 
follows: 
"Topographic information available to irrigation agencies lacks the detail and degree of precision needed for 
designing tertiary systems in a technically satisfactory manner. Furthermore the cost of obtaining the necessary 
information in a formal manner (using engineering personnel and equipment) would be prohibitive. But farmers 
have experimental knowledge about local micro-relief, based on their years of farming under a variety of water 
conditions. It appears that they can play a significant role in providing, in an informal fashion, some of the 
information needed by the engineers."181 
Similar arguments were observed to apply to the soil suitabilities, water and land rights and 
ownership. 
Given the quantity and quality of information required, the design for improved flow 
control at field-canal level appeared much more management intensive, and thus prohibitive, than 
at main system level. In contrast, important donors in all case studies pushed recipient 
governments for a long time to apply the conceptual solution of creating increased facilities for 
improved flow control at field-canal level. Wade and Ter Hofstede have described similar 
processes between the World Bank and the governments of respectively India and Indonesia.1 8 2 
Conceptually the donors apparently considered the "incremental return" of the field-canal level 
development as high. 1 8 3 
The fore mentioned "re-use based" design concept takes a more integrated perspective 
on system layout as it incorporates the prevalent constraints in commitment for increased 
management inputs. 
Diemer has described another example of a more integrated design concept. The French 
ministry of development cooperation recognized the limited probable contributions of a 
Senegalese managing agency for local flow control. It therefore initiated the so-called 
"intermediate" systems, that consisted of a main canal that diverted water from a river by 
gravity. Separate sub-systems had to pump water independently from this main canal. This 
physical layout facilitated the subsystems to operate as decentralized "responsibility" centers. 
Thus recognizing the need for decentralized decision making and accountability by farmers for 
an improved delivery performance. In a comparable, but slightly different system, the water 
had to be pumped into the main canal as well. This system worked less satisfactory due to the 
larger dependence of sub-systems on this centralized water intake, and the related needs for 
centralized coordination of the main system regulation.184 
Also many traditional interventions in irrigation in countries such as Indonesia and Sri 
Lanka had a more integrated approach. This consisted of support for already existing smaller 
irrigation (sub-)systems, thereby restricting the need for centralized management inputs. Coward 
has generalized this for Asia as follows: 
"...development of facilities at the lowest unit in a large public scheme (variously referred to as the chak. 
watercourse, or tertiary unit). Throughout Asia, the customary practice has been to leave development and 
elaboration of this portion of the system to the local users themselves. However, more recently, a number of 
states—sometimes with urging from international donors—have extended their investment activities into the 
distribution network (Levine and Coward, 1984) Results have been mixed, but frequently the outcomes have 
been underutilization and poor maintenance by the user groups."185 
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Often these units maintained their independent status, sometimes facilitated physically by buffer 
reservoirs or independent river intakes. Water-delivery arrangements within such units were 
often left untouched by outside agencies. Only for new system development the "rationalized" 
design concepts were introduced with the related assumptions of increased agency control over 
the water delivery.1 8 6 
The rationalized approaches have had a profound influence on the irrigation engineering 
profession. Since several decades, irrigation engineers have been trained, or rather brainwashed, 
in one single, "rational" and economic approach of irrigation design (i.e., Diemer's engineering 
paradigm187) that seems very hard to decode. It has stimulated an engineering attitude toward 
technical design as a "pure" science, that can only be desecrated by the farmers' or system 
managers' real-life requirements. It has biased engineers to think in terms of large reservoirs 
with "rational" new downstream development, and to disrespect existing small systems, and 
more pragmatic and gradual watershed development. For example, in Sri Lanka's Kirindi Oya 
system such attitudes of agency staff were observed to have caused the demolishment of about 
50 small existing systems to be replaced by a more "rational" layout. 
The so-called participative design appeared therefore a controversial issue for engineers 
as it conflicted with their scientific approaches. Such consultations were observed to be an 
exception. Yet during colonial times, rehabilitations in Indonesia, for example, were apparently 
always discussed with such relevant stakeholders as the agency staff, the operators and the 
farmers. 1 8 8 More recently, such consultations have become part of some "innovative", so-
called participatory experiments. Famous example of an innovative approach is the rehabilitation 
of Sri Lanka's Gal Oya in the late 1970s. Another example is a very interesting article by 
Meijers on the facilitative role of a design engineer for small-scale system development in 
Senegal.1 8 9 Eventually, a rehabilitation of the paradigm of irrigation system design may 
evolve through such "innovations". 
Peak Irrigation Requirements 
Peak irrigation requirements are a major determinant of the project costs. They determine the 
required discharge capacities of canals and structures, and thus the size and costs of canal 
excavation and lining, and of flow-control structures. Peak requirements are therefore a major 
assumption underlying the absolute project costs and thus the investment feasibility. If the peak 
irrigation requirements are underestimated, water cannot reach the tail-ends of canals. And if 
they are overestimated, the construction costs increase unnecessarily, and wasteful discharges 
may become necessary to maintain enough head in the canals. 
Although peak requirements could have been elaborated upon in the section on Feasible 
Investment Objectives, it is done in this section because of its direct interrelation with other 
system's functions such as the system layout and the controllability of flow. (To prevent 
repetitions as much as possible, the peak requirements were not discussed as a subheading of 
the previous section on Feasible Investment Cost and Project Implementation Schedule.) 
The theoretical crop water requirements at field level were observed to be the usual basis 
for the determination of the canal peak requirements. After the establishment of the crop water 
requirements, they tended to be multiplied with the field application and canal conveyance 
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efficiencies to arrive at the peak requirements for the different canals. In addition, rules of 
thumb tended to be used as guidelines for the peak requirements, sometimes as the only 
guidelines, and sometimes as a check on the theoretical assessment. Murray-Rust and Snellen 
have remarked these rules of thumb to range between 1.5 and 2.01/s/ha for the humid tropics, 
while for the Pakistani and Indian Punjabi systems in a semi-arid sub-tropical climate they range 
between 0.2 to 0.4 1/s/ha.190 
Peak requirements during capacity utilization appeared to deviate considerably from the 
design criteria in all case studies. For example, peak values measured by IIMI in Sri Lankan 
systems appeared to be between 3.4 and 11.5 1/s/ha in Uda Walawe and between 2.7 and 3.6 
1/s/ha in Kirindi Oya. 1 9 1 Overloading of canals was observed in all observed main systems, 
whether temporarily or permanently. These observations suggest a tendency to underdesign 
canals, something that seems supported by the worldwide problems to get water to tail-end 
reaches of irrigation canals, even during peak flows. The following reasons were observed for 
this gap between designed and actual peak discharges: 
1. Their reliance on the crop water requirements was observed to cause the same 
degree of overoptimism during the design as during the feasibility and appraisal 
assessments. As mentioned before, the theoretical crop water requirement 
formulae tended to represent overoptimistic possibilities rather than probabilities, 
especially regarding the inputs of agency management and farm labor; 
2. Directly influenced by these management and labor aspects was the proportion of 
the rainfall that could be effectively used for cultivation, while saving on the 
water deliveries by the irrigation system. Often the design assumed the effective 
rainfall to be the 80 per cent probable rainfall. This was an overoptimistic 
assumption as there were few, if any, irrigation systems in LDCs that have any 
contingent management strategies or procedures to respond to rainfall, other than 
stopping issues to prevent overloading of canal reaches. Besides, if no rainfall 
would occur during a certain demand period, such a canal was thus underdesigned 
for the full 80 per cent probable rainfall as the supply from the canal system must 
compensate such shortfalls. In Sri Lanka's Kirindi Oya system designers were 
observed to add an arbitrary 25 per cent extra discharge to the designed peak 
discharge to cover such drought periods. Still, the main canals appeared 
underdesigned; 
3. Also such physical factors as the lateral and vertical seepage and percolation1 9 2 
were observed to be very variable. So variable that they could not be determined 
reliably by formulae or measurement for either a turnout, or even a plot. 1 9 3 
These seepage and percolation estimates dominate the estimation of the water 
requirements. This difficulty to estimate them makes the "1 cusec" design 
concept, used in several Asian countries, of questionable merit. Especially 
because the size of the turnouts depends in detail on such "measured" seepage and 
percolation. The frequent unavailability in many countries of reliable soil data 
aggravates this further. These physical uncertainties were observed to make it 
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also difficult for designers to determine the size of field outlets without relying 
on the experience of operators and farmers along a field canal; 1 9 4 
4. Although the theoretical water requirements were mostly used to determine the 
peak requirements, during capacity utilization they were observed to occur during 
the land preparation. Levine has also argued that in rice cultivation, the land 
preparation is a major factor for water usage, and that evidence suggests that this 
relates to the way of water delivery.1 9 5 Even if the requirements during land 
preparation were used for designing the canal capacities, also these assumptions 
tended to be over-optimistic. Similarly, unrealistic levels of staff management 
and farm labor inputs were underlying the always optimistic assumptions of the 
progress of the land preparation, rotations, and the irrigation efficiencies. 
Overall, canals were usually designed for unrealistic efficiencies. Or, as Levine and 
Wickham have remarked: "Rarely is a project designed for 30% efficiency, yet many are 
actually operated at that level . . .it goes "against the grain" for an engineer to design an 
"inefficient" project.". 1 9 6 Partly, these unrealistic estimates were observed to find their origin 
in the fore-mentioned disciplinary bias of the irrigation engineer; assuming no management 
inputs by agency staff during capacity utilization would be quite realistic, but goes indeed 
"against the grain". 1 9 7 Those unrealistic efficiencies were institutionalized not only in the mind 
of engineers, but even in the official design guidelines of several irrigation agencies (that evolve 
from the same engineer's mind). 1 9 8 Though the unrealistic assumptions were also observed 
to be consistently and directly linked to the feasibility-level over-optimistic efficiency 
requirements. 
Like for the feasibility assessment, the peak requirements in the system designs in all case 
were not related to real-life experiences and requirements. The government committee for 
Irrigation Utilization in Andhra Pradesh, India has found this as well. 1 9 9 Yet, much flexibility 
to deviate during the design stage from the feasibility-level assessments did usually not exist as 
it would endanger a successful cultivation of the planned (i.e., the maximum) command area, 
even in theory. In all case studies, the cost-benefit analysis of the irrigation investments 
assumed the maximum benefits through assuming the benefits of the maximum possible area 
irrigated (by that assuming high "possible" water efficiencies). This was observed to create a 
pressure for designers to continue to design for this maximum benefit, at least in theory, to 
realize the envisaged ELRR. So, observed design engineers of agencies, consultants and donors 
in Sri Lanka, Philippines, and Morocco had to work with unrealistic peak requirements against 
the odds. The Sri Lankan case studies contain detailed descriptions of the related processes.2 0 0 
Coward has recommended to settle water rights prior to any investment in recognition 
of the frequent existence of customary water rights, and even an "investment history of the 
locale" (i.e., the existing agriculture). According to him this is usually not so: 
"Often this approach results in a new technological apparatus being placed into a muddled property context. 
Thereafter, the technology is unused or misused and soon inoperative, bypassed, or, if possible, modified to 
fit the realities of property rights . . .When doing . . .preproject investigations of the existing situation, effort 
should be devoted to understanding these established rights"201 
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The big question remains, of course, how to do that other than through time-consuming 
processes, trial-and-error, and, possibly, increased investments? 
An interviewed Senior Design Engineer of Sri Lanka's Irrigation Department remarked 
that the traditional way of matching canal capacities and the commanded areas in Sri Lanka was 
by trial-and-error. Ter Hofstede has described this for Bali as well. 2 0 2 Despite the many 
theoretical concepts and formulae related to irrigation requirements, the actual practice in most 
case studies was still by trial-and-error; the underutilized portion of the created command areas 
seemed thereby to represent a major, though hypothetical part of the widespread 
"underperformance" of irrigation investments. 
Controllability of Flow 
The case studies showed that the choice of all structures was based on implicit assumptions about 
desired water levels and management inputs. Usually the costs were not compared with the 
related benefits in water-delivery performance. Related experiences and lessons were never 
considered. Just like for the system layout, the design concepts of flow-control structures and 
canals were observed to have evolved over time toward increased flow control, and over ever 
smaller discharges. As mentioned before, the implicitly assumed increases in management inputs 
for improved flow control were not observed in any of the case studies. Levine and Wickham 
have generalized this international tendency toward more flow control, and make similar 
observations in the following citation on its functionality:203 
"Systems are almost always designed with the most modern features currently available and theoretically 
appropriate, almost irrespective of the current level of agricultural or irrigation practice in the area. Direct 
service to individual holdings, on demand, with volumetric metering and with high efficiency is considered to 
be the "ideal", providing the farmer with maximum decision-making independence, and reflecting modern 
approach to design. While this is not always achieved in design, and rarely in practice, it still reflects the ideal. 
In striving for this, as suggested in the discussion on operation and maintenance, measuring devices, control 
gates, modern institutional structures, etc. are incorporated into the design, even when the prospective clients 
have no experience with these components."204 
Such modern design concepts required much higher cost per unit area as mentioned 
before, although this was never made explicit in the observed decision-making processes. The 
argument that a design concept had to stick to "conventional engineering" was observed to be 
used frequently in reports and manuals. In itself this argument appeared often sufficient 
justification for the huge extra costs on construction or maintenance. Examples of such 
justifications were described in the two Sri Lankan case studies. Also the following citation 
from De Leeuw of a newly arrived consultant's criticism on the previous consultant in Kenya's 
Bura system gives such "conventional" reasoning: 
"The present designs [i.e., feasibility-level designs of the former consultant] provide for minimal control and 
adjustment of flows. Although this has the merit of requiring minimum operation and water management, it 
doesn't confirm with the commonly accepted standards of control associated with irrigation systems involving 
major investment and high agricultural potential."203 
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According to the new consultant, the changes would not influence the costs. Yet, De Leeuw has 
calculated the total project cost increases due to such reasoning to be 210 per cent only five 
years after this denial. 2 0 6 
Apparently, this rationale of "conventional engineering" allowed engineers their habit of 
keeping the underlying control and management requirements and expectations implicit. For 
example, the requirements for passive and active upstream level control2 0 7 for cross-regulators 
and offtakes, for sensitivity of offtakes along a canal toward flow fluctuations, for discharge 
control by capacities of canal and structures, were observed to be kept implicit. Thus they 
remained at the discretion of the involved designers. 
Of course, making these requirements explicit, would probably be a difficult task without 
any explicit performance targets or envisaged levels of service. Yet, without such explicit 
objectives and an agency commitment to them, the implicitly used performance targets stimulated 
and allowed theoretical flow-control solutions for system design. Interaction by designers with 
system managers and farmers about the level of service, and the related functions of flow 
control, was consequently unnecessary, and was observed, in practice, more exception than rule. 
No explicit definition of performance requirements was observed in any of the case 
studies. The more recently introduced practice of writing O&M manuals before or parallel to 
system design could, in principle, have facilitated such an objective setting process by the 
irrigation agency. Especially if the agency would have considered it as a kind of strategic 
planning. In practice the observed terms of reference, capabilities and awareness of consultants 
and agency did not go that far. Besides, the interest and commitment of the top management 
of the observed irrigation agencies to such objective setting was weak. 
The debate on flow-control concepts. The prevalent failure in irrigation for the water to 
reach the tail-reaches of canals has naturally led to a recognition that, apart from management, 
something must be wrong with irrigation design as well. A paper by Jurriens led to an initial 
international discussion on this subject in ODFs "Irrigation Management Network" in 1984. 
Jurriens pleaded that the irrigation performance problems were less a management than 
a design problem. According to him, new design concepts were required that would integrate 
all relevant aspects, including the physical, financial, economic and human. Most reviewers of 
his paper disagreed on his thesis of design as the sole solution to the performance problem, 
though many supported the need for new design concepts and analytical frameworks. Suggested 
solutions by other discussants focused, with few exceptions, on this conceptual need, rather than 
explicitly on the process of designing.2 0 8 
Several discussants of the paper have remarked, however, that assumptions made by 
designers in the existing design concepts were almost always unknown and implicit: 
" . . .the evidence is to be found in consultancy reports. These relate to particular contexts, may rarely be 
explicit about the underlying principles on which their contributions are based, and are not widely 
available."205 
Several suggested that this was provoked by the lack of time or money to consider the relevant 
aspects for conceptual design. Most suggested there were political reasons for the conventional 
nature of irrigation design as reflected in the following citation: 
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"...the factors which most respondents saw as being the most difficult to incorporate systematically into a 
coherent analytical framework were the wide range of potentially relevant political/cultural/institutional/social 
variables— no doubt because, in addition to being locale-specific, they are often difficult to quantify and hence 
appear intangible. For example, Parkes perceived such design information being "subjective or difficult to 
obtain" and saw this as the major reason the designer is often left to make an "engineering judgement"".210 
The conventional nature of irrigation engineering seemed to allow several completely 
different conceptual solutions for a similar problem. The following text from a recent World 
Bank document has remarked this as well: 
"The issues facing irrigation management in Indonesia are far from unique. Smallholder irrigation has faced 
similar problems in many other Asian countries. Solutions suggested have been varied, ranging from even more 
sophisticated systems [e.g., automatic downstream control at the block (Kedung Ombo) or farm level (Merriam 
1983)], dynamic regulation and remote control, through radical redesign [e.g., lowering canals below ground 
level with gravity supply replaced by low-head pumping, OED (1989)], to straightforward systems of 
proportional distribution".211 
New flow-control concepts. Since the time of the forementioned international discussion 
in ODI's network, several new design concepts were proposed based on more explicit "programs 
of requirements" for the levels of service and for the flow control. Earlier, an implicit criterion 
in the choice of required functions of many modern, flow-control-improving design concepts was 
the need for more flexibility of the water delivery to farmers. Partly, this function was 
perceived also a requirement to cultivate other crops than rice (OFC). Nowadays the status of 
flexibility as a design criterion seems to have become less divine. 
Several more recently proposed design concepts contain different degrees of reduced 
flexibility, while explicitly recognizing the constraints in management capacity of agency and 
farmers. For example, Horst has proposed less flexibility at distributary and/or field canal level 
through fixed proportional division. A perceived advantage of less flexibility at that level was 
more independence of farmers toward "the vagaries of mismanagement of the major system, but 
they also cause a considerable decrease in the operational manpower requirements. 1 , 2 1 2 
The World Bank has adopted a similar approach, the so-called "structured" design 
concept. Hereby, less flexibility was to be achieved through proportional division below a 
certain level, the so-called "structured" level. Below this level the system was designed to be 
operated on an on-off basis to provide an "irrigation service" to farmers rather than a specified 
demand. Only at field canal level, gates were provided for operation by the farmers themselves. 
Both the concepts of Horst and the World Bank have assumed that a reduction of the total 
number of movable gates would reduce considerably the required gate operations and would thus 
improve the system's "manageability". Although farmers were constrained in their freedom and 
the flexibility of service delivery in volume and duration, the system was perceived to be more 
manageable. The constraints were assumed to be "offset by certainty of supply". The critical 
design decision in the structured design concept was "the level at which the system is to be 
structured".2 1 3 
Yet, both concepts notwithstanding their potential may have the same drawbacks common 
to almost all "blueprint" type of design concepts. Horst has not said anything about the process 
of applying his design concept, and therefore did not exclude the risk of the design concept to 
be applied as a blueprint. The World Bank's intention it to be applied as a blueprint. Any plan 
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of the future level of service delivery (and the related "program of requirements" for the 
investments) that is supposed to have "a realistic chance of being implemented"214 can only 
be defined by the irrigation agency itself, preferably in consultation with the farmers. 
Moreover, it requires support from its top management and from political levels. If the 
proposed design concepts and related "irrigation service" objectives are defined by outsiders 
rather than by the agency, the commitment of the agency and the farmers can be expected to be 
very low. 
Without explicit performance targets of their own, likely reactions of both the agency and 
the farmers are to overload the main system permanently, and to operate it on a continuous 
rather than on an on-off basis. One wonders therefore about the rationale for assuming systems 
to be operated for variable flows, given the absence in most case studies of any performance 
targets, and given the difficulty to enforce variable flow through the physical infrastructure 
alone? For example, for the structured design farmers were envisaged to be able to increase 
outlet discharges only through major interference (e.g., by breaking the fixed offtakes).215 
Yet, they were likely, and were observed,2 1 6 to do so, conceivably even with support of the 
irrigation agency. The latter was observed in the two Sri Lankan case studies. 
The process of design. Such new substantive design concepts are important, but so are 
the decision-making processes of the definition of a "program of requirements" prior to a design. 
Especially the decision-making processes by those who have to make the structures work, the 
agency and the farmers. Both above examples of design concepts have justified their choice for 
proportional division based on their extensive and satisfactory application in traditional irrigation 
systems in Bali, North Africa, and Spain. Such justifications seem to have underestimated that 
such proportional division was likely the result of time-consuming negotiating processes, 
resulting in explicit water rights and allocation plans, rules and procedures. In general, 
conceptual designs ignore the importance of such a process. 2 1 7 
The following remarks hold much truth from a process perspective: 
"...most respondents were emphatic that an irrigation system should be designed "from the bottom up" in 
accordance with the capabilities and needs of the users (eg. Chambers, Framji, Griffith). The alternative 
approach --designing according to "principles of efficient water distribution" and then trying to get farmers to 
conform- "imposes unrealistic demands on the users." [Whithers]"218 
"...much of design work falls down because it is adapted to the way in which the designer considers the farmers 
ought to irrigate rather than the way in which farmers actually irrigate."2" 
What applied to farmers in these remarks applied also to system managers; without their 
involvement in the definition of a system's functions, or "program of requirements", the pursued 
performance improvements seemed unlikely to get their commitment. 
Not through design only. All the above observations suggest the need for a certain 
qualification of the importance of design concepts. So far, the importance of the process of 
design has surfaced. Apart from this process, also the actual organization's goals seem a major 
influence on the usefulness of any design concept in place. Although a system's design is 
important, without the will to manage, no design concept is "manageable". Similarly, if the 
objectives are right, every design is to a certain degree "manageable".220 In a situation where 
the agency and farmers support the performance objectives, every design becomes to a certain 
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degree "manageable", whether it were traditional, modern, flexible, simple, least-cost, or even 
dilapidated. Many professionals have argued similarly, and have produced related evidence. 
A few are quoted below: 
"...very old systems often provide better services than those recently constructed—it is not a technology 
gap."221 
"Proper design is needed today. But again, many systems serving high value diversified cropping in the 
developed countries were designed and built 60 to 100 years ago. The problem should not be seen as "new 
technology" that is missing."222 
"Old, successful irrigation projects may be readily found. Existing schemes in India, China, Indonesia and in 
North America, to mention a few, incorporated principles that are still valid today. Many have functioned 
continuously for 100 to 150 years. A competitive, healthy project agriculture evolved attesting to the 
effectiveness of the service provided by these systems usually sustained by local entities or by the farmers 
themselves. If one examines the total irrigation in many countries, more than 50% and up to 80% were built 
long ago and have been maintained from the onset by the farmers alone. Operable segments of Roman 
aqueducts remain after 2000 years, most with no maintenance. The design, construction and operation and 
maintenance were obviously of high quality -all of them— and that is the key!"223 
"It is perhaps fitting at this point to assert that all irrigation systems whether surface, sprinkler, drip, or other, 
can be grossly mismanaged. Granted some are easier to mismanage than others . . .On the other hand all 
irrigation systems can potentially achieve high efficiency with expert management and proper design. Thus, 
it is generally and properly accented among irrigation experts that well-managed systems produce similar 
efficiencies of water use. Real tragedies have been installed and more are proposed where the result has been 
and will be to replace one poorly managed system with another poorly managed system. These usually revolve 
around replacing canal systems in less developed countries with high-tech drip systems, etc. These have then-
proven place and can be successful, but hardware changes in an otherwise management starved environment 
are an invitation to disaster."224 
"...it appears that major progress can be made in efficient and equitable water distribution even with relatively 
deteriorated canals and structures."225 
"The very high efficiencies in Taiwan—around 60 per cent in normal water supply conditions, rising to 90 per 
cent as water comer very scarce—are achieved with physical structures which are not particularly sophisticated, 
by means of very effective utilisation of those structures, which is a function of management."226 
These quotations show that with the right management conditions and processes, also the 
simplest design concepts, and even deteriorated infrastructure, can work satisfactory. 
Design and centralization. The above newly proposed design concepts implicitly assumed 
an exclusively centralized concern for the water-delivery performance. An assumption that most 
likely evolved from the "through-design-only" approach. Yet, decentralization is an important 
measure of management control. 
Unlike today, in the past decentralization of the decision making was part of the 
discussion on design and management control. For example, decentralization was the subject 
of a long debate of the colonial engineers in Indonesia. Ter Hofstede and Van Santbrink have 
given a very interesting description of this debate, where most engineers preferred more and 
more centralization to improve the system performance. By the end of the nineteenth century, 
when the concept of "water management" (i.e., not the practice) still had to be invented, 
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expenditure control arguments of the colonial government led to an open discussion among 
engineers of the pros and cons of decentralization of the water delivery versus increased 
centralized control over the water flow. Both sides substantiated their argument with research 
results. 2 2 7 A similar situation in the 1930s, on the contrary, led to a different process; the 
arguments served merely to legitimize the existing situation (that failed to control the tertiary 
system), and experiments were not permitted. By that time, only few engineers dared to plead 
for decentralization along the institutional set up of the Balinese subak, against much social 
pressure of their engineering colleagues. Decentralization apparently did not match well with 
the engineering approaches toward increased flow control. 2 2 8 
In all case studies, financial resources for irrigation investments appeared not really a 
constraining factor after the independence. Thus, the natural tendency of irrigation engineers 
to opt for more centralization was not stopped since. Farbrother has complained about the 
resulting evolution to design for ever smaller discharges, typically determined by "on high" 
engineers, in the name of "efficiency" and according to "fashions that have changed over the 
years". He has also generalized the consistence of this tendency toward centralization over time 
in the following citation: 
"In the early classical developments in India and Egypt, really sizeable "main" canals were the favoured basic 
units for scheduling. From about 1920, however, the smaller distributaries and watercourses at about 10 cusec 
came in, with 4 cusec (in the Gezira) being regarded as the lower irreducible minimum. Postwar developments 
in India and Pakistan brought in rotational supplies at 3 cusec; then 2 cusec; and finally, the 1 cusec design 
criterion of the recent [Command Area Development] planning. The current rehabilitation proposals for the 
Gezira anticipate a reduction from 4 cusec (417 cu.m/hr) down to 1 1/2 cusec (130 cu.m/hr), but this will be 
shared simultaneously between four or five individual farmers, (say 0.3 cusec each). Elsewhere, we now have 
the strange spectacle of some engineers apparently agreeing in terms of rotating 0.1 cusec around 5 one-acre 
holdings -under pressure from the solar-power enthusiasts."229 
The Observed Management Processes 
Decision-making processes about the requirements for the design were observed to occur in all 
case studies at conceptual levels only. Engineers of donors, consultants and irrigation agencies 
together seemed to determine these concepts and to adjust them regularly. Yet, no interaction 
with local system managers and farmers was observed for the determination of an explicit 
"program of requirements". Also the Commission for Irrigation Utilisation in Andhra Pradesh, 
India, has observed this as follows: 
"All senior staff responsible for designs in Andhra Pradesh are unanimous that there is no feed-back from the 
field and the irrigation schemes are being planned, designed and operated on certain ad hoc assumptions without 
testing their validity in actual performance."230 
The resulting rigid application of the different design "blueprints" with insufficient 
localized information was observed to be widespread. It led to almost ad random turnout sizes, 
the use of unsuitable soils and cropping patterns in the design, and the suboptimal use of existing 
reservoirs and drainage lines. Also during design, the misuse of the theoretical formulae for 
crop water requirements was found, and sequential assessments were allowed to be inconsistent 
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without any related justification. Thus designs were adjusted to fit the preceding overoptimistic 
appraisal assessments. In addition, political interference was observed to occur frequently in the 
design process. 
Although substantial opposition against these design blueprints can be found in the 
irrigation management literature2 3 1, all the observed funding institutions had accepted them. 
From their perspective, the advantage of the conceptual design seemed that issues such as the 
service delivery and the agency's related management control could be circumvented, while still 
having a "solution". Also Wade has found this. 2 3 2 
To a certain extent, awareness about the non-functionality of the designs was observed 
within the case studies. Construction and political priorities in the agencies together tended to 
resist quality arguments, and to impede changes to more professionalism (as described earlier 
in this chapter). Considerable political maturity seems required to reverse such processes.2 3 3 
Over time, the design seems to have become a routinized, little creative or thought-requiring 
exercise. Wensley has remarked this for the National Irrigation Administration of the 
Philippines as well. 2 3 4 
The awareness of how the present design concepts have evolved over time was thereby 
observed to fade gradually away with the younger generations of engineers; the design concepts 
have become internalized and the question of functionality did often not even arise. After 
several years of participatory observation of an irrigation engineering faculty, Diemer has also 
found such internatization of the functionality of irrigation technology.235 
Yet, the influence of donor staff and external consultants on the formulation of the design 
concepts appeared tremendous.2 3 6 Wade and Hart have substantiated this also for India. 2 3 7 
Although the supervision by donor staff was observed to be intermittent and minimal—the World 
Bank and ADB staff visited a project typically only once a year—, they appeared more 
responsible for project justification and success, and thus for the project's design concepts, than 
the local executing agencies and government staff. To justify either new loans or loan 
continuation, the donor staff or consultants had to come up with solutions. These were 
necessarily conceptual due to their unfamiliarity with the actual institutional constraints. The 
local parties, from their side, were observed to agree to almost any solution proposed as long 
as they themselves did not become responsible or accountable. The actual functionality of the 
design seemed often a minor concern to governments, agencies, consultants, and donor. 
Accountability for it was a non-issue in the observed irrigation bureaucracies. 
Such processes raise the question if a capital-intensive mode of investment is appropriate 
for irrigation as it appeared to induce the conceptual design solutions. Levine and Wickham 
have phrased similar doubts about irrigation design in LDCs as follows: 
"In the context of the developing countries, especially the humid tropics of Asia, it is essentially impossible to 
design an effective appropriate project before implementation. The design must explicitly include an extended 
period for feedback and revision."258 
Yet, the visibility of capital-intensive investments is likely to remain politically attractive. 
This impetus was probably an important reason for the observed donor efforts to develop ever 
changing blueprints that were less dogmatic than the earlier design concepts.2 3 9 The tragedy 
of the donor-driven, conceptual solutions was that simultaneously the donor was observed to 
become more and more co-responsible for the performance of the new design concepts as they 
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became more and more their intellectual property. Especially because the irrigation agencies 
were not really responsible or accountable for either the functionality of its design, or for the 
water-delivery performance. 
From the early 19th century, the technical irrigation profession was developed entirely 
by trial-and-error.240 Despite the more conceptual approaches that were developed over time, 
the actual professional development still seems to occur by trial-and-error. The early pioneers 
experimented on a small scale before applying their concepts on a larger scale. Yet, nowadays 
the abundant resource availability seems to allow for large-scale trial-and-error, and thus also 
for large-scale errors. 
Some similarities exist with other large-scale facility-engineering disciplines (e.g., for 
petro-chemical and off-shore facilities) that tend to be created on a trial-and-error basis as well. 
Though a crucial difference with irrigation is that these other disciplines tend to specify in 
advance a "program of requirements" for innovative investments, and in a clear and explicit 
manner. 2 4 1 
No lessons were learned from irrigation's large-scale errors, as long as the assumptions 
about the system's functions tended to remain implicit. Ideally, design should start from an 
agency-wide assessment of the affordable and feasible "programs of requirements" and levels 
of service of an investment. Such decisions were currently non-existent in the observed 
irrigation agencies. 
Mutual Adaptation of the Substance and Processes of the Capacity Creation Decisions 
So far, this chapter describes the different parts of the capacity creation processes, and 
separately analyses the related management processes. Several professional approaches such as 
the EIRR, the theoretical water requirements, and the conceptual designs appear to be less useful 
than originally intended. This section briefly discusses the mutual adaptation of such 
professional approaches as the substantive aspects of the decision-making processes, and the 
managerial aspects of the decision making. 
The theoretical water requirements. The section on demand assessment in Chapter 4 
argues that in the decision making about the capacity utilization the scientific formulae to 
calculate the theoretical water requirements have problems to cope with such "soft" parameters 
as the scarcity value of water and the related inefficiencies of water. The formulae calculate the 
"hard" demand of crop, soils, and canals, and cannot cope with the "soft" requirements as 
expressed by people and institutions. Though even the assessment of the "hard" requirements 
appeared difficult to do accurately for individual farms and small subsystems. It was difficult 
to assess accurately most parameters required in the formulae, such as the irrigated area, the 
progress of the land preparation, the requirements for land soaking, effective rainfall, and 
seepage and percolation rates. 
The same problems were observed in the application of the formulae for the theoretical 
water requirements in the decision making about the capacity creation. The "hard" requirements 
were observed to be assessed usually in an approximate way only. Though some field testing 
of the meteorological parameters, and seepage and percolation rates tended to be done during 
the design stage. The seepage and percolation rates appeared thereby impossible to assess 
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reliably in most case studies. Only in the Sudanese case study, the homogenous soils allowed 
a reliable assessment of the latter. 
In practice, the assumptions about the water requirements were observed to be assessed 
in an overoptimistic manner to boost the benefits of the investment. The assessment tended to 
reflect the theoretically possible rather than the probable performance. The assumed 
performance improvements were thereby kept implicit and were not justified. Involved decision 
makers in several case studies appeared well aware of this misuse of these scientific formulae. 
So, worse than the possible technical deficiency of this scientific concept for the assessment of 
the water requirements seemed its systematic misuse and mechanical application to justify 
projects rather than to assess their feasibility. 
The Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR). Figure 8 shows a persistent gap between 
the EIRR at appraisal and audit. What explains the existence of this persistent gap? Is it the 
technique of cost-benefit analysis? Indeed, many professionals have criticized the adequacy of 
the cost-benefit techniques for development investments.242 For example, Roe has argued that 
because development investment projections are highly speculative, the venture-capitalist 
approaches of feasibility assessment would be more suitable than the traditional cost-benefit 
methods. Such venture-capitalist approaches typically start with an assessment of the proposed 
management framework and capacity.2 4 3 Traditional appraisal techniques, in their usual 
application, tend to ignore the existence of such management problems, according to Roe. 
Yet, after two decades of systematically disappointing irrigation investments, this study's 
observations suggest that little speculation seems left for such projections. Especially the 
performance achievement and the implied management inputs by agency staff can easily be 
assessed based on their probability in view of related experiences and achievements by the same 
agency or in the same region (as already explained in the section on Physical Performance 
Assumptions in Feasibility Assessments). 
Heaver has written another criticism of the cost-benefit analytical practices. He has 
argued that management skills are not considered a scarce resource in any of the investment 
appraisal manuals of economists such as Squire and van der Tak (World Bank), and Little and 
Mirless (Overseas Development Administration): "The contention is that as an economic 
appraisal guide, management is outside its brief; and yet management problems have a direct 
impact on the LRR."244 
A senior World Bank staff member has suggested even the existence of an inverse 
relation between a high estimate of the EIRR and the management capability of the recipient. 
He has thereby criticized the World Bank's related inability to determine a project's feasibility 
as follows: 
"...one sees very high rates of return for project rehabilitation~a bad rather than good omen. When one sees 
a high rate of return one can best become particularly skeptical of the institutions and carefully set forth 
institutional rehabilitation and change as prerequisite to any system rehabilitation. One does not often find high 
rates of return for project improvements on well managed projects and there is a reason—sound management 
prevents massive rehabilitation. " 2 4 5 
The method of shadow-pricing is another frequent subject of criticism as well. Much 
effort tends to go into this aspect of the financial feasibility assessments to compensate for 
distorted market prices "even when the poor quality of the data available makes such refinement 
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often questionable".246 Carruthers has contended in this respect that progress toward economic 
efficiency is likely to be slow if shadow prices are used to create a "shadow" world while 
engineers cannot "lift the telephone and find the shadow price of cement and be confident that 
there is financial support for shadow pricing procedures"." 2 4 7 
Similarly, the sensitivity and risk analysis of the traditional cost-benefit analysis has been 
attacked occasionally. In all case studies, they did not reflect the probable risks, especially not 
those implied in the water-related performance assumptions. De Leeuw has made similar 
observations.248 Besides, in all case studies the sensitivity and risk analyses were observed to 
be used at a stage in the decision making, typically at the end of the preparation period, that the 
results were not allowed to cause a fundamental reassessment of the planned investment 
anymore. Tiffen has generali2ed this for the whole development business.2 4 9 Also, several 
interviewed senior donor staff stated that they did not know of any example where sensitivity 
analysis had led to a loan refusal. 
Another criticism of the cost-benefit techniques is on the financial implications of the 
project risks for agencies or farmers. These were not calculated in any of the case studies. De 
Leeuw has observed a similar case in Kenya's Bura system. He has calculated for Bura that the 
1.5 per cent reduced EIRR, resulting of the sensitivity analysis, did not show the related 21.5 
per cent reduction of estimated farmer income, neither the estimated annual loss of US$ 6.3 
million (rather than a profit of US$ 1.4 million) for the managing agency. 2 5 0 Such neglect of 
the financial risks for individuals or agencies seemed caused by the general bias of feasibility 
assessments toward the economical rather than financial feasibility. Also Tiffen has argued this 
extensively. She has remarked in this respect that the official irrigation investment manual of 
the World Bank/FAO Investment Center neglects to look into such financial aspects. 2 5 1 
The following quotation of a specialist internal donor review of the risk analysis for 
investment selection has made clear what the relative value of such analysis is if everybody is 
geared toward project justification (rather than toward feasibility assessment): 
"Again we may ask, would a Risk Analysis incorporating probability distributions for the major benefit 
components have served any useful purpose? Read carefully the Appraisal Report presents a cogent case against 
the project. The base case EIRR barely tops the Bank's assumed cut-off rate of 10 per cent. The Sensitivity 
Tests indicate that a combination of a cost overrun of 10 per cent and a one-year delay in construction would 
reduce the EIRR to 6.5 per cent, while the reduction of the urea prices by 10 per cent alone would be sufficient 
to draw the EIRR down to 7.7 per cent. With this information the decision makers in the Bank could have put 
together a worst case scenario that would have come very close to an accurate prediction."252 
Overall, worse than any deficiencies of the technical approaches of cost-benefit analysis 
seemed therefore their systematical misuse and mechanical application to justify projects rather 
than to assess their feasibility.253 Roe's following generalizations are in line with this study's 
observations: 
"...project appraisal techniques, especially those of cost-benefit analysis, have been more abused than used. 
No set of techniques can correct for inadequate data or compensate for unreasonable assumptions. No 
procedure can stop an evaluator from massaging the analysis in order to justify a choice already made using 
different criteria. Donors need to move money and developing countries try to maximize their presence in rural 
areas by the number of development projects there. In this view, bad project appraisal and subsequent poor 
project performance are not so much causally linked as they are both outcomes of a decision-making process 
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motivated by objectives other than purely those ensuring project success."254 
The design concepts. The above section on The Observed Management Processes argues 
that the decision-making processes about the requirements for the design occurred in all case 
studies only at conceptual levels. Engineers of donors, consultants and irrigation agencies 
together seemed to determine these concepts and to adjust them regularly. No interaction with 
local system managers and farmers was observed for the determination of an explicit "program 
of requirements" in any of the case studies. The resulting rigid application of the different 
design "blueprints" with insufficient localized information was observed to be widespread. It 
led to almost random turnout sizes, often arbitrary placement of structures, the planning for 
unsuitable soils and cropping patterns in the design, and the suboptimal use of existing reservoirs 
and drainage lines. Although substantial opposition against these design blueprints can be found 
in the irrigation management literature2 5 5, all the observed funding institutions had accepted 
them. From their perspective, the advantage of the conceptual design seemed that issues such 
as the service delivery and the agency's related management control could be circumvented, 
while still having a "solution". 
Although new substantive design concepts are important, so are the decision-making 
processes of the definition of a "program of requirements" prior to a design. Especially the 
decision-making processes by those who have to make the structures work, the agency and the 
farmers. The recent design concepts seemed to have underestimated such required time-
consuming negotiating processes, resulting in explicit water rights and allocation plans, rules and 
procedures. In general, conceptual designs ignore the importance of such a process. 2 5 6 
This study's observations suggest also the need for a certain qualification of the 
importance of design concepts. Apart from the fore mentioned importance of the process of 
design, the actual organization's goals seem a major influence on the usefulness of any design 
concept in place. Without the will to manage, no design concept is "manageable". Similarly, 
if the objectives are right, every design is to a certain degree "manageable". In a situation 
where the agency and farmers support the performance objectives, every design becomes to a 
certain degree "manageable", whether it were traditional, modern, flexible, simple, least-cost, 
or even dilapidated. 
Theoretical solutions and commitment to performance. Implicit, and sometimes explicit 
justifications why an investment would not become another failure were thus observed to be 
mostly theoretical rather than related to real-life. The different observed conceptual, technical 
approaches developed to overcome the "management gap" (such as the parallel field canals, on-
farm water management, O&M manuals, water-management consultants, farmer participation 
and monitoring and evaluation) did not increase the commitment to performance of the agency 
and government as they did not touch upon the performance and accountability issues. In fact, 
these solutions increased the donors' influence in the actual investment planning and design, 
whereby the agencies felt increasingly less responsible, resulting in a diminishing commitment 
from their side. 
If the national agency or government was unwilling to adopt such conceptual solutions, 
the observed funding agencies appeared to enforce them through, for example, the conditionality 
of loans. In the Sri Lankan case studies this was observed for certain design concepts. Initially, 
in some cases, the national agencies, or individual engineers, resisted such conceptual solutions 
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based on their real-life experiences with the functionality of the traditional design concepts. 
Though several interviewed engineers in Sri Lanka, Philippines and Morocco remarked that such 
resistance in favor of the quality of the investment decisions has weakened considerably in their 
countries, mainly because of the general priority to acquire external project funding. Thus, 
sequential conceptual solutions established in a donor-driven mode 2 5 7, seemed to have produced 
progressively less and less commitment to their actual feasibility by the national agency staff. 
Incentives for theoretical solutions. Ironically, the systematic tendency to be over-
optimistic about investment objectives, and the absence of the related checks and balances, 
seemed a major stimulus for the development of conceptual solutions. Project officers of 
donors, consultants and governments continually had to justify technically and economically why 
a new investment, unlike earlier failures, was likely to be a 100 per cent success. All sorts of 
theoretical solutions have evolved over time as project justifications. Examples are the on-farm 
water management, canal lining, modern or simplified design concepts2 5 8, water user 
organizations, water management consultants, O&M manuals, improved management procedures 
and institutional development. These solutions tended to be considered managerially and 
politically neutral, and the implied assumptions of improved management and political inputs 
were either ignored, or considered unscientific (i.e., not in line with the pure, scientific logic). 
So quantity appeared supported by a dogmatic application of conceptual solutions. 
PRESENT MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE: THE LEVEL OF SOPHISTICATION 
Chapter 4 contains the assessment of the management performance for the capacity utilization 
in the four different countries. For capacity creation this assessment was done in detail for the 
Sri Lankan case studies, and appeared to occur at very low levels of sophistication. For donor-
funded, capital-intensive investment in irrigation these levels of sophistication can be considered 
essentially the same in all case studies, as the donors appeared to dominate quality of this 
decision making. The national inputs to this quality tended to be minimal, as described before 
in this chapter. 
The political nature of the capacity creation processes makes it also less appropriate to 
make a quantitative comparison between different countries. Therefore this section gives a broad 
quantitative judgement based on the four criteria underlying the concept of the levels of 
sophistication. Annex 1 gives the related descriptions of the levels of sophistication for the 
different key decisions. 
Feedback. National politicians tended to take the decision on the general desirability of an 
irrigation investment. Feedback on that desirability from such stakeholders as the existing 
local community, the future beneficiaries, the different agencies, the individuals in those 
agencies, and the local politicians was usually absent or ignored. Similarly, for donor-
funded, capital-intensive investment in irrigation, no feedback about the investment's real-life 
feasibility or functionality was usually obtained from such relevant sources as the involved 
agencies, related publications, the local communities and the beneficiaries. The generally 
applied conceptual approaches did not require feedback of any real-life experiences. Overall, 
a very low level of sophistication (0-20) was observed. 
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Foreseeing. The establishment of the desired objectives of the investments tended to occur 
in an ad hoc manner at very high political and donor levels. Usually there was no 
consideration of the sustainability during the investment's lifetime of such desirabilities of the 
investment as the cropping patterns, and the areas to be commanded after system degradation. 
Similarly, the sustainability of the investment's feasibility and functionality during its Lifetime 
after potential environmental changes such as crop diversification or the deference of 
maintenance and system degradation, was usually not considered. Overall, a very low level 
of sophistication (0-20) was observed. 
Integration. Irrigation investments were often considered a "privileged" solution. The 
mutual influences between the investment's desirability, feasibility and functionality for 
irrigation purposes and other interests such as off-farm employment or environmental 
sustainability, were thereby usually not considered. Also, no integrative perspective was 
taken in all case studies of the mutual influences on the quality of the capacity creation of 
different feasibility aspects such as the watershed management, the dam sites, the command 
area, the suitability of soils, the water-delivery concept, the water efficiencies, the cropping 
patterns and intensities, and the maintenance and settlement. Especially, the management-
related assumptions underlying these feasibility assessments were not considered. Instead, 
one-dimensional, disciplinary approaches were applied to facilitate "quantity". Overall, a 
very low level of sophistication (0-20) was observed. 
Systematics. A certain routine, and even rules, were observed to exist about the need for an 
investment's feasibility assessment to consist of the different phases of the so-called "project 
cycle" (such as the identification, the feasibility, and the appraisal studies). This suggested 
a low to average level of sophistication (20-60). Yet, no requirements existed toward the 
more quality-oriented interests. For example, no "remedial principle" tended to be applied. 
Neither existed any requirements about the involvement, the responsibilities or type and 
frequency of consultations with the different agencies, the government and the beneficiaries 
to assess, for example, the feasibility of restricting the excessive water use by a system's 
head-end reaches. Consequences of the absence of such rules were the inconsistencies in the 
sequential assessments of an investment's feasibility and functionality, a large room for 
subjective assessments, and the absence of a matching of the perceived and actual feasibility 
and functionality. This suggested a very low level of sophistication (0-20). Overall, a low 
level of sophistication (20-40) was observed. 
REQUIRED CHANGES IN PROCESSES TO IMPROVE CAPACITY CREATION 
Higher levels of sophistication of the capacity creation would require in all case studies a more 
explicit incorporation of experiences into the preparation and implementation of the involved 
decisions. These are likely to enforce some moderation of the dominating influence of the 
overoptimistic assumptions. Such information would require more related interaction with such 
stakeholders as the local communities, the system managers, and the farmers, and also would 
require references to publications on previous experiences. 
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A higher level of sophistication also would require the decisions on capacity creation to 
cover explicitly the "program of requirements" related to a pursued level of service and other 
performance targets for the investments. Without such explicitness, the achievement of the 
observed implicit assumptions could not be assessed, thus underperformance remained 
misunderstood, and no lessons were learned. 
Higher levels of sophistication also would require the consideration of the mutual 
influences of the different aspects of the feasibility assessments and the project design such as 
the dam sites in a water shed, the water duties, the related water-delivery concepts, the cropping 
patterns, the cropping intensities and command areas, the full reservoir levels and dam heights, 
the inundated areas, the required resettlement, the maintenance levels and the related life spans 
of projects. The mutual interrelations of these aspects should be considered, rather than 
considering only the unrelated outcomes of the tasks of the separate subject matter specialists. 
More integrated water basin and system development concepts are required without resorting to 
blueprint approaches that tend to ignore the relevance of localized experiences, information and 
interests. 
Higher levels of sophistication also would require the consideration of the mutual 
influences between the different design aspects such as the system layout, controllability of flow, 
peak irrigation requirements, the required management inputs of agency staff and farmers, the 
non-irrigation system functions, and the time-consuming processes required for adjusting these 
to each other in a specific location. This again would require interactive rather than conceptual 
design. 
All the above seemed only likely to occur if the staff of the donor, consultants and 
agencies would not become more neutral in their feasibility assessments. Project desirability 
from a political and donor perspective should therefore not overrule all other capacity creation 
decisions any further without taking any consideration of the performance-related aspects. This 
would require more accountability of the donor, the government and the agencies for the quality 
of the investment decision making, and less influence of spending pressures, i.e., of quantity on 
the investment decision making. It also would require fewer interventions of outsiders in the 
details of this decision making as this was observed to dilute the local accountability for the 
success of irrigation improvements. 
CHANGES IN MANAGEMENT CONDITIONS REQUIRED TO IMPROVE CAPACITY 
CREATION 
This section identifies those changes required in management conditions that are likely to lead 
to improved capacity creation processes (step 4 in Figure 3 of chapter 3). The improvements 
in the processes of capacity creation in the previous section are the basis for the changes in the 
management conditions. 
The following classes of management conditions are considered: human resources, 
provision of information, financial control systems, provision of knowledge, and organizational 
rules and structure. A change in one management condition may require complementary changes 
in other conditions. Overall conclusions and recommendations of required changes are thus best 
considered in an integrated manner. 
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In real-life irrigation, the management conditions for capacity creation and utilization are, 
to a large extent, the same; the same organizations, people, systems for accounting and 
budgeting, etc. tend to be involved in both areas of concern. Though the requirements regarding 
these management conditions of the different areas of concern are likely to be different. Chapter 
6 integrates the findings of this and the previous chapter. It therefore deals with the required 
changes in management conditions and the required management-control processes (step 5) for 
capacity utilization and capacity creation in an overall and integrated manner. 
Human Resources 
Decisions are always made by people. So people are the most important management condition 
in an irrigation system, like in any organization. In Chapter 4 it was remarked already that the 
attention of irrigation professionals for this important factor of management control has come 
only in the 1980s. 
Observed constraints in the provision of staff. Several deficiencies in the irrigation 
agency's human resources were observed in all case studies. The major single weakness toward 
improved capacity creation was observed to consist of the low motivation of all staff to put much 
effort in the quality of their assessments. Just like for the capacity utilization, the tendency of 
all actors involved in capacity creation was to minimize their management inputs. 
Simultaneously, they tried to minimize the complaints from the local communities, politicians, 
subordinates and superiors. The attitudes of agency staff tended to impede effective information 
exchanges about the capacity creation. 
Just like for the capacity utilization, the attitudes and behavior of the engineers toward 
the farmers tended to be top-down and hierarchical. So the agency staff appeared to discourage 
such information exchanges. Of course, exceptions to this general picture existed as well. 
Although the present focus on quantity rather than quality, and the lack of any accountability for 
performance in the whole process, was observed to sustain, and even to stimulate, such attitudes 
of the agency and government staff toward subordinates, farmers and other sources of local 
interests. The same processes seemed the likely cause for the observed arrogant attitude of a 
considerable portion of the interviewed donor staff, something that a former World Bank 
Director has remarked to be more systematic.259 Yet, decisions on the quality aspects of the 
capacity creation would require more long-lasting, systematic and time-consuming interaction 
between all involved actors. 
An important constraint for this decision making was the observed lack of neutrality and 
independence of all involved assessors of an investment's desirability, feasibility and 
functionality (as follows from earlier quotations on pages 143 to 145). 
The technical knowledge of the agency staff was observed to be of a sufficient level for 
capacity creation in all case studies. The technical expertise of expatriate consultants seemed 
only necessary in capacity creation for very specialized technical issues such as major dam 
construction. 
Motivation and incentives. Heaver seems to have touched the right point when he argued 
that most development professionals erroneously assume that people "want to but can't" (i.e., 
are motivated by social responsibility only), rather than the more real-life "can do much better 
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but won't". 2 6 0 Chapter 4 has mentioned the multitude of positive incentives for staff to be 
involved in construction and maintenance, and the negative incentives to be involved in capacity 
utilization. This chapter has shown that in all key decision-making processes the incentives and 
motivation in capacity creation were observed to be oriented toward the quantity of output, 
rather than toward its quality. Any solutions to improve the quality of the capacity creation 
decisions will have to address this crucial constraint. 
Such incentives for short-term quantity targets were observed to be stimulated in all case 
studies by a similar priority of the donors and the national politicians. Changes by the irrigation 
agencies, and thus in the management inputs and attitudes of their staff, seemed therefore 
unlikely without changed priorities from these actors. The required political maturity is not 
always present in the developed countries, let alone in many LDCs. 2 6 1 Yet, donors could be 
expected to be more prudent in their investment procedures, and by that attribute more value to 
performance in all key decision-making processes. 
The management of human resources. What human resource management (HRM) 
measures can reduce these deficiencies in managerial attitudes and behavior? Specific 
management training may be capable of changing such attitudes to a certain degree, or at least 
increase awareness about them. 2 6 2 Improved management skills of above actors are required, 
though they may not evolve from increased awareness only. The potentially evolving attitude 
and management changes seemed unlikely to be sustainable without the development of more 
priority for the quality of the feasibility assessments, and thus ultimately for the performance. 
And this would require related incentives for all involved staff and/or the farmers. 
The introduction of such incentives would require the introduction of more performance-
based career and salary systems. Chapter 4 has already discussed the observed constraints in 
all case studies for the introduction of such systems as the central governments tended to control 
them. Besides, the central governments appeared unwilling to introduce performance-related 
salary systems for (only part of) the government apparatus. Still, decentralization of the 
responsibility for such HRM policies seemed a necessary change in the management conditions 
if performance improvements were to be achieved in all case studies. 
Provision of Information 
Information is crucial for effective and efficient management of an organization. Decision 
making relates to processes in the minds of the different involved actors, that essentially depend 
on information for its preparation. Decision making involves choices among alternatives, among 
different compositions of information. A decision is essentially a transformation of information. 
Observed constraints in the provision of information. The levels of sophistication of the 
decision making on the capacity creation was observed to be very low in all case studies. The 
achievement of a low level of sophistication of the decision making about the desirability of the 
investments, what their feasibility is, and what their functions should be, all require more 
explicit provision and incorporation of information on obvious experiences into the preparation 
and implementation of these decisions. The achievement of an average level of sophistication 
of this decision making requires a more explicit provision and incorporation of the information 
on the most important experiences in this respect. 
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Relevant experiences, preferences and requirements are those related to investment 
objectives such as the desirable and feasible levels of service, water-delivery concepts, cropping 
patterns, calendars, and intensities, resettlement and environmental sustainability. Though they 
also include the relevant experiences with the feasible investment assumptions such as the levels 
of maintenance, the project implementation schedules, and the life span of the investment. 
Relevant experiences, preferences and requirements for the system's functions are the 
(peak) irrigation requirements, the required controllability of the main system, the hydraulic and 
managerial responsiveness, the communication requirements, the system layout, the drinking 
water and bathing requirements, and other functions of the system's canals and reservoirs. 
Though also those experiences about the necessities required for the sustainability of the system's 
functions during the investment's lifetime such as the medium- and long-term (peak) irrigation 
requirements, the passive and active controllability of flow after system degradation, and the 
long-term flexibility to diversify the cropping patterns. 
The achievement of a low level of sophistication (i.e., 20-40, see also Annex 1) also 
would require information about the convincing mutual influences between different feasibility 
assumptions such as the dam site and the soil suitability, the dam site and the environmental 
sustainability, the maintenance levels and project life, the dam site and water duties, the 
managerial capacity and motivation and the water duties. 
The achievement of a low level of sophistication of the decision making on the functional 
requirements also requires information about the convincing mutual influences between the 
different requirements such as between the rationalized turnout concept and such others as the 
organization of water users, the limited peak canal capacities, the improved water duties, and 
the envisaged command area. An average level of sophistication (40-60) also would require 
information about the mutual influences of directly related requirements such as the unsteady 
flow conditions and the management inputs. 
The achievement of a low level of sophistication also requires information about the 75 
per cent dependable regulated flow, or any other level that is considered feasible to achieve the 
other pursued investment objectives. 
Most of the above information was not considered in the decision making on the capacity 
creation in all case studies. Yet, most of the above information could be provided by the 
relevant local communities, the system managers, and the farmers. This is likely to require 
time-consuming, long-lasting interactions with such stakeholders. It also may require references 
to publications on such experiences. Some types of the above information would just require 
the related measurements, or a more serious data processing. Thus, the provision of the above 
information requires increased management inputs by the responsible staff levels in all case 
studies. These seemed unlikely without an increased priority of the head office, government and 
donor for the quality of the decision making about the capacity creation. 
Presently, instead of relying on the information from local communities, beneficiaries, 
and staff of managing agency for feasibility and appraisal assessments, the quantity and time 
factors were observed to stimulate donor staff and consultants to rely on simulations of reality 
in their assessments. So they banked on theoretical assessments of water requirements, surveys 
of soil and topography, and other assumptions underlying their assessments. Of course, it would 
not be cost effective to collect all possible information required for a perfect assessment, 
especially in LDCs where "there will never be enough funds or enough scientists to cover all 
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aspects of information needed for thorough prediction . . .". 2 S 3 Yet, almost no information 
reflecting the real-life desirability, feasibility and functionality of the investment is the other end 
of the spectrum. 
Errors. An additional problem for the actors involved in capacity creation was the errors 
in the available information, and the difficulty to collect higher quality information under the 
existing time pressures. 
Information on the desirable and feasible investment objectives, and what the functional 
requirements for the investments should be, appeared almost impossible to collect for outside 
donor staff and consultants in a situation of little commitment to performance targets. Their 
usual short missions aggravated this. So, their assessments were very conceptual, thereby 
ignoring the management realities. 
Also the physical information required for the conceptual assessments such as soil and 
topographic data appeared often unreliable due to the low motivation of the involved staff to 
provide quality, and the difficulty to check that quality. Carruthers and Clark have generalized 
an extensive list of frequently occurring data errors and insufficiencies, and the related 
reasons. 2 6 4 
Information provision and organizational structure. In all irrigation systems, the required 
quantity and quality of information about the requirements and opportunities of farmers and 
agency in the capacity creation seem enormous. This is due to the high variability of soils, 
topography and socio-economic situations, and the considerable geographical distances. 
Especially in LDCs, the large numbers of farmers in large-scale smallholder systems aggravate 
this information load. It becomes even more cumbersome with high intensities of flow-control 
structures. In practice, the observed low quality of the capacity creation seemed also directly 
related to the time-pressures under which such information had to be collected. 
These huge information needs easily cause information overloads for higher hierarchical 
levels of staff and consultants. Instead, it has led to the mentioned conceptual solutions that 
require comparatively little information. The lower quality of the decision was thereby taken 
for granted; like for the capacity utilization, also for the capacity creation slack resources tended 
to replace information exchanges and collection. Probably this choice for slack was to a certain 
degree a conscious one in view of the limited capacity in all case studies to collect such 
information. Carruthers and Clark have also made generalized suggestions for all LDCs in this 
respect. 2 6 5 Yet, to a certain degree the slack was observed to be hidden behind the conceptual 
approaches. 
These conceptual approaches were also observed to have facilitated a very centralized 
mode of capacity creation with the center frequently in the headquarters of the involved donor 
or consultant, rather than at system level. Such centralization in itself was observed to constrain 
the collection and consideration of field-level information. 
Also for capacity creation, the achievement of higher levels of sophistication therefore 
seemed to require more decentralization of the information collection and processing. Unlike 
for the present conceptual assessments, lower levels of agency staff should collect such 
information. In addition, lower echelons of the extension staff, the consultant or the contractors 
could be involved in such assessments. Although agency staff should determine the guidelines 
about the feasibility and functionality criteria as they have to make them feasible and functional 
after the construction anyway. 
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Potential and logical units of decentralization are either the system level, or the subsystem 
served by one or more main, distributary or lateral canals. Generalizations about the appropriate 
level and size for decentralized units are difficult to make, however. Such generalizations 
cannot depend on information considerations only, but depend also on the coherence of the 
problem. Some relevant factors are discussed in the section on Organizational Rules and 
Structures. 
Given the likely pressures by localized interests for favors, higher qualities of capacity 
creation probably can be achieved only if the decentralized units have incentives to achieve 
them. 
Financial Control Systems2 6 6 
Financial accountability for the managing agencies. The observed tendency and attitude of 
irrigation agencies was to go for the maximum investment they could justify, rather than for the 
minimum investment to achieve the same objectives. This tendency seemed to be caused mainly 
by the method of financing the agencies. There appeared to be no relation between their 
finance, either through the government's budgetary allocation or the "free" loans for capital 
investment, and the quality of their capacity creation and the ultimate water-delivery 
performance. Two obvious measures may improve the distorted financial set up for the 
agencies: 1) the development of a direct linkage between the agency's finance and the quality 
of the capacity creation decisions, and the ultimate water-delivery performance; 2) the reduction 
of the proportion of unconditional subsidies as the agency's finance. These two are elaborated 
upon hereafter. 
The most direct linkage between an agency's finance and the quality of its capacity 
creation can be achieved through cost-sharing of the capacity creation by the beneficiaries. This 
is likely to enforce some financial accountability toward real-life experiences, requirements and 
preferences. Especially in view of the fore mentioned large quantities of information required 
to achieve higher levels of sophistication such financial accountability toward the system's clients 
for the capacity creation seems the most logical way to ensure quality improvements. This is 
likely to be strengthened if the agency is also financially accountable to the farmers for the the 
water-delivery performance (e.g., if service fees are a major part of the agency's finance). 
Yet, the agency will only become seriously accountable to the farmers through cost-
sharing if the current dominance of unconditional subsidies on the agency's finance gets reduced. 
This requires both the reduction of the observed systematic misuse of the cost-benefit analysis, 
and the unconditional budgetary allocation to the agency. Both are discussed below. 
Several evaluators have even recommended to abandon cost-benefit analysis for irrigation 
investment as this would lead to better feasibility assessments as such, and thus to better capacity 
creation.2 6 7 Though this may be true in some cases (e.g., under least-cost investment 
approaches at a realistic implementation speed), abandoning cost-benefit analysis would 
institutionalize the subsidized nature of irrigation investment even more than at present. Besides, 
the checks and balances on cost control are likely to become even weaker than observed. 
Abandoning cost-benefit analysis seems therefore not a good solution either. 
Despite the theoretical purpose of the cost-benefit analysis as a guide for substantive 
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choices, its practical role appeared more for facilitating unconditional subsidies for irrigation 
investments and irrigation agencies. A major challenge seems therefore to reduce the hidden 
subsidies in the present application of the cost-benefit analysis, and thus to refurbish the cost-
benefit analysis as an instrument for feasibility assessment rather than for management 
(un)control. 
The introduction of checks and balances on the reliability of the assumptions underlying 
the economic feasibility seems the most logical direction to enforce the systematic introduction 
of more realistic assumptions by investment assessors and designers. It will enforce a more 
realistic economic, and thus indirectly also financial, value for the created capacity and for the 
management of the capacity utilization. 
Although several senior development professionals have pleaded the usefulness of checks 
and balances on overoptimism,268 they were unable to reverse them systematically. The only 
exception observed during this study was ADB's control in recent years of its hereto average 
cost overruns. Of course, such control over the average cost overruns does not necessarily 
exclude further manipulation of the individual assessments, but it showed serious efforts to 
reverse the tide for this assumption. Yet, the World Bank did not seem to make serious, or at 
least effective, efforts in this direction. 
Given the existing pressures and incentives on donor and recipient actors, how can more 
realistic assumptions be enforced? An earlier quoted report that had to investigate the question 
"Does Aid Work?" for the Development Committee (i.e., the Joint Ministerial Committee of the 
Boards of Governors of the World Bank and the IMF), has acknowledged the systematic over-
optimism, and the resulting conflict between quantity and quality. It proposed the so-called 
"remedial principle" to make feasibility and appraisal assumptions more realistic, as described 
below: 
"Among common deficiencies at the appraisal stage are excessive optimism, against the evidence, over project 
completion times; poor appreciation of recipient capacity for administration and implementation; over-optimism 
regarding the time and resources needed by the recipient to take over the project, or for it to become self-
reliant; and the lack of proper forecasting of effects on intended beneficiaries. Action should be taken on all 
these points. On the first three, the 'remedial principle' is once more relevant."269 
"Strengthening the incentives for quality lies in part in applying the 'remedial principle' referred to above, that 
new loan preparation explains how problems encountered in old loans will be overcome. This should be 
observed at all stages of preparation, beginning with design and appraisal. Monitors and evaluators will then 
have something additional to monitor and evaluate: whether problem avoidance procedures have been followed, 
and whether they have been successful . . . 
Once again, agencies differ in the extent to which the 'remedial principle' is already embodied in their 
project work. Some agencies regularly include a section on 'lessons of past projects' in appraisal reports, but 
they are not always incorporated with great seriousness-just as requirements to cover 'environmental impact' 
of projects are often ignored."270 
Yet, the above definition of the "remedial principle" leaves open if the problems in old loans 
can be encountered through a new project concept (i.e., by new approach of the inputs), or by 
more realistic performance assumptions (i.e., by more value for the output expectations). It 
seems thereby a vague concept toward the crucial accountability and performance issues. 
This study's observations suggest the need for more emphasis on the definition of the 
output expectations and clarity about the related accountabilities. A systematic way of 
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implementing this type of remedial principle would be the introduction of a "Performance 
Improvement Assumptions Balance Sheet" (or "Agency Performance and Accountability Sheet") 
in all assessments of an investment's feasibility, loan appraisal and functional requirements. 
Such a balance sheet would explicitly show the existing and assumed average performance 
achievements of the involved irrigation agency for key indicators (such as the level of service, 
the water duties and efficiencies, the cropping intensities, and the level of maintenance service). 
Such a balance sheet forces assessors to make explicit if they assume a pragmatic 10 per cent 
improvement, rather than an overoptimistic 100 per cent. The sheet also could make the risks 
implied in these assumptions for the investment's EIRR explicit. All assumed performance 
improvements in the investment appraisal would have to be justified based on agency 
commitments to improve. The way the agency wants to achieve these performance 
improvements should become completely at the agency's or government's discretion, whether 
through increased participation, automatic flow regulation, or systematic staff performance 
evaluation. What matters is not their achievement to build or implement such measures (i.e., 
the input), but their achievement of the assumed performance improvement (i.e., the output). 
The achievement of such commitments should be part and parcel of the balance sheet of 
every successive donor-funded investment by the same agency. So that gradually loan approvals 
become at least to some degree conditional to the quality of the capacity creation decisions and 
the ultimate water-delivery performance. And attribute thus at least some value to this quality. 
The pursued accountability can only work if all major funding agencies seriously apply the same 
performance and accountability balance sheets. Else the credibility of its conditionality can be 
easily undermined, as, for example, Olivares has described for the World Bank. 2 7 1 
Does such conditionality exist yet, and what are the related experiences so far? Some 
preliminary experiences with such conditionality to performance improvements were traced for 
this study. US AID has experimented recently in some Indian states with the above type of 
conditionality for irrigation investment. Its success was apparently modest, most probably 
because US AID's leverage toward these irrigation agencies has reduced considerably after its 
decision to stop investment in the irrigated subsector. Yet quite successful was, according to 
an interviewed US AID officer, the recent conditionality in Sri Lanka's Mahaweli system B of 
loan disbursements for irrigation construction on the actual implementation of a water allocation 
schedule in the new canals. US AID checked the latter through random on-site sampling of the 
actual implementation of the schedule. According to the project officer, this type of 
conditionality had completely changed certain priorities of the responsible project engineer. 
Outside the development business, conditionality of loan availability on performance 
appeared a standard banking practice nowadays. If a company does not perform well, it appears 
normal for a bank to make further loans conditional on, for example, a certain level of turnover 
in the coming year. This type of performance-oriented conditionalities apparently tends to 
replace the earlier general practice of private banks to intervene more in the client's operation 
to ensure higher performance272 . . .the similarities with development banking in this respect 
seem obvious. 
A logical and related effect of the manipulation of the assumptions pertaining to the EIRR 
is the decreased control over capital expenditures from the national point of view. Also Small 
has remarked this. 2 7 3 Limits on the expenditures per chosen unit were also observed to be 
non-existent in all case studies. For example, the maximum investment per settler, per increased 
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agricultural production, per unit of volume stored or regulated, per job created, per area 
commanded were seldom determined. Steekelenburg has observed this as well in all 11 African 
case studies of the comparative impact study of the EEC. 2 7 4 
The absence of any related control was observed to lead to maximizing investment 
attitudes by irrigation agencies and politicians at great economic loss for the overall country. 
For example, for the Moroccan irrigation authorities it was observed to be more attractive to 
modernize an 80 kilometer main canal for US$ 50 million, rather than to hire two persons to 
manage the existing water flows better and get the same result! Such processes cause 
excessively high average subsidy levels similar to the 83 per cent of full costs, as have been 
reported for the irrigation subsector in the USA. 2 7 5 
Society has made such sacrifices for the irrigation subsector because many felt that 
irrigation has many economic spin-offs and benefits that a cost-benefit analysis does not 
cover. 2 7 6 Economists have disputed such reasoning with some fervor as similar indirect 
benefits evolve from any type of investment.277 
Aluwihara and Kikuchi have developed a remedy against the impact of overoptimism on 
the national opportunities. Their remedy moderates simultaneously the size of the unconditional 
subsidies in the irrigation investments. For Sri Lanka they developed country-specific norms in 
the form of the maximum costs per unit area for new construction and rehabilitation unit. As 
they were based on the probable performance achievements, they prevented overoptimism in the 
assessment of the opportunities of the investment funds.2 7 8 
Reducing the unconditional budgetary allocation for investment to the agency by the 
central government requires more financial independence for the agency. Irrigation agencies 
would then operate like other utilities as those for water supply and electricity. Such financial 
independence would fit well with the fore mentioned financial control changes of cost-sharing 
in capacity creation by farmers, and increased financial accountability to the clients for the 
service-delivery performance. Such financial independence has proven to have impact on the 
investment mode. For example, after an increased financial independence of the irrigation 
agencies in New Zealand the investment pattern has apparently switched overnight from a 
maximizing to a minimizing approach.2 7 9 
Financial accountability of the funding agencies. Related to the implementation of the 
proposed checks and balances is the question why donors have not done so long ago? It 
appeared that the donors were not financially at risk, or accountable, for the quality of the 
investment decisions as well. As the national governments guaranteed the loan repayment to the 
international development banks, 2 8 0 and governments did not make the agencies accountable 
for repayment, no organization or actor was accountable for the quality of the capacity creation. 
The accountability for quantity further constrained the accountability for the performance of the 
capacity utilization. Only the general tax-payers in donor and recipient countries seemed 
(unknowingly) financially at risk as ultimate financiers of the performance deficiencies in the 
irrigation subsector. Repetto has generalized this to all LDCs and financing agencies as follows: 
"Even external financing agencies, such as the multilateral financing banks, are not dependent for debt service 
and repayment on the results of the specific projects to which they lend. At times, large, non-controversial 
projects that development agencies could support have been scarce, and irrigation projects have accounted for 
a large, steady flow of new lending. Irrigation specialists within those agencies naturally prefer a high level 
of activity and engineering consultants and construction firms in the lending countries depend on it (Carruthers 
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1983:96). As a result, financial discipline over investment decisions in public irrigation systems is structurally 
weak, from farmer to international banker, because no party -except the general tax payer— is seriously at risk. 
At the same time, because rents are so large, the pressures for new investments are strong . . .The main 
problem is that, unlike in private investment decisions, neither financial responsibility nor the need to repay 
capital invested in the project imposes a check against inaccuracy and bias in the projected returns."281 
Still, the conflict between quantity and quality is not a new one. Repetto has written 
about the related lack of accountability in 1985, and Cassen in 1986. 2 8 2 At the same time 
when also Yudelman has made suggestions for more realistic assumptions. Yet, very little action 
has been undertaken so far, and the same heroic assumptions were observed in the ongoing 
investment decisions,2 8 3 like they were before. Several interviewed staff members of the 
World Bank and ADB stated that generally the accountability of the recipient agencies was 
considered a non-issue in the international development banks. A likely reason is Cassen's 
argument that they assume that the excellent professionalism of their staff would cover the 
"quality" sufficiently. The financing agencies thus seemed to bank on social responsibility of 
their professionals rather than on accountability.284 
Some interviewed donor staff and others 2 8 5 have argued that the divisions of the 
development banks know a shared accountability for the quality of an investment decision. Yet, 
they acknowledged that such shared accountability easily evolved into no accountability. They 
also tended to consider individual accountability inappropriate, and even beyond discussion. 
Cassen has made this point as follows: " . . .while there are many reasons not to hold project 
staff personally responsible for the ultimate fate of projects, they could be rewarded when 
projects go well." 2 8 6 Cassen's remark has implicitly referred to the political nature of this 
investment decision making, which makes it difficult to hold individuals responsible for the 
manipulation of assumptions. Yet, this does not mean that checks and balances and individual 
accountability would not be beneficial. 
The accountability of the development banks for the quality of its investment decisions 
would benefit probably from increased financial risks for these banks for the performance of the 
individual loans. For example, through providing (part of the) loans directly to irrigation 
agencies, rather than through the national government. Although national governments still may 
have to guarantee the repayment of loans, the financial implications of low quality decisions are 
likely to become more transparent. 
Policy dialogue. All above financial control issues were stated rather bluntly. Important 
for such measures to succeed is their support by the national government and agencies, who 
ultimately have to make it work. This makes it essential to conduct so-called policy dialogues 
between donors and recipients on the advantages and disadvantages of such measures for the 
quality of the investment decisions. 
Some efforts were undertaken in this direction. In recent years, the donors, especially 
the International Monetary Fund, have more and more realized that certain changes in 
government policies were a precondition for effective investments. Therefore, efforts were made 
to start up the policy dialogues with the national governments. For the development banks such 
policy dialogue was observed to relate mainly to project-specific issues formalized in loan 
covenants.2 8 7 More recently, these project-based investments have transformed more and 
more into sector loans. 
Sector loans tend to provide general investment funds for a sector during a certain period, 
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on condition the government commits itself to introduce certain unpopular policies. Yet, 
accountability for performance achievements was not observed to be brought into this process. 
The sector loans therefore seemed to cause, to a certain degree, only a strengthening of the bias 
for quantity, and a further weakening of the accountability for the quality of the decisions about 
the capacity creation and the ultimate performance. An interviewed senior World Bank staff 
member argued that the World Bank's leverage toward the large Asian irrigation bureaucracies 
was too weak to bring performance achievements into the discussion. Though he admitted that 
it had not been seriously tried as well. 2 8 8 
Provision of Knowledge 
The irrigation engineering profession was observed to rely for the capacity creation mainly on 
certain "blueprint" planning and design concepts. The management conditions on which these 
blueprints seemed implicitly based were non-existent in all case studies, though this gap was 
much smaller in Morocco. More appropriate knowledge therefore required the development of 
an engineering profession that does not solely rely on the international reference literature and 
its generally implicit functional requirements and assumptions. Such new irrigation 
professionalism should work less with blueprints, and should always test the proposed design 
criteria and concepts for their feasibility and functionality for specific locations and countries. 
Although fewer blueprints seem required, some improved, more appropriate blueprints 
are likely to facilitate system planning and design. Two specific examples of aspects of more 
real-life design concepts are the following. A higher level of sophistication would require an 
irrigation engineering that provides insights on the mutual interrelations between different aspects 
of a feasibility assessment such as the dam sites in a water shed, the water duties, the related 
water-delivery concepts, the cropping patterns, the cropping intensities and the command areas, 
the full reservoir levels and dam heights, the inundated areas, the required resettlement, the 
maintenance levels and the related life spans of projects. Provision of such system design 
concepts would require subject matter specialists to work as real teams to identify such 
interrelations, unlike their present practice to accomplishing each a separate task. A higher level 
of sophistication of the determination of a system's functional requirements also would require 
the provision of knowledge about more creative and integrated perspectives on design features 
such as the system layout, the controllability of flow, the peak irrigation requirements, the 
required management inputs of agency staff and farmers, and the non-irrigation functions of a 
system. 
The observed knowledge gap of more real-life planning and design concepts seemed 
caused by the lengthy supply-driven mode of irrigation investment. Initially, irrigation 
consultants were equipped with knowledge developed during colonial times. Some assumed 
management conditions of developed countries thus seemed still applicable in LDCs. 2 8 9 
Though their expertise appeared less applicable nowadays in all case studies, the consultants 
were observed to play a major role in the development of conceptual solutions. The following 
processes seemed to cause this. Consultants (and development experts in general) have to 
sustain their livelihood, and if they happen to get lousy terms of reference, the survival of the 
company or themselves tends to make them to accept the job anyhow. 2 9 0 Similarly, though 
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irrigation investments continued to be disappointing beyond their control—their initial concepts 
were based on colonial tradition with such control-they would always innovate to find technical 
solutions, ways and design concepts that justified new investments. 
Such processes during the past 20 years seem to have slowly evolved into a situation 
where these consultants and donors together control the current irrigation design concepts, 
however theoretical they may be. 2 9 1 And they were observed to have become more and more 
theoretical nowadays as the younger generations of professionals, whether consultant, donor, or 
non-profit, lacked real-life experience in managing irrigation systems. 
More appropriate knowledge development requires the development of an engineering 
profession by the national agencies, that have more potential to determine the real-life 
feasibilities and functionalities than external consultants and donor staff. Yet, this requires the 
feasibility and functionality of the investment to become a concern for the national agency rather 
than these external parties. 
Reducing the listed gaps is desirable. On the other hand, the importance of such gaps 
in irrigation planning and design must not be exaggerated (as some irrigation professionals tend 
to do). This may lead to a focus on an improved irrigation professionalism only, while leaving 
the crucial issues untouched. Weak professionalism seems more a consequence of the weak 
motivation and accountability, and thus of inexperience, to deliver quality, than the cause of it. 
Improved professionalism can facilitate improvement processes. But it cannot be the sole 
entrance. 
Thus, knowledge must be developed also on how the processes for improved quality of 
the investment and design decisions could be integrated with the overall financial set up of 
irrigation investment by the international development banks. 
Organization Rules and Structure 
Decentralization and the role of the funding agencies. The need for decentralization of the 
responsibility for the quality of the capacity creation decisions, and the related levels of 
decentralization evolved from several fore mentioned management conditions. So this section 
need not repeat that structural aspect. Yet, related to this question of decentralization appeared 
the present centralized responsibility for the quality~in terms of the conceptual or professional 
rather than the real-life quality-of this decision making in the development banks. 
The role of the international development banks was observed to go far beyond the 
primary concerns of any normal large bank. Two World Bank staff members have described 
this as follows: 
"[Other large banks'] primary concern is to provide money for investment purposes, and not to determine 
whether the technology chosen for the investment makes the most efficient use of resources, whether local 
people have been trained to master the technology, or whether there has been a thorough assessment of the 
project on the environment or on the society. What makes the Bank a technological institution is its active role 
in the choice appropriate to each particular situation and in the mobilization of local technological capacity for 
the accomplishment of socioeconomic objectives of human development.. .Indeed, we may well be witnessing 
the beginnings of a new type of technology policy based on financial institutions, unlike our current technology 
policies, which are based for the most part on research institutions."292 
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Justification by the staff of the observed development banks for their technical interventions was 
usually the professional quality of their staff compared to the national capacities. Unfortunately, 
in all case studies the professional donor staff seemed able to address the management 
bottlenecks only in a conceptual way, through blueprints, and never by location-specific 
solutions. Besides, the management aspects remained far beyond their control. 
These observations suggested that development banks should not really become involved 
in determining solutions for processes they could not adequately influence, neither could 
sufficiently understand. "Stick to the Knitting" was one the main lessons advocated by Peters 
and Waterman's "In Search of Excellence" for successful companies, and this lesson seemed 
appropriate for the development banks as well. Development banks should stick to banking. 
Although as a development-oriented bank they should be aware of an insufficient, 
ineffective or inefficient level of internal organization, and the related lack of accountability of 
their clients in an underdeveloped managerial and political environment. Thus, their additional 
concern compared to a normal bank should be to create and maintain a local and internal concern 
for performance. This chapter described several related measures, mainly changes in the 
financial control. 
Presently, the interventions of the donors were observed to stimulate the reverse, by 
making performance increasingly an external concern. Making the specific technological and 
other choices by themselves as bankers was observed to confuse only the responsibility for the 
quality and performance by the national parties, and seemed thus counterproductive. To reverse 
that, development banks could require the national parties to present a fully developed plan, and 
assess its feasibility in a (quantity-)neutral way. The assessment of the design's functionality 
would remain a national discretion, although its quality should be enforced through the earlier 
proposed funding conditionality on performance achievements. And a badly prepared plan 
would be considered to show a constrained feasibility for outside funding, unless accountability 
for the quality of the investment decision and the performance were less important. 
Such more prudent, essentially economically and financially, rather than technologically 
oriented funding practices may delay initially the "fund channeling" functions of the funding 
agencies. But it is likely to sustain a more gradual development that allows the testing of 
envisaged design concepts and functions. Though such process changes seemed unlikely if donor 
staff do not become individually accountable for the quality of their investment decisions. 
Accountability. Information on an investment's performance in itself was indispensable 
for any accountability of (the staff of) a managing agency or donor. Yet, the information about 
the performance of the development investments tended to be confined to the quantity of the 
actual and target loan disbursements, and the quality of the actual and target project 
implementation. These performance targets were important for the donors, so the national 
agencies, government and donors were observed to collect the required information 
comparatively seriously. 
Amazingly enough though, information on the performance of the capacity utilization was 
not made available in any of the case studies except Morocco. Carruthers has criticized this as 
follows: 
"...there is a tendency for ex post evaluation to be seen primarily as an accounting or audit exercise with a 
check on the quality of design and supervision. The operation phase is isolated from the main parts of the 
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project cycle and for various complex reasons, mistakes are covered rather than recorded. In consequence, the 
learning process, which is conceived to be an integral part of project-oriented development, is very much 
diminished."293 
The consequence of the exclusion of the capacity utilization phase from the investment 
audit was that the project audit at project completion tended to evaluate an irrigation investment 
and its conceptual design based on its conceptual soundness rather than its actual feasibility and 
functionality.294 Only during the mid and late 1980s, the World Bank and ADB have started 
to assess the performance of their projects five years after their completion. Although donors 
and national parties alike seemed less good in, if not resisting, the use of such information for 
improvement of the quality of the decision making about the capacity creation295, such 
information's availability is indispensable for the development of any related accountability. 
Privatization. One proposed change in the financial control was an increased financial 
independence for the irrigation agencies. In New Zealand it has apparently reversed the 
investment pattern overnight from a maximizing to a minimizing approach, as mentioned before. 
Several professionals have argued that a more financially autonomous status for irrigation 
agencies is likely to lead to improved investment decisions.2 9 6 For example, Duane has listed 
the following valid advantages of restructuring irrigation agencies into so-called "public 
utilities", similarly to such others as the domestic water supply and electricity agencies: 
"-avoids a drain on government budgets; 
-provides a more certain guarantee (than does benefit-cost analysis) that irrigation investments are worthwhile; 
-reduces the political pressures that bias irrigation designs towards maximizing the number of beneficiaries, 
rather than efficient production; and 
-affords more direct public accountability and control over public irrigation agencies and their staff."297 
As many authors have expressed similar suggestions, the question arises why it did not yet 
happen? 
Irrigation agencies and national planning agencies in all case studies were observed to 
resist such changes, although this attitude seemed to be changing in the Moroccan and Sudanese 
case studies. Professionals have reported the opposition to such changes of many lobby groups 
inside and outside irrigation2 9 8, and so far they were apparently successful. Heaver has 
described them as the "silent coalitions of indifference"; while internally divided on questions 
of power and allocation of resources, to the external environment they act homogenous in the 
collective effort to acquire resources. Simultaneously, they represent the indifference toward 
the effectiveness of the utilization of these resources.2 9 9 
Another reason the change to utilities was not made so far, seems the fact that the 
international development banks left the issue to the discretion of the national governments.3 0 0 
Yet, more recent pressures on national budgets and on governments by the IMF seemed to 
induce national governments to take initiating steps toward more financial independence of its 
irrigation agencies. Given the above resistances Repetto seemed right to have advocated such 
an interventionist approach by the international funding agencies to break the resistance of the 
irrigation lobbies in the following citation: 
"...strategies for change must either circumvent this coalition by emphasizing private sector irrigation 
development where it is feasible or break it by imposing greater financial responsibilities, from the top down, 
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on irrigation interests. Rents can only be squeezed out of public irrigation systems step by step—by imposing 
a repayment obligation for new irrigation and rehabilitation investments on each level of financial authority from 
national governments to international financing agencies, from provincial governments to and irrigation agencies 
to the national treasury, from water user associations to irrigation agencies, and finally from individual farm 
beneficiaries to their water-user associations. If an agency must repay funds transferred to it from a higher level 
of authority and pay for services it has received, then-like it or not- it must exert pressure on agencies below 
to do the same."301 
Financial autonomy may provide incentives to improve accountability, but does not 
guarantee it. Without an integrated approach of parallel changes in other management conditions 
to make the agency accountable for its performance, it also can lead to "adverse incentives". 
Observed examples in the Philippine case studies were the deference of maintenance, and a focus 
of management inputs on the cost recovery at the expense of the service delivery itself. Small 
has also observed these in the Philippines as well as in Mexico. 3 0 2 Besides, he reported on 
other experiences with adverse incentives such as monopolistically high water fees, degrading 
the environment, or the replacement of recurrent costs with extra capital inputs, if only the latter 
remains subsidized.303 
The more independent irrigation government corporations observed in the Philippines and 
Morocco were not accountable for the water-related performance. Also Korten has remarked 
this about the Philippine National Irrigation Administration (NIA). 3 0 4 They were observed to 
remain dependent on the government budgetary allocations, and accountabilities for the (partial) 
repayment of loans were not enforced. The difference with normal line agencies seemed 
therefore not obvious. Svendsen has remarked this for the Philippine NIA as well. 3 0 5 The 
choices for these structural forms were apparently not very serious and probably merely 
symbolic3 0 6. These observations therefore supported Heaver's following statements: "structural 
reform, therefore, is useless unless the incentives exist for new structures to be used 
effectively."307 
The above changes in management conditions are those required mainly from the perspective of 
capacity creation. A full management perspective requires a simultaneous consideration of the 
perspective of the capacity utilization. Chapter 6 therefore integrates the required changes in 
management conditions from both these perspectives, and derives the related management-control 
decisions. 
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1979:25). 
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(Carruthers and Clark 1981:205). 
33. Moris 1987:106; Bottrall 1985:9. 
34. Moris 1987:106. 
35. "External consultants are usually based in Europe or America, and return to base after each phase in project 
development. This institutional setting inhibits learning from experience at the local level. By the time feedback from 
farmers can occur, the physical investments are locked in, and, in any event, the experts in charge of design will have 
departed." (Ibid: 103) 
36. Bottrall 1985:9. George Laycock's description of such attitudes in the USA: "The pork barrel has become a way 
of political life. Politicians...often believe they can equate their own worth to their home districts with the amount of 
money they send back from the federal treasury. Although there are other cuts of pork, such as post office buildings, 
the choice ones are the impressive big water projects scattered from Maine to Hawaii. The individual congressman has 
his eye on the project closest to his heart, which is to say, nearest to his voting booth. He might sense that projects 
within the bill are a waste of federal fund, but he is reluctant to argue against his fellow-congressmen's favorite dam or 
canal. To do so is to jeopardize the other's support for his own pet project." (Laycock in Goldsmith and Hildyard 
1984:259). 
37. Repetto 1986:22; Moore 1987:12. Sheridan's remarks about the extremely water scarce Western en South Western 
USA: "human systems are exceeding the carrying capacity of their natural life support systems" (Sheridan in Goldsmith 
and Hildyard 1984:261), and "it is unlikely that any sensible conservation measures will be introduced voluntarily. The 
reason lies in the availability of federal pork. No one, least of all the farmers in the area, want to be told that they must 
limit their use of water: instead, they see the solution lying in the massive water projects which the politicians promise 
to build with federal funds." (ibid). The heavy subsidies in irrigation investment in the case studies caused similar 
processes. 
38. Bottrall 1985:9-10. 
39. Frederiksen 1987:15; and 1989:6. 
40. Nijman 1992a. 
41. Ibid:112. 
42. GOAP 1982:43. 
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44. World Bank 1990d:36. 
45. Chambers 1988:115. 
46. Abbie et al. 1982:25 in Chambers 1988:116. 
47. Washington: US Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, International Economics Division, 
December 1984 in Repetto 1986:4. 
48. GOAP 1982:48. 
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56. ADB 1986:22. 
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58. Steekelenburg et al. 1985:12. 
59. World Bank 1990d:14. 
60. Diemer 1990:123. Besides, similar to the Sri Lankan case studies, Diemer has observed that although the current 
engineering paradigm frames engineers to design for double cropping (i.e., a 200% cropping intensity), he knew of no 
African example where force was exercised to actually achieve such double cropping. 
61. An irrigation professional has remarked the following on ADB's first irrigation impact study: "..the ADB did a 
impact survey in 7 different systems and found that outcomes were only 15 % of what the project documents were saying. 
Neighboring projects were studied as control areas, and had similar yield increases as the ADB investments. What had 
been really attributable to the projects was extremely little. ADB did not like the impact study, and censored the report 
considerably. It shows that vested interests impede honest assessments and evaluation of project results." (TiMt/World 
Bank 1991:50). 
62. E.g., a remark by a World Bank official on Indian irrigation: "Irrigation potential means nothing in reality." 
(UMI/World Bank 1991:36). 
63. GOAP 1982:3. 
64. Ibid:58. 
65. Ibid:66. 
66. Carruthers and Clark 1981:217. 
67. GOAP 1982:56. 
68. Moris 1987:116; De Leeuw 1985:280. 
69. This World Bank practice contrasts apparently with older guidelines used in the United States and Europe (Tiffen 
1987b:15). 
70. GOAP 1982:48. 
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71. It is also one of the few direct references in this respect: "...the reservoir duties are also based on experience in the 
past. The current trend is to plan irrigation projects on the basis of water requirements of crops on the field for meeting 
the evaporation demand and provide suitable extra capacity for water application losses and transmission losses." (GOAP 
1982:3), whereby "The irrigation Department has been planning irrigation projects on the basis of a designed cropping 
pattern to give a favorable benefit cost ratio." (ibid). 
72. Standard work on these concepts is Doorenbos and Pruitt 1977. 
73. Levine 1977:38. 
74. For example, Palmer Jones has referred to the irrelevance of the theoretical requirements as follows: "Economists 
have long pointed out that such a procedure aims to maximize yields and ignores costs [Carruthers and Clark 1980:45]; 
the economic definition of optimum irrigation capacity, balancing marginal costs and returns from extra water supply 
or water supply capacity, will prescribe levels of these variables that will not usually be insufficient to meet peak demand 
and will entail some water stress and consequent loss in yield. However economists have neither provided satisfactory 
operational definitions of optimal capacity and operating rules to assist designers, managers, and rehabilitators of 
irrigation systems, nor have they been able to explain actual irrigation capacity utilisation. This makes it very difficult 
to estimate underutilisation of capacity, and diagnose its causes." (Palmer Jones 1988:1) 
Diemer has toned down the perceived underutilization in African irrigation as farmers go for the least-cost 
production for self-sufficiency (Diemer 1990:70). Slabbers has argued that farmers consider minimizing conflicts as part 
of irrigation efficiency unlike the theoretical engineering concepts of efficiency (Slabbers 1989:677). Ironically, chapter 
4 has shown that the engineers and other agency staff also pursue the minimizing of conflicts during capacity utilization. 
Only in formal planning, design and utilization procedures they are expected, and have been taught at university, to use 
conceptual efficiencies. 
Wade has referred to the general link between management and irrigation efficiencies as follows: "The recurrent 
weakness of irrigation project design is an (implicit) assumption that water control is a function mainly, or only, of 
physical structures; so that if physical structures are greatly improved, one can be sure that water control will improve 
also." (Wade 1982b:179) Quoting Levine, he consequently has given convincing arguments of the function of 
management for a system in Iran "which has a full range of modern control structures, measuring devices, organisational 
structure and 'all the other accoutrements of a large modern system". After six years of operation, average water use 
efficiency was between 11 per cent and 15 per cent, while nearby traditional systems, with minimal physical control 
structures, have water use efficiencies of around 25%. The very high efficiencies in Taiwan-around 60 per cent in 
normal water supply conditions, rising to 90 per cent as water becomes very scarce—are achieved with physical structures 
which are not particularly sophisticated, by means of very effective utilisation of those structures, which is a function 
of management." (ibid) 
75. According to him, before the introduction of these more scientific approaches, the Irrigation Department used a more 
gradual approach to irrigation improvement whereby a part of the command area is developed and further developments 
would depend on the actual remaining amounts of water. 
76. Heaver has described the process inside the Mahaweli Authority and the Sri Lankan Cabinet. He showed thereby 
that all involved parties were well aware of the highly unrealistic nature of the optimistic water efficiency estimates, 
partly "never before achieved on any major irrigation scheme in Sri Lanka." (Heaver 1979:26-32). 
77. Ibid:68. Or, the Chief in charge of Investigation and Planning when asked about the basis on which cropping pattern 
is decided: "Irrigation projects are being planned as productive projects yielding suitable returns as judged by the benefit 
cost ration worked out for each scheme. All the projects are being planned for optimum yields of crops with full supply 
of water as required for such growth...."... .The Project Authorities appear to be obsessed with the criterion of benefit-
cost (BC) ratio for obtaining clearance of the scheme from the Planning Commission and the Government of India...The 
project authorities try to work out a favorable benefit-cost ration on the basis of a hypothetical cropping pattern. Simply 
stated, it means that a larger area than what could possibly be irrigated is presented as the beneficiary area. To achieve 
this end, it becomes necessary to show that lands can be irrigated for an assumed cropping pattern which in many cases 
has no relevance to local practices, agro-climatic conditions and farmers' preference. If one cropping pattern does not 
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result in projecting a favorable BC ratio another cropping pattern is assumed. Similarly, the assumptions for "duty" are 
generally very optimistic if not unrealistic in order to show that more area can be irrigated under the system than is ever 
possible in view of past experience. As no monitoring and evaluation of projects is done to find out whether they are 
performing according to the original promise, new projects are mere replications of the earlier projects with all the 
attendant deficiencies of the older schemes. The net result is that long stretches of main canals, distributaries and minor 
canals are built which do not receive any water at all or if they do, the supply is very inadequate and not enough for the 
growth of the crops planned. Such an extension of the canals is sometimes done for political reasons as well, when 
farmers lower down in the system demand water and to satisfy them a canal system has to be built." (ibid:69) 
A similar manipulation of soil proportions for Sri Lanka's Kirindi Oya system is described in ADB 
1977a:XXLX.10 quoted in Nijman 1992a:93. 
Ferguson found for the Philippines that only 75% of the service areas are irrigated during the wet season, that 
design expectations are "rarely attained" and that such overestimation is worse for newer systems. An important factor 
being the "intentional inflation of service area estimates to improve the project's chances for approval and funding" 
(Ferguson 1987 in Azarcon 1990:40) 
Similarly Moris mentions the Bura system in the lower Tana (Kenya) where the estimated size was adjusted from 
100,000 to 120,000 ha to achieve a 10% internal rate of return (Moris 1987:104). 
78. The major irrigation donors have undertaken such impact studies only recently. The ADB has published its first in 
1986, while the World Bank only in 1989. Also national governments did not take much action, as has been described 
well by the government commission for Andhra Pradesh as follows: "Yet, in project after project including the latest on-
going projects and also those in the pipe line no organised thinking seems to have been done at any level to remedy the 
earlier defects and to improve the planning, design, construction and management of new Irrigation Projects. The 
evidence before the Commission shows that all projects are merely replications of earlier projects without any effort at 
monitoring, evaluation, and rectification of deficiencies in earlier systems. This situation assumes greater gravity when 
we take into account the massive financial investment made by the State in Irrigation at the cost of other sectors like 
education, health, social welfare or even in other aspects of agricultural development including systematic follow up 
action after creating the irrigation potential meant for agriculture....The Commission tried to find out whether any policy 
paper has been issued by Government but was not able to lay hands on any such document." (GOAP 1982:51) and "No 
economic analysis has, however, been done of the BC ratio of any project by looking into its final cost and the area 
actually irrigated and the benefits actually accrued to the farmers from such irrigation and no comparison is made with 
the original assumptions." (ibid:70) 
79. Vide publications by Farmer, Chambers and Moore. 
80. E.g., Nijman 1991. 
81. Le Moigne 1986:2. 
82. E.g., the following quotation: "...the irrigation intensity assumed by the World Bank Team were also higher...The 
project facilities were proposed to be utilised in Kharif and Rabi seasons. Although the Project Agreement for 
implementing these changes has been signed by the Government of Andhra Pradesh 1982, no formal orders have been 
issued so far permitting irrigation in Kharif as well as Rabi seasons instead of following the localised pattern or irrigation 
for wet and I.D. crops in the Kharif season only." (GOAP 1982:38) 
83. E.g., Siy 1990:4. 
84. Conform ADB 1987:2 and 4. 
85. ADB 1987; World Bank 1986. 
86. UMI/Word Bank 1991:15-16; Howell 1985 in Svendsen et al. 1990:4. Howell has argued that the recurrent cost 
problem in LDCs "is not simply one of limited domestic financing capability", and that increased revenue levels will 
not necessarily solve this problem (ibid). 
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87. UMI/Word Bank 1991:46. 
88. Cassen 1986:126. 
89. "The rapid infrastructure deterioration common to all four projects...has nothing to do with the complexity of 
technology, it is not obsolete water control, it is not the weather, and O&M funding levels are too easy to use as a 
diversion from the real cause. All these countries and the major countries where the Bank is supporting "rehab" or 
"modernization" or "upgrading" work display identical experiences....This is not a question of O&M funding, O&M staff 
or the nature of the schemes. It is plain and simply a matter of non-enforcement of proper, simple construction methods 
and practices as specified in the approved construction documents This is a situation that should receive urgent 
attention Bank-wide... .and it should be placed in its proper perspective—at the top of problems in irrigation" (World Bank 
1990d:37) (Original underlining, CN). See also Frederiksen 1989:7. 
90. GOAP 1982:86. 
91. World Bank 1986:ii. 
92. World Bank 1986:iii. The Bank's policy has always been to recover all costs from beneficiaries for all its projects, 
agricultural projects sometimes being exceptions. However, "as a minimum, operational and maintenance (O&M) costs 
should be recovered completely." (ibid:4). The Bank's efforts in irrigation have focused mainly on these recurrent costs 
recovery. Even if there are no fundamental justifications for this distinction in costs of operation and maintenance and 
capital (Roumasset 1987 in Svendsen et al. 1990:3), Svendsen has argued that "there are practical reasons for i t -
including the fact that foreign and multilateral lenders will readily finance the former but seldom the latter." (ibid) 
93. Repetto 1986:21. 
94. This is displayed, for example, in the following citation of a senior World Bank official: "The precise origin of this 
policy feature is obscure. The most plausible explanation is a fiscal one: namely the concern that project O&M costs 
should not become a burden on the government recurrent budget. But there has always been the hint of an implicit 
behavioral assumption: namely, that irrigation project entities could be induced to behave like public utilities -e .g . , 
electricity supply, port, an portable water supply authorities- which are commonly set up as autonomous agencies, reliant 
on their own generated commercial revenues." (Duane 1986:6). Duane refers to it as "implicit", because Bank staff 
always relate cost recovery with "efficiency" (ibid:7). 
The same implicit assumptions can be read also in an early World Bank policy document advocating that a low 
water price would stimulate Asian farmers to use irrigation water (IBRD 1965:25-26)—itself a rather theoretical case 
given the actual low service fee recovery rates in Asian irrigation. 
95. Personal communication with senior World Bank staff. See also, World Bank 1986:43 and 46. 
96. Bottrall has stated this as follows: "Much of their [i.e., economists'] efforts have been wasted on elaborate proposals 
for changes in water pricing policy which have done little except reveal the authors' failure to comprehend the political 
and social environments in which decisions about water have to be made." (Bottrall 1985:11) 
97. Levine and Wickham 1977:74; Moore 1987. 
98. "Yet Borrowers' irrigation entities are invariably a part of regular Government departments and Ministries, without 
financial autonomy, and wholly dependent on the Government budget. Their very existence in such a form —accountable 
directly to a Government Minister— is a notable expression of Borrower desire to keep such agencies firmly in the 
political domain where there is maximum opportunity to exercise discretion and minimum constraint from the rules of 
commercial undertakings." (Duane 1986:7). 
99. Ibid:3. 
RESULTS: CAPACITY CREATION 189 
100. The following four citations have described this very well:"...the wide-ranging social, economic and political 
implications of tariff/user fee covenants, well beyond the boundaries of the projects, were not adequately studied at 
appraisal. Perhaps the implications were overlooked or avoided as a matter of expediency. There was hesitation in some 
cases in addressing such sensitive socioeconomic realities....Many such covenants were accepted without an assessment 
of the practicability of such covenants, including the requirements of confidentiality. There was consequently a lack of 
abiding commitment on the part of the borrowers." (ADB 1987:5). 
"...borrower or the executing agencies were not fully committed to their objectives. Recognizing that the 
performance of a project can never be insulated from its external macro-economic environment and sector policies, the 
Bank has been increasingly addressing such issues through covenants in project and program loans. However, appraisal 
missions have often to contend with the constraints of time and technical support which hinder a full comprehension or 
analysis of the macro-level issues and impact involved. Moreover, such an analysis may not always be within the domain 
of the executing agency." (ibid) 
"At the project preparation stage, a failure of the Bank and the borrowers (and all the executing agencies) to 
have a genuine two-way dialogue and reach a satisfactory understanding on the underlying objectives of the covenant 
often resulted in the absence of an abiding commitment to its compliance." (ibid:8) 
"Comments on this report received from the Government of India are typical of the lack of consensus between 
the Bank and a government. While the Bank advocates cost recovery as an important means for achieving both 
sustainability and replicability of irrigation projects, the Government of India states that its policy is different and that 
it does not expect irrigation projects to generate revenues or recover costs to ensure project sustainability after 
completion." (World Bank 1986:26) 
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102. Ibid:i. 
103. Duane 1986:8. 
104. World Bank 1986:43. 
105. E.g., ADB 1987:6; Cassen 1986. 
106. Carruthers and Clark 1981:53. 
107. Cassen 1986:126. 
108. World Bank 1990b:65. 
109. ADB 1990b:22. 
110. World Bank 1990b:62. 
111. Paranjpye in Goldsmith et al. 1984:270. 
112. ADB 1990b:23. 
113. Md:7. 
114. Siy 1990:2. 
115. Tiffen 1989:72. 
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116. World Bank 1990a: 14. Similarly, the Tenth Annual Review of Project Performance Audit Results of the World 
Bank has remarked that of all 25 long-term impact evaluations (i.e., 5 to 25 years after project completion) of projects 
that were considered worthwhile at audit, half of them were no longer (World Bank 1984:vii). 
117. World Bank 1990b:23. 
118. Steekelenburg et al. 1985:12. 
119. Frederiksen 1987:15. See also Seckler's image quoted in Note 3 of this chapter. 
120. Frederiksen 1989:6. 
121. Cassen 1986:117. 
122. Carruthers 1983a:53. 
123. "The Bank-approved Guidelines for Irrigation and Drainage Projects were revised in 1983 (FAO Investment Center, 
1983) and those for Agricultural Investment Projects in 1985 (FAO Investment Center, 1985)" (Tiffen 1987a:373). 
124. Tiffen 1987a:372-373. 
125. For example, Bloemen and De Moor have argued this for water (Bloemen and De Moor 1983:370). 
126. World Bank 1990b:23. 
127. The US Bureau of Reclamation's manual of 1951 and "The Guide to the Economic Evaluation of Irrigation Projects" 
by Bergmann and Boussard 1976 in Tiffen 1987a:374-375. 
128. This exception was a recent publication on NLA (Svendsen et al. 1990). 
129. Tiffen 1989:71. 
130. Repetto 1986:22; And Wade has remarked that the state's capability to work in the national interest becomes very 
weak in a "a state close to a condition of populist anarchy, with the rule of law constantly abrogated by the power of 
money Seckler's image of canals rolling up behind as new ones are rolled out in front then becomes a metaphor for 
the whole development administration." (Wade 1983:298). Also Carruthers in an UMI seminar in June 1990 has 
expressed a similar opinion "...governments in LDCs work seldom in public interest....Apart from population growth, 
mainly lousy macro-policies in Egypt for the last 20 years have caused it to be importing two-thirds of its food, while 
it had been self-sufficient for 2000 years." 
131. Sagasti 1988:433. For example, De Leeuw has described how the national plans aimed at acquiring as much foreign 
funds as possible, while ignoring the political realities. Kenya's Ministry of Finance appeared to be well aware of this 
function of the plan (Holtam and Hazlewood 1976:213 in De Leeuw 1985:123) 
132. "...in a surprisingly large number of (mainly African) countries, the government has no central unit with an 
overview of all aid flows; donors still negotiate with individual ministries. The first requirement for coordination is that 
the recipient have such a unit negotiating all aid agreements or having negotiations reported to it. Only then can the 
government link 'upwards' to the higher-level, donor-coordinating institutions, and outward to coordination activities 
within the country. The recipient should also have effective sectoral coordinating bodies to relate aid projects and 
programmes to each other and to its own development spending." (Cassen 1986:319) 
133. Repetto 1986:22. 
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134. As a senior World Bank staff member has remarked: "It is, however, necessary to do certain big infrastructure 
investments for which you have to steal money of the rest of the country." (LTMI/World Bank 1991:50). See also, 
Repetto 1986:8; The Economist 1991a. 
135. See note 78. 
136. Levine and Wickham 1977:68; Van de Laar 1979:208 in De Leeuw 1985; Goldsmith and Hildyard 1984:249. 
137. Generalizing statements of manipulation have been given by, for example, Tiffen 1989:79; Carruthers 1983; Roe 
1985:208; Gasper 1989:30; GOAP 1982:70; and Goldsmith and Hildyard 1984:270-272. The latter have observed 12 
types of manipulation to justify dam projects (ibid:272-283). De Leeuw has given a detailed account of manipulations 
of sequential assessments for Kenya's Bura where "feasible" investments amounted to US$25,000 per ha. Other terms 
used for manipulation of the EIRR are "fudging" (e.g., Goldsmith 1982:265), "massaging" and "SOSlPing" (or 
Sophisticated Obfuscation of Self-interest and Prejudice) (Stern quoted by Gasper 1989:30). 
138. World Bank 1990b:6. 
139. Van de Laar 1979:235-236, Verloren van Themaat 1983:13 in De Leeuw 1985:126. Holtha and Hazlewood 1976:89 
and a seminar by a Western diplomat quoted in De Leeuw 1985:127. 
140. Donors have even conceptualized this availability of good projects as the "absorption capacity" of LDCs, which 
is typically lowest in the least developed countries. 
141. Gunnell 1983:29; Tendler 1975:90 in De Leeuw 1985. 
142. A senior staff member of the World Bank's regional office in Nairobi quoted in De Leeuw 1985:127. 
143. See also page 125. 
144. OECD DAC 1984c in Cassen 1986:170. 
145. Cassen 1986:170. 
146. A citation of a Canadian report on Bangladesh in Cassen 1986:172. 
147. Cassen 1986:309. To remain fair, Cassen's subsequent sentence should be quoted as well: "But they are 
omnipresent. Quality considerations enter in mainly through the professionalism of staff, and also through the pressures 
from the recipients with developed capacity for judging projects." (ibid) To give a complete perspective, Cassen's latter 
argument on quality inputs by national partners should also have intimated the political pressures on agencies and 
individuals to keep a low profile towards such quality aspects. 
148. Cassen 1986:309-311. 
149. As mentioned before, interviewees in Morocco, Philippines and Sri Lanka remarked that the tendency of staff to 
raise quality related issues in such interaction has declined over time with the persistence of quantity-related interests. 
150. For a full discussion of this problem, see N. Hildyard, Cover-up, New English Library, London, 1983. 
151. Goldsmith and Hildyard 1984:265. Gasper has also written an interesting sociological perspective on this lack of 
neutrality of assessors in general: "Formal assessors may sometimes "join the team", even when not employed by the 
assessed organization-not only through social induction but because of their own interests in not rocking die boat but 
instead maintaining a steady and predicted flow of expenditure" (Gasper 1989:41), and has referred to some internal 
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criticisms of the US AID on their evaluations being "...essentially an advocacy process" and "AID analysis in project 
papers has been overly and unnecessarily optimistic" (ibid). See also Gow 1991. 
152. Heaver is one of the few who has written on this: "The history of appraisal has followed a course of concentration 
first on technical factors; then on economic appraisal, with the rise of cost-benefit analysis: then to an interest in the 
social effects of projects -on equity, on farmers as groups etc. But no appraisal procedures in standard use seriously 
set out to assess the management capability of recipient institutions." (Heaver 1979:34) 
153. Galbraith 1973:89. 
154. Dyson 1990:11. 
155. Levine and Wickham 1977:69. 
156. Van de Laar 1979:208 in De Leeuw 1985:138. 
157. Siy 1990:4. 
158. Conform ibid:3. 
159. World Bank 1984:50. 
160. Carruthers and Clayton, op. cit. 1977 in Carruthers and Clark 1981:229. 
161. The Economist 1991a. 
162. Lahlou in Eaux et Terres:41. 
163. EMI/World Bank 1991:50. 
164. Svendsen et al. 1990; Barker et al. 1984. 
165. In the following citation, Heaver has been very critical of cost-benefit analysis in view of their neglect of incentives: 
"A third reason for neglect is that present techniques and habits of thought were developed largely for a previous 
generation of much less "management-intensive" projects and programs. The new-style rural development project of the 
1970s raised the management problem in its most acute form, with the need for centralized bureaucracies to organize 
change in areas remote from the capital and poorly served with physical and administrative infrastructure: and within 
those areas to reach a large, geographically diffuse and ill-educated population. The emphasis on "integrated" 
development put further stress on management, calling as it did for unprecedented coordination and cooperation between 
government departments. Project appraisal and evaluation techniques lag behind the requirements of a changing 
philosophy of development. The evolution of cost-benefit analysis is an example. The main efforts to improve cost-
benefit techniques have concentrated on the quantitative pricing of costs and benefits (e.g., shadow pricing and weighing 
systems), rather than on improving the qualitative assessment of realistic implementation speeds. This is despite the fact 
that these are not only of crucial social and political importance, but directly affect the economic LRR which has been 
of so much concern to the analysis themselves. 
The preoccupation with allocative efficiency at the expense of organizational efficiency and effectiveness was 
highlighted by Harvey Leibenstein of Harvard University in a now classic article as long ago as 1966 (Leibenstein, 
1966). One reason for relative neglect of the efficiency factor is that closer involvement with management questions, 
and hence with the control of recipient organizations, raises a host of political difficulties. Corrections for allocative 
efficiency, on the other hand, are camouflaged by shadow pricing's mystique of figures, and so have been able more 
quietly to facilitate adoption of the equity-oriented projects of the 1970s. But the major reason for concentration on one 
kind of efficiency only is the professional bias of economists. The emphasis on quantitative training predisposes 
economists to refine shadow pricing techniques (even when the poor quality of the data available makes such refinement 
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often questionable) because this is what they are good at. Economists are also trained to see projects in input/output 
terms, so that the essence of the cost-benefit procedure is an exercise in comparative statistics — a comparison of the 
with-project scenario against the without- project scenario. In the cost-benefit calculation, it is as if a series of 
photographs is taken of the project at successive year-ends, with cash-flows artificially accumulated to these points for 
discounting. In contrast to this static approach, cost-benefit analysis should be seen as involving the construction of an 
"implementation model" of the project, stressing dynamics and process as much as statics and quantity...The Little and 
Mirless manual, for example, is called, all-embracingly, "Project Appraisal and Planning for Developing Countries", 
and contains a chapter on "Scarce Resources" which does not consider management skills as a scarce resource...The 
contention is that as an economic appraisal guide, management is outside its brief; and yet management problems have 
a direct impact on the IRR. The manual is widely distributed for use in developing countries, unaccompanied by 
guidelines for management appraisal. It can only contribute to the present emphasis on ever more "accurate" economic 
analysis which is in fact meaningless if implementation does not go as planned...Aid has to tread a narrow line between 
acting as an agent of change and development and "intervention in the internal affairs of another country." Too much 
or too obvious concern with the management question can be dangerous from this point of view, since this involves 
directing the use of local as well as aid-imported resources—and since resources in both these categories are by definition 
very scarce in the developing countries, the issue of who controls them is a particularly sensitive one. Useful approaches 
to the assessment and improvement of management performance must therefore take into account the aid agency's limited 
access and its need to tread carefully. "(Heaver 1982:4) 
166. Levine and Coward 1989:23. 
167. Replogle 1989:809. 
168. "Traditional" refers to the design concepts that were applied before the modern design concepts were introduced. 
The latter tended to occur during the last three decades although many of the principles existed already at the beginning 
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system." (Wade 1982b:172). 
183. Quotation of a 1974 World Bank report in Ter Hofstede and Van Santbrink 1979:1982. 
184. Diemer 1990:130-131. Diemer has presented this independence more in terms of a more principal need for 
independence of farmer groups from state intervention. He did not make a link with the logic of process and control 
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hand, control of expenditures by the community most probably made the independent units function as cost control 
centers. 
185. Coward 1986:503. 
186. For Indonesia (Ter Hofstede and Van Santbrink 1979:76); for Sri Lanka (Mendis 1977). 
187. Diemer 1990. Endnote 4 of Annex 4 gives a brief description. 
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226. Wade 1982b: 179. 
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on least-cost solutions. 
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practice" (Levine 1977). 
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264. Carruthers and Clark have given the following list of reasons for errors in these data or its insufficiency: "Physical 
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a surface irrigation scheme) at reasonable costs and irrigation would always be beneficial bringing prosperity and 
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of the State for investment without insisting upon a particular B.C. ratio. If this be done the overall cost of projects is 
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justified." (GOAP 1982:70). Similarly, Keller argues against the commercial approach of irrigation investment decisions 
(Keller 1986:332). 
268. E.g., rather implicitly, by a former director of the World Bank's Agriculture and Rural Development Program 
(Yudelman 1985:23-25). See also Cassen 1986. 
269. Cassen 1986:312. 
270. Ibid:311. 
271. E.g., Olivares 1986:134. 
272. Kampfraath pers. comm. 
273. Small 1989b: 13. 
274. "La none of the projects that we evaluated was anything like such an assessment made before funds were committed. 
The general story is that of a...plain with a river running through it, which according to engineering standards could and 
should be converted into a "granary" of the country. And so work began!" (Steekelenburg et al. 1985:28-29) 
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275. Repetto 1986:15. 
276. Also donor staff tend to use such inaccurate justifications: "The review shows that a significant proportion of 
projects with a rate of return, at completion, of below 10 percent (normally the cut-off rate below which projects are 
considered unsatisfactory) may still generate important nonquantifiable benefits and thus be worthwhile to the economies 
that have undertaken them." (World Bank 1990b:v). 
277. Aluwihara and Kikuchi 1991: Carruthers and Clark 1981; Tiffen 1987a:373. 
278. Aluwihara and Kikuchi 1991. 
279. Discussions with an involved system manager from New Zealand. See also EMI/World Bank 1991:47. 
280. The banks act as "preferential creditors", which reduces their accountability even more (De Leeuw 1985:318; Payer 
1982:84 and Van de Laar 1979:231 in De Leeuw 1985). 
281. Repetto 1986:21-22. 
282. "The disturbing feature of most of these design and appraisal faults is that they are well-known, yet the evaluation 
literature is replete with complaints that they keep being repeated. The DAC Expert Group of Aid Evaluation asserted 
that the lessons 'have frequently not been applied in practice despite the fact that they have long been recognized, with 
the result that mistakes recur, thereby lessening the impact of aid...'." (Cassen 1986:174). 
283. UMI staff have observed this in several recent World Bank appraisals of large-scale irrigation investments. 
284. These attitudes and perceptions of bank staff and most other development professionals confirm Heaver's remarks 
in the quotation at the beginning of this chapter of the rather sectoral/disciplinary bias of bank staff, and the related 
tendency to focus on technical assistance, improved professionalism, rather than on the management process requirements 
(Heaver 1982:8). 
285. E.g., Cassen at al. 1986. Cassen's mode of evaluation of the accountability of the development banks suggests that 
he and his co-writers shared many of the perspectives of the banks toward its accountability, as demonstrated by the 
following assessment: "In all agencies there are systems of shared accountability in which peer pressures, management 
surveillance, and the technical work required on projects all combine in an attempt to ensure quality. (Often the value 
of cost-benefit analysis is the not the rate of return, which is the 'bottom-line', but the fact that it forces project staff to 
be explicit about critical assumptions, which can be alert management)" (Cassen 1986:311) The starting point of their 
assessment did not seem very neutral as well as they all declared themselves part of the development clique whose own 
careers are at stake when evaluating the virtues of aid: they "...shared the view that there is nothing wrong with aid a 
priori, but that its virtue is not to be taken for granted." (ibid:2). 
286. Cassen 1986:310-311. 
287. E.g., ADB 1990a:16. 
288. See also EMI/World Bank 1991:35 and 59. 
289. E.g., Bloemen and De Moor 1983. 
290. This type of attitude is reflected in a letter to the International Agricultural Center (IAC), an advising body to the 
Dutch Ministry of Development Aid, by the late Professor Nugteren of the Department of Irrigation of Wageningen 
Agricultural University. In this letter, he has criticized a major association of Netherlands consultants as follows: "...it 
seems [the consultant] has still not yet seen the light that making a feasibility report without sufficient data and spending 
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with the set time for the feasibility study. 
291. An interviewed engineering professor from Cornell University confirmed this image when he stated that: "The 
present engineering designs around the world are determined and controlled by a small number of international consultant 
and donor organizations." And a staff member, later Director, of the International Land Reclamation and Improvement 
Institute (fLRI) in correspondence with the International Agricultural Center (IAC) in 1973 has made the following 
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way or the other. This is the umpteenth case, where one has considered soil and water according to the utility principle, 
instead of looking from a management perspective. Engineering means that one has to know the consequences of certain 
interventions beforehand and present these to the decision makers in the form of alternatives. It is somewhat shaming 
that such an approach has not been followed and one is faced with damage now. In this way, we compete ourselves out 
of the market, whereby it is a meager comfort that other (foreign) companies do mostly not act otherwise." (N.A. De 
Ridder 1973 in Bloemen and De Moor 1983:329). 
292. Weiss and Jequier 1986:2. 
293. Carruthers 1983b:96. 
294. The latter makes the typical resistance of operational donor staff toward inputs from the post-evaluation office staff 
in project design somewhat more understandable. 
295. E.g., "...the findings of evaluations do not always carry enough weight in influencing what is actually done." 
(Cassen 1986:175). See also the previous note. 
296. E.g., Moore 1987:3. 
297. Duane 1986:9. 
298. In general Duane 1986:8; for the USA Small 1989:4; and Repetto in general: "...coalition of farmers, their political 
representatives, and government irrigation supply agencies is so strong that it has been called "the iron triangle" (Repetto 
1986:33) 
299. Heaver 1982:19. 
300. For example, Duane has phrased as follows their apparent uneagerness to get involved in such issues: "There is 
no reason why this philosophy of irrigation finance should not sit well with the Bank....if it can find Borrowers who are 
also willing to try it." (Duane 1986:9). According to him: "...the first requirement-even for experiment-is interested 
Governments." (ibid:14) 
301. Repetto 1986:33. 
302. Small 1989b: 15. 
303. In the USA, subsidies for capital costs have apparently only stimulated "irrigators to select an irrigation method 
which involves a relatively high capital cost but lower O&M costs, even though such a system may be economically 
inefficient (US National Water Commission 1973:490).* (Small 1989b:17). Such adverse incentives are not specific for 
development aid, but tend to be a direct consequence of any competition for aid (Tullock 1988). 
304. Korten in Svendsen et al. 1990:95-98. 
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305. Svendsen et al. 1990:106. 
306. Heaver has quoted Pfeffer on the behavior and attitudes underlying such symbolic acts: "If it sounds as if managers 
(and politicians more generally) are playing an intentionally deceptive game, this is not the point, in that managers and 
politicians fool themselves as well as each other with their symbolic acts." (Pfeffer 1980:72 in Heaver 1982:7) 
Others that seemed to be fooled—or fool themselves—, were the funding agencies. For example, for the 
Philippines the loan repayment for capital costs by the corporation to the government was temporarily enforced-on paper 
at least~by the World Bank during a period of severe budget shortages in the early 1980s. Before that the government 
did not enforce it, apparently because else the National Irrigation Administration refused to do any further major 
construction, also in view of the government controlled cost recovery options. Such interaction showed again the crucial 
role that subsidies for major construction played in this game, also at political levels. It also showed the difficulties that 
donors experience in influencing accountability through intervention in the organizational structure. 
307. Heaver 1982:7. 
CHAPTER 6 
Results: Conclusions and Recommendations 
CHAPTERS 4 AND 5 respectively give the generalized descriptions and analyses of the key 
decision-making processes for the capacity utilization and the capacity creation (i.e., step 3 of 
Figure 13). The beginning of this chapter presents the main conclusions from these analyses of 
the key decision-making processes of the capacity utilization and capacity creation. 
Chapters 4 and 5 also identify the required changes in decision-making processes and 
management conditions for performance improvement (step 4). This chapter integrates these 
requirements from the perspectives from the capacity utilization and the capacity creation into 
an overall perspective. The final stage of the management perspective is this chapter's 
discussion of the recommended processes of management-control of the decision-making 
processes and of the management conditions (step 5, or the C-process of Figure 4 in chapter 3). 
Also some policy changes are recommended. 
Figure 13. Performance- and water-based management analysis 
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CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES 
Capacity Utilization 
Many conclusions evolve directly from the observed low motivation of staff for performance. 
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Staff of all observed irrigation agencies appeared little motivated and committed toward the 
water-delivery performance during the capacity utilization. This systematic low motivation 
toward the water-delivery performance was caused by the observed absence of an accountability 
for the water-related performance of the observed irrigation agencies as a whole. Though the 
observed low levels of sophistication of the key decision-making processes had also their own 
momentum, and may thus have caused some of the conclusions to a certain degree as well. 
Still, the following conclusions evolved mainly from this low motivation. 
1. Mainly due to this low motivation for performance, the actual decision making 
about the capacity utilization was left mostly to the gate operators. Higher level 
staff tried to minimize their management inputs and tried to keep the farmers 
satisfied by issuing more slack water into the system; 
2. Mainly due to this low motivation for performance, the assessment of the 
available water supply by the agency staff tended to be at the "safe" side to 
minimize the cultivation risks and to minimize thus the related conflicts with 
farmers and politicians; 
3. Mainly due to this low motivation for performance, the assessment of demand, 
the allocation of water, and thus also the regulation, tended to be demand-driven 
in all case studies. This contrasted with most design concepts and irrigation 
engineering approaches (except for the Moroccan) that all assumed a supply-
driven water allocation and regulation; 
4. Mainly due to this low motivation for performance, the management of the main 
system was an "adhocracy". Operational methods and procedures were 
determined ad hoc by the gate operators themselves, with no coordination of the 
flows along the main system. This provided much scope for the favoring of the 
head-end reaches of the canals; 
5. Mainly due to this low motivation for performance, the water schedules were 
often not adjusted to the actual constraints and opportunities. So they usually 
played a marginal role in the actual decision making about the allocation and 
regulation; 
6. Mainly due to this low motivation for performance, the monitoring and evaluation 
of the actual allocation and regulation tended to be absent. Measuring facilities 
appeared often not functional for such reasons as technical deficiencies, the cost 
effectiveness of metering, and the absence of a need to use them. Measuring 
structures, as well as the monitoring and evaluation were observed to be 
functional only in the Moroccan case study where the water was sold on a 
volumetric basis, and where such payments were a sufficient incentive for the 
agency staff to increase its management inputs; 
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7. Mainly due to this low motivation for performance, almost all professional 
methods and techniques (such as the theoretical water requirements, the 
scheduling, the measurement, and the monitoring and evaluation) that were used 
in the capacity utilization could not and did not contribute to performance 
improvement. Besides, all these conceptual approaches gave problems to 
incorporate the managerial aspects of irrigation; 
8. The absence of the management of the regulation as a separate discipline in 
irrigation engineering seemed mainly due to this low motivation for performance; 
The following conclusion about the capacity utilization processes did not relate to the low 
motivation: 
9. The scientific formulae to calculate the theoretical water requirements gave 
problems to cope with such "soft" parameters as the scarcity value of water and 
the related inefficiencies. The formulae calculated the "hard" demand of crop, 
soils, and canals, and could not cope with the "soft" requirements as expressed 
by people and institutions. Though even the assessment of the "hard" 
requirements appeared difficult to do accurately for individual farms and small 
subsystems with these formulae. It appeared difficult to assess accurately most 
parameters required in the formulae, such as the irrigated area, the progress of 
the land preparation, the requirements for land soaking, effective rainfall, and 
seepage and percolation rates. 
Capacity Creation 
Many conclusions evolve directly from the in all case studies observed low motivation of staff 
for the quality of the investment decisions. This systematic low motivation toward the quality 
of the investment decisions was caused by the observed absence of an accountability for the such 
quality of the observed irrigation agencies as a whole. Though the observed very low levels of 
sophistication of the key decision-making processes had also their own momentum, and may thus 
have caused some of the conclusions to a certain degree as well. Still, the dominating objectives 
of the agencies, and thus of its staff, appeared the acquisition of the external, and for them 
"free" investment funding. This priority for investment quantity appeared to be the main cause 
for the low motivation toward the quality of the capacity creation decisions and the performance 
during the capacity utilization. 
Apart from the above conclusions, the following conclusions were linked to this 
"quantity-at-the-expense-of-quality" incentive system in the observed irrigation agencies: 
1. Mainly due to the priority for quantity, also during the capacity creation, the 
agency staff tried to minimize their inputs in the quality of their assessments and 
design (i.e., in assessing the actual desirability, feasibility and functionality of an 
envisaged investment for the farmers, system managers, and local communities). 
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They thus tried to minimize their management inputs in interacting about these 
issues with the farmers, system managers, and local communities; 
2. The priority for investment quantity thereby prevented the assessment of the real-
life feasibility and functionality of the envisaged investments. Determination of 
the feasibility and functionality was approached in a conceptual way. The 
underlying assumptions about the physical performance (such as the water duty, 
cropping pattern, calendar, intensity, and yield), the maintenance levels, the cost 
recovery, the time and costs of project implementation, and the life span of the 
investments, were observed to relate to what was "possible" in a systematically 
over-optimistic direction, rather than to what was "probable". These assumptions 
were never justified. Performance achievements and experiences were ignored 
in all case studies. Also the feasibility assessment of an irrigation system's major 
resource, the available water resources, occurred unprofessionally and nonchalant 
in all case studies. The available data appeared thus insufficient in all case 
studies. Staff of the donor and consultant, government and agency all appeared 
interested in the justification of the investment rather than in its true feasibility 
and functionality. This led to the manipulation of many assumptions underlying 
the economic feasibility in all case studies; 
3. Decision preparation and often the decision taking on the feasible objectives was 
usually done by donor staff and consultants. Yet, apart from their fore mentioned 
bias for quantity, it was observed to be very difficult, if not impossible, for them 
to determine the true feasibility of an investment, especially of the assumed 
performance improvements. Recipient agency and government staff tended to 
represent vested interests to realize the funding, and were unlikely to provide any 
information counteracting these interests. Even in the few observed cases where 
they were willing to do so, they were usually not asked to by their superiors, or 
donor staff or consultant. So the coinciding interests of donors and recipient 
governments encouraged the manipulations. Besides, also the assessment experts 
and donor staff, who were driven by their organization's targets, appeared not 
interested in an absolutely neutral feasibility assessment; 
4. The priority of quantity stimulated capital-intensive investments, that again 
stimulated the conceptual approaches. These conceptual approaches toward the 
feasibility assessment and the functional design allowed the agency and donor to 
rely on (unreliable) data (e.g., on' soils, topography, geography, and 
demography), rather than on the interaction with the farmers and system 
managers, or on other types of experiences in similar irrigation systems. This 
reliance on data appeared indispensable for investment quantity, as, unlike time-
consuming interactive processes, it facilitated capital-intensive investments. This 
priority for quantity and the related time-pressures were observed to stimulate the 
controversial status of participative design in irrigation engineering; 
RESULTS: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 207 
5. Mainly due to this priority for quantity, almost all professional methods and 
techniques (such as the EIRR, the theoretical water requirements, and the design 
concepts) used in the capacity creation could not and did not contribute to 
performance improvement in all case studies. Cost-benefit analyses and the 
related sensitivity analyses were not allowed in any of the case studies to classify 
a project as unfeasible. They seemed therefore to have lost their theoretical 
functionality for the assessment of investment feasibility and appraisal. Instead, 
they were used to facilitate considerable subsidies for irrigation investments. 
Besides, all these conceptual approaches gave problems to incorporate the 
management aspects of irrigation; 
6. The different observed conceptual approaches developed to overcome the 
"management gap" (such as the parallel field canals, on-farm water management, 
O&M manuals, water-management consultants, farmer participation and 
monitoring and evaluation) did not increase the commitment to performance of 
the agency and government as they did not touch upon the performance and 
accountability issues. In fact, these solutions increased the donors' influence in 
the actual investment planning and design (further strengthened by the donor's 
leverage, whether passively or actively), whereby the agencies felt increasingly 
less responsible, resulting in a diminishing commitment from their side; 
7. Mainly due to this priority for quantity, the cost effectiveness of the rationalized 
design concepts seemed to have remained unclear. This, despite a considerable 
increase of the unit costs related to the shift from the traditional (i.e., least-cost) 
to the rationalized design concepts. Besides, the latter design concepts allowed 
to leave out many real-life constraints and ignored such real-life practices as the 
reuse of irrigation water downstream. The design concepts also ignored the fact 
that in real-life irrigation, system development tends to occur by trial-and-error; 
8. Mainly due to this priority for quantity, the designs had to fit the overoptimistic 
feasibility and appraisal assessments in most case studies (i.e., this was not 
observed in Morocco). Much flexibility to deviate during the design stage from 
the feasibility-level assessments did usually not exist as it would endanger a 
successful cultivation of the planned (i.e., the maximum) command area, even in 
theory. In all case studies, the cost-benefit analysis of the irrigation investments 
assumed the maximum benefits through assuming the benefits of the maximum 
possible area irrigated (thereby assuming high "possible" water efficiencies). 
This was observed to create a pressure for designers to continue to design for this 
maximum benefit, at least in theory, to realize the envisaged EIRR; 
9. System rehabilitations often seemed to serve merely the cover up of a 
disappointing economic viability of the preceding investment. The related internal 
donor justification processes were thereby observed to have a tendency of creating 
their own momentum of investment desirability; 
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10. The assumptions underlying the feasibility assessment and the functional design 
were kept implicit in all case studies. This prevented any accountability for the 
quality of these assessments, as well as potential learning processes from earlier 
mistakes. Especially, irrigation design may benefit from making the assumed 
functional requirements explicit; 
11. The ELRR appeared unable to assess the national opportunities for the investment 
funds. First, because it was not used to compare investment alternatives. 
Second, because of the systematic manipulation of the underlying assumptions. 
In general, there seemed a lack of consideration of the national opportunities for 
development investments, and a lack of accountability for their performance. 
This caused huge subsidies for the irrigation subsector and a considerable wastage 
of national opportunities; 
12. These subsidy-oriented practices seems to have ignored the here observed 
influence of these supply-driven subsidies on the incentives to perform during the 
capacity utilization. Ignoring these incentives is likely to become a self-fulfilling 
prophecy: as long as you do not allocate more value to the performance during 
the capacity utilization by unconditional huge subsidies for capacity creation-
through a low quality of the feasibility assessment—, the underutilization of the 
created capacity make further investments in capacity creation necessary; 
Also the observed funding agencies appeared not accountable for the quality of their investment 
decisions. Despite the extensive awareness of the "quantity-at-the-expense-of-quality" nature of 
their investments for a long time, they appeared to have made few serious efforts to make 
recipients accountable for performance. Moreover they appeared to have undertaken little to 
reduce the negative influence of quantity through the reduction of the related pressures. The 
observed funding agencies appeared to operate internally essentially as banks, and they thus 
fueled the pressure for "quantity". The following conclusions are directly connected to this 
dominant accountability for quantity of the funding agencies: 
13. The observed funding agencies lacked effective checks and balances to moderate 
the influence on the quality of the assessments of this systematic priority for 
quantity of its staff, recipients and consultants. In none of the case studies the 
appraisal assessments were based on, or linked to, experiences and achievements 
of the same irrigation agency (the so-called "remedial principle"). The few 
existing checks, like the peer review, appeared to be dominated by the interests 
for investment quantity. Although some interviewed donor staff considered the 
loan covenants, the EIRR, and the sensitivity analyses as such checks, this 
appeared erroneous in view of their manipulability. The sensitivity analysis was 
observed to exclude the real risks intricated in the overoptimistic assumptions, 
neither did it ever seem to be a basis for a loan refusal; 
14. At all stages of the investment decision making, career incentives and the annual 
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budgetary processes appeared to motivate the involved donor staff to realize the 
envisaged investment. The observed funding agencies did not keep its staff 
effectively accountable for the quality of its funding appraisals; 
Other conclusions about the capacity creation processes are the following: 
15. Although new substantive design concepts are important, so are the decision-
making processes of the definition of a "program of requirements" prior to the 
design. Especially the decision-making processes by those who have to make the 
structures work, the agency and the farmers. The recent design concepts seemed 
to have underestimated such required time-consuming negotiating processes, 
resulting in explicit water rights and allocation plans, rules and procedures. In 
general, conceptual designs ignore the importance of such a process; 
16. This study's observations suggest also the need for a certain qualification of the 
importance of design concepts. Apart from the fore mentioned importance of the 
process of design, the actual organization's goals seem a major influence on the 
usefulness of any design concept in place. Without the will to manage, no design 
concept is "manageable". Similarly, if the objectives are right, every design is 
to a certain degree "manageable". In a situation where the agency and farmers 
support the performance objectives, every design becomes to a certain degree 
"manageable", whether it were traditional, modern, flexible, simple, least-cost, 
or even dilapidated; 
17. A technical deficiency observed in the feasibility assessment was the omittance 
of the probabilities of the available water resources in the assumed cropping 
intensities. This caused a direct overestimation of the likely cropping intensity 
with at least 20%. 
RECOMMENDATIONS: POLICY CHANGES 
This study's recommendations start with the recommended policy changes that seem essential 
to improve the performance of irrigation investments, though most of them apply equally well 
to other sectors of development investment. 
Policy changes are substantive choices about the organizations goals. They are therefore 
not part of the management-control decisions that deal only with controlling the process of 
decision making, rather than the evolving choices. Yet, policy decisions are the input for 
management and control decisions, and are therefore important decisions to achieve performance 
improvements in the irrigation subsector. 
The remainder of this section presents only the main and very broad recommendations 
about policy changes that evolved from this study's analyses: 
1. "Quality First" (of investment appraisals). Major evaluations of the effectiveness 
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of development aid by the Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) and the Development Assistance Committee (i.e., the Joint 
Ministerial Committee of the Boards of Governors of the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund) have recognized the bias for investment quantity as 
a serious threat to the quality of investment decisions.1 The quality of the 
investment decision has a direct influence on the performance of the capacity 
utilization through its influence on the capital and recurrent costs. Yet, these 
major evaluations have not recognized the other major threat of the bias for 
quantity that was observed in this study; its systematic and long-standing 
distortion of the performance-related incentives of the recipient organizations and 
their staff. 
The observations suggest the need for a major policy change of the 
funding agencies of development aid. Improvement of the performance of 
development investments would require a shift from a priority for "fund-
channelling'1 (or investment quantity) toward a priority to the quality of the 
investment decisions, and thus for performance. Performance should be made a 
national concern, rather than only a concern for external parties such as the staff 
and consultants of the funding agencies. 
The ultimate responsibility for investment appraisal would have to rest 
with "quality" rather than with "quantity" interests. Rather than using the donor's 
leverage for substantive policy changes, it could be used to require a satisfactory 
performance of the investments. Also policy dialogues would have to discuss 
such accountability and performance issues. 
"Stick to Knitting" (i.e., banking). This study's discussion of the cost 
recovery policies have shown the potentially very centralized decision making in 
the observed funding agencies, as well as the big time gap between feedback on 
the quality of its interventions and some related improvements. Such 
centralization seems a consequence of the observed absence of any accountability 
for performance of the recipients of development aid. Though it simultaneously 
confuses the related responsibilities of the recipients. Such type of directive 
operation has important drawbacks for developing far-away countries, and seems 
to bring along high risks of retarding local processes and opportunities. Besides, 
the funding agencies appeared to have no control over the actual compliance with 
such loan covenants, or their effectiveness, due to its bias for investment quantity. 
In general, such policies seemed the consequence of a confusion about the role 
of the funding agencies in development. Rather than enforcing certain policies 
such as cost recovery and participation or sector-specific measures, the Board of 
Governors of the funding agencies would have to worry about making the national 
parties accountable for performance. Therefore, they should concentrate on 
making the funding agencies only accountable for facilitating performance 
improvements as described above; 
2. "Stick to Knitting" (i.e., banking). Another policy change would be to require 
that donor staff and consultants should not be involved in the assessment of the 
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desirability and feasibility of such investment objectives as the type of crops, the 
project size, and the performance objectives. Their involvement was observed to 
confuse the local responsibilities and accountabilities for the investment's 
performance. Besides, they appeared less suitable for high quality assessments. 
They were observed to have insufficient familiarity with the local political and 
organizational issues in any of the case studies. Neither would it be likely for 
them to get sufficient time for any participatory processes. Instead, they should 
be involved only in investment appraisal decisions while neutral toward quantity. 
3. Making national parties accountable for performance requires a more tight 
funding through a reduction of the (hidden) and other unconditional subsidies. 
Though this does not exclude any future subsidies for irrigation investment. Still 
subsidies may be considered necessary, though they should not bias the agencies 
toward investment only, and against the quality of the capacity creation decisions 
and against performance. Subsidies also should be related to the opportunities of 
providing them to other sectors. Such subsidies thus could be proportional to the 
investment, or, for example, comprise of an annual lumpsum that is independent 
of the size of the actual investments. Such types of subsidies would be more 
neutral toward specific investment choices; 
4. Another policy decision would be to require the water users to pay a reasonable 
price for the volumetric water use to enforce more consciousness about the 
scarcity of the water resource; 
RECOMMENDATIONS: MANAGEMENT CONTROL OF THE MANAGEMENT 
CONDITIONS 
Chapters 4 and 5 identify the required changes in management conditions for performance 
improvement (step 4 of Figure 13). This section integrates these requirements from the 
perspectives from the capacity utilization and the capacity creation into an overall perspective. 
The final stage of the management perspective is this section's discussion of the recommended 
processes of management-control of the management conditions (step 5 of Figure 13 or the C-
process of Figure 4). Subsequently, the next section discusses the recommended processes of 
management control of the decision-making processes. 
Financial Control 
Conclusions about the required changes. Financial control is not by coincidence the first 
management condition in this discussion of the related management control. In all case studies 
the investment funds for capacity creation were observed to dominate the incentives for agencies 
and the individual staff members. Financial accountability of agencies and organizational units 
seems therefore the primary starting point to develop some accountability for the quality of 
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investment decisions and for performance. 
The main required changes in this management condition were from a perspective of the 
performance improvement during the capacity utilization: 
1. a financial control system that links an agency's finance to its water-delivery 
performance, whether through 1) structural solutions (e.g., more financial 
autonomy), or through 2) different accounting systems (e.g., business accounting, 
profit/cost centers). The latter solution is only valid if seriously implemented. 
It requires probably that an agency's finance does not fully depend anymore on 
the government budgetary allocation and unconditional subsidies, i.e., more 
financial independence; 
2. the most direct and refined incentives for an improved service delivery by the 
agency staff and decentralized units are the service fees paid by the farmers for 
the delivered services on a volumetric basis, especially if the agency's financial 
viability is at risk for the fee collection as mentioned under 1; 
Complementary changes from a perspective of the improvement of the quality of the decisions 
about the capacity creation were the following: 
3. several changes in management conditions would contribute to the recommended 
policy change of more tight funding through the reduction of the hidden (i.e., in 
the cost-benefit analysis) and other unconditional subsidies. An example is a 
reduction of the misuse of the cost-benefit analysis through checks and balances 
on all performance and other assumptions underlying the feasibility assessment 
(e.g., through the remedial principle). Also an explicit commitment to 
performance improvements could be introduced through, for example, the 
consistent use of a "performance and accountability balance sheet" by all major 
funding agencies; 
4. a direct link between an agency's finance and the quality of its capacity creation 
decisions, and the ultimate water-delivery performance may reduce the observed 
bias toward investment quantity and against performance. For example, cost-
sharing by the agency and the clients is likely to reduce this bias as it makes both 
parties think twice about the likely benefits of the investment. Other possible 
measures would be subsidies proportional to an investment's size, or as a fixed 
annual lump sum that does not depend on the size of actual investments; 
5. a direct financial accountability of the agency to the funding agencies. For 
example, through (partial) direct lending to the irrigation agencies. By that the 
financial implications of a low quality of the capacity creation decisions will 
become more transparent, even if the national government would guarantee the 
loan. Though more financial autonomy of the irrigation agencies seems the best 
way to ensure cost effectiveness and efficiency of irrigation investments. Direct 
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lending also may have the advantage that funding agencies would bear some of 
the risks, and may thus be more careful about the quality of the investment 
appraisal decisions; 
6. more individual accountability of donor staff for the quality of the investment 
appraisal decisions-even though the time gap to assess the adequacy of the 
original assessment makes this more difficult-while they should become neutral 
toward quantity. 
All financial control changes for capacity creation are complementary to the one for the capacity 
utilization, i.e., a decentralization of financial control, either through more financial autonomy, 
or through the creation of cost or profit centers. A serious creation and implementation of cost 
or profit centers would be a less drastic measure than financial autonomy, and would be the 
minimum required change. Though increased financial autonomy is likely to be more effective 
as it touches upon the incentives of the agency as a whole. 
The overall recommended management-control processes. Hereafter follows the overall 
picture of required management-control processes to realize the above financial control changes. 
Linking an agency's finance to its water-delivery performance (item 1) seemed unlikely to be 
very effective unless the management-control issues for the capacity creation (items 3-6) were 
implemented because of dominating influence of the subsidies for the capacity creation on the 
agency and staff incentives. These observations suggested that the most basic steps required 
would be to reduce these subsidies. Items 3 and 4 address possible ways of doing that. 
Yet, also the observed funding agencies seemed unlikely to initiate such constraints on 
quantity, as they themselves were not accountable for the quality of the capacity creation 
decisions and the performance of their investments. Item 4 gives a possible financial control 
measure to make a funding agency more financially accountable for the quality of its investment 
appraisal decisions. 
Making the quality of investment appraisal decisions, rather than the quantity, the major 
performance indicators for funding agencies and its individual staff members, may increase the 
quality-related pressures. Linking quality-related checks and balances toward the individual 
performance assessment of donor staff members may provide for more quality-oriented 
incentives. They would provide for professional and legitimate incentives for individual staff 
members to resist political pressures on investment appraisal decisions. The observed practice 
of collective performance assessment in the funding agencies circumvented this sensitive aspect, 
and did not provide pressures on quality-related performance. The overall result was no quality-
related accountability, other than conceptual. 
Even it could be envisaged to make the funding agencies accountable for its facilitation 
of performance improvements. The fore mentioned "performance and accountability balance 
sheet" provides a tool to the governing boards of the funding agencies for making donor staff 
and units accountable to the quality of their investment decisions. Besides, these sheets can 
provide a tool for making the funding agencies agency as a whole accountable for their success 
in facilitating performance improvement, and "getting the performance-related processes 
started". 
Still, getting these processes started requires primarily that the quality of the investment 
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appraisal decisions should be the only performance indicator for a development financier. And 
to get the process of improved performance started, donor staff have to be impartial to say "yes" 
or "no". 
The above changes in irrigation financing modes are stated bluntly. Yet, the proposed 
changes toward more accountability are likely to be successful only if the recipients support such 
changes. Policy dialogues between funding agencies and recipient governments thus should 
address such accountability and performance issues more seriously than was observed in the case 
studies. 
Provision of Information 
Conclusions about the required changes. The main required changes in this management 
condition were from a perspective of the performance improvement of the capacity utilization: 
1. improvement of the water delivery would require such an increased level of 
information provision to the decision making by higher level staff that they are 
very likely to become overloaded with the information. A possible adaptation in 
the provision of information would then be to reduce the need for such provision 
to higher level staff through a decentralization of the decision making. Potential 
and logical units of decentralization are the system level, or the subsystem served 
by one or more main, distributary or lateral canals; 
2. another form of adaptation of the provision of information through a reduced need 
for it would be through more "management by exception" in terms of the 
development of more standing orders for different situations; 
3. improvement of the water delivery would possibly also require facilities to 
provide information more timely, especially for the coordination of the regulation 
along the main canals. This may need the application of more on-line 
communication facilities; 
and from the perspective of the improvement of the quality of the decisions about the capacity 
creation: 
4. a higher quality of investment decisions would require an increased provision of 
information to the responsible decision makers, often the staff of donors and 
consultants. Sufficient information provision to such external parties seems very 
difficult, especially related to local organizational issues and requirements and 
other location-specific information. A possible adaptation in the provision of 
information would then be to reduce the need for such provision to such external 
parties through a decentralization of the decision making. Potential and logical 
units of decentralization are the agency or project level. 
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Although both perspectives thus require a decentralization of the decision making, it relates to 
different levels. The management-control decisions to achieve these different types of 
decentralization are described below. 
The overall recommended management-control processes. Decisions about the 
decentralization of the decision making, related authority, responsibilities and accountabilities 
from the national government to, for example, the agency or project level require a political will 
to do so. The foreign funding was observed to discourage such decentralization as its acquisition 
appeared to stimulate centralization. Interviewed donor staff confirmed this, and World Bank 
staff have made similar statements in a seminar at IIMI. 2 The frequently abundant quantity with 
little political, financial and economic accountability attached further strengthened this intrinsic 
characteristic of aid to encourage centralization. It biased national politicians and government 
toward quantity without any need for increased information exchanges, demand assessment and, 
ultimately, decentralization. Only if the performance considerations become more important for 
investment decisions as described before, the need of the national parties for demand assessment 
and decentralization may evolve. Decentralization as a loan condition without a need for 
performance is unlikely to be successful. 
Decentralization of the decision making about the capacity creation from the donor staff 
and consultant to the agency, requires decisions by the funding agency to make it a concern for 
the national party. Related measures were discussed before. 
Human Resources 
Conclusions about the required changes. The main required changes in this management 
condition were from a perspective of the performance improvement of the capacity utilization: 
1. the introduction of more performance-oriented human resource management 
(HRM) measures, such as performance-based incentive systems and career 
development. The introduction of more performance-oriented HRM measures 
requires a decentralization of the responsibility for HRM from the central 
government to the agency; 
2. a reduction of political interference in HRM matters would increase the credibility 
of merit-based HRM policies. This may evolve from more financial 
independence of irrigation agencies; 
3. specific management training may alleviate to a certain degree such constraints 
as attitudes that impede communication, improve teamwork, and leadership skills. 
Though these should be complemented with a more operational HRM as described 
under item 1. 
Items 1 and 3 evolved also from a perspective of the improvement of the quality of the decision 
making about the capacity creation. Both the perspective of the capacity creation and the 
capacity utilization thus require a decentralization of the responsibility for HRM, complemented 
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with specific management training. The possible advantage of a more independent irrigation 
agency of a reduced political interference would complement the other two changes. The overall 
picture of required management-control processes to realize this type of decentralization, more 
financial independence and management training are described hereafter. 
The overall recommended management-control processes. In all case studies, the national 
governments themselves appeared constrained in giving special incentives to one type of (semi-) 
government agency. Such a move would definitely meet opposition from other interested parties 
such as government agencies, trade unions and political parties. Therefore, outside pressure or 
conditionalities from funding agencies may provide for the necessary momentum for the above 
changes. Decentralization of HRM and more financial independence may evolve if the national 
government and agency are required to improve the performance of its investments. This brings 
us back to the already described required changes in the financial control such as an individual 
accountability of donor staff toward the quality of the investment appraisal decisions. 
The current approaches of donors to institution building in the agencies such as training, 
performance evaluation and monitoring, more staff, manuals, and the provision of external 
consultants were observed to have little success in all case studies. In general, investments that 
specifically aim at improved HRM in an isolated way are unlikely to be successful, especially 
without a need for improved performance. 
Provision of Knowledge 
Conclusions about the required changes. The main required changes in this management 
condition were from a perspective of the performance improvement of the capacity utilization: 
1. the availability of knowledge about the managerial aspects of main system 
regulation (i.e., of the coordination of the gate settings along the main system). 
No such knowledge appeared available in the observed agencies; 
and from a perspective of the improvement of the quality of the capacity creation decisions: 
2. the availability of knowledge about real-life planning and design approaches (i.e., 
approaches that rely on local feasibilities and requirements, rather than on the 
international reference manuals with mostly [implicit] requirements unfit for the 
management situations in all case studies); 
3. the availability of knowledge about more integrated capacity creation concepts 
(i.e., concepts that consider the interrelations between such issues as the system 
layout, the peak irrigation requirements, the required management inputs of 
agency staff and farmers, and the non-irrigation functions). 
4. the availability of knowledge of performance-oriented methods of irrigation 
financing (i.e., concepts about integrating performance within a financial setting 
dominated by international funding agencies). Currently, the priority for quantity 
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seemed to have forced the staff and consultants of the funding agencies to 
interpret quality in terms of their own disciplinary professionalism. Instead, they 
should focus on performance and thus require the national parties to develop the 
relevant professionalism. 
The overall recommended management-control processes. Major constraint for the 
availability of the above knowledge is the general absence of the related professionalism. This 
professionalism is unlikely to evolve without any requirements toward performance. In fact, the 
absence of such professionalism seemed caused by the absence of a need for it. After several 
decades of supply- and donor-driven development investments, the applied knowledge necessarily 
has become more and more theoretical to justify further investment against the odds of extensive 
disappointments. The justification processes have caused these theoretical approaches to 
intervene in increasing detail in local planning and design questions (e.g., in the required field 
level discharges, and the flexibilities of structures). 
The staff of donor and consultants were major actors in these justification processes, and 
so they were in the development of these theoretical approaches. The donor staff and 
consultants are unlikely to deliver quality for such locality-specific issues. Therefore, the design 
approaches should become again a local concern. Only if requirements toward performance are 
developed, the need for such professionalism is created. Such a need is likely to result 
automatically from the from such a move resulting learning processes by the national agencies 
and governments, though this may take time. If the need for such professionalism is there, its 
development can be facilitated by, for example, the funding of related research projects and 
institutes, by the starting and strengthening of related networks, and the development of 
documentation of the related experiences. Examples of relevant techniques for the flow 
regulation would be trial-run techniques, or the application of simulation models to experiment 
with different operational methods and procedures. 
Structural Reform 
Conclusions about the required changes. The main required changes in this management 
condition were from the perspective of the performance improvement of the capacity utilization: 
1. an improved performance of an irrigation agency's service delivery during the 
capacity utilization requires a more elaborate and precise mission statement on 
the levels of service delivery. Such an improved mission statement is a 
prerequisite for an agency and its staff to become responsible for the water-
delivery performance, as well as accountable for it. It may also increase the 
awareness among engineers that a large part of their tasks is managerial; 
2. external public monitoring, or a "water-delivery performance audit", for more 
systematic accountability (if no financial or other accountability to the clients 
exists); 
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3. an increased decentralization of the presently centralized irrigation agencies, as 
observed in all case studies. Though there remains a need for a "central 
coordinating unit" that represents the system-wide interest along the main system, 
and that regulates the flows along it. Naturally, such decentralization only works 
with performance-related incentives for the decentralized decision makers; 
4. an improved performance of an irrigation agency's service delivery depends to 
an important extent on the quality of the flow regulation in the main system. 
Charging a separate organizational unit, or even organization, with the regulation 
may facilitate an improved separation of the conveyance along the length of the 
canal from the localized distribution interests. It also may facilitate an explicit 
accountability for the flow regulation service, because of the existence of a 
transfer point from the "main system" unit to the "sub-system" unit. Again, the 
performance of a separate "flow regulation unit" will be best if its financial 
viability depends on the performance of its service delivery; 
5. if WUGs are to be functional, they need a more powerful position in the water-
related decision-making processes than currently observed in all case studies. 
This could be achieved either through more administrative authority, or through 
financial accountability to the WUGs. An ultimate step as the transfer of the 
ownership of (part of) the system (and possibly the agency) would provide the 
collectivity of farmers with even stronger powers to make the managing agency 
accountable for the performance of the capacity utilization; 
6. external water-management consultants and separate units for (participation in) 
irrigation management were observed to serve little purpose if not allocated any 
related responsibility and authority; 
7. more appropriate government regulations and related enforcement to reduce the 
observed adverse incentives in some more independent irrigation agencies; 
and from the perspective of the improvement of the quality of the capacity creation decisions: 
8. the decentralization of the responsibility far the quality of the capacity creation 
decisions, except the investment appraisal, from donor staff and consultants to 
national parties—donors and other external parties cannot take up this 
responsibility—. Donors should make this a local and internal agency 
responsibility and accountability, and keep it that way; 
9. individual accountability of donor staff for the quality of their investment 
appraisal assessments; 
10. a more independent status of the irrigation agencies, also financially, seems the 
best way to ensure cost effectiveness and efficiency of irrigation investments. 
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The above required changes in organizational structure and rules from a perspective of both 
capacity creation and capacity utilization do not bite each other. More decentralization and 
financial independence evolved from both perspectives. The following management-control 
processes are required to realize such changes in the management conditions. 
The overall recommended management-control processes. To realize the above required 
changes it seemed necessary in all case studies to break the so-called "silent coalition of 
indifference". Donors should provide incentives to agencies and governments to use any new 
organizational structures in a serious way. Increased financial incentives for governments and 
agencies to perform seemed the most logical way to provoke such changes to be pushed through 
the many layers of resistent stakeholders. Without such incentives, structural changes appeared 
symbolic, rather than functional. This brings us back to the earlier discussed financial control 
changes. 
RECOMMENDATIONS: MANAGEMENT CONTROL OF THE DECISION-MAKING 
PROCESS 
The above mentioned management-control decisions all relate to improving the accountability 
for performance of the irrigation and funding agencies and their staff. Yet, if such 
accountability is introduced in the management conditions, higher levels of sophistication of the 
decision-making processes may not evolve automatically. The control decisions about the 
management conditions are not enough. This section therefore recommends specific 
management-control decisions to improve the decision-making processes. These management-
control decisions aim to improve the levels of sophistication, and, thereby, to develop, introduce 
and control performance-related requirements into the decision making about the capacity 
utilization and the capacity creation. 
Management control of the decision-making process refers to the establishment of the 
pattern of the decision-making processes in terms of the different steps of the processes, the 
room of manoeuvre for these different steps, the levels of sophistication, and what actors should 
be involved in the different steps. It includes the related monitoring and evaluation. Although 
management control thus influences the processes, it does not deal with the actual substantive 
choices. The latter are per definition part of the decision-making process as such (i.e., the B-
process of Figure 4 of chapter 3). This section separately discusses the management control of 
the processes of the capacity utilization and those of the capacity creation. 
Capacity Utilization 
Allocation. The following management-control decisions may increase the levels of 
sophistication of the allocation decision-making processes, and thus may lead to improved 
allocation decisions, and ultimately to an improved performance: 
1. A management-control decision that may cause some balancing of the observed 
conservative tendencies of agency staff in their assessment of the available water 
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supply would be to require more explicit statements of the likely available water 
supply, and of the probabilities of different supply scenarios. 
Such explicitness may have two advantages. First, it may cause the 
cultivation risks inherent in the prediction of the rainfall and the inflow to be 
shared by the other participants of this decision making. Currently, these risks 
were observed to be the responsibility of the managing agency only. Second, it 
may cause more transparency to other parties than the managing agency of the 
climatological and managerial causes of the cultivation's success and failure. And 
thus of the trade-offs of increased risks and cultivation by more farmers; 
2. Making a water schedule or plan as an objective in itself was the observed 
common practice of higher level agency staff of matching of supply and demand, 
except for the Moroccan case studies. Such plans had little relevance for the 
actual implementation. A management-control decision that may enforce a more 
realistic demand assessment, and match between demand and supply, would be 
to require one or more intermediate steps in the allocation decision making (i.e., 
before the final decision taking to allow for required adjustments). 
Such intermediate steps may lead to several improvements. They may 
provide the clients with opportunities to enforce the consideration of their 
requirements and preferences. So they may balance the presently divine role of 
the theoretical water requirements in this decision making in most irrigation 
agencies (compared to important real-life criteria such as the reduction of 
uncertainty, the minimizing of conflicts among farmers, and between farmers and 
agency, and the consideration of the income effects for individual farmers). The 
intermediate steps also may increase the acceptability of the water schedule to the 
clients, and thus the likelihood of its implementation. 
Different forms of intermediate steps can be imagined. Examples are 1) 
to require the field staff to make initial demand schedules (instead of the higher 
level staff); 2) to require a formal endorsement of the plan by (representatives of) 
the water users' groups (WUG); 3) to require WUGs or individual farmers to sign 
for the requested water quantity (as was observed in Morocco); and, 4) to require 
the allocation of quantitative water rights either to the WUGs, or to individual 
water users. Or, to require the existing qualitative water rights to be fixed in 
quantitative terms to make them more manageable, and reduce the uncertainty in 
the whole process. A related management-control decision would be to require 
meetings to be held with (representatives of) the WUGs and agency staff, or 
between different levels of agency staff, to discuss the proposed schedules. Or, 
simply to require the farmers to be informed regularly and timely about the 
proposed schedules to allow for related feedback; 
3. Another possible management-control decision would be to require explicit 
statements of efficiencies targeted for the different subsystems, also in comparison 
with earlier seasons, and the related justifications. Thus localized norms for 
efficiencies are developed, for example, for the slack required for the regulation 
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of the main system. The latter management-control decision may induce agency 
staff to increase their efforts to interact with the farmers and field staff to 
improve the match between the supply and demand. 
Flow regulation. The following management-control decisions may improve the levels of 
sophistication of the flow regulation decision-making processes, and thus may lead to improved 
regulation decisions, and to an improved performance: 
1. A management-control decision that may increase the coordination of the gate 
settings along the canals would be to require higher level staff to develop standing 
orders of required gate operations for all regularly occurring flow scenarios (i.e., 
management by exception or if . . .then . . .instructions). Such standing orders 
were observed to be either non-existent, or highly irrelevant in view of the actual 
choices made by the gate operators in the observed situations; 
2. Another management-control decision would be to require for all other gate 
settings than those covered by standing orders the timely definition of specific 
instructions and the related room of manoeuvre. Specific instructions for gate 
settings would cover the timing, duration and frequency of gate settings. They 
also may indicate the margins of allowed flow fluctuations before a new gate 
operation would be required. A related management-control decision would be 
to require regular meetings between higher level staff and field staff for the 
evaluation of these instructions and standing orders. Such meetings may not only 
increase the quality of the instructions, but also their acceptability for the field 
staff. In addition, they may increase the field staffs motivation and job 
satisfaction; 
3. Another management-control decision would be to require that gate operators are 
informed about the time, size and duration of flow changes; 
4. Another management-control decision would be to require water levels along the 
canal to be used as inputs for the above instructions. 
All above management-control decisions are unlikely to be successful without continuous 
and serious monitoring and evaluation of their actual implementation. Especially for irrigation, 
with its multitude of conflicting individual interests, it would be required to follow-up on 
management-control decisions, to enforce rules and to have a decisive managing agency-
provided the instructions and decisions are reasonable, realistic and acceptable to most clients 
and staff. 
Capacity Creation 
The following management-control decisions may improve the strategic decision-making 
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processes, and thus may lead to improved strategic decisions, and ultimately to an improved 
performance: 
Desired investment objectives. 
1. Ensuring stronger professional guidance in this decision making through 
management-control decisions seems almost impossible given its highly political 
nature, and the "invisible" nature of the political influence on the professional 
guidance. Yet, a possible management-control decision would be to require at 
least two alternative options of desirable investment as this would require some 
justification of the desirability of one option compared to another; 
2. The participation of other interested parties than politicians and donor staff in the 
determination of the desired objectives for investment was observed to be low in 
all case studies. A management-control decision to increase the likelihood of 
participation would be to require a formal forum of public participation (e.g., 
public meetings), or to require the registration of the desirabilities of the clients 
and local community, or to require the registration and consideration of all 
dissent with a possible investment in the determination of its desirability. A 
related management-control decision would be to require sufficient time to 
organize any participatory processes. Such decisions are, of course, highly 
political; 
3. A management-control decision that may increase the quality of the desirable 
performance objectives would be to require an explicit statement of these 
performance objectives by the managing agency; 
Feasible investment objectives. 
4. A management-control decision that may cause some balancing of most assessors' 
natural bend toward investment justification would be to require an explicit 
justification for all assumptions underlying the feasibility assessment, i.e., to 
require a feasibility assessment based on explicit probabilities rather than implicit 
possibilities. Examples are the justifications of the level of dependability of the 
available water resources, the related number of crop failures, the level of the 
service delivery, the (peak) water requirements and efficiencies, the cropping 
intensities, calendars and patterns, the yields, the levels of maintenance, the 
envisaged life span of the investment, the investment cost and implementation 
schedule, and the level of cost recovery. Such justifications would also enforce 
a less divine role of the EIRR and other conceptual simulations of reality. A 
related management-control decision would be to require that the justification 
considers all readily available relevant information such as earlier assessments, 
publications, documents, and obvious local experiences; 
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5. Related management-control decisions would be to require the explicit 
consideration of either at least two alternative investment options, or a more 
phased option, or a least-cost option to achieve the same objectives. All these 
options would facilitate an increased consideration of the real-life feasibility into 
the feasibility assessment; 
6. Another related management-control decision that may balance the confusion of 
the responsibility for success and failure of specific project components to a 
certain degree would be to reduce the involvement of donor staff or consultants 
in the development of investment proposals and to require the agency itself to 
become the leading party in their development. Donor staff and consultants 
should preferably be involved only in judging the feasibility of a fully developed 
proposal, i.e., in the investment appraisal; 
7. The frequently observed practice of a marginal EIRR while envisaging maximum 
resource use for maximum benefits at maximum costs caused little room of 
manoeuvre at later stages. A management-control decision that may increase the 
flexibility for changes in the investment design and implementation after the initial 
investment appraisal would be to require the economic feasibility to be of such a 
level as to allow for such flexibility; 
8. A management-control decision that may improve the observed opaqueness of the 
financial impact of investment decisions on the recipient organization and 
individual farmers would be to require explicit statement of the financial impacts 
in investment appraisals and the related sensitivity analyses; 
9. A management-control decision that may ensure a reduction of the observed lack 
of consideration of the national opportunities of the funds for irrigation investment 
would be to require the development of such location-, organization-, or country-
specific norms for irrigation investment as, for example, the maximum costs per 
unit area for new construction and rehabilitation based on probable performance 
achievements; 
10. A management control decision that may ensure more transparency of the 
envisaged reliability of the available water resources for a new investment would 
be to develop explicit criteria for the required dependability of the inflow for 
feasibility assessments for different regions or countries; 
Functional requirements for the investments. 
11. A management-control decision that may increase an investment design's 
functionality would be to require an explicit statement of the "program of 
requirements" of the investment. Examples of such requirements are the future 
arrangements of ownership or rights of land and water, the local experiences with 
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soils, the performance targets, the management practices, the "investment history 
of the locale", the cost effectiveness of the individual components, and the reuse 
of water. A related management-control decision would be to require this 
program of requirements to be developed and determined by the agency itself, 
possibly in interaction with its clients, rather than by external actors. Especially 
requirements such as the controllability of flow, and performance targets probably 
can be determined only by the agency in a serious way. These two management-
control decisions are likely to induce the agency to think about the functionality 
of its design; 
12. A management-control decision that may facilitate more participation by farmers 
and system managers-and thus the acceptability and functionality of the design-, 
would be to require one or more intermediate steps in the decision making to 
allow for some form of interactive design. In such steps the clients would have 
an opportunity to enforce some consideration of their requirements and 
preferences. And thus to balance the divine role of the theoretical design 
concepts in this decision making that was observed in all case studies. This 
management-control decision also may facilitate more flexibility during project 
implementation, thus reducing some observed negative consequences of the rigid 
time frames for project implementation. Irrigation capacity creation seemed to 
need some trial-and-error. Such intermediate steps also may increase the 
acceptability of the design for the clients, and thus the likelihood of its 
implementation. 
Different forms of intermediate steps are possible. Examples are 1) to 
require a formal endorsement of the design and the related "program of 
requirements" by (representatives of) the WUGs; 2) to require WUGs or 
individual farmers to sign for the design and the related "program of 
requirements"; 3) to require a pilot testing of the design, and formal evaluation 
by agency and clients; 4) to require a gradual development of the command area; 
and, 5) to require the allocation of water rights to WUGs, or individual water 
users. A related management-control decision would be to require more or less 
meetings to be held with (representatives of) WUGs and agency staff to discuss 
the proposed designs. Or, simply to require that farmers are informed regularly 
and timely about the proposed design to allow for related feedback. 
WHO SHOULD TAKE WHAT MANAGEMENT-CONTROL DECISIONS? 
The above management-control decisions are not related to those who have to take them. They 
are stated as general requirements to improve the management conditions and decision-making 
processes about the capacity utilization and capacity creation, and thus ultimately the 
performance. This section contains some remarks about who should control what. 
Most management-control decisions about the processes and practices of the capacity 
utilization should be taken by the agency itself, either by the project level, or if not, by the 
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agency head office. The only management-control decision that the central government or 
funding agency could take about the capacity utilization would be to require performance 
standards to be developed and used. Also, they could make it policy to let farmers pay for the 
consumed water volumes. 
Only in Malaysia, the Prime Minister's Office was observed to try to enforce some 
accountability for the water-delivery performance by initiating the definition of performance 
indicators and the related monitoring and evaluation. The agency seemed to take these 
performance measurements more serious than in the other case studies because of the 
simultaneous pressure on the budgetary allocation. In Morocco, Sudan and Sri Lanka such 
financial pressures were not linked to the water-delivery performance. In Sri Lanka, the central 
government did not even monitor the water-delivery performance of its irrigation agencies. 
In Morocco, the government enforced another way of linking the water-delivery 
performance to the agency's finance, through its policy of enforcing volumetric water fees from 
the farmers. Yet, this financial accountability to performance seemed weakened through the 
observed government practice to allocate budgets independently of the agency's performance, 
as well as through the hidden subsidies in irrigation investments. 
In contrast all management-control decisions about the processes and practices of the 
capacity creation should be taken parties external to the irrigation agency, as the pressure for 
quantity originates from there as well. In principle, it would be best if the central government 
takes all these decisions. Though the risk that short-term political priorities overrule such 
management-control decisions is quite high. So such management-control decisions can probably 
be introduced seriously only after funding agencies introduce some related financial pressures. 
Especially, the above management-control decisions 4 and 6 could do this. Serious 
implementation of such management-control decisions would probably require these funding 
agencies, to become accountable to the quality of its investment appraisal decisions, and possibly 
for facilitating performance improvements, and not to the investment quantity. 
Similarly, all management-control decisions to achieve the required changes in 
management conditions could probably best be taken by the central government, except those 
that relate to the internal operations of the funding agencies. Examples of some of these changes 
could be observed in all case studies. Yet, the observations suggested that such changes were 
only implemented seriously if there were potential financial implications, either enforced by the 
central government or by the funding agency. 
New mission definitions, organizational set ups and other policies for the irrigation 
subsector were observed to be under preparation in the Sri Lankan government under a US AID-
funded project, the Irrigation Management Policy Support Activity (IMPSA). The quality of the 
policy papers was high. Yet, it remains to be seen to what degree these policies will be 
implemented and effectuated without financial pressures on the central government or agencies. 
The short-term political priority for quantity seemed likely to overrule their implementation or 
impact. 
In the Philippines, the central government has forced the National Irrigation 
Administration (NIA) in the 1970s to become a government corporation. Although it was an 
attempt to reduce the government budgetary allocation, it was never really enforced financially 
after the structural change itself. In the early 1980s the World Bank forced the central 
government to cut its subsidies to NIA for the repayment of its capital costs. Yet, after several 
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years it restarted these subsidies, as NIA refused further capital investment without them. Also 
NLA was never made financially accountable for its service delivery in any serious way. The 
above major structural change had little impact without it. 
In Morocco, the World Bank's sector loans were conditional to the central government's 
acceptance and implementation of increased financial autonomy, decentralization and business 
accounting systems for the irrigation agencies. Such conditionality seemed intended to stimulate 
the government to commit itself and implement such decentralization. The agencies seemed to 
support such decentralization. Though the commitment was there, the implementation still has 
to be realized. 
The above type of donor condinonalities often seemed to fail because both parties know 
that the funding agencies have pressures to realize the loans anyway. This weakens their 
leverage toward serious changes by the national governments. Not coincidentally probably 
therefore, the most serious management-control measures were observed in Sudan after the 
international funding agencies actually stopped disbursements. (Sudan is one of the few 
countries where this has happened.) 
Sudan was the only case study where the government was serious enough about the 
management-control improvements to start with the issue that matters most, finance. The 
government there approached the decentralization and increased financial independence by giving 
the agencies a deadline by which their finance would be cut back. 
Overall, the management-control decisions about the capacity creation and changes of the 
management conditions are likely to require financial conditionality from the funding agencies. 
Given their important role in the finance of the irrigation subsector in all case studies, only the 
funding agencies seem able to enforce some accountability for its performance. Though this 
requires neutrality toward quantity, i.e., the possibility to say "no". 
Notes 
1. E.g., Cassen 1986:170. 
2. EMI/World Bank 1991:30. 
CHAPTER 7 
Evaluation of the Research Methodology 
THIS LAST CHAPTER evaluates the methodology of the research. Thereto, the chapter 
evaluates the management perspective on its contributions to the analysis of the 
underperformance problem in the irrigated subsector. Also some disadvantages encountered in 
the application of the analytical framework are given, as well as its prospects of further 
applications. The significance of this study's results for the results of previous research is 
discussed. And the fulfilment of this study's problem definition and objectives are briefly 
evaluated as well. The chapter concludes with recommendations for future research that evolve 
from this study. 
THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR IRRIGATION MANAGEMENT 
Chapter 3 gives the developed analytical framework. This section discusses the framework-
specific contributions to this study's analyses and findings. Besides, the significance of the 
framework is indicated. 
Discussion: framework-specific contributions. The use of an explicit framework 
facilitated a more focused data collection and analysis. It appeared easy for an irrigation 
management analyst of any irrigation system to drown in the multitude of actors, agencies, 
interests, and more or less important information in any irrigation system. For example, in the 
first Sri Lankan case study 17 different government agencies were involved in the irrigation 
decision making. The explicit orientation here on performance-oriented key decisions facilitated 
a prioritizing in the data collection and analyses. This saved considerable time, and guided the 
management analyses to remain structured and consistent. 
Another merit of an explicit framework was its framing of a more objective analysis of 
opinions and feelings that people and different professions had about a system, or about 
irrigation in general. The analyses were also less distracted by the fights among the different 
irrigation managers, professions, agencies, consultants and donor organizations. 
Besides such general contributions of any framework, the following traits, and the related 
conclusions and recommendations in the previous chapter, can be attributed to the used 
framework: 
1. The framework facilitated a consistency in analyzing processes. In the initial case 
studies it appeared to be difficult to think consistently in processes. The 
identification of a problem tends to be in terms of such structural units as actors1, 
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organizational units or other management conditions. One by that simultaneously 
excludes certain possible causal factors from the analysis as they tend to remain 
hidden in these structural units. The definition of a problem in structural units 
preempts the analysis of the usefulness of these units themselves. 
An example was the following. The management analysis of the water 
allocation processes tended initially toward such reasoning as " . . .the water 
control center did this . . .". The evaluator was usually unaware that he took the 
functionality of the center itself for granted. Thinking through and analyzing 
processes and management conditions required a concentrated effort to get rid of 
such implicit and hidden assumptions. Several professionals claiming to apply a 
process-based analysis were observed to make inconsistent analyses.2 
Structural and systems3 approaches seem to fall into the same mistakes in 
this respect. By dividing the world in certain classifications and subsystems, the 
people using these approaches tend to understand only their "defined" perspective 
of reality. Yet, simultaneously they blind themselves to the role in the analysis 
of, and errors caused by, their definitions. 
A practical example of the consequence of such partial analysis is the 
following. A structural or systems approach can define politicians, agencies and 
farmers each as a different subsystem. Such a classification tends to stimulate of 
farmers and state as different parties with conflicting interests. Yet, (part of the) 
farmers and politicians have often an indirect but powerful influence on officials 
in an irrigation agency-many system managers are more their representatives 
than of the state—, and can mobilize considerable influence on the water allocation 
decisions. Chapter 2 gives examples of the partial analysis of most existing 
irrigation management concepts. Also, most process-based analyses in chapter 
2 appeared to be inconsistent in separating the processes and management 
conditions. 
Despite such inconsistencies, the structuralist or systems approaches have 
their value as well. For quantitative comparative research on organizational 
structure, performance, and situation they can provide useful insights and 
knowledge. Yet, for purposes such as a qualitative management analysis, or 
developing a management perspective, these analytical approaches are biased by 
their nature of defining subsystems that may not be fully functional or relevant 
in real-life; 
2. The framework's explicit separation of the substantive and managerial aspects of 
the decision-making processes forced an objective analysis of the functionality of 
disciplinary approaches in the decision-making processes. Most other analytical 
perspectives do not facilitate this. Consequently, as the involved disciplinary 
scientists are trained to evaluate the disciplinary approaches toward the quality of 
their application, rather than toward their functionality per se, the latter tends to 
be taken for granted. Of course, many professionals have experienced and 
published on certain disfunctionalities as demonstrated by the related quotations. 
Yet, these disfunctionalities evolved from an ad hoc and implicit framework of 
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the involved professional. 
Examples of the related framework-specific contributions to this study's 
findings are those about the actual functionality of the ELRR, the theoretical crop 
water requirements, the conceptual design, the discharge measurements, the water 
scheduling, the sensitivity analysis etc.; 
3. The definition of all key decisions relevant to the water-delivery performance 
forced the study to consider the full scope of irrigation management concerns. 
So this study, unlike most other irrigation management studies, included such 
relevant issues as the investment identification and the flow regulation as well. 
The consideration of all relevant questions made it not only possible to 
identify, but also to strengthen the credibility of the findings about the systematic 
flaws in the decision-making processes. Examples of such framework-specific 
contributions to the findings are the absence of accountability for the water-
delivery performance, the dominating influence of the EIRR on the feasibility and 
design, and the influence of the justification approach to feasibility assessment on 
the design concepts; 
4. The quantification of the management performance to a certain extent through the 
concept of the levels of sophistication facilitated a systematic and consistent 
analysis of flaws, and of the identification of the requirements for improvement. 
So this concept strengthened the objectivity of the analysis and thus strengthened 
the validity of the findings and recommendations; 
5. The simultaneous consideration of all key decisions enabled the analysis of the 
interaction and consistency between other issues than only the usually researched 
upon design-utilization interaction. For example, there were observed to be few, 
if any, publications on systematic studies of the interaction between the planning 
and design requirements, between the allocation and the regulation, and between 
the capacity creation and the decision-making processes of the capacity utilization; 
6. The analysis considered not only the management condition "Organizational 
structure and rules", but also others such as the provision of information and 
knowledge, the human resource management, and the financial control. It 
considered the required changes in these management conditions in an integrated 
manner. Besides, it considered these changes also in view of the requirements 
of the decision-making processes. This integrated perspective gave an unique 
understanding of the irrigation performance problem. So this study's 
recommendations of separate activities such as training, human resource 
management, and institutional reform, were only advocated in consideration of 
the related required changes in other management conditions. 
The current practices of the observed agencies, government and donors 
tended to be different as exemplified by this text's related remarks. Examples of 
related framework-specific contributions to the findings were the observed 
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practices on O&M manuals, investment in human resources, water-management 
consultants and others; 
7. By looking at the influence of the management conditions on the decision-making 
processes, and subsequently on the performance, the analysis took a full 
performance- and resource-based management perspective. Earlier analyses have 
not relied on an explicit management perspective, and tended to deal thus with 
partial problems and solutions. 
An example of a related framework-specific contribution to the findings 
was the link between the absence of accountability and the lack of performance-
related finance for the observed irrigation agencies. Or, the link between the 
supply-driven mode of investment and the accountability for performance, or 
between the supply-driven investments and the evolution of the investment 
concepts; and 
8. Based on the recommended changes in management conditions, the analysis goes 
one step further by focusing on the required management-control decisions "to get 
the performance-oriented processes started". Only few professionals have 
published such recommendations, and none of them based on an explicit 
framework. Examples of such framework-specific contributions to the 
recommendations were the proposed measures to increase the link between 
finance and performance, and between the quality of the capacity creation and 
capacity utilization and the internal performance assessment of the funding 
agencies. 
Discussion: disadvantages of working with the framework. The application of the 
analytical framework appeared to have the following disadvantages: 
1. Thinking and reasoning in structural units (such as a person or a division) tends 
to occur almost automatically, and the concentration on the pure processes was 
difficult. This can be considered a disadvantage for the application of the 
framework as it makes a high quality application of the framework less 
transferable to other irrigation professionals. Besides, as long as most 
management scientists do not understand the value of a pure process-based 
analysis, it remains difficult to communicate its value as well. On the other hand, 
any thinking on the separation of the processes and conditions increases the 
quality of a management analysis of the irrigation performance problems; 
2. Several concepts of the framework are process-based. They are defined in a 
framework-specific jargon to a certain extent as the concepts of management and 
control in English and American usage tend to be linked to structures only. The 
latter has the advantage that they can be imagined more easily than the process-
based concepts that cannot be visualized in real-life that easily. This specificity 
of the framework appeared to be of minor relevance for the analyses, and was 
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thus not stressed in this text to keep it as accessible as possible. In general, it 
was tried to keep the framework-specific jargon to an absolute minimum. Only 
the concept of the levels of sophistication is a jargon specific to this framework. 
This made its transferability to other irrigation professionals less easy, though not 
impossible; 
3. The analytical framework guides and frames the descriptions and analyses in this 
text completely. It had the disadvantage that certain repetitions in the text were 
inevitably. For example, much of the information, criteria, actors etc. are the 
same in the seasonal and in-seasonal allocation, or in the different key decisions 
of the strategic concern. Especially in chapter 5 the many aspects of the 
investment selection made that the dominating criteria, incentives, actors and 
information were repeated regularly. The repetitive nature of such analysis was 
a disadvantage, perhaps especially so for the reader. Similarly, now and then 
repetitions appeared inevitable in the analyses of the same issues and information 
from the different perspectives of the processes and the management conditions; 
4. Although management performance is quantified to a certain extent by using the 
levels of sophistication, many conclusions are derived from the systematic 
analysis of the decision-making processes and are therefore based on qualitative 
assessments. Especially persons with backgrounds in disciplines that are not used 
to the validity of qualitative assessments may have difficulties in understanding 
such validity. 
To what degree do the above disadvantages of the application of the framework impede further 
application? Although a consistent analysis of processes is not that easy, it is well possible. 
And any efforts to be consistent will pay off in the quality of the analysis. The repetitions are 
more a problem of presentation than of the analysis itself. Applying the framework in other case 
studies in terms of relating performance, decision-making processes, management conditions and 
management control (as represented in Figure 3 of chapter 3) is therefore relatively simple. 
Simple for a researcher or management specialist to do a management analysis. Though also 
irrigation managers could use these simple interrelations to take a different perspective of their 
work. 
The concept of the levels of sophistication has been translated in a questionnaire and in 
a description of the different levels for all water-related key decisions (see Annexes 1 and 2). 
Its application for management analysis in other systems and organizations also could be copied 
from each of the publications of the two Sri Lankan case studies. Researchers or management 
specialists could use it for a management analysis. And even with this concept, an irrigation 
manager could get some ideas about measures to achieve a higher level of sophistication. 
Overall, the above disadvantages do not seem major impediments to its application by others, 
also for the concept of the levels of sophistication. 
Significance for the irrigation practice: prospects forfuture application. The framework 
was used here for a systematic management analysis. It can be replicated as such. It can be 
used, and is used in some cases already, also as a tool kit for different purposes as described 
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hereafter: 
As a check list of relevant irrigation management concerns. 
1. To facilitate an awareness among irrigation professionals of the differences 
between the substantive and the managerial aspects of their day-to-day irrigation 
activities. Therefore, the substantive and managerial aspects can be identified for 
one or several different key decisions. The framework is thus used as a check 
list of day-to-day irrigation activities.4 It is used as such in HMI's Training 
Division for its Training Needs Exercises and for the development of training 
modules.5 Though it can be used for this purpose in any interactive exercise 
with irrigation professionals, such as a strategic planning exercise; 
2. To facilitate a more systematic approach to irrigation management in research by 
using the framework's management concerns as a check list for the identification 
of relevant research questions. This can force an irrigation management 
researcher to be aware about the relevant issues to be included in a full 
management perspective on irrigation. Or, at least, it may create awareness 
about those issues that are excluded. The framework is currently used as such 
in IIMI's research in Sudan, and, possibly, in Tamil Nadu (India); 
3. To develop manuals in a systematic way. For example, on procedures and rules 
for the capacity utilization and the capacity creation, or on information needs for 
the same; 
4. To professionalize the ex-post evaluations and impact studies of irrigation (and 
other development) investments. These studies were seldom observed to address 
the managerial aspects at all, and certainly not in a systematic way. 6 Ex-post 
evaluations and impact studies could be professionalized by using the framework 
as a check list of relevant issues that influence performance; 
As a performance indicator for management. 
5. To identify systematically opportunities for improvement of the management 
performance by means of the concept of the levels of sophistication. The 
descriptions of the levels of sophistication for the different key decisions in Annex 
1 and the questionnaire in Annex 2 give ample guidelines for the identification of 
the existing level of sophistication. Also the identification of the required 
measures to achieve a higher level is possible through these annexes. IIMI's 
ongoing research in Sri Lanka's Kirindi Oya system presently uses the framework 
as such; 
6. To assess management improvements quantitatively before and after management 
innovations through the levels of sophistication. This can be done as described 
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for item 5. IIMI's ongoing research in Sri Lanka's Kirindi Oya system uses it 
in this way as well; and 
7. To develop normative indicators for irrigation management performance for 
different socio-economic and physical environments through comparative 
research. This was part of IIMI's Organizational Dynamics survey in the 
Philippines and Sri Lanka. 
THE SILENCE ON QUANTTTY, QUALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
What is the significance of this study's results for the results of previous research? The text 
makes frequent references to disfunctionalities of disciplinary approaches and previous solutions 
to irrigation management problems. These will not be repeated here. Yet, some remarks are 
made of the impact of this study's major findings on the results of previous research. 
The major finding from this study is the need to balance the observed influence of the 
bias for investment quantity on the quality of investment decisions. This bias had its impact on 
the accountability for the water-delivery performance in the decision making concerning all 
studied management concerns. Only after a change in priority from investment quantity to the 
quality of investment decisions, the elevation of the levels of sophistication of the decision 
making becomes indispensable for performance improvements. Yet, this issue is presently 
almost absent in the discussion among irrigation professionals dealing with irrigation's 
underperformance. The findings of much previous research on irrigation's underperformance 
appeared therefore merely partial solutions. This section briefly evaluates this gap in irrigation 
management research. 
Only few irrigation and development professionals have considered the mutual influences 
of the different management conditions and of the management control for the capacity 
utilization and creation. Some have considered the management condition of the human 
resources as a dead end for development interventions. For example, Wade has explicitly 
considered this "man management" aspect as a dead end, because, as he stated: " . . .there is 
not much that can readily be done about problems of this second type in the specific context of 
irrigation. One could not, for example, use promotion criteria in irrigation which differed from 
those used elsewhere in the civil service. " 7 So his stated bias was for the "big potentials in 
irrigation reform" by circumventing these crucial, though hopeless issues, and to concentrate on 
changes in operating procedures and "the information system -especially public monitoring of 
the 'output' of an irrigation system--"8 Similarly, Chambers has poohpoohed as a dead end the 
frequent calls by irrigation professionals for "political will". On the other hand, a few 
professionals have dealt with irrigation's finance and thereby addressed indirectly factors 
influencing investment quantity, the quality of investment decisions and performance.9 
Almost nobody has argued for a moderation of the "investment-quantity-at-the-expense-
of-creation-quality".10 This suggests it to be an even more sensitive issue for irrigation 
professionals than corruption or political interference. Wade has suggested this in the following 
quotation: 
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"International development agencies potentially have a role in reducing the mismanagement of development 
projects. But at present the official position of both the agencies and the recipient governments is that the 
[donors] are to concern themselves with increasing the inputs to development, while it is for the host 
governments to worry about the outputs of development projects. Indeed, there is perhaps no subject in the 
international development community so sensitive and suppressed as the mismanagement of development 
programmes"." 
Several interviewed development professionals argued that any discussion on the "quantity-at-the-
expense-of-quality" issue, despite its crucial role for performance, would play in the hands of 
the opponents of investment in irrigation, and in development in general. Based on similar 
arguments, others defended increases in investment based on statistical forecasts of population 
growth and food balances in LDCs. 
Yet, such defensive and static approaches toward the quality of the decisions on 
development investments underestimate the process requirements for performance improvement. 
Statistical forecasts never compare the potential food production "with" and "without" the right 
processes and incentives. Admittedly, this would not be easy and probably impossible, or highly 
speculative. Still, the observed analyses defended large-scale subsidies and by that seem to 
become self-serving. Such analyses can typically also not explain why, for example, a tiny 
country like the Netherlands is presently the world's second agricultural exporter. 
Therefore, a more logical focus of development investments would be efforts "to get the 
conditions and processes right", rather than "throwing money"1 2 to finance underutilization, and 
by that stimulate or sustain underdeveloped processes. Similarly, research efforts should be re-
oriented "to get the conditions and processes right" by taking a full management perspective in 
their analysis, and thus avoid partial solutions. 
EVALUATION OF THE PROBLEM DEFINITION 
The results of this study point at some major changes required in the management and control 
in the irrigation subsector. These findings seem to confirm the assumption that there is a 
potential for performance improvement through improved management. On the other hand, the 
observed systematic overoptimism in the performance assumptions during the investment 
decision making suggests a need to qualify most estimates of the underperformance to a 
considerable extent. 
EVALUATION OF THE OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The objectives of this study were twofold: 1) the identification of generalized directions of 
management change for performance improvement in the irrigation subsector in LDCs; and 2) 
the testing of an analytical framework for irrigation management." Both issues are evaluated 
here. 
The results of the application of the framework work systematically toward an integrated 
picture of the required changes in the management and control in the irrigation subsector. These 
recommendations fulfil the first objective of this study. Although the results are to a minor 
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extent based on quantitative analyses, most findings are based on many observations in different 
environments, and are therefore likely to be true. The applied analytical framework is based 
on an analytical framework that has been applied several times before, which further 
substantiates the validity of the findings. The heterogeneous nature of the case studies and the 
similarity of the observations by the quoted professionals justify the generalization of the 
findings for the irrigation subsectors in all LDCs. Though in specific countries certain findings 
may be less true, of course. 
This study tested the analytical framework indirectly through its application in the 
irrigation subsector. The framework's usefulness appears from the apparent contribution of this 
study's results to the achievement of the first objective of this study. 
EVALUATION OF THE LEVELS OF SOPHISTICATION AS A RESEARCH TOOL 
This section evaluates the only measurement tool, the level of sophistication, used in the 
operationalization of the framework. As mentioned in chapter 3, the operationalization of this 
concept consisted essentially of a translation for irrigation of a similar questionnaire and tables 
for maintenance management developed by Marcelis.1 3 Essentially the same values (see Annex 
2) for similar types of activities were maintained to make use of the experience of Marcelis' in-
depth work to establish them. Also the lack of any reliable values in irrigation to establish 
alternative values made it logical to use those developed by Marcelis. 
After the initial pilot testing of the questionnaires by some Sri Lankan engineers, the 
adjusted questionnaires were used for comparative surveys in the Philippines and Sri Lanka. 
Yet, the disinterest of the respondents to improve their performance made them boost their 
present performance in their responses of the questionnaires. The responses appeared thus 
unreliable and incomparable. Adequate cross-checking was required to obtain reliable and 
comparable outcomes. As such cross-checking was logistically impossible for all respondents, 
the outcome of the comparative surveys was not used for this study. Instead, in each case study 
several agency staff were interviewed about the levels of sophistication. Based on these 
interviews and further observations, a more reliable and comparable picture of the levels of 
sophistication was obtained for this study. 
The used translations as given in Annexes 1 and 2 were not perfect as well. Yet, they 
were the best possible for the irrigation subsector and for the available expertise and insights in 
irrigation management. Still, if the questionnaires will be used in further comparative studies 
refinements of the questions, and, possibly, of the values may be necessary. As long as 
respondents have no interest themselves in identifying possible ways of performance 
improvement, the assessments of the levels of sophistication should be done by objective 
outsiders. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The following priorities for future research on the underperformance in the irrigation subsector 
evolved from this study: 
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1. First and foremost is the need for research on specific management-control 
methods and techniques that are likely to bring accountability for performance into 
the financing of irrigation. Especially where subsidies are involved, such 
research seems required to balance the observed biases toward "quantity-at-the-
expense-of-quality"; 
2. Another research issue would be to establish the probable potential for 
performance improvement in different countries or regions. These estimates 
could then be used for realistic investment norms per unit area as Aluwihara and 
Kikuchi have done for Sri Lanka. 1 4 Such indicators may not only prevent 
hidden subsidies in future irrigation investments, but also may attribute a more 
realistic economic and financial value to performance; 
3. Cost effectiveness and efficiency of the collection of service fees in smallholder 
systems seems a priority research issue that has been comparatively neglected so 
far;1 5 and 
4. Similarly, appropriate structures for volumetric measuring of water in smallholder 
systems seem a priority research issue. 
The above research issues relate all to measures to introduce accountability for the water-
delivery performance. The following recommendations about research issues evolved from this 
study as well although they are irrelevant for introducing accountability, and thus of secondary 
importance from the perspective of performance improvements: 
5. Research on the managerial aspects of the coordination of gate settings along the 
main system. Examples of relevant techniques would be trial-run techniques, or 
the application of simulation models to experiment with different operational 
methods and procedures. Thus, more knowledge about relevant contingency 
(if...then...) instructions could develop; 
6. Research by local (research) institutions engaged in irrigation management issues 
on methodologies for establishing feasible and functional design criteria that 
incorporate site-specific experiences and historical information, especially with 
regard to the experiences and requirements of the water users and system 
managers. Examples of relevant approaches could be a pilot study or a phased 
development; 
7. Research by the same institutions on the possible impact of low-cost sequential 
improvements of the irrigation capacity at certain locations, also compared to 
capital-intensive improvements. 
Despite the above list, much research seems to have been done on irrigation management 
already. Performance improvements in the irrigation subsector seem to need therefore much 
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more the application of the available knowledge to change the present management and control, 
rather than more research. 
Notes 
1. An actor should be read here as a person with a certain function. A person, without reference to his function, used 
in the process description or analysis, does not bring such implicit structural meaning along. 
2. For example, Bottrall has defined the decision-making process in terms of persons and structures (Bottrall 1981a). 
3. Although many systems approaches have recognized explicitly the value of the processes, their very nature necessitates 
the definition of "parts", and their coordination (e.g., West Churchman 1968:29). 
4. Nijman 1989. 
5. TJMI/DID 1990; IIMI/BADC 1991; Nijman and Kampfraath 1991a-c. 
6. Bottrall 1981a:233-236. 
7. Wade 1982b: 180. 
8. Ibid. 
9. E.g., Carruthers and Small 1991; Duane 1986; Repetto 1986; Small 1989b; Svendsen et al. 1990; Aluwihara and 
Kikuchi 1991. 
10. The only exceptions found for this study were Seckler 1982; and Cassen 1986. 
11. Wade 1982a:324. 
12. Seckler 1982:16. 
13. Marcelis 1984. 
14. Aluwihara and Kikuchi 1991. 
15. Conform Repetto 1986:30. See also note 127 of chapter 4. 
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ANNEX 1 
Levels of Sophistication of the Irrigation Management Concerns 
AN ANALYSIS OF an irrigation organization focussed on its key decision-making processes, 
is likely to lead to the conclusion that conditioning is required for performance improvement. 
Kampfraath and Marcelis (1981) have identified four criteria to guide the choice among 
different conditioning alternatives that together form the basis for the concept of the "level of 
sophistication." 
These four criteria are derived from the decision-making processes: systematics, feedback, 
foreseeing and integration. Decision-making processes are essentially processes of 
transformation of the "resource" information into decisions. Two dimensions influence the 
quality of the decision, namely 1) what information is taken into account; and 2) how that 
information is processed. The first dimension can be split up into three criteria: 
* In fact, a decision is a position toward future action, so that for taking that decision 
"foreseeing" (i.e., to what degree does decision taking foresee the scope of the 
decision?) is likely to influence the quality of the decision; 
* Another element is the influencing through and of other processes. A position in the 
area of seasonal planning has consequences for the area of maintenance, for example. 
"Integration" (i.e., to what degree are problems seen in a wider context before the 
decision is taken?) is used as a criterion for this aspect. 
* The position will only have actual consequences if the de facto action has commenced. 
Up to that moment the position can be revised based on information of the past; the 
quality of the position depends on the level of "feedback" (i.e., to what degree the 
decisions taken are tested continuously for appropriateness?). 
The second dimension refers to the following criterion: 
* "Systematics" (i.e., to what degree decisions are taken following a more or less fixed 
pattern?). 
The level of sophistication is derived from those four criteria through the attachment of an 
estimated quantitative label to different qualitative levels of those four criteria, as shown in 
Table 1 of chapter 3. The levels of sophistication of the different irrigation management 
concerns and key decisions used here were derived from Table 1 and are listed in this 
Annex. 
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S T R A T E G I C C O N C E R N : D E S I R E D I N V E S T M E N T O B J E C T I V E S 
0 - 2 0 / V E R Y L O W : The establishment of the desired investment objectives is ad hoc without considering the 
likely sustainability of these objectives during the lifetime of the envisaged investments. No feedback with on 
the desirability and acceptability of the identified desirable objectives occurs from such stakeholders as the 
existing local community, the future beneficiaries, the separate agencies and individuals in those agencies, the 
local and national politicians, the consultants and donors. No rules support this decision making, though a 
certain routine may exist. 
2 0 - 4 0 / L O W : Necessities for the short-term sustainability of the desired objectives during the life- time of the 
envisaged investments are incorporated. Irregular feedback on the desirability and acceptability of the most 
important desirable investment objectives takes place from such stakeholders as the existing local community, 
the future beneficiaries, the separate agencies and individuals in those agencies, the local and national 
politicians, the consultants and donors. Broad rules support this decision making. 
4 0 - 6 0 / A V E R A G E : Priorities for the short- and long-term sustainability of the desired investment objectives 
during the lifetime of the envisaged investments are considered. Regular feedback occurs on the desirability 
and acceptability of relevant system objectives from such stakeholders as the existing local community, the 
future beneficiaries, the separate agencies and individuals in those agencies, the local and national politicians, 
the consultants and donors. The preferences and requirements of these groups with respect to these 
objectives are considered. Rules support important aspects of this decision making (e.g., the determination of 
the district and national social and economic opportunities for the investments). 
6 0 - 8 0 / H I G H : Foreseen developments that will affect the short- and long-term sustainability of the desired 
objectives during the lifetime of the envisaged investments are considered. Frequent feedback occurs on the 
desirability and acceptability of the most important desirable investment objectives takes place from such 
stakeholders as the existing local community, the future beneficiaries, the separate agencies and individuals in 
those agencies, the local and national politicians, the consultants and donors. Important preferences and 
requirements of these groups with respect to these objectives are incorporated. Procedures in terms of 
combinations of mutually attuned rules support this decision making. 
8 0 - 1 0 0 / V E R Y H I G H : Expected developments that will affect the short- and long-term sustainability of the 
desired objectives during the lifetime of the envisaged investments are reviewed and considered. Continuous 
feedback occurs on the desirability and acceptability of the most important desirable investment objectives 
takes place from such stakeholders as the existing local community, the future beneficiaries, the separate 
agencies and individuals in those agencies, the local and national politicians, the consultants and donors. All 
relevant preferences and requirements of these groups with respect to these objectives are incorporated. 
Balanced systems of mutually attuned procedures support this decision making. 
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S T R A T E G I C C O N C E R N : F E A S I B L E I N V E S T M E N T O B J E C T I V E S 
0-20/VERY LOW: The assessment of the feasible objectives is ad hoc without considering their likely 
sustainability during the lifetime of the investments. No feedback on the appropriateness of the feasible 
objectives is obtained from relevant sources such as agencies, publications, local communities or beneficiaries. 
No consideration of the mutual influences between such feasible objectives such as the watershed 
management, dam sites, command area, suitability of soils, water-delivery concept, water duties, cropping 
patterns and intensities, maintenance, settlement, and environment; mono-disciplinary feasibilities dominate 
the decision making. No rules exist regarding the determination of the feasible objectives though a certain 
routine may exist. 
20-40/LOW: Necessities for the short-term sustainability of the feasible objectives during the life- time of the 
envisaged investments are incorporated. Obvious experiences regarding the appropriateness of the feasible 
objectives of relevant agencies, publications, local communities or beneficiaries regarding the appropriateness 
and the feasible objectives are processed. Incorporation of convincing mutual influences between the different 
feasible objectives such as the watershed management, dam sites, command area, suitability of soils, water-
delivery concept, water duties, cropping patterns and intensities, maintenance, settlement, environment etc. 
Broad rules (e.g., steps to be taken, criteria to be used, consultations required, level of agreement of different 
groups) support the decision making. 
40-60/AVERAGE: Priorities for the short- and long-term sustainability of the feasible objectives during the 
lifetime of the envisaged investments are considered. Consideration of the regular feedback of important 
information regarding the appropriateness the feasible objectives. Consideration of directly related mutual 
influences between the different feasible objectives such as the watershed management, dam sites, command 
area, suitability of soils, water- delivery concept, water duties, cropping patterns and intensities, maintenance, 
settlement, environment etc. Rules (e.g., steps to be taken, criteria to be used, consultations required, level of 
agreement of different groups) support important decision-making processes regarding the feasible objectives. 
60-80/HIGH: Consideration of foreseen developments that will affect the short- and long-term sustainability of 
the feasible objectives during the lifetime of the envisaged investments. Consideration of the frequent 
feedback of most relevant information regarding the appropriateness of the feasible objectives. Incorporation 
of important mutual influences between the different feasible objectives such as the watershed management, 
dam sites, command area, suitability of soils, water-delivery concept, water duties, cropping patterns and 
intensities, maintenance, settlement, environment etc. Procedures in terms of combination of mutually 
attuned rules support important decision-making processes regarding the feasible objectives. 
80-100/VERY HIGH: Expected developments that will affect the short- and long-term sustainability of the 
feasible objectives during the lifetime of the envisaged investments are reviewed and considered. 
Consideration of the continuous feedback of all relevant information regarding the appropriateness of the 
feasible objectives. Incorporation of all mutual influences between the different feasible objectives such as the 
watershed management, dam sites, command area, suitability of soils, water-delivery concept, water duties, 
cropping patterns and intensities, maintenance, settlement, environment etc. are incorporated. Balanced 
systems of mutually attuned procedures support important decision-making processes regarding the feasible 
objectives. 
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S T R A T E G I C C O N C E R N : F U N C T I O N A L I N V E S T M E N T R E Q U I R E M E N T S 
0 - 2 0 / V E R Y L O W : The decision making about the functional requirements is ad hoc and does not foresee the 
sustainability of these requirements (e.g., in case of crop diversification, or after degradation of parts of the 
system due to deficient maintenance) during the lifetime of the envisaged irrigation system or the involved 
components. No feedback occurs of experiences of the local community and the system managers regarding 
the appropriateness of the functional requirements for the investment. The decision making about the 
functional requirements does not try to integrate the engineering interests with other irrigation and 
nonirrigation interests and requirements of such stakeholders as the local community, the water-management 
staff, the politicians, the future settlers, and the (national or regional) agricultural interests. No rules exist 
regarding the determination of the functional requirements, though a certain routine may exist. 
2 0 - 4 0 / L O W : The decision making about the functional requirements considers necessities regarding the 
sustainability of these requirements (e.g., in case of crop diversification, after degradation of parts of the 
system because of lack of maintenance) during the lifetime of the envisaged irrigation system or the involved 
components. Feedback occurs of obvious experiences of the local community and system managers regarding 
the appropriateness of the functional requirements for the investment. The decision making about the 
functional requirements considers convincing subsidiary influences between engineering interests and other 
irrigation and nonirrigation interests and requirements of such stakeholders as the local community, the water-
management staff, the politicians, the future settlers, and the (national or regional) agricultural interests. 
Broad rules exist regarding the determination of the functional requirements. 
4 0 - 6 0 / A V E R A G E : The decision making about the functional requirements considers priorities regarding the 
sustainability of these requirements (e.g., in case of crop diversification, after degradation of parts of the 
system because of lack of maintenance) during the lifetime of the envisaged irrigation system or the involved 
components. Most important experiences of the local community and the managing agency regarding the 
functional requirements for the investments are considered. The decision making about the functional 
requirements integrates engineering interests with directly related influences of irrigation and nonirrigation 
interests and requirements of such stakeholders as the local community, the water-management staff, the 
politicians, the future settlers, and the (national or regional) agricultural interests. Important decision-making 
processes regarding the functional requirements such as the number and sites of intermediate reservoirs, the 
determination of peak irrigation requirements to certain subsystems, the required controllability over water 
flow etc. are supported with rules. 
6 0 - 8 0 / H I G H : The decision making about the functional requirements considers foreseen developments 
regarding the sustainability of these requirements (e.g., in case of crop diversification, after degradation of 
parts of the system because of lack of maintenance) during the lifetime of the envisaged irrigation system or 
the involved components. Most experiences of the local community and the managing agency regarding the 
functional system requirements are considered. The decision making about the functional requirements 
integrates engineering interests with important other influencing factors of irrigation and nonirrigation interests 
and requirements of such stakeholders as the local community, the water-management staff, the politicians, 
the future settlers, and the (national or regional) agricultural interests. Most decision-making processes 
regarding the functional requirements such as the number and sites of intermediate reservoirs, the 
determination of design and peak irrigation requirements to certain subsystems, the required controllability 
over water flow etc. are supported with combinations of mutually attuned rules. 
8 0 - 1 0 0 / V E R Y H I G H : The decision making about the functional requirements considers and reviews expected 
developments regarding the sustainability of these requirements (e.g., in case of crop diversification, after 
degradation of parts of the system because of lack of maintenance) during the lifetime of the envisaged 
irrigation system or the involved components. All relevant experiences of the local community and managing 
agency regarding the functional requirements are considered. The decision making about the functional 
requirements integrates engineering interests with all influencing factors of irrigation and nonirrigation interests 
and requirements of such stakeholders as the local community, the water-management staff, the politicians, 
the future settlers, and the (national or regional) agricultural interests. Decision-making processes regarding 
the functional requirements are supported by balanced systems of mutually attuned procedures. 
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ALLOCATION CONCERN : SEASONAL ALLOCATION PLAN 
0-20/VERY LOW: The seasonal allocation planning of water duties, cropping calendar, pattern, irrigable area 
and cultivation risks for different subsystems occurs ad hoc, though a certain routine may exist. Few rules 
guide this planning. No consideration for the related decision making by other stakeholders such as the 
agricultural department, the water users and the maintenance planners. Performance evaluation through 
complaints. 
20-40/LOW: The seasonal allocation planning considers to some degree the available supply during the season 
for the different subsystems. No quantification of cultivation risks. Rules of thumb are used for the seasonal 
assessment of supply and demand, and the allocation planning. Incorporation of convincing influences of 
decision making by other stakeholders such as the agricultural department, the water users, the politicians and 
the maintenance planners. Performance evaluation through complaints and registration of final seasonal plans. 
40-60/AVERAGE: The available supply during the season for the different subsystems is assessed and 
priorities are made between the allocation parameters (i.e., irrigable areas, cropping pattern, calendar, water 
duties and cultivation risks). Quantification of cultivation risks. Consideration to some degree of the 
consequences of the current season's allocation decisions on future expectations; i.e., a more active allocation 
strategy. Rules support this decision making. Consideration in the allocation planning of the directly related 
decision making by other stakeholders such as the agricultural department, the water users, the politicians and 
the maintenance planners. Performance evaluation through registration of final plans and comparison with 
important earlier experiences, and through regular monitoring of the actual implementation. 
60-80/HIGH: Assessment of the available supply during the season for the different subsystems, and priorities 
are set between the allocation parameters, also considering the consequences for future expectations for 
important subsystems (given the allocation strategy for these subsystems and the overall system). 
Quantification of the cultivation risks and water duties for subsystems. Procedures of mutually attuned rules 
support this decision making. Incorporation of important influences of decision making regarding the different 
subsystems by other stakeholders such as the agricultural department, the water users, the politicians and the 
maintenance planners. Performance evaluation through comparison of final plan with earlier experiences for 
the different subsystems, and through frequent monitoring and evaluation of the actual implementation. 
80-100/VERY HIGH: Assessment of the available supply during the season for the different subsystems, and 
priorities are set between the allocation parameters, also considering and reviewing the expected 
developments during the season and their consequences for future expectations of subsystems (given the 
allocation strategy for these subsystems and the overall system). Balanced systems of mutually attuned 
procedures support this decision making. Incorporation of all relevant decision making regarding the different 
subsystems by other stakeholders such as the agricultural department, the water users, the politicians and the 
maintenance planners. Performance evaluation through comparison of the final plan with earlier experiences for 
all subsystems, and through continuous monitoring and evaluation of the actual implementation. 
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ALLOCATION CONCERN : IN-SEASONAL ALLOCATION 
0 - 2 0 / V E R Y L O W : Little effective planning of the in-seasonal allocation occurs; operational targets for 
conveyance and distribution, cropping calendar, pattern, irrigable area and cultivation risks for different 
subsystems are set ad hoc, while incorporating urgencies. A certain routine may exist. Few rules guide this 
planning. No consideration in the official allocation decisions, if any, by other stakeholders such as the water 
users and the agricultural department. Gate tenders determine to a large degree the actual allocations, 
whereby often the conveyance along the main system is neglected. Performance evaluation through 
complaints. No reliable or effective feedback to higher hierarchical levels on the realization of the operational 
targets for distribution and conveyance for the different subsystems. 
2 0 - 4 0 / L O W : Short-term planning of in-seasonal allocation whereby necessities and urgencies are considered. 
Rules of thumb are used for the in-seasonal assessment of supply and demand, and allocation planning. 
Incorporation of convincing influences for different subsystems of decision making by other stakeholders such 
as the water users, the agricultural department and the politicians. Gate tenders take allocation decisions 
partly on their own, and partly based on instructions. Only for urgencies, operational targets for distribution 
and conveyance are considered separately. Performance evaluation through complaints and registration of 
final allocation plans (i.e., water schedules). Feedback on realization of the operational targets for distribution 
and conveyance for the different subsystems occurs for obvious points in the (sub)system. 
4 0 - 6 0 / A V E R A G E : Regular (e.g., weekly or biweekly) planning of the in-seasonal allocation. The consequences 
of allocation decisions on future expectations are considered to some degree. The allocations consider the 
foreseen supply and demand changes during realization of the operational targets for distribution and 
conveyance for the different subsystems. Rules support this decision making. Important targets for 
conveyance to the tail end of the main canal and other important subsystems are incorporated in the matching 
of supply and demand. Consideration of the directly related decision making by other stakeholders such as the 
water users, the agricultural department and the politicians. Gate tenders take allocation decisions in line with 
water schedules and related instructions. Performance evaluation through the registration of water schedules 
and through comparison with important earlier experiences, and through regular monitoring of the actual 
implementation of most important operational targets. Allocation schedules consider regular feedback on the 
effective rainfall for most important subsystems. Experience With allocations is laid down in records (e.g., 
database, seasonal reports). 
6 0 - 8 0 / H I G H : Planning through frequent scheduling of allocations to different subsystems. Consideration of 
the consequences of allocation decisions on future expectations. The allocations consider the foreseen supply 
and demand (e.g., probable effective rainfall) changes during realization of the operational targets for 
distribution and conveyance for the different subsystems. Combinations of mutually attuned rules support this 
decision making. Incorporation in the matching of supply and demand of the most relevant decision making by 
other stakeholders such as the water users, the agricultural department and the politicians. Gate tenders take 
allocation decisions in line with water schedules and related instructions. Part of the instructions include 
standard practices for operational methods and procedures. Operational targets for distribution and 
conveyance are considered separately. Performance evaluation through frequent comparison of the actual 
implementation with the scheduled operational targets for conveyance and distribution for different 
subsystems. Frequent feedback on the demand includes the effective rainfall for all important subsystems. 
8 0 - 1 0 0 / V E R Y H I G H : The actual allocation is laid down in the water schedules. The gate tenders allocate 
accordingly, also in line with standard practices. Expected developments regarding supply and demand for 
different subsystems during the realization of the operational targets for distribution and conveyance for the 
different subsystems are reviewed and considered. Most sudden demand changes are thus covered in a 
consistent and reliable manner. Balanced systems of mutually attuned procedures support this decision 
making. Incorporation in the matching of supply and demand of all relevant decision making by other 
stakeholders such as the water users, the agricultural department and the politicians. Performance evaluation 
through continuous comparison of the actual implementation with the water schedules for conveyance and 
distribution. Deviations and delays are reported and registered. 
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REGULATION CONCERN 
0 - 2 0 / V E R Y L O W : Hardly any preparation and calculation of the operational methods and plans occurs; they 
are established ad hoc and hardly foresee the consequences for upstream and downstream water levels in the 
main system. No rules support this decision making, though a certain routine (developed through on-theiob 
experience! may exist. No feedback occurs of used operational methods. Hardly any coordination of the 
operation of different structures along the main system. No advance determination of the time required for the 
operations. Gate tenders do the division of work by themselves. Performance evaluation by complaints and 
by some monitoring of the time spent. 
2 0 - 4 0 / L O W : Supervisors do some preparation and calculation of operational methods and plans (e.g., 
determination of approximate time and size of flow variations along the main system). The operational 
methods and plans consider the necessities for the conveyance of the resulting upstream and downstream 
water levels. Irregular feedback of the most obvious experiences with operational methods and stabilization 
occurs. The different operational methods incorporate convincing influences of the operations of the different 
structures along the main system on the stability of the water levels. Broad rules support this decision 
making. Advance estimation of the time required for the operations. Division of work is done partly by gate 
tenders themselves, partly by their supervisor. Performance evaluation by complaints and by monitoring of 
time spent by supervisor. 
4 0 - 6 0 / A V E R A G E : Special staff of higher hierarchical levels do part of the preparation and calculation of 
operational methods and plans. The operational methods and plans consider priorities with respect to the 
conveyance of resulting upstream and downstream water levels. Regular feedback occurs regarding the 
important experiences with operational methods. Relevant influences of the operations of the different 
structures along the main system on the water levels are incorporated in an operational plan. Rules support 
this decision making. Time required for the operations is calculated by means of historical data. Division of 
work is done through tasks and instructions. Performance evaluation by regular monitoring of actually 
implemented operational methods and time spent by supervisor. 
6 0 - 8 0 / H I G H : Special staff for a systematic preparation and calculation of operational methods and plans. 
Frequent feedback occurs regarding practiced operational methods and resulting water-flow regulation. The 
operational plan incorporates all control structures that influence the regulation along the main system. 
Combinations of mutually balanced rules support this decision making in all subsystems. Time required for the 
operations is calculated; partly by means of calibrated norms. Division of work is done through tasks and 
instructions. Part of the instructions constitute standard operational methods. Performance evaluation by 
monitoring and evaluation of the actually implemented operational methods and by comparison of the time 
spent with the norms. 
8 0 - 1 0 0 / V E R Y H I G H : Special staff for a complete systematic preparation and calculation of operational 
methods and plans. Most operational methods have been standardized. Expected developments regarding 
upstream and downstream water levels are reviewed, evaluated and incorporated in the operational methods. 
Continuous feedback takes place regarding practiced operational methods and the resulting water flows and 
levels. Balanced systems of mutually attuned procedures support this decision making in all subsystems. 
Calculation of the time required for the operations is based on unit time calculations (e.g., UMS). Performance 
evaluation by monitoring and evaluation of the actually implemented operational methods and time spent. 
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NOTE: The questions on this page and the following 4 pages deal only with the pre-seasonal planning. 
The questions should not be answered for water allocation during the season. 
HOW DOES THE MATCHING OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND OCCUR BEFORE THE START OF. THE 
CULTIVATION SEASON ? 
Only one of the following 1.1 fa) to 1.1 fd) 
can be responded with Ves' 
1.1 (a) The gate operators determine 
the starting date of the 
cultivation season and the 
areas to be cultivated 
(b) Field supervisors determine the 
starting date and the different 
areas to be cultivated 
(c) Senior officers In the hierarchy 
determine the starting date and 
the different areas to be 
cultivated, but only for a 
limited part of the irrigation 
system 
(d) The starting date, different 
areas, and possibly crops to be 
grown, are determined at a 
central point for the whole 
irrigation system 
Only one of the following 1.5(a) to 1.5(c) 
can be responded with yes'l Only for the 
question responded with 'yea' the related 
sub-questions have to be responded 
1.5 (a) Requests of individual water users 
are considered in season planning 
if water is abundantly available 
- True, and in addition, water 
users and gate operators are 
Informed before the start of 
the season 
- True, and in addition, water 
users and gate operators are 
consulted 
- True, and in addition, the 
majority of farmers or their 
representatives accept the 
allocations 
1.5 (b) Actual requests of the smallest 
sub-systems (for example tertiary 
or field canals) are considered in 
the seasonal planning, if water is 
available abundantly 
- True, and in addition water 
users and gate operators are 
informed before the start of 
the season 
VALUE 
10 
15 
15 
10 
MOROCCO 
100 
SUDAN 
100 
100 
50 
75 
80 
SRI LANKA 
10C 
PHIL 
100 
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- True, and In addition water 
users and gate operators are 
consulted 
- True, and in addition the 
majority of farmers or their 
representatives accept the 
allocations 
1.5 (c) Actual request of important sub-
systems (for example distributary 
canals, tracts or blocks) are 
considered in the seasonal 
planning if water is available 
abundantly 
- True, while in addition water 
users and gate operators are 
informed before the start of 
the season 
- True, and in addition water 
users and gate operators are 
consulted 
- True, and in addition the 
majority of farmers or their 
representatives accept the 
allocation 
1.17 A fixed seasonal allocation policy 
exists and is implemented. (This 
policy gives procedures and 
guidelines regarding possible 
starting and completion dates for 
the cultivation season, crops, 
water duties for different areas. 
Or, it determines which sub-systems 
get priority or are denied 
cultivation for different water 
availability situations) 
1.18 This seasonal allocation policy is 
determined in consultation with 
headquarters, water users, local 
administration/government officials, 
relevant agencies and possibly 
politicians 
1.19 This seasonal allocation policy is 
evaluated after each season 
1.20 Seasonal cultivation plans are in 
accordance with agricultural plans 
1.21 Seasonal allocation decisions are 
in line with annual and seasonal 
maintenance plans, rehabilitation 
and improvement plans 
VALUE MOROCCO SUDAN SRI LANKA PHIL 
5 
5 
5 100 
5 
5 
5 
i 
15 75 100 50' 
10 75 50 
10 25 25 
5 25 100 
5 25' 80 50 
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1.22 The seasonal decisions are in line 
with the long term allocation 
strategy. (For example, If no rice 
cultivation is allowed in areas 
where only water is available for 
less water consuming subsidiary 
field crops, the seasonal water 
duty allocations are in line with 
these envisaged long term water 
allocations) 
TOTAL 
VALUE 
10 
100 
MOROCCO SUDAN SRI LANKA PHIL 
25 25 
63 42 38 15 
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HOW IS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SEASONAL ALLOCATION DECISIONS PLANNED ? 
2.2 
2.3 
2.1 The urgency of requirements of water 
users or sub-systems (for example 
agricultural inputs, credits, labor 
availability) determines actual starting 
dates or staggers between water users 
or sub-systems 
A system of fixed priorities/rules for 
implementation of seasonal plan is laid 
down in schedules and is implemented 
Seasonal agricultural plans and maintenance 
plans form the basis for the implementation 
of the staggers 
True, but In addition these staggers 
are determined as well by an annual 
agricultural plan and maintenance plans 
2.5 A weekly schedule for the implementation 
of the cultivation season exists on paper in 
which all related tasks are scheduled in 
time. 
True, and in addition to this weekly 
implementation schedule, a time 
utilization schedule is made that 
reflects the degree of utilization of 
the different involved divisions in 
time 
True, and in addition, a time 
utilization schedule for every 
individual staff member exists 
True, and in addition, this time 
utilization schedule is detailed 
by means of a bar schedule 
2.9 The implementation planning is executed 
by a central planning officer 
TOTAL 
VALUE 
10 
10 
20 
100 
MOROCCO SUDAN SRI LANKA PHIL 
100 
75 50 
50 
50 
75 50 
50 50 
29 5 23 10 
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3.1 
3 .2 
3 .3 
3.5 
3.6 
3.8 
3 . 1 0 
Monitoring and evaluation of starting 
up of cultivation season through 
supervision of gate operators by field 
level supervisors 
Monitoring and evaluation of starting 
up of cultivation season through 
supervision of gate operators by 
supervisors who are hierachically 
higher than field level staff 
Regular (= at least weekly) progress 
meetings with Involved staff 
True, but also with participation 
of farmers or their representatives 
Regular documentation of progress and 
delays in starting dates of the 
cultivation season for different 
cultivated extents 
Formal, documented completion of starting 
up of seasonal plan and verification of 
realized water duties during starting up 
and of cultivated crops and cultivated 
extents 
True, and in addition written 
reporting and anlysis of causes of 
deviations from plan 
Regular comparison of implementation 
progress with plan 
True, with written reporting and 
analysis of causes of deviations 
Monitoring and evaluation of costs 
involved (for example salaries, transport) 
in implementation of seasonal plan for 
important sub-systems by calculation at 
conclusion of starting up of season 
True, but In addition written 
reporting and analysis of deviation 
TOTAL 
VALUE 
5 
1 0 
1 0 
1 0 
1 0 
1 0 
1 0 
1 0 
1 0 
1 0 
1 0 0 
MOROCCO SUDAN SRI LANKA PHIL 
100 5 0 
5 0 5 0 2 5 
75 
2 0 
5 0 100 
100 
5 0 2 5 
50 
3 2 1 5 4 1 0 
HOW IS THE PROGRESS MONITORING AND EVALUATION (QUANTITATIVELY AND QUALITATIVEL 
OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SEASONAL ALLOCATION PLAN ? 
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4. HOW IS THE DEMAND FOR WATER DURING THE CULTIVATION SEASON MATCHED WITH THE 
AVAILABLE WATER RESOURCES? 
VALUE MOROCCO SUDAN SRI LANKA PHIL 
Only one of the following 4.1 (a) to 
4.1 (d) can be responded with *yes' 
4.1 (a) Gate operators can allocate water 
volumes (=timing, quantity and duration) 
according to own judgement and 
preferences 0 50 100 75 100 
4.1 (b) Field supervisors determine these 
in-seasonal allocations 5 50 25 25 
4.1 (c) The allocation of water volumes for 
a limited part of the irrigation system 
is determined by senior officers in the 
hierarchy 5 25 
- 4.1 .o is true, and this determination 
of the allocation happens 
c.1 daily 5 50 
c.2 weekly 4 50 
c.3 bi-weekiy 3 
c.4 monthly 2 
c.5 irregularly 1 
4.1 (d) The allocation of water volumes is 
determined at a central point for the 
whole Irrigation system 10 25 
- 4.1 .d is true, and this determination 
of the allocation happens 
d.1 daily 5 
d.2 weekly 4 50 
d.3 bi-weekly 3 50 
d.4 monthly 2 
d.5 Irregularly 1 
Only one of the followlnq 4.15fa) to 4.15(c) can 
4.15 (a) Individual water user requests (actual) 
are considered in water allocation if 
water is available abundantly, also 
in view of requirements and allocations 
of other users 15 100 
- True, while in addition informing 
water users (or their representatives) 
and gate operators before the 
implementation of the scheduled 
allocation 5 100 
- True, and In addition water users or 
their representatives and gate 
operators are consulted 5 75 
NB: The questions on this page and the following 4 pages have to be responded for water allocation 
during the season only I 
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- True, and In addition the majority of 
farmers or their representatives are 
in agreement with the allocation 
4 . 1 5 (b) Actual requests of the smallest 
sub-systems (for example, tertiary or 
field canals) are considered if the 
water Is available abundantly, also In 
view of requirements and allocations of 
other sub-systems 
- True, while in addition informing 
water users (or their representatives) 
and gate operators before the 
implementation of the scheduled 
allocation 
- True, and in addition water users or 
their representatives and gate 
operators are consulted 
- True, and in addition the majority of 
farmers or their representatives are 
In agreement with the allocation 
4 . 1 5 (c) Actual requests of Important sub-systems 
(for example distributary canals, tracts or 
blocks) are considered if water is 
available abundantly, also in view of 
requirements of other sub-systems 
- True, while in addition informing 
water users (or their representatives) 
and gate operators before the 
implementation of the scheduled 
allocation 
- True, and in addition water users or 
their representatives and gate 
operators are consulted 
- True, and in addition the majority of 
farmers or their representatives are 
in agreement with the allocation 
4 .27 A fixed in-seasonal allocation policy exists 
and is implemented. (This policy gives 
procedures and guidelines regarding water 
volumes for different areas in timing, 
quantity and duration. Or, it determines 
which sub-systems get priority or are 
denied water for different water availability 
situations) 
VALUE 
1 0 
1 5 
MOROCCO 
75 
75 
SUDAN SRI LANKA 
25 100 
50 
PHIL 
1 0 0 
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4.28 This in-seasonal allocation policy is 
determined in consultation with 
headquarters, users, local government 
officials, relevant agencies and possibly 
politicians 
4.29 This in-seasonal allocation policy is 
regularly evaluated 
4.30 In-seasonal allocation decisions are in 
accordance with the seasonal allocation plan 
4.31 In-seasonal allocation decisions are in 
accordance with the seasonal agricultural 
implementation plan 
4.32 The decisions are in line with a long term 
allocation strategy. For example, if no rice 
cultivation is allowed in areas where only 
water is available for less water consuming 
subsidiary field crops, the water allocations 
are in line with these envisaged long term 
water allocations 
TOTAL 
VALUE 
10 
10 
5 
100 
MOROCCO SUDAN SRI LANKA PHIL 
50 10 
100 50 
25 50 
25 25 
66 4 19 6 
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HOW IS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IN-SEASONAL ALLOCATIONS PLANNED ? 
5.2 
5.3 
5.1 The urgency or requirements of water 
users or sub-systems (for example labor 
availability, input supply, pest or disease 
incidence, other agricultural reasons) 
determines the actual allocations (timing, 
quantity and duration) to different 
sub-systems 
A system of fixed priorities/rules has been 
laid down on paper and is implemented 
A schedule of actual water requirements from 
different sub-systems forms the basis for 
the allocation implementation scheduling 
True, but the allocation scheduling is 
determined also by a written schedule of 
seasonal or annual water delivery 
performance and agricultural production 
targets 
5.5 A weekly allocation implementation schedule 
exists in which related tasks in time have 
been scheduled and indicated as well 
5.6 This weekly allocation implementation 
schedule exists in which related tasks 
in time have been scheduled and indicated 
as well 
5.7 In addition, a time utilization schedule 
for every individual staff member is provided 
5.8 In addition, this time utilization schedule 
is detailed by means of a bar schedule 
5.9 This implementation planning is executed by 
a central planning officer 
TOTAL 
VALUE 
5 
5 
10 
10 
20 
10 
10 
10 
20 
100 
MOROCCO SUDAN SRI LANKA PHIL 
25 100 100 100 
75 25 
100 25 
100 25 
50 
35 5 24 5% 
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6.1 
6.2 
6.3 
6.5 
6.6 
6.8 
6.10 
Progress monitoring and evaluation of 
actual water delivery through supervision 
of gate operators by field level supervisors 
Progress monitoring and evaluation of 
actual water delivery through supervision 
by officers who are higher in the hierarchy 
than field level staff 
Regular progress meetings (= at least 
bi-weekly) with invovled agency staff 
True, but also with participation of 
farmers or their representatives 
Regular documentation of monitoring and 
evaluation of deviations in timing of 
start and completion of actual water delivery 
Formal, documented completion and 
verifications of water delivery performance 
(for example, timeliness, predictability, 
adequacy, efficiency) 
True, and in addition documented 
reporting and analysis of cause of 
deviations from scheduled allocations 
Regular comparison of implementation 
progress and scheduled implementation 
True, with documented reporting and 
analysis of causes of deviations 
Monitoring and evaluation of costs involved 
(for eample salaries, transport) in 
implementation of in-seasonal allocations 
for important sub-systems by ex-post 
calculation 
True, but in addition documented 
reporting and analysis of deviations 
TOTAL 
VALUE 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
100 
MOROCCO SUDAN SRI LANKA PHIL 
50 50 50 
25 25 25 25 
100 
75 
75 
25 
50 
50 
41 1 4 4 
HOW IS PROGRESS MONITORING AND EVALUATION (QUANTITATIVELY AND QUALITATIVELY) OF 
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IN-SEASONAL ALLOCATIONS ? 
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—GATE OPERATIONS AND WATER FLOW REGULATION— 
NB: Tha questions of this page and the following 2 pages have to be responded only for the actual gate 
settings (procedure, size, frequency) and actual flow regulation. fThls Is different from the earlier 
questions regarding allocation of water volumes) 
7. HOW DOES THE PREPARATION OF GATE SETTINGS (=. PROCEDURE, SIZE AND FREQUENCY) BY 
OWN STAFF TAKE PLACE ? 
NB: This question does not refer to the planning In time of these operational methods and plans, which had 
been covered In questions 1 to 6 already. Questions 7 and 8 refer to the management concern that the 
actual flow regulation through the execution of gate settings at a specific moment Itself happens as 
effectively and efficiently as possible 
7.1 The gate operators do the preparation of 
procedure, size and frequency of 
different gate settings by themselves 
In principle, only one of the following 
7.2fa» - 7.2.a3172(b) and 7SlcA can be 
with 'yes.' Yet It Is possible to respond to 
both 7.2(b) and 7.2(c) with -yes' 
7.2 (a1) Field supervisors give specific 
instructions to the gate operators about 
procedure, size and frequency of different 
gate settings 
7.2 (a2) Officers who are hierarchically higher 
than field level staff give specific 
instructions to the gate operators about 
the procedure, size and frequency of 
different gate settings 
72 (a3) Supervising officers do the administrative 
and technical preparation of procedures, 
size and frequency of gate settings (for 
example, rating curves for gates) 
7.2 (b) There are fixed rules/standing orders 
for procedures, size and frequency of 
gate settings (for example, for important 
water level fluctuations after rainfall, or 
for safety) 
7.2 (c) Special technical staff do the preparation 
of procedures, size and frequency of gate 
settings 
7.7 Such special technical staff has up to date 
information of hydraulic conditions of canals, 
control and measurement facilities 
7.8 Regular analysis of gate setting procedures 
by means of historical data 
7.9 Systematic analysis for different water flow 
scenarios by means of time-and-rnotion 
techniques (= non stop monitoring for 
some days) 
VALUE 
15 
25 
25 
15 
10 
10 
MOROCCO 
100 
SUDAN 
80 
20 
10 
20 
SRI LANKA 
100 
50 
25 
PHIL 
100 
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7.10 
7.11 
The outcomes of such analyses are 
discussed with the supervisors 
The analyses are discussed with the gate 
operators, for which inputs from their 
side are expected 
TOTAL 
VALUE 
10 
100 
MOROCCO SUDAN SRI LANKA PHIL 
0 4 9 0 
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8. HOW IS THE CONTROL OVER TIME UTILIZATION BY GATE OPERATORS ? 
8.1 
8.2 
8.3 
8.4 
8.5 
Supervisors check their actual working hours 
Gate operators record their own daily 
working hours 
Methods like multi-moment recordings 
(= continuous monitoring for a couple of 
days), are used for fixing once in every 
two or three years the working hours in 
a representative period 
Gate operators record their time taken 
per operation 
Time taken per operation is regularly 
analyzed by means of comparing different 
operations 
Only one of the following 8.5 and 8.6 can be 
responded with yes' 
8.6 Working time norms are developed by 
means of historical data 
8.7 That time norm is determined by means of 
work studies or multi-moment recordings 
8.8 Analyses are done on actual time spent in 
comparison to norms 
8.9 Such analyses are done by a special officer 
(for example, who is involved in the 
preparation of operational methods as well) 
8.10 The outcomes of the analyses are discussed 
with supervisors 
8.11 The outcomes of these analyses are discussed 
with gate operators, whereby their input is 
expected 
TOTAL 
VALUE 
10 
5 
10 
15 
25 
10 
15 
5 
10 
100 
MOROCCO 
75 
75 
25 
11 
SUDAN SRI LANKA 
25 
25 
PHIL 
25 
25 
ANNEX 3 
Hydraulic Control: Flow, Levels and Storage Control 
THIS ANNEX ELABORATES on the factors that influence flow, level and storage control. The 
section intends to give some insight in the hydraulic aspects of irrigation for non-engineering 
readers. Also, it proposes a more management-relevant terminology for the purely hydraulic 
concepts of upstream and downstream control. 
THE NEED FOR FLOW, LEVEL AND STORAGE CONTROL 
All structures in irrigation systems are intended to increase control over water flows and levels. 
"Control" refers thereby to the process of giving direction to the water flow and levels, and the 
process of getting some degree of feedback on realized flows and levels. The latter may 
subsequently be used to change the future direction so that targets will be achieved. Thus, this 
definition of control includes both management and hydraulic control. 
Control over water flow is seen here as a continuum between no control and full control. 
The required degree of control over water flow and level depends on the required quality of the 
water delivery; if more timeliness, reliability, and efficiency are pursued, then more control over 
the physical process is required. 
Control over water flow and level in an open canal is necessary for the following 
reasons: 1) to prevent the overtopping of canals without wasting water through spillways; 2) to 
facilitate and control the distribution by maintaining enough head to command the service area 
through gravity; and 3) to facilitate and control the conveyance of water along the canal. 
In many traditional irrigation systems, there is little opportunity for control over the 
water flow. Only by maintaining the full discharge it is possible to issue enough water through 
the offtakes, because lower discharges result usually in too little head.1 
Modern designs tend to increase the opportunity for flow and level control. For example, 
by introducing cross-regulators in a canal. Cross regulators serve to achieve level control along 
a canal while conveying variable flows through it. A problem of canals with cross-regulators 
is the time lag in the transmission of flow variations over long distances; only in canals with 
flow variations such responsiveness becomes relevant. In canals with fixed cross-regulators like 
duckbill weirs this responsiveness becomes even more constraining. Another problem in canals 
with cross-regulators is the need to manage these flow variations and thus the operations of the 
cross-regulators. By introducing level control structures (i.e., the cross-regulators) the canal 
becomes a cascade of small reservoirs. The filling and emptying of these reservoirs have to be 
managed to ensure the conveyance of water along the canal. Yet, the latter problem is less valid 
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for fixed cross-regulators where such filling and emptying occurs more automatically as long as 
the overall discharge in the canal is sufficient. 
The management of filling and emptying of these reservoirs to ensure conveyance and 
distribution requires more than just localized control over flow and level at a certain moment; 
it requires the integration of the flow and level control along the canal for a period of time. 
Such integrated flow and level control to reach the pursued degree of storage control is defined 
here as flow regulation. Flow regulation encompasses both the formulation and execution of an 
operational plan for the conveyance of water along a canal and the distribution through its 
offtakes. The operational plan includes the operation of storage and diversion works to adjust 
water levels in the canal and possible intermediate reservoirs, and to adjust changes in stream 
flow.2 
SENSITIVITY OF STRUCTURES FOR FLOW AND LEVEL CONTROL 
Different types of irrigation structures release different discharges after the same flow 
fluctuations upstream. For example, this so-called sensitivity is different for overflow type (i.e., 
weirs and flumes) and undershot type (i.e., orifices) structures. The change of the downstream 
discharge as a result of an equal increase of the upstream water level is much higher for a weir 
than for an orifice. 
This sensitivity of structures has of course much influence on their functionality for the 
flow regulation. If the function of a structure is to reduce fluctuating water levels upstream, 
then a weir seems more fit. From a decision making perspective, a weir used as a level 
regulating structure in the parent canal requires fewer operations to control the diverted flow 
(with a similar accuracy) after a flow fluctuation in the parent canal. 
On the other hand, the orifice seems more fit if the structure's function is to reduce 
fluctuations in the downstream water flow after upstream water level fluctuations. From a 
decision making perspective, an orifice as offtake requires fewer operations to control the water 
diverted flow with the same accuracy, after water level fluctuations in the parent canal. 
COMPLETE AND PARTIAL HYDRAULIC CONTROLS 
The hydraulic properties of water make the control over the physical process in irrigation very 
complex. They cause the decision making on the flow through a structure to be influenced by 
the downstream water levels, and thus by the so-called backwater effect of structures 
downstream. With backwater effects it becomes very difficult to control accurately the discharge 
through a structure. In a management environment where management control is weak, the 
introduction of more hydraulic controls during the design phase (if enough head is available) 
may help to reach sufficient control over the physical process to achieve the pursued water-
delivery performance. 
ICLD has defined a hydraulic "control" as follows: "A section or a reach of a conduit 
where conditions exist that make the water level above it a fairly stable index of discharge. A 
control may be partial or complete. A complete control is independent of downstream conditions 
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and effective at all stages.".3 A complete hydraulic control gives the opportunity to control the 
water flow fully as "the water doesn't know what's happening downstream".4 
If the "water does know what's happening downstream" the so-called backwater effect 
makes it more difficult to control flow as the canal reaches become hydraulically interdependent. 
Subsequently flow control needs more information: an assessment of the gate opening and the 
level both upstream and downstream of a structure. Even then it remains difficult to assess the 
flow without calibrating the structure for different hydraulic situations. 
System design may harness hydraulic controls in the following ways: 
* flow assessment requires a narrow weir so that the level fluctuates more with 
variable discharges; 
* level comrol in a limited upstream reach of a hydraulic control will be improved 
with a wide weir as it limits level fluctuations for variations of flow. (Such level 
control facilitates the opportunities for flow control through the offtakes in the 
upstream canal reach.); 
* decoupling of different canal reaches, in particular preventing the downstream 
reaches from influencing the upper reaches, requires weir type of structures. 
These create the hydraulic conditions that facilitate the so-called upstream control 
type of regulation that designers often pursue. 
BASIC MODES OF REGULATION AND RELATED DESIGN CONCEPTS 
The basic design concepts for flow regulation rely on different sources of information for the 
target setting for the operations. These are either from the head or from the tail of the canal. 
An upstream mode of regulation means that a change in water flow is (envisaged to be) 
initiated from the head end of the canal (i.e., filling), and must be "pushed" downstream. This 
upstream mode of regulation can be achieved manually through allocation and regulation 
decisions and control, as well as automatically through decision making during the planning and 
design phase. Design concepts that favor an automatic upstream mode of regulation are such 
hydraulic controls as overflow type of structures (e.g., duckbill weirs) and different types of 
more advanced technological concepts (e.g., counterbalancing gates). 
In a system designed for a manual upstream mode of regulation without any hydraulic 
controls its existence in the day-to-day operation depends on the quality of the management and 
its communications due to the hydraulic interdependency of the canal reaches. Apart from the 
high communication requirements, a problem in long canals with this type of regulation is the 
high hydraulic lag time to react on requests from the tail end. If this lag is a major impediment, 
the design can alleviate it by using intermediate storages. These can act, depending on how 
good they are managed, as a buffer for the variability of upstream flows and levels. 
Alternatively, a downstream mode of regulation means that a change in water flow is 
(envisaged to be) initiated from the tail end of the canal (i.e., draining). This downstream mode 
of regulation can be achieved manually through allocation and regulation decisions and control, 
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as well as automatically through decision making during the planning and design phase. Design 
concepts that favor an automatic downstream mode of regulation do not envisage hydraulic 
controls. A special automatic, counterbalancing gate exists for downstream control as well as 
some other high-tech gates that react automatically on downstream level fluctuations. A 
particular feature of these automatic downstream modes of regulation is that the propagation of 
information about targets occurs hydraulically. Also, a degree of downstream mode of 
regulation exists in canals with undershot gates where limited coordination between the different 
canal reaches occurs, and where thus part of the information is propagated hydraulically.5 
For both upstream and downstream modes of regulation manual storage control along 
canals with cross-regulators is difficult to achieve as follows from the following quotation: "the 
storage capacities corresponding to different water surface profiles for different steady state 
flows conditions are generally not readily available to the irrigation agency in charge of 
operations. Per default, the current operational rules do not take into account the variations of 
canal built-in storage capacities corresponding to the different flow regimes in the management 
of the transfer of water. Instead, the operations rules are generally expressed in more simple 
terms for the gate tenders, for example the standing orders to maintain water level at full supply 
depth at the cross-regulator. These rules mean that the volume comprised within a reach would 
increase or decrease with the variation of inflow and that would oppose to some extent and delay 
the transfer of water.".6 Storage control in canal reaches under unsteady flow conditions is thus 
very difficult to achieve with manual operation only. 
Yet, another automatic system aims at a constant storage. In this design concept the 
target control level lies in the middle of the canal reach between two counterbalancing or other 
type of automatic gates. 
BALANCING BETWEEN MANAGEMENT AND HYDRAULIC CONTROL 
The above mentioned design concepts do not replace the need for management control as the 
decision makers at system and sub-system levels have considerable potential to use a design 
concept for an upstream mode of regulation in a downstream mode. Therefore, more 
consistency seems required between the mode of regulation envisaged during the planning and 
design and the actual mode of utilization. This means not necessarily a choice between a 
downstream and upstream mode of regulation but a choice for an adequate combination of the 
two in the various sub-systems of the main system, also in view of the likely objectives and 
practices during capacity utilization. 
ANNEX 3 
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1. For example, in Sri Lanka's ancient irrigation concepts this lack of controlled flow was compensated partly by the 
construction of cascades of small tanks as buffers for the upstream variability, and for some degree of control over the 
water levels. 
2. Definition free after ICID 1967:615. 
3. Ibid:384. 
4. Henderson 1966. 
5. See also LTMI 1989 and Nijman 1992a. 
6. LTMI 1989. 
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Fake Management-Control Systems 
IN PRINCIPLE, THE sections on financial control systems in chapters 4 and 5 should cover all 
material and immaterial control systems, other than incentive systems and information systems 
that were covered under other management conditions. In practice, the chapters discuss just the 
most important management-control system, the financial control. Yet, several systems were 
observed to be often considered erroneously as management-control systems. This Annex 
discusses them. 
Two different categories of control systems and methods can be recognized. They 
correspond to the different categories of decision-making processes described in chapter 3 (see 
also Figure 4). These different categories of processes form the different objects of control, as 
listed hereafter: 
1) B-process control systems for controlling the physical processes (i.e., A-process) 
relate only to substantive choices in the B-process. Examples are the methods for 
assessing the crop water requirements or the inflow, methods of zoning and 
rotational water deliveries, methods for assessing the feasible or designed water 
requirements or inflow, or the methods of assessing the feasible or functional 
zoning and rotational water deliveries. Such B-process systems do not control or 
relate to the decision making of the B-process itself; and, 
2) C-process control systems for controlling the decision-making processes about the 
physical processes and conditions (i.e., B-process), such as systems of physical 
and financial accounting and control. 
These systems are often closely related to management information and incentive systems, and 
sometimes the boundary is rather arbitrarily. 
Though per definition, the systems and methods of the first category, the B-process 
systems, have no function as management-control systems. Yet, several of them are often 
erroneously considered as such, and some generalizations of such misunderstandings seem 
sufficiently relevant to summarize here. 
CAPACITY UTILIZATION 
Control systems are usually based on some performance indicators. The theoretical crop water 
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requirements are often considered an instrument to control the water allocation, both during the 
utilization and the creation of irrigation capacity. Yet, this method cannot control much at field 
level. It is based on theoretical assumptions and does not provide managers with the information 
and arguments to restrict allocations. Its major weakness remains the seepage and percolation 
rates that can vary considerably, even within a small allotment. A reliable assessment of these 
rates is thus too difficult to make the assessment functional in a management-control system. 
ITMI research has demonstrated this in the Kirindi Oya and Uda Walawe systems.1 
The concept of the "cumulative relative water supply" considers only these losses to the 
degree they are really lost to a sub-system over a period of time. This reduces the influence of 
this major weakness somewhat thus, though its practicality still has to be tested.2 In the absence 
of other management-control systems, these calculations are sometimes enforced on the field 
staff and farmers, at least that is what the higher hierarchical irrigation managers (like to) tiiink 
. . .the practice tends to be different. 
These theoretical crop water requirements are thus not a management-control system, and 
they can function only marginally in another control system, neither can it replace the absence 
of others. Although this misconception may seem trivial, it has contributed to many delusions 
in irrigation projects, and the consequent underperformance. 
Gross comparative water-delivery performance indicators for larger sub-systems or 
systems based on comparative data may play a somewhat more functional role. Though they 
do not provide the manager with any location- and time-specific arguments as well. More useful 
in any management-control system are location-specific gross performance indicators based on 
historical data. They provide managers with such location-specific arguments, though they are 
still not time-specific. A combination of a management information system and historical, 
normative indicators can provide for such a time-specific management-control system. 
Alternatively, water pricing can replace this type of B-process systems. Or, this can be 
achieved through the creation of decentralized profit centers, thus delegating this decision 
making to lower hierarchical units or to the farmers themselves. The section on Financial 
Control Systems in chapter 4 elaborates upon these two options. 
Other B-process systems are the rotation of water deliveries, zoning of cultivation, yield 
optimization, planning of staff time utilization.3 These systems may help to enforce some 
reduction of water wastage in certain parts of a system, though they do not necessarily lead to 
it; they are not management-control systems. Their effectiveness depends instead on the related 
management-control systems that influence staff to use such a system in a more or less functional 
way. 
In general, donors require the development of O&M manuals for the utilization of their 
irrigation investments. Such manuals provide all sorts of fore mentioned and other B-process 
systems and methods such as instructions for the assessment of the water requirements, the 
scheduling, the monitoring and evaluation, and flow regulation. They seldom touch upon the 
more sensitive C-process management-control issues. This contrasts with the dependence of the 
functionality of such manuals on the management control. Without touching these management-
control issues, such manuals seem therefore a waste of money.4 
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CAPACITY CREATION 
Design concepts. Conceptual design is also a method that many professionals assume to be a 
management-control concept in that it influences design decision-making processes. In practice, 
it only relates to substantive design choices, and not to the preparatory processes of these 
decisions. Therefore, it does not relate to the C-process, the management control. 
In contrast, the here proposed condition to develop an explicit statement on a "Program 
of requirements" for the new irrigation investments would represent such a management-control 
system as it influences the process of the B-process. 
Cost-benefit analysis. Similarly, cost-benefit analysis guides substantive choices of the 
feasibility assessment. It does not control its output, neither the process of decision making. 
The prescribed cut-off rate of most donors provide a certain management control. It is meant 
as an output performance indicator for this process, and was observed to function as such. 
Notes 
1. IJMI 1990a. 
2. Sakthivadivel in UMI Technical Staff Seminar, 10 December 1990. 
3. E.g., Murray-Rust 1990. 
4. See, for example, page 103 and Le Moigne 1986. 
To conclude, a short discussion on Diemer's interesting process-based anthropological perception of the origins 
of the way engineers have come to look at several of these systems the way they do at present. Diemer has called this 
perspective of irrigation engineers the engineering paradigm (Diemer 1990). 
For many reasons, the engineering paradigm of irrigation traditionally regarded an irrigation system as an 
agricultural production system. Design of such a system was optimized toward the physical water efficiency at the 
expense of the economic opportunities for water and farmers. In the past, under fully controlled governance (e.g., under 
colonial rule), such assumptions could, to a certain degree, be realized. Yet, even physically, perfect planning by the 
agency is impossible given the huge and unrealistic amount of detailed information about location-specific soil, 
topography and other considerations that is required for optimal physical planning. The only observed study that 
recognized this physical impossibility is on the Moroccan system of "assolement" (i.e., the state controlled cropping 
pattern and calendar for different sub-systems) and is based on several detailed case studies by a German social 
geographer (Popp 1984:243-244). 
Over time, these opportunities and governance situations have changed, while the engineering paradigm did not; 
in fact, engineers are educated without any awareness of such historically developed assumptions and their present 
validity. 
The consequences of this engineering paradigm on irrigation are manifold. Engineers tend to plan, design and 
operate irrigation systems for the delivery of water to crops, rather than to their actual clients, the fanners. Similarly, 
engineers and agronomists have always thought that the best cultivation plans could only be developed by the agencies; 
if optimization of the use of physical resources only is considered, this is indeed the case. In practice, however, market, 
economic and management constraints cause quite different opportunities that cannot be planned or controlled by the 
agencies. Along such paradigmatic lines, agencies traditionally planned and controlled cultivation in Sudan and Morocco. 
Also in Asia engineers preferred this type of cultivation in irrigation systems through the subsidized provision and control 
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of many additional inputs by the irrigation agency, often with support and pressure of the donors. More recently, more 
awareness of the high social and economic costs and missed opportunities of such approaches have led to more liberalized 
approaches in these countries, again with support and pressure of the donors. 
Diemer's interesting thesis elaborates on several of the mentioned points (Diemer 1990). By explicitly adopting 
a process-based perspective of irrigation, Diemer derived many findings similar to this study. The difference with this 
study is that Diemer focussed on FMIS and did not systematically consider the management conditions and management 
control processes. He thus also omitted, for example, the important role of finance. Diemer also meant his study more 
to provide a process-based sociological perspective, rather than a management perspective (Diemer pers. comm.). 
Samenvatting 
DEINVESTERINGEN IN irrigatie voorzieningen gedurende de laatste decennia zijn 
immens geweest. De geschatte jaarlijkse investeringen van 15 miljard dollar maken 
irrigatie de grootste subsector van de agrarische sector, zelf verreweg de grootste sector 
van investeringen in onlwikkelingslanden. Sinds het midden van de zestiger jaren is het 
bewustzijn gegroeid dat de uitkomsten van die investeringen ver beneden hun potentieel 
liggen. Ze zouden uiteindelijk gemiddeld ten opzichte van de schattingen ten tijde van de 
investeringsbeslissingen twee keer zoveel kosten en maar de helft opbrengen. 
DE PROBLEEM DEFINITIE EN DOELSTELL1NG 
TegeKjkertijd met het toegenomen bewustzijn over de onderbenutting van de irrigatie 
voorzieningen, realiseerde men zich dat het management niveau van de systemen laag was 
in vergeLijking met de expertise en inspanningen in de constructie van nieuwbouw en 
rehabilitatie. Experimenten in de Filipijnen, Sri Lanka en India in het eind van de 
zeventiger jaren suggereerden een potentieel voor verbeterde capaciteitsbenutting puur 
door management verbeteringen. Editer, dit potentieel is sindsdien niet benut. 
Bovendien ontkennen veel ingénieurs het management probleem. Er blijken dus 
afwijkende benaderingen en visies op het irrigatie management probleem te bestaan, en 
daarom hebben vele irrigatie deskundigen gepleit voor een meer objectieve benadering 
van de onderbenutting in de irrigatie. Deze studie poogt zo'n benadering te ontwikkelen 
middels een bestaande besturingsbenadering. Ook wordt getracht door toepassing van de 
benadering op de irrigatie problematiek een verbeterd inzicht in de onderbenutting te ver-
krijgen, alsmede de mogelijkheden tot verbetering te identificeren. 
BESTAANDE IRRIGATIE BESTURINGSBENADERINGEN 
Er zijn weinig expliciete pogingen gedaan om een concept voor de besturing van irrigatie 
Systemen te ontwikkelen. Van de bestaande concepten zijn de meeste meer gericht op de 
formele verschijning van de organisatie, de structuur. De meeste concepten blijven ook 
vaag over de relatie tussen de structuur en de besluitvormingsprocessen. Geen enkel 
concept probeert een integrale benadering te zijn, dat wil zeggen alle voor irrigatie 
managers relevante zaken mee te nemen in de analyse. De potentiele bijdrage van deze 
Studie is een expliciete integrale benadering van de irrigatie besturing, alsmede een 
systematische analyse van de relatie tussen besluitvormingsprocessen en structuur. 
Bovendien worden andere soorten besturingscapaciteit, ofwel management condities, dan 
alleen structuur bekeken, zoals het financieel beheer, de mensen, en de voorziening van 
informatie en kennis. 
283 
284 SAMENVATTINO 
KEN INTEGRALE BESTURINGSBEN ADERING 
De management benadering in deze studie is gebaseerd op de integrale besturingsbenade-
ring zoals die ontwikkeld is door Kampfraath en zijn collega's van de Vakgroep Bedrijfs-
kunde van de Landbouwuniversiteit te Wageningen. 
De onderstaande figuur geeft deze proces-benadering stapsgewijs weer. De eerste 
stap is de identificatie van de belangrijkste bestuurlijke vraagstukken die beantwoord 
moeten worden voor de levering van water (stap 1). Deze vraagstukken zijn verdeeld in 
twee hoofdgroepen, namelijk 1) vraagstukken georienteerd op het scheppen en 
instandhouden van capaciteit ten bate van de uitvoering; en, 2) vraagstukken georienteerd 
op het benutten van deze capaciteit. Voor het scheppen van capaciteit betreft dit de 
besluiten ten aanzien van respectievelijk de gewenste investeringsdoelstelling, de haalbare 
investeringsdoelstelling en de functionele eisen ten aanzien van de investering. Voor het 
benutten van capaciteit betreft dit de water allocatie en regulering. 
Voor de finale besluiten van elk van deze belangrijke vraagstukken wordt vervol-
gens de bijdrage aan de prestaties van de organisatie vastgesteld (stap 2). Indien deze 
bijdrage als onvoldoende wordt beschouwd, worden de besluitvormingsprocessen geana-
lyseerd die leiden tot dat finale besluit. De vaststelling van de niveaus van perfectie van 
de besturing van de belangrijkste besluiten is onderdeel van die analyse (stap 3). 
Gebaseerd op de analyse van de interactie tussen de besluitvormingsprocessen en de 
soorten van besturingscapaciteit, de management condities, worden veranderingen in de 
laatste geidentificeerd die waarschijnlijk tot verbeteringen in de besluitvormingsprocessen 
zullen leiden (stap 4). En dus tot verbeterde besluiten en verbeterde resultaten. Zoals 
gezegd, andere management condities dan structuur zijn de mensen, hun motivatie en 
drijfveren, het financieel beheer en de voorziening van informatie en kennis. De laatste 
stap is de identificatie van de besturing van de besluitvormingsprocessen, ofwel de regie, 
die nodig zijn om de geidentificeerde verbeteringen in management condities en besluit-
vormingsprocessen te bewerkstelligen (stap 5). 
De besturingsbenadering verbindt dus de prestaties en resultaten van de organisaties 
met het fysieke proces, de besluitvormingsprocessen daarover, management condities, 
alsook de regiserende besluitvormingsprocessen. Hierdoor wordt een integrale kijk op de 
onderbenutting in een organisatie mogelijk. 
Prestatie-georiënteerde management analyse 
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DATA \ ERZ AMELING 
De data verzameling voor deze Studie vond plaats door middel van twee diepgaande case 
studies van twee Sri Lankaanse irrigatie organisaties, alsook door vergelijkende case 
studies in Marokko, Sudan en de Filipijnen. Minder intensieve waarnemingen vonden 
plaats in India, Maleisie en Pakistan. De data verzameling ten aanzien van de besluitvor-
mingsprocessen bestond uit interviews met managers en uitvoerende staf in irrigatie en 
andere diensten, ministeries, financieringsorganisaties, en consultants. Ook rapporten, 
archieven, databestanden en andere documentatie zijn bestudeerd. Een literatuurstudie 
diende ter vorming van en vergelijking met de bevindingen. Hieronder volgen de 
voornaamste bevindingen en aanbevelingen voor de benutting en schepping van capaciteit 
in ontwikkelingslanden. 
RESULTATEN: HET BENUTTEN VAN CAPACITEIT 
De bepaLing van het beschikbare water aanbod in de geobserveerde irrigatie Systemen 
gebeurde meestal meer op een benaderende dan op een precieze wijze. De bepalingen 
waren meestal aan de "veilige" kant~bij voorkeur MET een 100 procent waarschijnlijk-
heid, d.w.z. mil risico~om de risico's van droogte en dus de gerelateerde conflicten 
tussen boeren en politici te minimaliseren. Hierdoor werd een afweging tussen lagere 
risico's voor een kleinere groep en hogere risico's voor een grotere groep boeren 
uitgesloten. Andere belanghebbende partijen dan de irrigatiedienst waren gewoonlijk niet 
op de hoogte van het beschikbare water aanbod. Dus deelden ze ook niet in de verant-
woordelijkheid van de gerelateerde risico's. 
In tegenstelling tot de algemene opvatting bleek de bepaling van zowel de vraag 
naar water, als de water allocatie en de regulatie, in alle case studies vraag-gestuurd te 
zijn. Deze besluitvormingsprocessen werden vrijwel geheel aan de uitvoerende staf 
overgelaten. Staf op hogere hierarchische niveaus maakten water schema's op basis van 
theoretische berekeningen die geen rekening hielden met relevante invloeden, zoals de 
vereiste inspanningen door staf en boeren om hoge water efficiëntst te bereiken. De 
schema's hadden daarom zelden enige praktische waarde voor de implementatie van de 
water allocatie en regulatie. 
Staf op hogere hierarchische niveaus probeerden daarbij hun eigen inspanningen in 
deze besluitvormingsprocessen te minimaliseren. Alleen bij klachten van boeren en 
politici raakten ze betrokken bij de besluitvorming. Om klachten te voorkomen stonden 
ze toe dat staf van lagere hierarchische niveaus in de vraag naar water voorzagen door 
een overvloedig debiet in alle kanalen (voorzover voorradig). De hoofdkanalen bleken 
dus vaak het maximale debiet te vervoeren. Er was geen systematische contrôle op deze 
besluitvorming in de case studies, aangezien de vraag-gestuurde besluitvormingsprocessen 
dit niet behoefden. 
De minimale betrokkenheid van de staf van de irrigatiediensten bevoordeelde de 
boeren aan de bovenstroomse gedeelten van de kanalen. De boeren aan de 
benedenstroomse gedeelten hadden vaak problemen om voldoende water te bemächtigen, 
aangezien de ontwerp debieten van de kanalen meestal te klein waren voor de 
geobserveerde ruime water allocatie. 
De regulatie van de water strömen door de hoofdkanalen bleek een "adhocratie". 
De uitvoerende staf bleek geen "als...dan..." instructies te krijgen voor bedieningsmetho-
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den en werkwijzen in termen van een bepaalde tijd, duur en grootte van stroomfluctuaties. 
Dus werkten ze volgens de méthode van vallen en opstaan. Het irrigatie areaal onder hun 
directe verantwoordelijkheid werd daarbij meestal bevoordeeld t.o.v. benedenstroomse 
arealen teneinde de Machten te minimaliseren. Ook de uitvoerende staf verantwoordelijk 
voor de benedenstroomse arealen konden deze bevoordeling niet systematisch corrigeren. 
Voor hen was het aanvragen van een vergroting van het totale debiet in het hoofdkanaal 
de makkelijkste uitweg. 
Een verhoging van het debiet naar het eind van het kanaal bleek alleen mogelijk 
door ofwel een verhoging van het algehele debiet, ofwel, indien mogelijk, door een 
rotatie van water of een spreiding van de begindatum van de cultivate (wanneer de vraag 
naar water het grootst is). Invoering van de laatste twee maatregelen vereisten echter een 
verhoogde inspanning door hogere hierarchische niveaus en gebeurde alleen indien er 
Machten kwamen van een invloedrijke partij zoals (een deel van) de boeren, superieuren 
en politici. 
De bovenstaande processen werden vooraamelijk veroorzaakt door een läge 
motivatie van de bij de benutting van capaciteit betrokken staf. De läge motivatie werd 
veroorzaakt door de volgende "negatieve" factoren: boeren waren nooit tevreden; geen 
financiële, carrière of andersoortige prikkelingen om te presteren in de levering van 
water; het voortdurende risico van politieke inmenging; en professionele en financiële 
prikkelingen in het belang van de constructie en het onderhoud in plaats van de benutting 
van de capaciteit. Ook de irrigatiediensten in hun geheel hadden geen prestatie-geori-
enteerde prikkelingen, anders dan de genoemde negatieve. 
Sommige van bovenstaande praktijken, motivatie en prikkelingen golden meer voor 
het ene land dan voor het andere. In Marokko waren de management praktijken van een 
hoger niveau in vergelijMng met de andere case studies en sommige van de voornoemde 
generalisaties gingen niet op voor Marokko. De aan prestatie gerelateerde motivatie en 
prikkelingen bleken hoger door een meer hoogstaand management, dat verbruikt water 
per individuele boer in rekening brengt, en dat water volumetrisch levert aan boeren. 
Echter, ook in Marokko bleken de irrigatiediensten geen stimulansen te hebben om de 
water allocatie en regulatie in het hoofdkanaal te besturen teneinde overduidelijke en voor 
hen bekende water verspilling te voorkomen. 
Voornaamste aanbevelingen. De verbetering van de capaciteitsbenutting zou in alle case 
studies een verhoging vereisen van de inspanningen van de staf op hogere hierarchische 
niveaus. Dit vereist dat zij, evenals de uitvoerende staf, meer gemotiveerd worden voor 
dit soort werk. Dit lijkt onwaarschijnlijk zolang de irrigatiediensten als geheel niet meer 
geïnteresseerd in en aanspreekbaar voor hun prestaties in de levering van water zouden 
worden. 
De over het geheel genomen aanbevolen richtingen van organisatie verandering 
waren, vanuit het oogpunt van een betere capaciteitsbenutting, de volgende: 
1. Een decentralisatie van de irrigatiediensten. Dit zou grotere informatie 
uitwisselingen op lagere hierarchische niveaus tussen boeren en dienst, en 
tussen verschillende hierarchische niveaus mogelijk maken; 
2. Een financiële afhankelijkheid van de irrigatiedienst van de prestaties in de 
levering van water. Dit zou een aanspreekbaarheid voor deze prestaties 
introduceren. Bijvoorbeeld door een duidelijke relatie met de betalingen voor 
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geleverde diensten door boeren. Meer fïnanciële onafhankelijkheid van de 
irrigatiediensten betekent ook een verminderde afhankelijkheid van de 
willekeurige budgettaire toewijzingen door de overheid; 
3. Een meer prestatie-georiënteerd personeelsbeheer, zoals prestatie-gebaseerde 
beloningssystemen en carrière ontwikkeling, speciaal voor hogere hierarchi-
sche niveaus. Dit zou een decentralisatie van de gerelateerde bevoegdheid 
van de centrale overheid naar de irrigatiediensten vereisen; 
4. Een meer expliciete en specifieke definiëring van de missie van de irrigatie-
dienst; 
5. Externe openbare contrôle voor een betere verantwoording (als geen 
fïnanciële of andere verantwoording naar de klant bestaat); 
6. Meer doorzichtigheid en dus aanspreekbaarheid voor de prestaties in de water 
regulatie door een afzonderlijke, centrale "regulatie eenheid"; 
7. Als gekozen is voor een rol van water gebruikers' groepen in de besluitvor-
ming dan zal waarschijnlijk een machtigere positie voor hen in de water-
gerelateerde besluitvormingsprocessen nodig zijn dan werd waargenomen in 
alle case studies. Dit zou bereikt kunnen worden door meer bestuurlijke 
macht, ofwel door fïnanciële verantwoording aan de water gebruikers en/of 
hun groepen. Een verdergaande stap als de eigendomsoverdracht van (een 
gedeelte van) het systeem (en mogelijk de dienst) zou de collectiviteit van 
boeren nog sterker maken om de dienst aan te spreken op zijn prestaties in de 
capaciteitsbenutting ; 
8. Betere overheidsregelingen en gerelateerde uitvoering zijn nodig om de 
geobserveerde afwijkende motieven in sommige meer zelfstandige irrigatie-
diensten in te perken; 
Gezien de betrokken belangen van de diensten, hun staf en de boeren, lijken de 
bovenstaande veranderingen alleen haalbaar indien ze serieus gesteund worden door de 
nationale politici en de belangrijkste financieringsorganisaties. 
RESULTATEN: HET SCHEPPEN VAN CAPACITE1T 
De gewenste investeringsdoelstellingen. De besluitname over gewenste 
mvesteringsdœlstellingen bleek vaak alleen door politici te gebeuren. De voorbereiding 
van zulke besluiten gebeurde gewoonlijk door de staf van de financieringsorganisaties met 
steun van consultants en staf van de irrigatiedienst. Deze voorbereiding liet gewoonlijk 
weinig tijd en beslissingsruimte over voor interactie met andere belangengroepen. 
Politici bepaalden dus vaak politiek relevante doelstellingen als de project situering 
en de selectie van begunstigden. In sommige gevallen bleek de politieke druk de 
professionele begeleiding van zulke besluiten ineffectief te maken. 
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Het verkrijgen van externe financiering Week de belangrijkste wenselijkheid in deze 
besluitvorming voor zowel poMci als de irrigatie dienst. Het overheerst de andere 
gewenste investeringsdoelstellingen, anders dan de politiek relevante. Ten gevolge van 
deze politieke prioriteit voor externe financiering bleek de financieringsorganisatie, in 
principe, en in de praktijk, een grote invloed te hebben op de bepaling van de 
wenselijkheid van de investeringsdoelstellingen. Dus, de wenselijkheid van zulke 
investeringsdoelstellingen als de project grootte en de prestaties van de levering van water 
en agrarische produktie was in alle case studies voornamelijk een discretie van de staf van 
de financieringsorganisatie of consultant. 
Hierdoor werd het waarschijnlijk, en werd ook waargenomen, dat de belangen van 
de boeren en andere lokale instanties onvoldoende vertegenwoordigd waren in de 
besluitvorming over de gewenste investeringsdoelstelLingen. Vaak werd de wenselijkheid 
vanuit het oogpunt van de boer gelijk verondersteld met de maximale financiering, 
aangezien de investeringen vaak werden gezien als politieke giften aan lokale kiezers. 
Gecombineerd met de waargenomen aanbod-gestuurde beschikbaarheid van 
financiele middelen voor irrigatie investeringen, belemmerden deze door de politiek 
gedomineerde besluitvormingsprocessen en de gerelateerde attitudes, een mogelijke keuze 
voor minder kapitaalintensieve, meer effectieve investeringen in bijvoorbeeld water beheer 
en conservering. Dit gold voor alle case studies. 
Echter, het belangrijkste hiaat dat werd waargenomen in deze besluitvorming leek 
de afwezigheid van een expliciete definitie van de gewenste prestatie niveaus voor de 
nieuwe investeringen. De wijdverspreide en langdurige ervaringen met onderbenutting 
van irrigatiecapaciteit maakte deze afwezigheid des te opmerkelijker. Zelfs als de 
financieringsorganisaties, overheden of consultants zich bewust waren van de 
onwaarschijnlijkheid van het behalen van de aannames ten aanzien van de prestatie 
niveaus voor specifieke systemen of projecten, dan nog werden zulke overwegingen niet 
meegenomen in de investeringsselectie en ontwerp. Aannames ten aanzien van de 
beoogde prestaties werden in alle case studies impliciet gehouden. 
De waarschijnlijke betrokkenheid van de betreffende partijen als de nationale 
politici, overheden en irrigatiediensten tot de impliciet gedefinieerde prestatie doelen was 
vrijwel nihil (behalve voor de weinigen die daartoe intern gemotiveerd waren). Zeker 
gezien de afwezigheid van enige prikkeling om die doelen te halen, en de aanwezigheid 
van prikkeling om zoveel mogelijk externe financiering te verwerven en te besteden (in 
een omgeving gedomineerd door een schijnbaar overvloedige beschikbaarheid van finan-
ciele middelen voor irrigatie investeringen). In alle case studies bleek de motivatie en 
betrokkenheid voor prestatie verbeteringen vrijwel afwezig bij de genoemde partijen. De 
wijdverbreide onderbenutting van irrigatiecapaciteit in het verleden scheen niet tot betere 
voorwaarden jegens de kwaliteit van daaropvolgende investeringsbesluiten geleid te 
hebben. De onderliggende reden lijkt het conflict tussen de kwaliteit van de investe-
ringsbesluiten en de geld-overhevelende functie van de financieringsorganisaties, dat wil 
zeggen met hun bestedingsdrang. 
De haalbare investeringsdoelstellingen. De overvloedige beschikbaarheid van 
financiele middelen voor irrigatie investeringen leek vooral veroorzaakt door het karakter 
van de haalbaarheids- en beoordelingsstudies. In alle case studies bleken deze studies te 
gebeuren nadat het politieke besluit al genomen was om het project te ondernemen. De 
verschillende stappen en methodologien bleken slechts te dienen ter rechtvaardiging van 
het besluit. De haalbaarheid van alternatieve typen projecten, project situeringen, of een 
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meer gefaseerde ontwikkeling om dezelfde resultaten te behalen, was in alle case studies 
niet bestudeerd. 
De besluitvoorbereiding van de haalbaarheid bleek voornamelijk de taak van de staf 
van de financieringsorganisaties en consultants. Soms omdat zij werden verondersteld 
meer onafhankelijk te zijn dan staf van het betreffende land of irrigatiedienst, in andere 
gevallen omdat ze vertragingen in de uitbetalingen van de leningen zouden kunnen 
voorkomen. Echter, het bleek erg moeilijk tot onmogelijk voor die externe partijen om 
de waarschijnlijke haalbaarheid te bepalen, vooral met betrekking tot de veronderstelde 
prestatie verbeteringen. De staf van de betreffende irrigatiedienst en overheid vertegen-
woordigden over het algemeen het gevestigde belang om de financiering te realiseren. 
Het was daarom onwaarschijnlijk dat ze informatie zouden verschaffen dat die belangen 
zou kunnen schaden. In de weinige waargenomen gevallen waar ze daartoe bereid waren, 
bleek het ze meestal ook niet gevraagd te worden. Ook de staf van de financierings-
organisaties en de consultants, gestimuleerd door de doelen van hun eigen organisaties, 
bleken niet geihteresseerd in een volledig objectieve besluitvorming. 
De aannames met betrekking tot de prestatie verbeteringen en andere optimistische 
aannames werden dus niet verdedigd en werden impliciet gehouden. De kosten-baten en 
gevoeligheids analyses werden in geen van de case studies toegepast om onhaalbaarheid te 
bepalen. Ze leken daarom hun oorspronkelijke functie van een objectieve bepaling van de 
haalbaarheid van een investering verloren te hebben. In plaats daarvan werden ze 
gebruikt om irrigatie investeringen te subsidiären. 
De geobserveerde financieringsorganisaties bleken opmerkelijk weinig ondernomen 
te hebben om de neiging tot een te groot optimisme over de haalbaarheid in te perken. In 
plaats van expliciete bewijzen te eisen voor de veronderstelde prestatie verbeteringen werd 
in de geobserveerde ontwikkelingsbanken alleen een tegenwicht geboden in de vorm van 
de milde "peer reviews". Deze vergaderingen werden gewoonlijk voorgezeten door 
personen die primair verantwoordelijk waren voor de hoeveelheid leningen, in plaats van 
voor de kwaliteit van de investeringsbesluiten. 
In alle case studies werden de prestatie doelen van de investeringen impliciet 
vastgelegd tijdens de haalbaarheidsstudies en beoordelingen, en daarmee vooral gestuufd 
door de staf en prioriteiten van de financieringsorganisaties. Betrokkenheid tot en 
bewustzijn over, die doelen van de kant van de nationale overheid en irrigatiediensten was 
laag tot afwezig. 
Rechtvaardigingen waarom een bepaalde investering niet weer zou mislukken waren 
meestal conceptueel en niet gerelateerd aan de realiteit. De verschillende conceptuele 
benaderingen zijn de afgelopen jaren ontwikkeld om het management hiaat op te vullen 
(zoals de parallelle veldkanalen, het on-farm water beheer, de operationele en onder-
houdshandboeken, water beheer consultants, boeren participatie, en controle en evaluatie). 
Echter deze verplichtten de irrigatiedienst en overheid niets ten aanzien van kwesties als 
hun prestaties en aanspreekbaarheid daarover. In feite vergroten de genoemde oplossin-
gen de invloed van de financieringsorganisaties in de feitelijke investeringsplanning en 
ontwerp. Ook hierdoor voelden de irrigatiediensten zieh in toenemende mate niet meer 
verantwoordelijk voor de kwaliteit daarvan, noch voor hun succes in de capaci-
teitsbenutting. Opeenvolgende conceptuele oplossingen, vastgesteld in een door de 
financieringsorganisaties gedomineerde besluitvorming, leken te hebben geleid tot een 
steeds verder afbrokkelende betrokkenheid van de staf van de irrigatiediensten met de 
werkelijke haalbaarheid van die conceptuele oplossingen. 
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Een logisch en gerelateerd effect van de waargenomen manipulatie van de aannames 
met betrekking tot de economische interne rentevoet was de vanuit het nationaal oogpunt 
afhemende contrôle over de kapitaaluitgaven. In geen van de case studies bestanden 
maxima voor de investering per water gebruiker, per eenheid toename in agrarische 
produktie, per volume eenheid opgeslagen of gereguleerd water, per gecreëerde arbeids-
plaats, of per geïrrigeerd oppervlak. Dus werden die maxima alleen gebaseerd op 
politieke overwegingen. Dit leidde tot een maximaliserende houding van irrigatiediensten 
en politici bij het verwerven van financiering-en tot aanzienlijke economische verliezen 
voor het land als geheel voor zowel de huidige als in toekomstige generaties. 
De functionele eisen t.a.v. investering. Net zoals voor de haalbaarheids- en 
beoordelingsstudies werd ook voor de besluitvorming over de functionele eisen van het 
ontwerp in alle case studies waargenomen dat dit alleen op een conceptueel niveau plaats-
vond. Ingenieurs van financieringsorganisaties, consultants en irrigatie diensten tezamen 
bepaalden deze ontwerp concepten en herzagen ze regelmatig. Echter, in geen van de 
case studies werd interactie met de aanwezige systeem managers of boeren waargenomen 
teneinde een expliciet "programma van eisen" voor de investering te bepalen. 
De resulterende rigide toepassing van verschillende blauwdrukken voor het ontwerp, 
zonder voldoende informatie over de lokale situatie, bleek wijdverspreid. Het leidde tot 
ontwerpfouten zoals vrijwel willekeurige groottes van de tertiaire vakken, vaak willekeuri-
ge plaatsing van kunstwerken, ontwerp voor ongeschikte bodems en gewaspatronen, en 
het suboptJmaal gebruik van reeds bestaande reservoirs en drainage patronen. Ook tijdens 
het ontwerp bleek misbruik van de theoretische formules voor de waterbehoefte van het 
gewas meer gebruik dan uitzondering. Opeenvolgende bepalingen konden inconsistent 
zijn zonder enige rechtvaardiging. De ontwerpen werden aldus aangepast aan de 
voorgaande optimistische aannames voor de haalbaarheids- en beoordelingsstudies. Ook 
politieke inmenging kwam nogal eens voor in de besluitvormingsprocessen over het 
ontwerp. 
Alhoewel er in de literatuur een behoorlijke oppositie kon worden gevonden tegen 
het gebruik van blauwdrukken voor het ontwerp, pasten aile bestudeerde financieringsor-
ganisaties ze toe. Van hun kant leek het voordeel van conceptuele ontwerpen dat ze 
kwesties als de prestaties in de dienstverlening en in de besturing van besluitvormingspro-
cessen konden omzeilen, terwijl ze toch een "oplossing" hadden. 
Tot op zekere hoogte was men zieh in alle case studies bewust van het niet 
funetioneren van de ontwerpen. Echter, in het algemeen ging de voorkeur uit naar het 
verkrijgen en besteden van investeringsfondsen op de körte termijn, ook al ging dat ten 
koste van de prestaties op de midden en lange termijn. De construetie en politieke 
prioriteiten in de irrigatiediensten overheersten over het algemeen de prestatie-gerelateer-
de argumenten, en belemmerden mogelijke veranderingen naar een meer realistisch 
professionalisme. Een behoorlijke politieke verantwoordelijkheid leek nodig om zulke 
Processen te keren. Door de tijd genomen leek het irrigatie ontwerp te zijn geëvolueerd 
tot een nogal routineus, weinig creatief procès. 
Het bewustzijn hoe de huidige ontwerp concepten zieh over de tijd hebben 
ontwikkeld bleek daarbij te vervagen bij de jongere generaties irrigatie ingénieurs. 
Wetenschappelijke ontwerp concepten bleken meestal geinternaliseerd en de functionali-
teitsvraag werd meestal niet eens gesteld. 
De invloed van de staf van financieringsorganisaties en consultants op de formule-
ring van deze concepten bleek aanzienlijk. Alhoewel de supervisie door staf van de 
financieringsorganisaties beperkt was~zij bezochten een project meestal slechts een maal 
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per jaar—bleken zij toch meer verantwoordelijk voor de rechtvaardiging en succes van de 
investering, en dus voor het ontwerp concept, dan de staf van de lokale irrigatiedienst of 
overheid. Om ofwel nieuwe leningen te rechtvaardigen, ofwel om bestaande te continue-
ren, moesten de staf van donors en consultants met oplossingen komen voor het misluk-
ken van eerdere investeringen. Het conceptuele karakter van deze oplossingen Week vaak 
het gevolg van hun onbekendheid met de werkelijke lokale situatie betreffende de institu-
ties, boeren en fysieke condities. Van hun kant waren de waargenomen lokale partijen 
geneigd om in te stemmen met vrijwel elke voorgestelde oplossing, zolang als zij zelf niet 
verantwoordelijk of aanspreekbaar voor de prestaties werden. De werkelijke functionali-
teit van het ontwerp Week vaak een ondergeschikte kwestie voor overheid, diensten, 
consultants en fmancieringsorganisaties. 
De zichtbaarheid van kapitaalintensieve irrigatie investeringen blijft waarschijnlijk 
politiek aantrekkelijk. Deze politieke druk was waarschijnlijk een belangrijke reden voor 
de pogingen van de geobserveerde financieringsorganisaties om de blauwdrukken voor het 
ontwerp voortdurend te veranderen en minder dogmatisch te maken. Hierdoor werden 
steeds nieuwe oplossingen verzonnen als rechtvaardiging voor nieuwe investeringen. De 
tragedie van zulke donor-gestuurde conceptuele oplossingen was echter dat, hoe gepast die 
ontwerp concepten ook konden zijn, ze bleken te leiden tot een steeds verdergaande 
medeverantwoordelijk van de financieringsorganisaties voor de prestaties van de ontwerp 
concepten, aangezien ze steeds meer hun intellectuele eigendom werden. Vooral ook 
gezien de al genoemde afwezigheid van aanspreekbaarheid van de irrigatiediensten voor 
de functionaliteit van hun ontwerpen, en hun prestaties in de levering van water. 
Vanouds werden irrigatie arealen proefondervindelijk ontwikkeld dat wil zeggen 
met vallen en opstaan. Ondanks het meer recente conceptuele karakter van irrigatie 
ontwerpen lijkt de werkelijke areaal ontwikkeling nog steeds op die manier te gebeuren. 
De vroege pioniers experimenteerden op kleine schaal alvorens hun ontwerpen op grotere 
schaal toe te passen. Tegenwoordig echter lijkt de overvloedige beschikbaarheid van 
financiele middelen voor irrigatie investeringen toe te staan dat op grote schaal 
geexperimenteerd wordt, en dus dat op grote schaal fouten gemaakt worden. 
Van die grootschalige fouten lijkt niet echt te (kunnen) worden geleerd, aangezien 
de aannames over de functionaliteit van een ontwerp altijd impliciet bleven. Idealiter zou 
het ontwerp moeten starten met een bepaling van een betaalbaar en haalbaar "programma 
van eisen" en niveau van dienstverlening dat met de investering gehaald kan worden. 
Zulke besluitvorming was afwezig in alle case studies. 
Voomaamste aanbevelingen. Een verbetering van het scheppen van capaciteit zou in alle 
case studies een verhoogd niveau van management inbreng door hogere hierarchische 
niveaus vereisen. Dit zou ook vereisen dat zij, evenals de veld staf, beter gemotiveerd 
worden voor de kwaliteit van die besluiten. Dit leek onwaarschijnlijk zolang de irrigatie-
diensten zelf niet meer geinteresseerd in en aanspreekbaar werden voor de kwaliteit van 
hun investeringsbesluiten en de uiteindelijke prestaties gedurende de benutting van de 
capaciteit. De over het geheel genomen aanbevelingen met betrekking tot veranderingen 
in de irrigatie organisaties waren, vanuit het oogpunt van een betere schepping van 
capaciteit, de volgende: 
1. Een directe relatie tussen de financiele inkomsten van de irrigatiedienst en de 
kwaliteit van de capaciteitsscheppende besluiten, en de uiteindelijke prestaties 
gedurende de benutting van de capaciteit. Bijvoorbeeld doordat de irrigatie-
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dienst en de bœren deelnemen in de investeringskosten. Ofwel door een 
krappere financiering door een vermindering van de (in de kosten-baten 
analyse) verborgen en andere onvoorwaardelijke subsidies. Het laatste kan 
bereikt worden door, bijvoorbeeld, een verniindering van de misbruik van de 
kosten-baten analyse door betere contrôles op aile prestatie-gerelateerde 
aannames waarop de haalbaarheids- en beoordelingsstudies zieh baseren. Ook 
een expliciete verplichting jegens de veronderstellingen ten aanzien van de 
prestatie verbetering kan worden geïntroduceerd door, bijvoorbeeld, het 
consistent gebruik van een "prestatie verantwoordingsbalans" door alle 
belangrijke fînancieringsorganisaties; 
2. Een decentralisatie van de besluitvorming naar het niveau van de irrigatie 
dienst of het project. Dit zou het mogelijk maken de capaciteit te vergroten 
om de besluitvorming te voorzien van informatie over relevante ervaringen, 
voorkeuren en eisen, zowel in kwalitatieve als kwantitatieve zin. Momenteel 
bleek veel van die besluitvorming op het zeer centrale niveau van de staf en 
consultants van de fînancieringsorganisaties plaats te vinden. (Door een 
dergelijke decentralisatie kan ook het belang van vooraf, op hoog niveau 
bepaalde, conceptuele benaderingen afhemen.); 
3. Een meer prestatie-georiënteerd personeelsbeheer, bijvoorbeeld door belo-
ningssystemen en carrière ontwikkeling gebaseerd op verrichte prestaties, 
speciaal voor hogere hierarchische niveaus. Dit zou een decentralisatie van 
de gerelateerde bevoegdheden van de centrale overheid naar de irrigatiedienst 
vereisen; 
4. Een meer onafhankelijke status voor de irrigatie diensten, ook financieel, lijkt 
de beste manier om een verbeterde kosten-effectiviteit en -efficiëntie van 
irrigatie investeringen te garanderen. 
RESULTATEN: PMORrTEITEN VOOR PRESTATIE VERBETERINGEN 
Maak prestaties een intern probleem voor de irrigatiediensten. Verbeterde prestaties ten 
aanzien van de dienstverlening van een irrigatiedienst kunnen alleen worden bereikt door 
degenen die besluiten nemen, dat wil zeggen door de staf van de irrigatie dienst. Kortdu-
rende inbrengen van externe actoren kunnen zulke prestaties niet garanderen. Prestatie 
Verbeteringen in alle geobserveerde irrigatiediensten vereisten dat de dienst het een zorg 
van zijn staf maakt om die prestaties te verbeteren. De boven genoemde aanbevelingen 
zijn voorbeelden van dergelijke maatregelen. 
Maak prestaties een lokaal i.p.v. een extern probleem. Het leek onwaarschijnlijk 
dat deze maatregelen geinitieerd zouden worden door de geobserveerde irrigatiediensten 
zolang prestatie verbeteringen niet een probleem voor de dienst zelf waren. Daarom 
zouden ofwel de nationale overheid, politici of financieringsorganisaties het een probleem 
voor de irrigatiediensten moeten maken. 
Mogelijke maatregelen hiertoe zijn, bijvoorbeeld, het relateren van de financiele 
inkomsten van de dienst aan de geleverde prestaties; het gebruik van subsidies die niet de 
neiging van diensten versterken om alleen voor de kwantiteit van de investeringen te gaan 
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(bijvoorbeeld door deelneming in de kosten, vaste uitkeringen, of door proportionele 
subsidies); de vermindering van verborgen en andere onvoorwaardelijke subsidies; een 
hogere kwaliteit van besluiten ten aanzien van de investeringsbeoordeling; meer objectivi-
teit jegens de hoeveelheid investeringen van de staf van de financieringsorganisaties; de 
zelfstandige ontwikkeling van investeringsvoorstellen door de irrigatiedienst; en een 
externe "audit van de levering van water" als geen financiele of andere aanspreekbaarheid 
bestaat. Kwesties van aanspreekbaarheid en prestaties zouden een serieus agenda punt 
moeten worden in de zogenaamde "beleidsdialogen". 
Loot de financieringsorganisaties voorzichtige bankiers worden, die financiele 
risico's lopen voor de prestaties van hun investeringsbeslissingen. Zoals gezegd vereisten 
prestatie verbeteringen van een irrigatiedienst dat de nationale overheid, politici of 
financieringsorganisaties deze verbeteringen een verantwoordelijkheid van de dienst 
zouden maken. Echter, de bestudeerde financieringsorganisaties bleken voornamelijk aan-
spreekbaar voor de kwantiteit van de investeringen, en niet voor de kwaliteit van hun 
investeringsbeoordelingen. 
Mogelijke raaatregelen om de kwaliteit van de investeringsbeoordelingen een 
verantwoordelijkheid van de financieringsorganisaties en hun staf te maken zijn, bijvoor-
beeld, meer financiele doorzichtigheid en risico deling door donoren. Dit kan bereikt 
worden door bijvoorbeeld directe kredietlijnen naar de irrigatiediensten in plaats van naar 
centrale overheden. Irrigatiediensten bleken zelf nooit aangesproken te worden voor 
(gedeeltelijke) terugbetaling van de leningen voor irrigatie investeringen. Ook kunnen de 
financieringsorganisaties ten opzichte van hun Board of Governors aanspreekbaar gemaakt 
worden voor de kwaliteit van hun investeringsbeoordelingen door het vergelijken van de 
oorspronkelijk beoordeelde en uiteindelijke behaalde prestaties van de investeringen (in 
plaats van voor de zogenaamde professionaliteit van de staf en de kwantiteit van de 
investeringen). Ook zouden de financieringsorganisaties als geheel aanspreekbaar 
gemaakt kunnen worden voor hun succes in het faciliteren van prestatie verbeteringen. 
Concluderend, om irrigatiediensten en overheden meer prestatie-georienteerd te maken 
zouden de financieringsorganisaties zich moeten beperken tot bankieren, en de kwaliteit 
van investeringsbeoordelingen moeten laten prevaleren boven de bestedingsdrang. 
Bestuur en organiseer teneinde bevredigende prestaties in de levering van water te 
behalen. Indien de voornoemde aansprakelijkheid geintroduceerd zou kunnen worden, 
dan nog kan het moeilijk zijn om hogere niveau's van perfectie te behalen in de 
besluitvormingsprocessen. De aanbevelingen van deze studie bevatten om die reden 
verscheidene specifieke regiserende besluiten die beogen om op prestatie gerichte eisen te 
ontwikkelen, introduceren en beheersen in de besluitvorming over het scheppen en 
benutten van capaciteit. 
EVALTJATTE 
De toepassing van de besturingsbenadering had de volgende voordelen. Elke expliciete 
benadering vergemakkelijkt een gerichte data verzameling en analyse. Verdere bijdragen 
van de gebruikte besturingsbenadering waren: het bevorderen van een consistente analyse 
van de processen; de dwang om zo objectief mogelijk de functionaliteit van de verschil-
lende disciplinaire benaderingen in de besluitvormingsprocessen te analyseren; de dwang 
om het complete scala van belangrijke besluiten ten aanzien van het primaire procès, de 
levering van water, in beschouwing te nemen; het daardoor inzien van het belang van 
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andere Processen dan de in de irrigatie gebruikelijke relatie tussen ontwerp en capaciteits-
benutting; en de integrale kijk op prestaties, besluitvormingsprocessen, management 
condities en de regie. 
Nadelen van het werken met de besturingsbenadering waren dat het in het begin 
moeilijk was om consistent Processen en condities te scheiden, en dat door de systemati-
sche toepassing op alle belangrijke besluitvormingsprocessen en management condities 
herhaling in analyse en presentatie onvermijdelijk was. Die nadelen lijken geen grote 
belemmering te zijn voor toepassing van de benadering door anderen. Die anderen 
kunnen onderzoekers of management specialisten zijn. Maar ook een irrigatie manager 
zou de onderlinge verbanden van de besturingsbenadering (zoals eerder weergegeven in 
de figuur) kunnen gebruiken voor een andere kijk op het eigen werk. 
Vooruitzichten voor praktische toepassingen van de bestuursbenadering in de 
irrigatie zijn allereerst als checklist van relevante aandachtsgebieden van irrigatie op de 
hiernavolgende manieren: een systematische bewustmaking van de management aspecten 
van irrigatie; een systematische ontwikkeling van onderzoeksvragen of van handboeken 
ten aanzien van de capaciteitsbenutting; en een professionalisering van ex-post evaluaties 
en effectiviteitsstudies van irrigatie investeringen. Ook het concept van de 
bestuurstechnische niveaus van perfectie zou gebruikt kunnen worden als een prestatie 
indicator voor de besturing van irrigatie Systemen en biedt daartoe de volgende mogelijk-
heden: om systematisch mogelijkheden voor verbetering te identificeren, om kwantitatief 
verbeteringen in de besturing voor en na innovaties te bepalen, en om door vergelijkend 
onderzoek normen te ontwikkelen voor de prestaties in het irrigatie beheer voor verschil-
lende socio-economische en fysieke situaties. 
Aanbevelingen ten aanzien van prioriteiten voor toekomstig onderzoek naar de 
onderbenutting in de irrigatie subsector die voortkomen uit deze Studie relateren vrijwel 
allemaal aan de volgende maatregelen om de aanspreekbaarheid over de prestaties in de 
levering van water te vergroten: 
1. onderzoek naar specifieke methoden en technieken van besturing van de 
besluitvormingsprocessen die naar alle waarschijnlijkheid de aan-
spreekbaarheid voor prestaties inbrengen in de financiering van irrigatie; 
2. onderzoeken van het waarschijnlijke potentieel voor prestatie verbeteringen in 
verschülende landen en regio's (Zulke schattingen zouden dan gebruikt 
kunnen worden als realistische investeringsnormen per eenheid oppervlak. 
Dergelijke normen zouden verborgen subsidies in toekomstige investeringen 
kunnen voorkomen, maar zouden ook kunnen bijdragen aan een meer realisti-
sche economische en financiele waarde van de besturings prestaties); 
3. onderzoek naar de kosten-effectiviteit en -efficientie van het (gedeeltelijk) in 
kosten brengen geleverd water in Systemen met veel kleine boeren; en 
4. onderzoek naar aangepaste kunstwerken voor volumetrische metingen van de 
levering van water in Systemen met veel kleine boeren. 
Echter, er is al veel onderzoek naar irrigatie beheer gedaan. Prestatie verbeteringen in de 
irrigatie subsector lijken daarom meer af te hangen van de toepassing van de beschikbare 
kennis voor veranderingen van het huidige irrigatie beheer dan van meer onderzoek. 
Curriculum Vitae 
Charles Nijman, bora in 1960 in Rijswijk (The Netherlands), studied from 1978 to 1985 
at the Wageningen Agricultural University in The Netherlands. He graduated as an 
agricultural engineer in tropical land and water use with majors in management science 
and irrigation. 
Since 1985 he worked as a staff member for the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(1985-1986), and as a researcher for the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of 
the United Nations in Burkina Faso, West Africa (1986-1987). 
In 1987 he joined the International Irrigation Management Institute (HMD on 
secondment from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs to work on management issues in 
the irrigated subsector. Initially, he conducted in-depth organizational analyses of two Sri 
Lankan irrigation agencies from 1988 till 1990. These were published as 1TMI Country 
Papers. From 1990 to 1992 he conducted and reported on comparative case studies in 
Sudan, Morocco and the Philippines, and less intensive studies in Malaysia and India. 
These studies form the basis for this thesis. During his assignment at IIMI he assisted 
also in training needs, management training and strategic planning exercises in Malaysia. 
In September 1992 he joined GITP International/Management Consultants B.V. in 
Nijmegen, The Netherlands. 
295 
